

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) Missing Item - [redacted]
302-1A20

Date: 05/06/2019

b3
b7E

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI13

Contact: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3
b7E

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) To document missing item [redacted]-302-1A20, which is described as "FD-597 Receipt for Property" acquired from Williams & Connolly LLP

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20441231~~

Reference: [redacted]-302 Serial 23

b3
b7E

Details:

(U//~~FOUO~~) For reference, Washington Field Office (WFO) CI-13 has been gathering and copying materials from captioned case in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) tasking from Information Management Division (IMD; formerly Records Management Division).

(U//~~FOUO~~) On or about February 4, 2019, Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] [redacted] attempted to locate [redacted]-302-1A20, described as described as "FD-597 Receipt for Property" acquired from Williams & Connolly LLP (see referenced serial). The SA's looked

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Title: (U//~~FOUO~~) Missing Item - [redacted]-302-1A20
Re: [redacted] 05/06/2019

b3
b7E

through all case materials in the CI-13 file and workbox area, however, they were not able to locate this item.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA [redacted] inquired with Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) [redacted] regarding the item, as he was previously the IA assigned to the case. He was also not able to locate this item.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) As such, WFO CI-13 considers the item missing and will enclose this document into 1A20 as a placeholder until the missing item is located.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 6

- Page 92 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per CIA;
- Page 93 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per CIA;
- Page 94 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per CIA;
- Page 95 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per CIA;
- Page 96 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per CIA;
- Page 97 ~ b1 - Per CIA; b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per CIA;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

1/12/06
Serial 130

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/7/2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 7, 2016, writer received a 15 page fax from [redacted] Special Agent in Charge at the U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General. The faxed documents consisted of time and attendance records for Bryan Pagliano.

b6 per
b7C DOS

(U//~~FOUO~~) The faxed documents are enclosed in an attached 1A.

Investigation on 1/7/2016 at Washington, DC

b3 per
b7E FBI

File # [redacted] -130 Date dictated N/A

By FoA [redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI


This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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HRC-858

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Evidence Entry

Event Title: (U) ~~(S)~~ DOS

Date: 02/01/2016

Approved By: [Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20261231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected By: Missing on Missing

Collected From: Department of State

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Item Type
1B Digital

Description
(U) 1 CD Marked [Redacted] PST"
Collected On: 01/28/2016
Seizing Individual: [Redacted]
Located By: [Redacted]
Location Area: NA
Specific Location: NA
Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video
Disc(CDs/DVDs)
Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U)
Title: (S) DOS

Re: [REDACTED] 02/01/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI


◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

HRC-861

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Evidence Entry

Event Title: (U) EMAILS

Date: 02/03/2016

Approved By: [Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted] (U)

~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected By: Missing on Missing

Collected From: [Redacted] SPECIAL ASST, DEPT OF STATE

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Item Type
1B Digital

Description
(U) 2 DVDS: OPENNER [Redacted] -EMAIL - 2011.PST
OPENNER [Redacted] -EMAIL - 2012.PST
Collected On: 02/03/2016
Seizing Individual: [Redacted]
Collected By: [Redacted]
Location Area: DEPT. OF STATE
Specific Location: DEPT. OF STATE
Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video Disc(CDs/DVDs)
Number of Devices Collected: 2

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) EMAILS

Re: 02/03/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI

◆◆


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

HRC-864

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Evidence Entry

Event Title: ^(U) ~~(S)~~ DVD provided by DoS

Date: 02/08/2016

Approved By:

b6 per
b7C FBI

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

^(U) ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per
b7E FBI

~~Reason: 1.4 (b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20261231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected By: Missing on Missing

Collected From:
Department of State

b6 per
b7C DOS

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Item Type	Description
1B Digital	^(U) (S) DVD provided by Dos containing emails flagged during the FOIA process. Collected On: 02/05/2016 Seizing Individual: <input type="text"/> Collected By: <input type="text"/> Location Area: NA Specific Location: NA Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video Disc (CDs/DVDs) Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 per
b7C FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) (S) DVD provided by DoS
Re: [redacted] 02/08/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI

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
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

HRC-867

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Evidence Entry

Event Title: (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE HQ

Date: 02/10/2016

Approved By:

b6 per
b7C FBI

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per
b7E FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple
Sources
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected By: Missing on Missing

Collected From: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Item Type
1B Digital

Description
(U) ONE (1) DVD LABELED FIELD BM FILES AND MARKED
SECRET.
Collected On: 02/10/2016
Seizing Individual:
Collected By:
Location Area: DEPARTMENT OF STATE HQ
Specific Location: ROOM 6316
Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video
Disc(CDs/DVDs)
Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 per
b7C FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE HQ

Re: 02/10/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI


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~~SECRET~~

HRC-870

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Evidence Entry

Event Title: (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Date: 02/10/2016

Approved By: [Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple
Sources
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected By: Missing on Missing

Collected From: (U) [Redacted]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Item Type
1B Digital

Description
(U) ONE (1) DVD LABELED [Redacted] E-MAIL 2012
Collected On: 02/10/2016
Seizing Individual: [Redacted]
Collected By: [Redacted]
Location Area: DEPARTMENT OF STATE HQ
Specific Location: ROOM 6316
Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video
Disc(CDs/DVDs)
Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Re: 02/10/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI

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~~SECRET~~

HRC-873

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Evidence Entry

Event Title: (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Date: 02/10/2016

Approved By:

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple
Sources
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected By: Missing on Missing

Collected From:

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Item Type
1B Digital

Description
(U) ONE (1) DVD LABELED E-MAIL 2012
Collected On: 02/10/2016
Seizing Individual:
Collected By:
Location Area: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Specific Location: ROOM 6316
Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video
Disc(CDs/DVDs)
Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Title: (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Re: 02/10/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

2/12/16
Serial 138

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

HRC-876

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

21 January 2016

b6
b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]

Acting Section Chief
Counterespionage Section
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: [Redacted]

Associate Deputy Director of Operations
Central Intelligence Agency,
Foreign Intelligence and Covert Action

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) MIDYEAR EXAM:
Use Request - 5 January 2016

(~~U//FOUO~~) By Letterhead Memorandum dated 5 January 2016
you requested CIA approval to use emails surfaced in the
referenced case with potential witnesses and their counsel. [Redacted]

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA

[Redacted] (S)

(~~U//FOUO~~) I am the Associate Deputy Director of Operations
for CIA, Foreign Intelligence and Covert Action. The content of
the emails, which was described to me, involve operational
matters within my jurisdiction. As such, I have the authority
to grant approval to use these emails as outlined in the
referenced use request and release of this memorandum provides
that approval with the following caveats:

- FBI must verify that the witness/counsel:
 - o **had** the appropriate clearance contemporaneously with the sending/receipt of the email at issue;
 - o currently **has** the appropriate clearance when interviewed by the FBI; or
 - o signs a Non-disclosure agreement at the time of the interview prior to being shown properly labeled CIA classified information.

[Redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA

Attachment: Requested emails

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HRC-877

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-10-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG



**U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001**

Date: 5 January 2016
To: [Redacted]
Counterespionage Group
Counterintelligence Center CIA
From: [Redacted] [Redacted]
Acting Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA

b6
b7C

Subject: Requests authority use classified CIA documents during interviews

(U//~~FOUO~~) In July 2015, the FBI received a Section 811 referral from the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community (ICIG) regarding the possible compromise of classified national security information. The potential compromise was identified when, as part of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the ICIG reviewed electronic mail (email) communications from private email accounts previously used by a former Secretary of State during their tenure at DoS.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At the request of the FBI, as well DoS and the ICIG, the CIA has since conducted classification reviews of emails and documents related to this matter that were deemed to contain CIA equities.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Currently, the FBI plans to interview several individuals who originated, transmitted or received classified documents via an unclassified email system. During these interviews the FBI would like to show the interviewee, and if necessary their legal counsel, the relevant documents that they were a party to. Doing so will allow the FBI to pursue a logical line of questions regarding the circumstances in which the classified information was sent.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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~~SECRET~~

HRC-878

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA

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(S)

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(U//~~FOUO~~) As such, the FBI respectfully requests Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authority to show the above referenced emails to those individuals that were originally involved in each respective email chain. Given the amount of time that has elapsed

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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~~SECRET~~

HRC-879

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

since the emails were first sent, the FBI believes that it is necessary to show the actual emails to the interviewees in order to have a meaningful discussion regarding the context in which the email was sent. For each listed email, the FBI will only show the email to individuals, and their attorneys, necessary to further the investigation. Additionally, standard safeguarding procedures will be used to ensure the protection of the content and to prevent any unnecessary disclosures.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please direct all inquiries regarding this request to Special Agent

b6
b7C

Sincerely,

b6
b7C

Acting Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-880

2/2/16
serial 139

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

SECRET

HRC-881

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Acting Section Chief
Counterespionage Section
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEB 10 2016

b6
b7C

FROM:
Information Review Officer for the Director's Area

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA

SUBJECT: MIDYEAR EXAM: Use Request - 4 January 2016

(U//~~FOUO~~) By Letterhead Memorandum dated 4 January 2016 you requested CIA approval to use an email surfaced in the referenced case with two potential witnesses and their counsel. The email is unclassified, but for CIA Internal Use Only.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I am the Information Review Officer for the Director's Area and have Original Classification Authority. As such, I have the authority to grant approval to use this email as outlined in the referenced use request and release of this memorandum provides that approval.

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA



Attachment: Requested email

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HRC-882

-139

b3
b7E

2/17/16
Serial 140

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-883

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/12/2016

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

On February 12, 2016, SA [redacted] electronically sent the Department of State (Dos) an LHM requesting authority to use DoS emails and documents in future interviews regarding the captioned matter. The request was electronically sent to [redacted] Executive Assistant, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, [redacted]

Copies of the requests are maintained in a 1A.

Investigation on 2/12/2016 at Washington, DC

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

File # [redacted] - 140 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2/26/16
Serial 144

b6 per
b7c FBI

HRC-894

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

(202) 434-5000

FAX (202) 434-5029

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1976)

February 22, 2016

BY E-MAIL

[Redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per
b7C FBI

Dear [Redacted]


b6 per
b7C FBI

I write to memorialize our responses to two inquiries concerning the Department of Justice's security inquiry.

You asked that we identify the serial numbers for the Williams & Connolly LLP ("W&C") laptops provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on August 6, 2015 and August 25, 2015, and to confirm the positions and number of W&C personnel who had access to those laptops during the time period that the laptops contained the .pst file of the e-mails that Secretary Clinton produced to the State Department. As listed on the property receipts for those laptops, the model and serial numbers are: (1) Lenovo Thinkpad T420, S/N PB-YC912 12/03; (2) Lenovo 4236-VQ5 S/N PB-YC910 12/03; and (3) Lenovo 4236-VQ5 S/N R8-NV8XB 11/11. Five W&C personnel (three attorneys, one paralegal, and one IT employee) had access to the laptops at points during the relevant time period.

You asked whether Secretary Clinton's @clintonemail.com e-mails for the time period January 21, 2009 through February 1, 2013 were transferred or migrated to the hrcoffice.com account. As we indicated, Secretary Clinton did not transfer her @clintonemail.com e-mails for the time period January 21, 2009 through February 1, 2013 to her @hrcoffice.com account, nor did she instruct anyone to do so.

Sincerely,


David E. Kendall

[Redacted]

-144

b3 per
b7E FBI

2/26/16
Serial 145

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-896

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

(202) 434-5000

FAX (202) 434-5029

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

February 22, 2016

BY E-MAIL

[REDACTED]
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

b6 per
b7C FBI

Dear [REDACTED]

b6 per
b7C FBI


I write in response to your February 9, 2016 letter concerning certain equipment and devices. Following the inquiries that we have made in response to the requests in your letter, I can report the following.

In relation to your request regarding "Desktop computer in Whitehaven residence: model unknown (located at residence as of July 2010)," we have identified an iMac G5, 20" iSight computer that is believed to have been housed at the Whitehaven residence during 2010.

In relation to your request regarding an iPad "Generation 1 (Model A1337): Serial unknown (first use: June 2010)," we note that the iPad that we have previously identified to you, and which will be voluntarily produced pursuant to a consent letter is a Model A1337.

We have not located any equipment or devices matching the descriptions of the remaining items in your letter.

Sincerely,



David E. Kendall

HRC-897

b3 per
b7E FBI

[REDACTED]

2/20/11
Serial 146

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.
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DAVID E. KENDALL
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dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

February 23, 2016

BY E-MAIL

[Redacted]
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

Dear [Redacted]

This letter provides consent, in connection with the Department of Justice's security inquiry and subject to the provisions set forth herein, (1) to search the iPad, Model A1337 (hereinafter "the device") provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Secretary Clinton's e-mails and files dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013; and (2) to conduct a forensic analysis of the device for the purpose of identifying information relevant to the Department of Justice's security inquiry. This consent applies solely to the above-described e-mails and files of Secretary Clinton, and not to any of her e-mails and files outside of the date range or to the e-mails or files of any other individuals that reside on the device.

You have confirmed that any searches of the device will be undertaken initially by a filter team, who will hold back from the investigative team any e-mails or files that may contain privileged information. You have further confirmed that the filter team will set aside any e-mails or files (including Contacts) that are associated with the @hrcoffice.com domain account or created after February 1, 2013; and that any e-mails or files associated with that domain account or created after February 1, 2013 will not be searched or reviewed by anyone, even by the filter team, or otherwise be used in connection with your security inquiry or for any other purpose, as those e-mails and files were not in existence during the relevant time period. In order to preserve the data on the device, we agreed, as of December 23, 2015, not to turn on the device or to otherwise modify the device prior to its production to the FBI.

In connection with the filter team's efforts to segregate from the investigative team any e-mails or files that may contain privileged information, I incorporate by reference my October 1, 2015 letter, which provides a list of individuals and entities with whom Secretary Clinton may have communicated in a privileged context, and my October 16, 2015 e-mail, which supplemented that list.

b6 per
b7C FBI

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-899

[Redacted]

b3 per
b7E FBI

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

[Redacted]


February 23, 2016

Page 2

b6 per
b7C FBI

We request and anticipate that the device, as well as any of Secretary Clinton's non-federal record e-mails or files on the device, will be returned to us at the conclusion of your inquiry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. E. Kendall". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail that extends downwards and to the right.

David E. Kendall

2/24/16
serial 147

b6 per
b7c FBI

HRC-901

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per FBI, CIA
b7C Per FBI

Date of transcription 2/24/2016

On February 24, at approximately 3:50 PM, Special Agent [redacted] provided [redacted] [redacted] FBI liaison to the Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with an LHM requesting assistance in contacting former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell for an interview. The LHM was provided to [redacted] via the FBI Microsoft Lync system.

A copy of the LHM is enclosed in an accompanying 1A.

Investigation on 2/24/2016 at Washington, DC b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

File # [redacted] - 147 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted] b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2/26/16
Serial 148

b6 per
b7c FBI

HRC-903

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/24/2016

b3 per CIA
b6 per FBI, CIA
b7C per FBI

On February 24, 2016, SA [redacted] provided the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with an LHM to give notice that the FBI planned to use documents possibly containing classified CIA equities during future interviews. The LHM was provided to CIA detailee [redacted]

A copy of the LHM is enclosed in an attached 1A.

Investigation on 2/24/2016 at Washington, DC b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI
File # [redacted] -148 Date dictated N/A
By SA [redacted] b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

3/1/16
Serial 149

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-905



United States Department of State

*Assistant Secretary of State
for Diplomatic Security*

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

February 26, 2016

TO: FBI – Peter Strzok

FROM: DS – Gregory B. Starr

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory B. Starr", written over the printed name.

SUBJECT: Request for Authority to use Classified Department of State Documents During Interviews

Thank you for your letter of February 12, 2016 regarding the FBI's request for authority to show classified Department of State e-mails and documents during interviews. We have received by e-mail a list of 74 individuals whom the FBI may want to interview regarding these documents.

The Department of State understands the FBI's desire to use these documents in interviews to pursue logical lines of questioning pursuant to your investigation, and similarly understands the desire to share these documents with both interviewees and their legal counsel if necessary. However, we are particularly concerned about sharing the 22 e-mails determined by the Intelligence Community (IC) to contain Top Secret (TS) information. The Department poses no objection to the FBI's plan to use the documents during interviews, but the Department believes that any individual, to include legal counsel, with whom these e-mails will be shared must have appropriate security clearances and must be read in to any special access program discussed in the relevant e-mail by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research or by the appropriate IC element.

The Department has independently identified the recipients of the 22 TS e-mails for the purposes of placing the documents under proper controls and performing any necessary inadvertent disclosure procedures (the number of contemporaneous recipients is a small fraction of the list provided to the Department by the FBI). We have also compiled and can provide information on which recipients were cleared for access to the information at the time the e-mails were sent and which recipients are cleared for such access now. In addition, we can provide their current employment status and the status of their security clearance. We can provide the same information for those individuals on the FBI's

UNCLASSIFIED

HRC-906

b3 per
b7E FBI

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

list who did not have access to the e-mails determined by the IC to contain TS information. With respect to individuals not currently employed by the Department of State, the Department defers to the FBI to determine whether they may be granted a TS security clearance and have the necessary need to know for purposes of granting access to the information contained within the e-mails. If the FBI makes an affirmative determination, the Department has no objection to the e-mails being shown to the interviewees and their legal counsel.

Should you wish the Department of State to provide the information above, I request the FBI inform the Department of State in writing. We will then provide the requested information through our previously established channels.

Attachment:

Tab – FBI Letter dated February 12, 2016

UNCLASSIFIED

HRC-907

Approved: DS -- Gregory B. Starr

Drafted: DS [redacted]

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Cleared: M - PKennedy (ok)
L - [redacted] (ok)
INR [redacted] (ok)
INR [redacted] (ok)

3/1/16
Serial 150




United States Department of State

*Assistant Secretary of State
for Diplomatic Security
Washington, D.C. 20520*

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

March 1, 2016

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION**

FROM: DS -Gregory B. Starr 

SUBJECT: State's Compliance Regarding FBI Requests

(U) I am writing to follow up on our January 29th video teleconference and our February 1st meeting regarding the Department of State's response to the FBI investigation of Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton's emails.

~~(SBU)~~ In our discussions on the production of records, the Department of State previously outlined current IT data management. As we have said, technical limitations affect our ability to achieve full compliance with the Bureau's request. We remain committed to working with the FBI investigative team to refine the request to ensure the most compliant response possible.

(U) My staff, with principal point of contact can work with FBI personnel and offices from State to determine how or if we can be best responsive.


b6 per
b7C DOS

Attachment:

Tab - DOS IT Technical Limitations

HRC-910

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~



Approved: S/ES – Joe Macmanus (OK)

Drafted: DS - [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Cleared: IRM - [REDACTED] (OK)
INR - [REDACTED] (OK)
A/GIS – Peggy Grafeld (OK)
S/ES – IRM [REDACTED] (OK)

~~**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**~~

Department of State IT Technical Limitations

This paper outlines technical limitations of the Department of State's IT infrastructure as related to the FBI investigation into Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton's emails.

Limitations Due to Organization and Infrastructure

(U) The Department of State (DOS) is committed to a thorough and timely response to the multiple data production requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, as previously noted, technical limitations affect this outcome. The Department's use of multiple networks, multiple administrative entities, and multiple policies governing the storage, retention, and disposition of documents and e-mails created over the time period outlined in the FBI's requests are the chief obstacle in our efforts to comply. In addition, until 2009 the Department's email retention policy relied on individual employees to print and file the emails the individual employee judged to be a record. Beginning in 2009, while "print and file" remained the official general guidance of the Department, the Department nevertheless captured the inboxes of certain senior officials on their departure. Again, as previously described, this capture would include all emails still residing in their email inbox but would not include any emails they had previously deleted.

The Disparate Nature of Networks Create Challenges

~~(SBU)~~ Data requested by the FBI potentially resides on four different physical networks: OpenNet (unclassified up to SBU), PACE (unclassified for Public Affairs), ClassNet (up to Secret), and a TS/SCI information system operated by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The Department does not maintain a single data owner or custodian for the OpenNet and ClassNet systems. Rather the data custodians, data owners, and official archivists vary according to which information resource management office supports the employee's bureau. Consequently, multiple offices may need to take action in response to the data production requests, depending on the assignment history of the employee in question. On these two networks, the IRM Bureau is the largest data custodian, managing approximately 25% of mailboxes, primarily for users located in the Washington DC region. Mailboxes for these users are limited to 5GB and users routinely use Personal Archives (.pst files) to store older e-mail that exceeds this storage location. These .pst files are stored in multiple locations by users, including home directories, other network shares, local workstations, and sometimes on removable media. As a result, IRM can only fully verify content of "active" mailboxes - anything archived in a .pst file may or may not be discovered. The

~~**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

data owner of these IRM-managed mailboxes is the bureau to which the employee is assigned. When the employee departs the Department, the data owner is responsible to determine the disposition of the mailbox and other user-created files. The data owner has the ability to retain the files within the bureau or transfer them to the A Bureau for official archiving. Regardless of the decision, the e-mail and files are removed from the on-line system six months after the employee leaves the Department. After this time, IRM can no longer access and provide the data.

~~(SBU)~~ The Secretary, other Department Principals, certain Special Envoys, their staffs, and the Executive Secretariat (S/ES) use OpenNet and ClassNet accounts in a system called the Principal Officers' Executive Management Support, or POEMS. The Executive Secretariat manages POEMS through its IT office, S/ES-IRM. When an official leaves the Department, S/ES-IRM, in coordination with record-keeping officials in S/ES and staff from the official's office, creates one or more .pst files containing the departing official's email, and saves all material stored on the official's personal drive, or P drive, to the same .pst. That data is backed up and kept indefinitely. S/ES-IRM performed this procedure for several prior administrations. While comprehensive in capturing all extant emails, this process did not, however, preserve emails previously deleted by the official.

(U) For overseas users and for domestic locations including the U.S. Mission to the UN, the Department's administrative center in Charleston, SC, the offices of the Inspector General, and U.S. passport offices, the data custodian and owner are the U.S. embassy or consulate where the employee works, or domestic office itself.

(U) Many Department employees including Foreign Service regularly rotate assignments from domestic to foreign assignments and between different locations in the Department. Department administrative restrictions place limits on the total bandwidth available for the storage of an individual employee's email and other data. Employees must therefore reduce their total on-line data storage prior to departure. In this way, they may enable the transfer of their data over the OpenNet and ClassNet networks from the office they are departing and to the office or mission abroad where they will arrive.

(U) Furthermore data transfer is also limited by policy. The Foreign Affairs Manual states, "Department workforce members must not take official files with them when they are reassigned to the field from the Department, to the Department from the field, or between posts unless the records transfer has been approved by A/GIS/IPS/RA." (5 FAM 432.4) As a result, finding specifically requested data

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

for individuals who have rotated assignments since the date the item was created is especially difficult.

INR Network

(SBU) The Department's TS/SCI network is the most straightforward, particularly with respect to email, because there is only one data custodian (INR) for email sent on that network (sometimes referred to as "ice-mail" because it resolves to @state.ic.gov email addresses). Pursuant to Intelligence Community (IC) guidance, INR saves electronic records for 25 years. Since early 2014 it has backed records up to disk in addition to less reliable tapes, which previously were used exclusively. Also, in November 2014 INR installed CommVault Indexer. INR is now able to search electronic records, including ICEmail, relatively easily. For periods predating early 2014, however, restoration of email accounts may be difficult or, in the case of certain older accounts, impracticable if not impossible.

(SBU) Department users with ice-mail accounts fall into two categories: those who have "INRISS" (INR Information Support System) accounts and those with "eIntel" accounts, which were first introduced to the Department by INR in 2008. During 2009-2013, INR maintained two mail servers, one for INRISS account holders and another for eIntel account holders. In early 2014 INR began transitioning eIntel users to the INRISS mail server. In the process of migration, only active accounts were migrated. If at the time it was reached in the migration process an account had not been logged into within the prior 365 days it was deemed inactive and retired; its mailbox contents were saved into a PST file and stored on a file server that was decommissioned in late 2014. That server is still available, and the PST files on this server can be accessed, but the PST files represent the user's mailbox as it existed the day the account was retired. To determine what the account looked like prior to its retirement INR must turn to the former eIntel mail server's tape backups, which are old and rely on infrastructure that is no longer in operation.

(SBU) With respect to the ICEmail accounts requested by the FBI, all were eIntel accounts and were inactive at the time of the 2014 migration mentioned above. With one exception, the associated PST files that were saved and stored contained no data, indicating a mailbox that was empty at the time of the migration. The one PST file that was not empty was copied and provided to the FBI.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Detail Specific Search Requests Yield Better Results

(U) The Department of State's current search technology does not allow cross-enclave searches. Most Department email data searches are done using relatively simple Outlook search tools, i.e. keyword searches of specific .psts or email boxes. Such searches are based within specific selected employees' records. It is therefore not possible to conduct a search in response to vague or general requests that specify "all e-mail to or from" or "all e-mail related to" a particular topic. Even within one of the above systems, there is no comprehensive search method that can even attempt such a search, much less provide accurate results. Instead requests should specify the employees' electronic records to be searched, timeframes, and relevant keywords. For example, "all e-mail between users *x and y regarding (topic keywords)*" or "all e-mail related to *w* either sent or received by users *x,y, and z* between *xxx* date and *yyy* date" will have a much greater chance of yielding responsive records, assuming those employees' records are available.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

3/18/16
serial 152

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-919



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

March 8, 2016

Gregory B. Starr
Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Starr:

I am writing in response to your letter dated February 8, 2016 regarding the Department of State's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) review of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's emails. We appreciate your concerns about the impact that the Department of State (DOS) actions may have on our ongoing investigation. Consistent with DOS's normal practice, as described in your letter, DOS should hold in abeyance any administrative action related to the mishandling of classified information for a limited and reasonable amount of time until the FBI can determine what, if any, impact such action might have on our investigation.

As for the emails that have been classified by the US Intelligence Community or DOS, the FBI recommends that you follow the standard security procedures established by DOS to remove potentially classified materials from any unclassified network.

Finally, with regard to Congressional requests for copies of the former Secretary's classified emails, the FBI defers to DOS to respond consistent with its normal practices.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E.W. Priestap", is written over a printed name.

E.W. Priestap
Assistant Director

HRC-920

3/18/16
serial 153

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-921

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

MAR 0 1 2016

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: Peter P. Strzok
Section Chief, CD-4
Counterintelligence Division

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) MIDYEAR EXAM - Response to LHM

REFERENCE: (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI LHM, dtd 24 Feb 2016

*Assign to MYE
Special SA*

3/2/16

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Action Requested: For your information and action as appropriate. Please forward to Special Agent [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The following information is provided for the exclusive use of your organization for background, investigative, or lead purposes, as appropriate. It may not be used in any legal proceeding without prior coordination. While the information may be shared with necessary investigative components of your organization, it should not be released in any form to other components within the CIA or any other agencies without prior approval of the Chief, Counterintelligence Mission Center, [redacted] Counterespionage Group (C/CIMC/[redacted]/CEG). Details contained in this CIOL may not be uploaded into any SIPRNET-based computer system.

b3 Per CIA

CIOL-0183-16

HRC-922

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) MIDYEAR EXAM - Response to LHM

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) This CIOL responds to your LHM dated 24 February 2016 in which you asked for CIA assistance in arranging an FBI interview of former DDCIA Michael Morell on a voluntary basis. FBI detailee to CIMC/CEG further explained that FBI is seeking this interview because of Mr. Morell's subject matter expertise; he is not the target or subject of the underlying sensitive matter. Mr. Morell requests that his attorney, Ken Wainstein, be present at the interview; Mr. Wainstein is unable to meet on 4 March 2016. Mr. Morell indicated that Mr. Wainstein can be reached at (202) 862-2474 to schedule a meeting.

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Please address all correspondence concerning this matter to the Counterintelligence Mission Center, [redacted] b3 Per CIA
[redacted] Counterespionage Group, Attention: [redacted] b6 Per CIA
commercial line [redacted] referencing the CIOL number [redacted] b7C Per CIA
given below.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR/CIA FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

[redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA

CIOL-0183-16

4/11/14
Serial 154



United States Department of State

*Assistant Secretary of State
for Diplomatic Security
Washington, D.C. 20520*

UNCLASSIFIED

March 21, 2016

TO: FBI – E.W. Priestap

FROM: DS – Gregory B. Starr

SUBJECT: Congressional Review of Hillary Clinton E-mails Classified Secret or Confidential

Thank you for your letter of March 8, 2016 (Tab 1), which contained helpful guidance. As a follow-up, I am writing to inform you that the Department of State intends to make available, with limited redactions, versions of the Hillary Clinton e-mails classified as Secret or Confidential during the Freedom of Information Act review process, to appropriately cleared members and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) possibly starting as early as this week. The e-mails may be shared with additional committees in the future. The e-mails will be available for review, either *in-camera* or at the State Department, but will not be retained by the reviewers. In addition, reviewers will not be permitted to make copies or otherwise reproduce the contents of the e-mails during their scheduled review.

The 22 e-mails determined by the IC to contain Top Secret information will not be made available to the SFRC.

Attachments:

Tab 1 – FBI letter dated March 8, 2016

Tab 2 – Department of State letter dated February 8, 2016

UNCLASSIFIED

HRC-925

b3 per
b7E FBI

~154

Approved: DS/FO - [redacted]

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Drafted: DS/FO - [redacted]

Cleared: M - [redacted] (ok)
L - [redacted] (ok)
L/M/DS - [redacted] (ok)
INR - [redacted] (ok)
A/GIS - [redacted] (ok)
H - [redacted] (ok)
DS/Leg - [redacted] (ok)



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

March 8, 2016

Gregory B. Starr
Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Starr:

I am writing in response to your letter dated February 8, 2016 regarding the Department of State's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) review of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's emails. We appreciate your concerns about the impact that the Department of State (DOS) actions may have on our ongoing investigation. Consistent with DOS's normal practice, as described in your letter, DOS should hold in abeyance any administrative action related to the mishandling of classified information for a limited and reasonable amount of time until the FBI can determine what, if any, impact such action might have on our investigation.

As for the emails that have been classified by the US Intelligence Community or DOS, the FBI recommends that you follow the standard security procedures established by DOS to remove potentially classified materials from any unclassified network.

Finally, with regard to Congressional requests for copies of the former Secretary's classified emails, the FBI defers to DOS to respond consistent with its normal practices.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E.W. Priestap", is written over a printed name.

E.W. Priestap
Assistant Director



United States Department of State

*Assistant Secretary of State
for Diplomatic Security*

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

February 8, 2016

TO: FBI – E.W. Priestap

FROM: DS – Gregory B. Starr

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory B. Starr", written over the printed name.

SUBJECT: Department of State Hillary Clinton E-mail Review

I am writing to follow up on our January 29, 2016 video teleconference regarding the current status of the Department of State's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reviews of former Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton's e-mails.

Late last week the Department reported that 22 Clinton e-mails would not be publically released due to their Top Secret (TS) classification at the request of the Intelligence Community (IC). That is, under FOIA, these e-mails were denied in full, but they are being accounted for in the Clinton e-mail collection. In addition to these 22 TS e-mails, portions of 22 other e-mails have been classified Secret by the State Department or the IC to date. Finally, approximately 1300 e-mails contain sensitive information that was previously redacted and classified as Confidential prior to the e-mails' release under our FOIA process.

The Department of State is prepared to take appropriate administrative action for any instances of mishandling of classified information in accordance with our own internal processes (see Attachment). However, we appreciate the sensitivity of ongoing criminal investigations generally and do not want to compromise or hinder the FBI's current investigation in any way. It has been the normal practice of the Department and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to delay taking administrative action against current State employees when active criminal investigations of a parallel nature are underway. I request the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI inform the Department of State in writing as soon as possible if the Department of State can undertake administrative investigations or inquiries into possible security violations, or if the Department of State should delay due to the current criminal investigation until notification to proceed is received from the DOJ and FBI.

In addition, following up on my letter of September 15, 2015, please be advised that pending further guidance from the FBI we are still – as a general rule – not removing any emails that have since been classified from any unclassified systems or providing instruction to individuals that may have upgraded classified emails on non-official email accounts to take steps to protect this information.

Finally, Congressional Committees have requested unredacted copies of former Secretary Clinton's classified e-mails. I request DOJ and FBI inform the Department of State in writing as soon as possible as to whether they have any concerns regarding such a possible production of these e-mails in unredacted form at this juncture. I note that we are not considering turning over to any Committee documents the members/staff are not cleared to receive because of their classification level.

Attachment:

Tab – 12 FAM 550 Security Incident Program

Approved: DS – Gregory B. Starr

Drafted: DS

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Cleared: L (ok)

[Redacted]

155

~~SECRET~~

b3 per
b7E FBI

HRC-931

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Collected Item Log

Event Title: ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Collect from DoS under banner/FOIA authority Date: 04/06/2016

Approved By: [Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted] ^(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/10/2015

Collected From: [Redacted]
Department of State

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Details: No Details Provided

Item Type	Description
1B Digital	^(U) (S) DVD containing PST for [Redacted] Collected On: 04/06/2016 Seizing Individual: [Redacted] Collected By: [Redacted] Location Area: N/A Specific Location: N/A Device Type: Compact Disc/Digital Video Disc (CDs/DVDs) Number of Devices Collected: 1

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U)

Title: (S) Collect from DoS under banner/FOIA authority

Re: 04/06/2016

b3 per
b7E FBI

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] -157
4/6/2016 4/11/16
[redacted] [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b3
b6
b7C per
b7E FBI

HRC-936

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Date: March 18, 2016

To: [Redacted]
Counterespionage Group
Counterintelligence Center CIA

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA
b7C Per CIA

From: Peter P. Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

Subject: Request for Identification

~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) respectfully requests the CIA's assistance in identifying the names and current location of the individuals who occupied the positions listed below during the date ranges provided. This assistance is in regards to requests for FBI interviews. These interviews are voluntary and pertain to a sensitive matter in which the FBI believes the individuals may be of assistance.

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA

- [Redacted] May 2011 - September 2012 (S)
- [Redacted] May 2011 - September 2012 (S)
- [Redacted] May 2011 - September 2012 (S)
- [Redacted] May 2011 - September 2012 (S)
- Director, Counterterrorism Center, 2010 - 2012 (S)
- [Redacted] 2010 - 2012 (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) If you have any questions regarding this request,
please direct all inquiries to Special Agent [redacted] at
[redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI

Sincerely,

Peter P. Strzok
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section

◆◆

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

HRC-938

[Redacted] -158
4/8/2016 [Redacted]
[Redacted] 4/11/16 [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b3
b6
b7C per
b7E FBI

HRC-939

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [] ~~NOFORN~~

b3 Per CIA

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

APR 07 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: Peter P. Strzok, II
Section Chief, CD-4
Counterintelligence Division

SUBJECT: ~~(U)~~ ~~(S//NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM - Response to LHM

REFERENCE: (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI LHM, dtd 16 March 2016

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Action Requested: For your information and action, as appropriate. Please forward to Special Agent []

b6 per
b7C FBI

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The following information is provided for the exclusive use of your organization for background, investigative, or lead purposes, as appropriate. It may not be used in any legal proceeding without prior coordination. While the information may be shared with necessary investigative



CIOL-0254-16

b3 Per CIA

~~SECRET~~ [] ~~NOFORN~~

HRC-940


(U) SUBJECT: ~~(S/ []/NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM - Response to LHM

components of your organization, it should not be released in any form to other components within the CIA or any other agencies without prior approval of the Chief, Counterintelligence Mission Center, [] Counterespionage Group (C/CIMC/[] CEG). Details contained in this CIOL may not be uploaded into any SIPRNET-based computer system.

b3 Per CIA

3. ~~(S/ []/NF)~~ Per the referenced FBI Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) dated 16 March 2016, CIA provides the attached spreadsheet []


b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA



(S)

(U) SUBJECT: ~~(S/NF)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM - Response to LHM

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA




(S)

5. (U/~~FOUO~~) Please address all correspondence concerning this matter to the Counterintelligence Mission Center, [] Counterespionage Group, Attention: [] commercial line [] referencing the CIOL number given below.

b3 Per CIA

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR/CIA FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:



b3 Per CIA
b6 Per CIA

CIOL-0254-16

Attachment: (S/~~NF~~)



(S)

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA

-162

4/18/2016 5/2/16

b3
b6
b7C per
b7E FBI

HRC-959

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901

(202) 434-5000

FAX (202) 434-5029

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1986)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

April 15, 2016

BY E-MAIL

[REDACTED]
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530


Dear [REDACTED]

This letter provides consent, in connection with the Department of Justice's security inquiry and subject to the provisions set forth herein, to conduct a preliminary examination of the iPad mini, Model A1432 (hereinafter "the device") provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for the limited purposes of (1) determining whether any of Secretary Clinton's e-mails and files dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 reside on the device; and (2) conducting an analysis of the device to determine whether any intrusions occurred. You have represented to us that the intrusion analysis will not involve search or review of any e-mails or files that reside on the device. Furthermore, to the extent the FBI determines in that preliminary examination that no e-mails or files of Secretary Clinton dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 reside on the device, you have agreed to return the device to us promptly without conducting any further examination of the device other than the intrusion analysis.

To the extent the FBI determines in its preliminary examination that e-mails or files of Secretary Clinton dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 do reside on the device, this letter provides consent, in connection with the Department of Justice's security inquiry and subject to the provisions set forth herein, to search such e-mails and files of Secretary Clinton dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013 (in accordance with the procedures outlined below) for the purpose of identifying information relevant to the Department of Justice's security inquiry. This consent applies solely to the above-described e-mails and files of Secretary Clinton (to the extent any such files exist on the device), and not to any of her e-mails and files outside of the date range or to the e-mails or files of any other individuals that may reside on the device.

b6 per
b7C FBI

b6 per
b7C FBI



April 15, 2016

Page 2


b6 per
b7C FBI

You have confirmed that the searches consented to above will be undertaken first by a filter team, who will hold back from the investigative team any e-mails or files that may contain privileged information, as well as all e-mails and files outside of the scope of the searches consented to above. You have further confirmed that the filter team will set aside any e-mails or files (including Contacts) that are associated with the @hrcoffice.com domain account or were created after February 1, 2013; and that any e-mails or files associated with that domain account or created after February 1, 2013 will not be searched or reviewed by anyone, even by the filter team, or otherwise be used in connection with your security inquiry or for any other purpose, as those e-mails and files were not in existence during the relevant time period.

In connection with the filter team's efforts to segregate from the investigative team any e-mails or files that may contain privileged information, I incorporate by reference my October 1, 2015 letter, which provides a list of individuals and entities with whom Secretary Clinton may have communicated in a privileged context, and my October 16, 2015 e-mail, which supplemented that list.

In the event that the device is determined in the FBI's preliminary examination to contain e-mails or files of Secretary Clinton dated January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013, we request and anticipate that the device, as well as any of Secretary Clinton's non-federal record e-mails or files on the device, will be returned to us at the conclusion of your inquiry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. H. Kendall".

David H. Kendall

[redacted] -163
4/26/2016 [redacted]
[redacted] 5/2/14 [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C per
b7E FBI

HRC-962

LAW OFFICES
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
725 TWELFTH STREET, N.W.

DAVID E. KENDALL
(202) 434-5145
dkendall@wc.com

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005-5901
(202) 434-5000
FAX (202) 434-5029

EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS (1920-1988)
PAUL R. CONNOLLY (1922-1978)

April 22, 2016

BY E-MAIL

[Redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530


Dear [Redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI

b6 per
b7C FBI

This letter confirms that, pursuant to our discussions, Williams & Connolly LLP ("W&C") has provided to the Department of Justice two W&C hard drives (a Samsung Lenovo 256 GB hard drive and a Samsung Lenovo 128 GB hard drive) (the "drives") for the sole purpose of destruction. The drives each contained a copy of data that W&C had previously provided to the Department of Justice, as well as other W&C attorney-client privileged and attorney work product materials. Pursuant to our agreement, W&C has deleted all data from the drives prior to providing them to the Department. We understand that once the drives have been destroyed, you will provide us confirmation of that fact. For avoidance of doubt, this letter does not provide any consent to search the drives prior to their destruction.

Sincerely,


David E. Kendall

5/27/10
Serial 166

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-975



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

David E. Kendall, Esq.
Katherine M. Turner, Esq.
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005

February 9, 2016

Dear Mr. Kendall and Ms. Turner,

b5 per NSD

1. Laptop Computer

- MacBook Air: Serial unknown (purchased November 2008)

2. Desktop Computer

- Desktop computer in Whitehaven residence: model unknown (located at residence as of July 2010)

3. iPads

- Generation 1 (Model A1337): Serial unknown (first use: June 2010)
- Generation 3: Serial DLXHFT7VDVGJ (first use: May 2012)
- Mini: Serial unknown

4. Phones Associated with (212) 920-6329

- BlackBerry Curve 8310: IMEI 359315014408230 (January 2009 – May 2009)
- BlackBerry Curve 8900: IMEI 359485022135651 (June 2009 – September 2009)
- BlackBerry Curve 8900: IMEI 358453025219261 (September 2009 – August 2011)
- BlackBerry Curve 8900: IMEI 358453029684668 (August 2011 – February 2012)
- BlackBerry Curve 8900: IMEI 355383038220886 (February 2012)
- BlackBerry Bold 9900: IMEI 357966040796790 (February 2012)
- BlackBerry Curve 8900: IMEI 355383039952164 (February 2012 – March 2012)
- BlackBerry Curve 9360: IMEI 357965040112701 (February 2012 – March 2013)
- BlackBerry Curve 9360: IMEI 357965043386724 (March 2013 – October 2013)

HRC-976

b3 per
b7E FBI

- BlackBerry Bold 9900: IMEI 357966044557578 (October 2013 – November 2015)
- BlackBerry Bold 9900: IMEI 357966044869312 (December 2014)

5. Phones Associated with (212) 920-7127

- Sony Xperia Z C6603: IMEI 35576205415155 (April 2013)
- Motorola EX431G: IMEI 35948604203695 (September 2013 – February 2014)


6. SIM Cards with One of the Following Identifiers

IMSI (stored digitally on the SIM card):

- 310410088779408
- 310410248923744
- 310410492968953
- 310410758808198
- 310410774223342
- 310410785717450
- 310410178586207
- 310410208687757
- 310410248923744
- 310410283447343
- 310410331125794
- 310410408399442
- 310410676110393
- 310410785725002
- 310410614126238


ICCID (may be written on outside of SIM card):

- 89014104200887794085
- 89014102232489237447
- 89014104254929689530
- 89014103277588081989
- 89014103277857174507



b5 per NSD

Sincerely,



b6 per
b7C FBI

6/30/16
Serial 171

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-987

[Redacted]

(RO) (FBI)

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

From: [Redacted] (NSD) [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2016 3:42 PM
To: [Redacted] (RO) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted] (NSD) (JMD) [Redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: iPad Minis

b5 per NSD
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

- 1. A1489/F9FMW65UFCM9
- 2. A1432/F4GJG37XF193

Thanks

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

[Redacted]

HRC-988

[Redacted]

Serial 172

~~SECRET~~

b3 per
b7E FBI



HRC-989

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/28/2016

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field
CI-13

Contact: SOS

[Redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI

Approved By:

[Redacted]

A/SSA

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

(U) Case ID #: (S)

[Redacted]

b3 per
b7E FBI

Title: (U) (S) MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

Synopsis: (U//FOUO) Documents details related to the investigation's inability to acquire 19 electronic devices potentially utilized to access the hdr22@clintonemail.com or hrod17@clintonemail.com e-mail accounts.

~~Classified By: F22M62K21
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20411231~~

References:

(U) (S)
(S)
(S)

[Redacted]

Serial 36
Serial 41
Serial 42

b3 per
b7E FBI

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

Details: (U//FOUO) During the course of its investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified electronic devices with e-mail capability associated with former Secretary of State HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON through witness interviews, Grand Jury subpoena returns and information provided by CLINTON's defense counsel. As of the date of this communication, the FBI identified, but was unable to acquire, 19 devices which possibly were used to access CLINTON's hdr22@clintonemail.com or hrod17@clintonemail.com e-mail accounts.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(U//~~FOUO~~) Unless specifically noted, the FBI was unable to find explicit evidence indicating the devices outlined in this communication were connected to either the Bryan Pagliano or Platte River Networks (PRN) e-mail servers. However, the FBI was unable to identify all of the devices that accessed CLINTON's e-mail or synced with the servers due to the limitations of the data and log files available from the hardware collected.

(U) [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C per
b7E FBI

(U) ~~(S)~~ The author [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per NSD

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

b3
b6 per
b7C FBI


[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b3 per FBI
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI



(U) Apple iPads (Two Identified)

b3 per FBI
b5 per NSD
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI
b7E per FBI



b3 per FBI



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



b5 per NSD

(U) Laptop and Desktop Computers (Four Identified)



b5 per NSD

(U/~~FOUO~~) Finally, the FBI investigation identified an Apple MacBook Pro laptop computer which contained a full archive of the e-mails from CLINTON's tenure as Secretary of State. In March 2013, CLINTON's hdr22@clintonemail.com e-mail address was publicly released following the on-line posting of e-mail exchanges between CLINTON and an informal political advisor,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. According to interviews of COOPER and CLINTON aide MONICA HANLEY, the event prompted a switch to CLINTON's new e-mail account, hrod17@clintonemail.com, and the creation of an archive of CLINTON's State Department tenure e-mails. In late March 2013, HANLEY created an archive of the e-mails in CLINTON's account on an Apple MacBook Pro from HANLEY's New York residence. HANLEY subsequently shipped the laptop to PRN employee [redacted] in February 2014 to migrate the archive onto the PRN server. Following [redacted] migration, he shipped the laptop to [redacted] who was CLINTON's office manager at the time. [redacted] indicated she never received the laptop from [redacted] however, she advised that CLINTON's staff was moving offices at the time and it would have been easy for the package to get lost during the transition period. The FBI did not identify the location of the Apple MacBook Pro computer.

b6 per
b7C FBI

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

1/10/16
1/10/16
1/10/16

[Redacted]

(WF) (FBI)

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

From: Turner, Katherine [KTurner@wc.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 05, 2016 10:14 PM
To: [Redacted] (NSD) (JMD); Kendall David; [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted] (NSD) (JMD); [Redacted] USAVAE; [Redacted] USAVAE);
[Redacted] (WF) (FBI); [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Attorney Notes

Thanks very much, [Redacted] We will let Cheryl and Heather know.

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Sent with Good (www.good.com)

From: [Redacted] (NSD)
Sent: Tuesday, July 05, 2016 10:11:44 PM
To: Kendall, David; Turner, Katherine; [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted] (NSD); [Redacted] (USAVAE); [Redacted] (USAVAE); [Redacted]
[Redacted] (WF) (FBI); [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: Attorney Notes

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

David/Katherine [Redacted]

b5 per NSD
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[Large Redacted Block]

Thanks,
[Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

National Security Division U.S. Department of

Justice

Phone: [Redacted]

This message and any attachments are intended only for the addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you have received this message in error, please do not read, use, copy, distribute, or disclose the contents of the message and any attachments. Instead, please delete the message and any attachments and notify the sender immediately. Thank you.

7/16/16
serial 825

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-999



U.S. Department of Justice

Criminal Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

DEC 29 2015

Special Agent [redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Washington Field Office
601 4th Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

b6 per
b7C FBI

Re: Declination of Bryan M. Pagliano

Dear Special Agent [redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI

The Public Integrity Section has completed its review of allegations concerning Bryan M. Pagliano.

This letter will confirm that we have concluded that initiation of criminal proceedings in this matter is not warranted and we have declined prosecution. We understand that your office concurs with this decision.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call me or contact trial attorney

[redacted] at [redacted]

b6 per
b7C DOJ-CRIM

Sincerely,

Raymond N. Hulser
Chief
Public Integrity Section

HRC-1000

[redacted]

Serial 172

b6 per
b7C FBI

MAW

Serial 172

EC from

re: 19 emails

[Redacted]

(WF) (FBI)

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

From: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, June 09, 2016 3:54 PM
To: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: iPad Minis

From: [Redacted] (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2016 9:49 AM
To: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: iPad Minis

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

From: [Redacted] (NSD) [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2016 3:42 PM
To: [Redacted] (RO) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted] (NSD) (JMD) [Redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: iPad Minis

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

b5 per NSD
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

- 1. A1489/F9FMW65UFCM9
- 2. A1432/F4GJG37XF193

Thanks,

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice

[Redacted]

HRC-1006

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

[Redacted]

- 178

- 179

7/22/2016

7/22/16



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

David E. Kendall, Esq.
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005


July 21, 2016

Dear Mr. Kendall,



b5 per NSD

Sincerely



b6 per
b7C FBI

7/22/16
Serial 180

b6 per
b7c FBI

HRC-1009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/21/2016

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

On July 21, 2016, Special Agent [redacted] provided [redacted] of the United States Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service, a package containing the following two (2) DVDs:

“Final Production to U.S. Department of State Disc 1; Datasets 1-3” Disc #DEHQ76

“Final Classification Determinations” Disc #DEHQ75

b6 Per
b7C DOS

A copy of the FD-597 [Receipt for Property] signed by [redacted] acknowledging the receipt of said DVDs is enclosed in an accompanying 1A, along with a copy of Disc #DEHQ75

Investigation on 07/21/2016 at Washington, D.C.

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

File # [redacted] - TS and [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

7/29/14
Serial 181

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-1011

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of State
Governing Retrieved Materials

(U) INTRODUCTION

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) This MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ("MOU") between the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the United States Department of State ("DOS") (collectively, the "Parties") memorializes and confirms the Parties' agreement governing the status and handling of certain information provided by the FBI to DOS in furtherance of agency record determinations by DOS.

(U) DEFINITIONS

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The "FBI's Investigation" means the FBI's investigation concerning a referral from the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community ("ICIG") in connection with former Secretary Hillary Clinton's use of a private e-mail server.
3. (U//~~FOUO~~) "Retrieved Materials" means certain information that the FBI has provided or that it may in the future provide to DOS for review and determination of DOS agency record status.

(U) BACKGROUND

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) During the course of the FBI's Investigation, the FBI obtained certain information that may include DOS agency records.
5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Pursuant to a July 8, 2016 request from DOS, the FBI notified DOS on July 12, 2016 that it would provide such information for review and DOS agency record determination pursuant to the Federal Records Act and for subsequent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processing as appropriate.

(U) UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) The purpose of this MOU is to express and embody the Parties' understanding and agreement regarding the conditions under which the FBI has provided the Retrieved Materials to DOS.
7. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Parties understand and agree that the Retrieved Materials are being provided to DOS for the purpose of conducting a review and determination of DOS agency record status.
 - a. (U//~~FOUO~~) During the review, upon DOS's determination that a document from the Retrieved Materials is a DOS agency record, custody of that document will immediately transfer to DOS. DOS may then process and use the identified DOS

1

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


HRC-1012

-181

b3 per
b7E FBI


agency record for any lawful and authorized purpose, to include responding to FOIA requests.

- b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Except for those Retrieved Materials that are determined by DOS to be DOS agency records, DOS will not, absent written consent of the FBI, disclose or disseminate the Retrieved Materials to anyone other than individuals participating in, assisting, or supervising the DOS record determination process.
 - c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Upon completion of DOS's agency record review, any Retrieved Materials determined not to be DOS agency records, and any copies of such Retrieved Materials made by DOS, will be returned to the FBI for disposition in accordance with FBI policies and procedures.
8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Parties understand and agree that, until a document within the Retrieved Materials is determined to be a DOS agency record, the Retrieved Materials shall not constitute DOS agency records under the FOIA or any other law; DOS may not integrate the Retrieved Materials into its records filing systems and may not disseminate or use the Retrieved Materials for any purpose other than DOS agency record determination; and if DOS receives a request for access to the Retrieved Materials from outside DOS under the FOIA or any other law or authority, DOS will notify the FBI of the request.
9. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Parties understand and agree that the FBI will mark the Retrieved Materials with appropriate classifications to the greatest extent possible, but that the FBI was unable to obtain definitive classification determinations for all documents therein.



Brian J. Egan
Legal Adviser
U.S. Department of State

7.19.16
Date



E. W. Priestap
Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

07/20/2016
Date

8/15/16
Serial 182

b6 per
b7C FBI

HRC-1014

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/05/2016

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

On August 5, 2016, Special Agent [redacted] provided [redacted] of the United States Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service, a package containing the following two (5) DVDs:

- Final Production to U.S. Department of State, Disc 2; Dataset 4
- Final Production to U.S. Department of State, Disc 3; Dataset 5-9
- Final Production to U.S. Department of State, Disc 4; Dataset 10-14
- Final Production to U.S. Department of State, Disc 5; Dataset 15-19
- Final Production to U.S. Department of State, Disc 6; Dataset 20

A copy of the FD-597 [Receipt for Property] signed by [redacted] acknowledging the receipt of said DVDs is enclosed in an accompanying 1A.

b6 per
b7C DOS

Investigation on 08/05/2016 at Washington, D.C.

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

File # [redacted] - 182 Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



Serial 185

HRC-1016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/31/2016

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

On August 18, 2016, Special Agent [redacted] provided [redacted] of the United States Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service, a package containing one CD-R labeled (U) Final Production to U.S. Department of State, Datasets 1-20 File Listings.

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

A copy of the FD-597 [Receipt for Property] signed by [redacted] acknowledging the receipt of the CD-R is enclosed in an accompanying 1A.

Investigation on 08/18/2016 at Washington, D.C.

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

File # [redacted] Date dictated N/A

By SA [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1A3

FD-340c (4-11-03)

File Number - 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence NF

Serial # of Originating Document 4

Date Received 9/2/2015

From

b6
b7C

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By SA

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title: MIDYEAAL EXAM

Reference: FD-302
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

1A3

FILE UNDER: [redacted]
currently HB /
Former DS
Agent
till [redacted]

07 - 2 AM [redacted] b6 Per FBI, DOS
b7C Per FBI, DOS

PRE - REST GIFT HANDLER
[redacted] - Clinton 2007-2009 (HRC)

MAIN STATE
STAFF DIFF in SEC & Protocol
MURKIN in line to HRC
- embassy / unsecured

ADVANCE SCHEDULE
- designed for staff safety
- she override safety concerns
- crit question not / shot
safety
- at - museum exhibit

[redacted] - was brief
[redacted] - was brief
rest bank - b6 Per FBI, DOS
b7C Per FBI, DOS

- Asked to open window
- Protocol breaches abundant
- Frequently disobeyed protocols
- insisted window be opened
in occupied territory

POST 1 -
- Movement towards & departure
from Post 1 and route then to
rec. area

TOPIC:

DATE:

FILE UNDER:

PAGE:

b7E Per DOS

- Refused to coin up SS labels

[Redacted]

Blackburn -

b7E Per DOS

[Redacted]

DS Agent of Un. Team

DS Agent Resumed to write BO

@ [Redacted]

DS turns left line outside

[Redacted]

part of STATE

b6 Per
b7C DOS

RS: patrol, brooks, etc.

Hummer had much more power than
indicate COS of often overrule
patrols etc.

CL... - perception that SAS
was not simply way to compare
for photos. Took select media
to her room where that showed
her in dramatic light. often
checked protocols & sides, to
get good press & press for
"Campaign".

HRC-1094

HSI Agents & FSO

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number -302 b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 5

Date Received 9/11/15

From b6
b7C
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

U.S. DEPT OF STATE
(Address)

(City and State)

By b6
b7C

- To Be Returned Yes No
- Receipt Given Yes No
- Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
 Yes No
- Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
 Yes No

Title: MID YEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of b6
b7C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (S/ES-IRM)

SES = Office of the Secretary, Office of the Executive Secretariat

[Redacted] 9/11/2015
[Redacted]

@ESOC in Culpeper, VA
Backup @ HST

b6
b7C

Unclass (open net)

Class (classnet)

DS,
consular affairs,
etc.

has own exchange server
SES (one domain of many)

DS,
consular affairs,
etc.

SES (one domain of many)

→ S/ES-IRM → International Resource Management

POEMS - originally a TS network for email
- only INR has TS network

→ state keeps copies for an indefinite period of time.
~600 customers, take snapshots of customer's files and emails as they come and go

Have box of "hold" backup tapes (system wide backup done every night (exchange, file server, shared drive, etc.) of class and unclass. → can restore entire system

b6
b7C

Some addresses were distr. lists - lists different currently than they were in 2011. Baglioni works here → probably [Redacted]

IRM-POC-Ask [Redacted]

Backups only held for 45 days

↳ typically keep mailbox for 60 days, then deleted

- SES also responsible for assigning devices - keep property records only until returned.
- System used to issue devices at the time was taken offline; efforts to get back in unsuccessful → data corrupt
- Customers do not use SMART for archiving - other parts of state
- Guidance for backup is "print and file"
- PACE - people/staff close to Secretary may be on this system (small number belongs to bureau of diplomacy)

CableXpress (replaced by SMART)

- ↳ created to make archive records of telegraphs
- ↳ phased out ~4-5 years ago

Openet + Openet+ (plus) are same

- ↳ added web browsing and external email

No official restriction ⁺²⁰¹¹ on using personal email

- guidance in 2009 to send work-related email sent to personal email back to work account
- one → openet everywhere → Go (global openet)

• Global openet (uses FOB to access from any computer)

→ users on travel who don't have mobile device might do this.

- No mechanism to track use of personal email
- Customers not requested to ^{provide} use personal email address
- No record of form completed requesting ~~an~~ unclass or class account for Secretary Clinton
- Very strict on form requirement
- No request for mobile device

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Purpose: Need to understand IT / Email ecosystem to provide further guidance wrt preservation requests sent to DoS.

Questions: What are the primary email systems for each classification level (Uncl, S, TS):

- What type of information is conveyed on these systems (i.e., general coms, cables, exec communications, etc)?
- How are users allocated between systems and how can we identify if a specific person has a profile on a given system?
- How is the data stored for each system?
 - What is the frequency of backup (i.e. automatic, user initiated), how far back does it go?
 - Where is this information stored (i.e., remote server vs. desktop PST)
- What is the retention system for each system?
- Do these systems use the State Messaging and Archival Retrieval Tool (SMART)?
 - How can SMART records be accessed?
- What are the search and filtering capabilities for archived files on each system?
- Who is a POC for each system?
- Is there a POEMS equiv for unclass or TS coms?
- Does POEMS communicate with Siprnet systems, unclass systems, etc?
- What system would the Secretary of State be on?

S/ES-IRM
-IRM

IRM
NOT MOBILE

45 days
PRINT FILE
PRG/AM/D
IRM/POEMS
OF 900 are POEMS

Classification	Unclass	Secret	TS
Domain	Opennet Opennet+ <i>→ Add USS</i>	Classnet <i>SSPC</i>	JWICS
Email Domain	State.gov <i>College Park</i>	State.sgov.gov	
Sub Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoS Outlook email - 2014 • Personal email - 2009 • PACE (Public Affairs Communications Electronically) <i>not open net email TO/FROM</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POEMS (Principal Officer Electronic Messaging System) • CableXpress <i>can exchange secrets</i> <i>→ not relevant just TELEGRAM</i>	
Technical Point of contact		POEMS	
Primary Users	All DoS employees PACE - Public Affairs Media	POEMS - 7 th Floor Execs	

Branch of Public Dip.
Sep. Network

IRM 60 THRS
LOG IN TO EMAIL
GO
Guest open net (IRM)
secure access for WEB ACCESS
and any email w/ TIME

b6
b7C
IRM
IRM
b6
b7C
POEMS

1A5

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number - 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 6

Date Received 9/17/15

From
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

DEPT OF STATE
(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title: MID YEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

1A5

9/17/15

120K MB total 700K (400 central)

Hub & spoke

over 100 of existing

central location, each spoke embassy or consulate

SES remaining?
IRM

Managed by own ^{appropriate} ISSOs Group

↳ contact Info Sec. Officer

Backup for server

OS
VM is backed up
with Snap
Just
a month
or so)

→ DB is on separate luns (don't get backed up) re: authority

Exported incl. deleted items → preserved

Have DAGS copies of every DB One Active DB (transactions are written

" Dumpster for 90 days

to other copies of DB)

Retention

Posts do have backups kept varying lengths based on storage limitations

↳ varies by post

↳ off-site backups, but may vary by location (practice may vary)

Profiles centrally located open net & ? (approx 400 profiles)

IRM

b6
b7C

Mailboxes - short turnaround (1 day) 500MB mailbox

↳ challenge is the date timeframe

5G mailbox - most of 2012

beg 2013

Record email - Nat. Arch

includes the RI for 90 days

reflects official direction

Smart Archive AGIS - Peggy Graphil Deputy Assistant
Cables & records → Records Management Bureau

Prior was

↳ 1st in 2008,

fully operation 2010

↳ official communication


Cable Express

SES chosen not to go Smart Archive - obligation to Print/File

↳ Senior officials - retention policy archived when departing

9/17/15

b6
b7c



- STATUS OF PRESERVATION REQUEST
- BACKUP CAPABILITIES (PROCESS, RETENTION PERIOD)
- USER SPECIFIC RECORDS
- TURN AROUND TIME
- IIR CONTACT [] → POC [] []

b6
b7c

120K MAIL BOXES

95
35K CENTER WORK NBS.

HUB/SPOKE
↓
CABLES

IRM (HUBS) → DAGS

POST/ISSO (SPOKES) → TAPES NOT DAGS

400 of 900 in central site

majority in SSS

CABLE ENERGY
→
REASON → RECORD EMAIL.

Post → enterprise ISSO. central.

100 of Billion
EMAILS TO
FIREWALL,
80% STOPPED
THERE

exported all mailboxes for users on list (for people in central)

deleted items retained for 90s, stored on ~~5~~ 5 DISK ^{DRIVE} 2 site.

- DO NOT INCLUDE desktop ARCHIVED FILES.

MAILBOX CAP ONLY WHAT IS IN THE ACTIVE MAILBOX.

SEMP → NOT LIKELY A LOT OF OLD EMAIL DUE TO LIMITS

300 GB
in 2012/2013 → DELETE OR PST

→ RECORD EMAIL SYSTEM.

- course of action
- underpinnings of policy
- need

SMART - 2008
AGIS 2014
GASFIELD

DATE OF LETTER HOLD.

SNAP SHOT OF MAILBOX

NO RECORDS FOR THOSE THAT LEFT.

SE OFF, (AND A BUREAU) OFFICIAL RECORDS.

varying retention
period
by topic

#8

1A8

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

-302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFO

Serial # of Originating Document

9

Date Received

9/24/15

From

~~WFO~~

[Redacted]

WILMERTHALE

(Name of Contributor or Interviewee)

b6
b7C

1875 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW

(Address)

WASHINGTON, DC 20006

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

Title:

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

~~PROPERTY RECEIPT~~

LETTER FROM WILMERTHALE

1A8

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-17-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

Case ID: _____

On (date) SEPT 24, 2015

item (s) listed below were:

- Collected/Seized
- Received From
- Returned To
- Released To

(Name) WILMER HALE

(Street Address) 1875 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW

(City) WASHINGTON DC 20006

Description of Item (s): _____

(1) LAPTOP - APPLE MAC BOOK AIR

S/N

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

9/24/2015

HRC-1108

b6
b7C

Received By: [Redacted]


Received From: [Redacted]

Printed Name/Title: [Redacted] /SA

Printed Name/Title: [Redacted]

Delivered 09242015

1. One (1) silver Apple brand Mac Book Air laptop computer, Serial Number



b6
b7c

Copy

WILMERHALE

September 10, 2015

[Redacted]

National Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 201530

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

By Email: [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Thank you for talking with us on September 8 and 9, 2015, regarding our voluntarily providing the FBI two laptop computers and one external hard drive that belong to Justin Cooper. We have described these devices (hereinafter "Mr. Cooper's computer hardware") more fully in the enclosed document. This letter memorializes our agreement with the government about the removal of Mr. Cooper's personal and business files from Mr. Cooper's computer hardware.

As we discussed and as the government has agreed, before providing Mr. Cooper's computer hardware to the FBI, we will remove and securely delete Mr. Cooper's personal and business files. We will load personal and business files selected by Mr. Cooper onto a new computer owned by Mr. Cooper, and he will be free to retain and use that data in the ordinary course without restriction. WilmerHale will maintain and securely store a complete copy of all personal and business files removed from Mr. Cooper's computer hardware until such time that we reach a written agreement with the government as to what portion we should retain.

The following files will remain on Mr. Cooper's computer hardware when it is provided to the FBI: (1) Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton while she was in office extracted from his email files; and (2) back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. As we discussed and agreed regarding our consent for these remaining files on Mr. Cooper's computer hardware:

1. We authorize the government to possess and review all of Mr. Cooper's emails to or from Secretary Clinton while she was Secretary of State (January 21, 2009, to February 1, 2013). During that time, Secretary Clinton occasionally sent Mr. Cooper emails for hand-delivery to her husband, President Clinton. We are aware that some of those emails contain information marked "Attorney Client Privilege."
2. We authorize the government to possess files labeled as back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. These files do not belong to Mr. Cooper and we therefore lack the authority to consent to an examination of their contents.

Mr. Cooper's computer hardware contains one or more files labeled as back-up copies of blackberry devices, but that are not further labeled with an owner's name.

WILMERHALE

[Redacted]
September 10, 2015

Page 2

b6
b7C

As we discussed and as the government has agreed, we will open those files^{*} for the sole purpose of determining whether one or more of them is a back-up copy of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. Any file determined to be a back-up copy of her blackberry device will remain on Mr. Cooper's computer hardware and be provided to the FBI. As with the files labeled with Secretary Clinton's name, these files do not belong to Mr. Cooper and we therefore lack the authority to consent to an examination of their contents.

Mr. Cooper will not transfer, copy, or retain in any form the files that will remain on Mr. Cooper's computer hardware provided to the FBI.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

b6
b7C

^{*} Our forensics team will first copy these files to an external drive and open and review them in that location. Our team will not open those files on the original machine.

Justin Cooper's Computer Hardware

- A. One (1) silver Apple brand Mac Book Air laptop computer, Serial Number C02LF01CFM74
- B. One (1) silver Apple brand Mac Book Pro laptop computer, Serial Number W89361H6644, and charging cord
- C. One (1) black Seagate brand external hard drive, Serial Number NA5AGV8A, and USB cord

Copy

WILMERHALE

September 24, 2015

[Redacted]

National Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 201530

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

By Email: [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Pursuant to our letter agreement with the government dated September 10, 2015, today we voluntarily provided the FBI one silver Apple brand Mac Book Air laptop computer, Serial Number C02LF01CFM74 ("Mac Book Air"), that belongs to Justin Cooper.¹ We provided the Mac Book Air for the purposes of DOJ/FBI's investigation of Secretary Clinton's personal email accounts.

As agreed, we have securely deleted from the Mac Book Air Mr. Cooper's personal and business files, and we have overwritten its unallocated space with zeros. WilmerHale is maintaining and securely storing a complete copy of all personal and business files removed from the Mac Book Air until such time that we reach a written agreement with the government as to what portion we should retain.

The following files remain on the Mac Book Air: (1) Mr. Cooper's emails² to and from Secretary Clinton while she was in office extracted from his email files; and (2) back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. The attached document describes in greater detail the files remaining on the Mac Book Air. As we agreed on September 10, 2015, regarding our consent for the files remaining on the Mac Book Air:

1. We authorize the government to possess and review all of Mr. Cooper's emails to or from Secretary Clinton while she was Secretary of State (January 21, 2009, to February 1, 2013). During that time, Secretary Clinton occasionally sent Mr. Cooper emails for hand-delivery to her husband, President Clinton. We are aware that some of those emails contain information marked "Attorney Client Privilege."
2. We authorize the government to possess the files labeled as back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. These files do not belong to Mr. Cooper and we therefore lack the authority to consent to an examination of their contents.

¹ We will provide the FBI an additional laptop computer and an external hard drive that also belong to Mr. Cooper at a later date.

² We treated any email addressed to or from Mr. Cooper as his email. As such, the Mac Book Air contains not only those emails that were sent between Mr. Cooper and Secretary Clinton, it also contains emails that were addressed to both Mr. Cooper and Secretary Clinton (within the same email).

[REDACTED]
September 24, 2015

Page 2

The Mac Book Air contained one or more files labeled as back-up copies of blackberry devices, but that were not further labeled with an owner's name. As we discussed and as the government agreed, we opened those files³ for the sole purpose of determining whether one or more of them was a back-up copy of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. None of those files contained an email account belonging to Secretary Clinton.

Mr. Cooper has not transferred, copied, or retained in any form the files that remain on the Mac Book Air. WilmerHale is temporarily holding an image of the Mac Book Air hard drive (which includes the files that remain on the Mac Book Air); we created this drive to enable us to restore data in the event our forensics team made an error when segregating and removing data. We are not aware of our forensics team making any errors, thus we will securely delete the image of the Mac Book Air in seven calendar days from today unless you advise us in writing that the files listed on the attachment (*i.e.*, the files remaining on the Mac Book Air) are corrupted or that their contents are otherwise irretrievable for reasons that could be cured with the image of the Mac Book Air. After we provide Mr. Cooper's remaining laptop to the FBI, and after a similar waiting period, we will degauss the drive that contains the image of the Mac Book Air drive.

Sincerely yours

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Enclosure

³ Our forensics team first copied these files to an external drive and opened and reviewed them in that location. Our team did not open those files on the Mac Book Air.

Enclosure // 09/24/2015

All items reside in \Users\Jcooper\Desktop (Item numbers have no significance; item numbers used here for reference only)

Item 1

drwxr-xr-x@ 5 502 20 170 Sep 15 18:15 Archive_email.mbox

Item 2

dr-xr-xr-x 1161 502 20 39474 Sep 16 12:45 Archive_email_documents

Item 3

-rw-r--r-- 1 502 20 66559 Sep 21 11:45 Archive_responsive_2009
Jan and Feb.rtf

Item 4

-rw-r--r-- 1 502 20 5641 Sep 21 12:05 Archive_responsive_2009
March.rtf

Item 5

-rw-r--r--@ 1 502 20 17040306 Feb 26 2013 HR BlackBerry Bold
9900.ipd

Item 6

-rwxrwxrwx 1 502 20 25446688 Apr 13 2009 hrc
Backup-(2009-04-13).ipd

Item 7

-rw-r--r-- 1 502 20 26283514 Nov 26 2011 hrc BlackBerry Curve
(24B603D0) (2011-11-26) - Full.bbb

Item 8

drwx----- 5 502 20 170 Aug 15 12:39 hrc saved

Item 9

-rw-r--r-- 1 502 20 385147 Nov 26 2011 hrc saved.bbb

Item 10

-rw-r--r-- 1 502 20 385147 Nov 26 2011 hrc saved.xml

Item 11

-rw-r--r-- 1 502 20 385147 Nov 26 2011 hrc saved.zip

#12

1A12

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302 b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 14

Date Received 10/5/15

From WILMER HALE
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

1975 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW
(Address)

WASHINGTON DC
(City and State)

By b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title: MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

LETTER FROM WILMERHALE AND
PROPERTY RECEIPT.

1A12

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-17-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

FD-597 (Rev. 4-13-2015)

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Receipt for Property

Case ID: _____

On (date) OCT 5, 2015

- item (s) listed below were:
- Collected/Seized
 - Received From
 - Returned To
 - Released To

(Name) WILMERHALE

(Street Address) 1875 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW

(City) WASHINGTON DC 20006

Description of Item (s): MAC BOOK PRO

S/A [Redacted]
POWER CORD

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

10/5/2015
8357

Received By [Redacted] (Signature)

Received From: [Redacted]

Printed Name/Title [Redacted]

Printed Name/Title: [Redacted]

b6
b7C

FBI Copy

WILMERHALE

October 5, 2015

[Redacted]

National Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 201530

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

By Email: [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Pursuant to our letter agreement with the government dated September 10, 2015, today we voluntarily provided the FBI one silver Apple brand MacBook Pro laptop computer, Serial Number W89361H6644 ("MacBook Pro"), that belongs to Justin Cooper.¹ We provided the MacBook Pro for the purposes of DOJ/FBI's investigation of Secretary Clinton's personal email accounts.


As agreed, we have securely deleted Mr. Cooper's personal and business files from the MacBook Pro, and we have overwritten its unallocated space with zeros. WilmerHale is maintaining and securely storing a complete copy of all personal and business files removed from the MacBook Pro until such time that we reach a written agreement with the government as to what portion we should retain.

The following files remain on the MacBook Pro: (1) Mr. Cooper's emails² to and from Secretary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State extracted from his email files; and (2) back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. The attached document describes in greater detail the files remaining on the MacBook Pro. We resolved several issues for the MacBook Pro as follows:

- Using MD5 hash values, Kroll determined that two text files on the MacBook Pro were identical to two text files on the MacBook Air provided to the FBI on September 24, 2015. As we agreed, because those files are identical and had therefore already been preserved in Kroll's processing of the MacBook Air, we did not review and save the responsive portions of those two files on the MacBook Pro.
- Again using MD5 hash values, Kroll determined that two text files on the MacBook Pro were identical to each other. As we agreed, because those files were identical to each other, Kroll processed only one of them.

¹ We will provide the FBI an external hard drive that also belongs to Mr. Cooper at a later date.

² We treated any email addressed to or from Mr. Cooper as his email. As such, the MacBook Pro contains not only those emails that were sent between Mr. Cooper and Secretary Clinton, it also contains emails that were addressed to both Mr. Cooper and Secretary Clinton (within the same email).


October 5, 2015

Page 2


- Like the MacBook Air, the MacBook Pro contained files labeled as back-up copies of blackberry devices, but that were not further labeled with an owner's name. Kroll matched those files to the unlabeled blackberry back-up files on Mr. Cooper's MacBook Air using MD5 hash values. As described in my letter of September 24, 2015, Kroll had previously determined those files on the MacBook Air did not contain an email account belonging to Secretary Clinton.

As we agreed on September 10, 2015, regarding our consent for the files remaining on the MacBook Pro:

- We authorize the government to possess and review all of Mr. Cooper's emails to or from Secretary Clinton while she was Secretary of State (January 21, 2009, to February 1, 2013). During that time, Secretary Clinton occasionally sent Mr. Cooper emails for hand-delivery to her husband, President Clinton. We are aware that some of those emails contain information marked "Attorney-Client Privilege."³
- We authorize the government to possess the files labeled as back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's blackberry device. These files do not belong to Mr. Cooper and we therefore lack the authority to consent to an examination of their contents.

Mr. Cooper has not transferred, copied, or retained in any form the files that remain on the MacBook Pro. WilmerHale is temporarily holding an image of the MacBook Pro hard drive (which includes the files that remain on the MacBook Pro and the text files described above) to enable us to restore data in the event our forensics team made an error when segregating and removing data. We are not aware of our forensics team making any such errors, thus we will securely delete the image of the MacBook Pro and degauss the drive in seven calendar days from today unless the government advises us in writing that the files listed on the attachment (*i.e.*, the files remaining on the MacBook Pro) are corrupted or that their contents are otherwise irretrievable for reasons that could be cured with the image of the MacBook Pro hard drive.

Sincerely yours



b6
b7C

Enclosure

³ Because Mr. Cooper's emails contain information marked "Attorney-Client Privilege," David Kendall, counsel to Secretary Clinton, is reviewing Mr. Cooper's emails.

ATTACHMENT

JG Cooper MacBook Pro // 10022015

(Item numbers have no significance; used here for sake of reference)

Item 1

hrc saved 2

macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\hrc saved 2

Item 2

hrc BlackBerry Curve (24B603D0) (2011-11-26) - Full.bbb

bbb 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 1c3c62e765f7b85d9cc35f3c0cf57f7e
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\hrc BlackBerry Curve (24B603D0) (2011-11-26) - Full.bbb

Item 3

hrc saved.bbb

bbb 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 bca9c5661494e15c1aa1f8902ce9ab11
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\hrc saved.bbb

Item 4

HR BlackBerry Bold 9900.ipd

ipd 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 acaf592275644075510cf53110df4567
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\Mail Download\HR BlackBerry Bold
9900.ipd

Item 5

hrc saved (folder)

Item 6

hrc Backup-(2009-04-13).ipd

ipd 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 af8ad110a4faf0fa4234fa6151675f6f
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\hrc Backup-(2009-04-13).ipd

Item 7

Archive_email.mbox

mbox macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\Archive_email.mbox

Item 8

Responsive - PC Mail - Sent Items.mbox

mbox macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\Responsive - PC Mail - Sent Items.mbox

Item 9

responsive PC Mail inbox old server inbox.rtf

rtf 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 18ed6542b5e4ab3f69384bdbbc7d3fa2
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\responsive PC Mail inbox old server inbox.rtf

Item 10

responsive PC Mail Inbox.rtf

rtf 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 ac71599abc6d62ff95482ce7c8012f9a
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\responsive PC Mail Inbox.rtf

Item 11

hrc saved.zip

zip 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 bca9c5661494e15c1aa1f8902ce9ab11
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\hrc saved.zip

Item 12

hrc saved.xml

xml 10/2/2015 0:00 10/2/2015 16:49 bca9c5661494e15c1aa1f8902ce9ab11
macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\hrc saved.xml

Item 13

Mail Download

macbook pro\Single Files\pro - responsive\Mail Download

1A21

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

-302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFO

Serial # of Originating Document

24

Date Received

10-23-15

From

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

FBI HQ

(Address)

Washington DC

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title:

Midyear Exam

Reference:

Interview Notes

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:



Original notes re interview of

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

1A21

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

DOB

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

on w/ Rice

- 6 yrs DS

was on detail @ same
time, but now w/ IRS.

b6 per
b7C FBI

LAFO -

[Redacted]

Sec Detail -

[Redacted]

w/ Rice -

[Redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI
b7E Per DOS

[Redacted]

Chap address - would usually take w/air shutt.
from DCA to White Plains - take her back & forth
USSS handled most security

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI
b7E Per DOS

DSS - SAC (SES)

[Redacted]

ASAC -

[Redacted]

over shift
Admin

SSA for shifts

SAs between shifts

all still
w/ DSS.

[Redacted]

- direct SSA over RM

b6 per
b7C FBI

[Redacted]

WFO/DSS

- both SAs on details

[Redacted]

WFO/DSS

@ DOS. 7th Floor

[Redacted]

b7E Per DOS

① / drop phones on DSS office on 2nd floor by motorcade.

Blackberry -
don't recall computer in office

Sec Clinton would keep phone in [Redacted] top Drawer & come out to get phone & go to [Redacted] space to make call. b7E Per DOS

Huma Cheryl - offices inside [Redacted] didn't travel much overseas

Main traveling crew

[Redacted] constantly on device - can't remember. b6 per b7C FBI b7E Per DOS
[Redacted] (Mostly on trips)
Jake Sullivan. [Redacted]

can't recall specifics of devices used by above but prob blackberries

Poss gmail

[Redacted] b7E Per DOS

Never interacted w/ Sec or Cheryl via email but sometimes forwarded.
Clintonfoundation.org

Know 1 res^{in DC} had secure phone - would assume secure room, but not sure.

~~DSS team~~ Tech ~~Staff~~ Security Engineers / Specifically assigned to SecState.
traveled overseas to set up Comms.
(usually @ hotel)

Welcome letter provided by RSD to DSS concerning guidance on security in country. Not sure what was provided to Sec & direct staff

~~work~~ Hotwash after w/ Advance vs. Supervisors but RSD not part of it.

~~between~~ RSD cables prob go back to ^{DSS} SAC re security issues. DSS SSA RSD in charge of 7th floor.

DIP pouch - ^{DSS for} COMMS

but as far as sec. mostly processed

b7E Per DOS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI

Scheduler - would have contact to determine location, departure time

During Sweeps OCONUS.

[Redacted]

(S)

~~unprocessed~~

b1 Per DOS
b7E Per DOS

[Redacted]

(S)

1A23

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number - 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 27

Date Received 11/6/2015

From
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

U.S. Department of State
(Address)

(City and State)

By ITS/FE

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
 Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
 Yes No

Title: MIDYER EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of CPIC

Copy of email from Senior Special Agent
 U.S. Department of
State, dated 11/6/2015.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (OIG) [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, November 06, 2015 12:01 PM
To: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: Case email

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Look for

FW: 2003 Cable

Or

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 per DOS, FBI
b7C per DOS, FBI

Senior Special Agent
Office of Investigations
Office of the Inspector General
US Department of State
[Redacted] office
[Redacted] cell

1A24

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

-302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

28

Date Received

10/29/2015

From

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

By

SA

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title:

MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

FD-597 + State Department
Property Transaction

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- (1.) **Date**
Enter the date the form DS-584 is prepared.
- (2.) **Action**
Enter an "X" in the select action field to indicate the type of property action.
 - **Issue** - asset(s) issued to or moved from the warehouse or storage facility to an employee, office, residence, or other location.
 - **Turn In** - asset(s) turned in or moved from an employee, office, residence, or other location back to the warehouse or storage facility
 - **Loan** - asset(s) provided to an entity (see 14 FAM 412.4-2 (a) for specifics) for a period of less than 90 days and/or no more than a year.
 - **Reutilization** - the movement of an asset within a bureau or post from one location to another. The movement of an asset from one bureau or post to another bureau or post.
 - **Transfer** - the movement of asset(s) from DOS to another federal agency when title is passed.
- (3.) **Control/Authorization Number**
System generated by ILMS.
- (4.) **Loan Information**
Enter the date the loan ends and the date the loan is returned.
- (5.) **Requestor's Name (Print Name)**
Enter the name of the receiving agency/post/bureau contact.
- (6.) **Post/Agency/Bureau**
Enter the name of the receiving agency/post/bureau.
- (7.) **Office**
Enter the name of the office.
- (8.) **Room Number**
Enter the room number.
- (9.) **Telephone Number**
Enter the telephone number of the receiving agency/post/bureau contact.
- (10.) **Justification or Remarks**
Enter the reason for the request and any other item specific details.
- (11.) **Authorizing Officer (Print Name)**
Enter the authorizing officer name.
- (12.) **Authorizing Officer (Signature) and Date (mm-dd-yyyy)**
Enter the authorizing officer signature and date (14 FAM 411.2, 14 FAM 414, and 14 FAM 425).
- (13.) **Approving Officer (Print Name)**
Enter the approving officer name.
- (14.) **Approving Officer (Signature) and Date (mm-dd-yyyy)**
Enter the approving officer signature and date (14 FAM 411.2, 14 FAM 414, and 14 FAM 425).
- (15.) **Deliver or Ship to (List Registry Information)**
The delivery address of the agency to which the property is being transferred.
- (16.) **Property Details**
 - Property Number** -
Enter the nonexpendable property application (*tag*) property number.
 - Serial Number** -
Enter any serial number.
 - Description** -
Enter description.
 - Quantity** -
Each line will be a one-item entry.
 - Condition** -
Indicate the condition of the property.
 - Unit Cost** -
Enter the unit cost.
 - Total Cost** -
Enter the total cost.
- (17.) **Property Records**
Update property records.
- (18.) **Receipt**
The receiving agency's employee signs and dates (14 FAM 413.3).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized

File: # _____

On (date) 10/29/2015

- item(s) listed below were:
- Received From
 - Returned To
 - Released To
 - Seized

b6
b7C

(Name)

(Street Address) 2025 E St., NW

(City) Washington, DC

Description of Item(s): HP dc 5850 desktop computer #N

b6
b7C

HRC-1164

Received By:

Received From:
(Signature)

b6
b7C

#26

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

302-1A

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFO

Serial # of Originating Document

30

Date Received

11/3/2015

From

[Redacted]

(Interviewee)

b6
b7C

805 21st NW Suite 400

(Address)

WASHINGTON DC

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

Title:

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

[Redacted]

on 11/3/15

b6
b7C

[redacted]

11-3-15

b6
b7c

Didn't speak to DOS about same matter

1st of emails released / contacted by Vice Media
title "Wikileaks" - redacted.

@ DOS Feb 09 - end of Sec term

[redacted]

met w/ HC. Volunteered to take

b6
b7c

Dep Sec of State

[redacted]

under Pres. Clinton

"Clintonista"

99. @ Pentagon Asst.

2003 - Hire #13

2009 - conversation about

[redacted]

b6
b7c

requested DOS.

[redacted]

- initial spokesperson

[redacted]

took over

in both roles.

Confirmed ^{Thurs 6th} Memorial Day

Sworn in day after M. day 2009

Met w/ Sec @ 8:45 every morning

in many bilateral mtgs.

Saw Sec. 4-5 times a day - most interactions

in person.

didn't email a lot.

2010 (April) got sense of Wikileaks

2010 (Nov) came about fully.

would try to guide as to why certain info shouldn't be put out.

General Rule - wouldn't talk about classified material contained in a cable but would find ways to talk about stuff w/o talking about the classified

Most of Dec / Born daily & no mtgs in Mails office to manage Wikileaks.

w/ Wiki "playing defense" most of time. batting av. .250 / .300 gave it best shot.

Would highlight not to post in entirety or would provide background so wouldn't misread cables.

outside of Wikileaks -

how to talk about diplomatic conversation in public sphere w/o getting into details that may be confidential/protected.

Respect what has come out of Benghazi ex. look back & determine something was classified even though thought was it wasn't @ time

HC Inner Circle

Cheryl Mills - lead / COS

Huma
Jace } always w/ sec.

usually would go through Mills, but sometimes would go direct w/ HC.

judgement call on what provided by email.
no guidance

"Didn't think it was a big deal she didn't use DOS email."

HC very much a paper person.
"paper drove system over email"

decisions always made re: "How do I deliver this fact w/o compromising sources & Methods?"

Mtg. w/ NY Times Ed. Nov 2010 @ DOS

re: classified info now in open space.

Told - not to access NYT from work, but okay @ home.

Mid Nov - Early Jan - daily conversations w/

[redacted]

b6
b7c

would cite cable #s and asked for comments before release.

Attempted to set rules -

NYT would pass off to other outlets.

NYT would remove some names

Nobody comes to mind as a blatant security violator.

(TPs)

generally generated on low side country desk officer original.

shop out to other equities who may have a weigh in.

↓
Desk officers know "protect sources/methods"

No ^{security} concerns looking back @ how HC handled her comms during her time @ DOS.

Standard comms between PA & Sec through Ops

↓
IO met w/ HC everyday @ 9:45

colleagues outside this group prob emailed w/ HC more.

A-bureau
Pat Kennedy* - 2^{likely} involved w/ setup of email & system used by HC
& Mills

1A27

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

31

Date Received

11-15-15

From

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

US Dept. of State

(Address)

NW Washington DC

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

Midyear Exam

Reference:

Interview Notes

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

1A27

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-17-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

RELEASE IN
FULL

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 10:14 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Stevens Update (Important)
Importance: High

Jake may have sent but in case not..

----- Original Message -----

From: Davis, Timmy T
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 06:48 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Abedin, Huma; Wells, Alice G; S_SpecialAssistants
Subject: Stevens Update (Important)

*New York
replaced
McManus*

(SBU) Per Special Envoy Stevens:

- The situation in Ajdabiyah has worsened to the point where Stevens is considering departure from Benghazi. The envoy's delegation is currently doing a phased checkout (paying the hotel bills, moving some comms to the boat, etc). He will monitor the situation to see if it deteriorates further, but no decision has been made on departure. He will wait 2-3 more hours, then revisit the decision on departure.
- He received reports of shelling last night in Ajdabiyah as well as snipers shooting people in the city. AFRICOM reported Qadhafi's forces took the eastern and western gates of Ajdabiyah, with 5 vehicles at the eastern gate and 50 at the western gate. More Qadhafi forces are heading to Ajdabiyah from Brega.
- The Brits report Qadhafi forces are moving from Sirte to Brega, which they interpret as preparation for another assault on Ajdabiyah today.
- He plans to discuss the situation further with the Brits, Turks, and the TNC to see if this is an irreversible situation. Departure would send a significant political signal, and would be interpreted as the U.S. losing confidence in the TNC. Initial message to the TNC would frame the departure as due to security grounds and as a temporary measure only.
- Polaschik said she would discuss these developments with Amb. Cretz.
- If the group departs, the contract for the boat stipulates they return to Greece. One scenario could be the group stages elsewhere for a few days.

Ops will continue to monitor the situation.

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

Feb 2009 - 2013

↳ Ops Center [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Later [Redacted]

Advance Staff -
"The Line"

March/April 2010 became Clintons

(2)

[Redacted]

on travel Specialist
12-15 people
travel w/.

filled in during holiday

Info/Action memos - decide what Sec needs to see.
Intel Notes

INR brings to [Redacted]

(1) 6 AM - 3 PM

PDB Briefer is separate.

(2) 12 - when work is done.

talk to rest of building to learn what to brief
Make sure useful

Reports mix bag:

some as mundane as

ceremony in

place when Clinton arrived

BCL - brief checklist

Talking Points not class

~~Secret to Codeword~~

Secret to Codeword - would be careful to make sure proper classification put in proper folder in office 100% paper. - Folders clearly marked.

on travel - Communicate w/ line and Sec's XOs - Joe McMannus.
Communicate both high & low

b6
b7c

Guidance on when to send up?

sort of get a sense of when sent where
very skittish about sending stuff to anyone.
would originally check w/ XO, but eventually
got comfortable.

COS.

High side / Low side

Jake worked till 11 PM - Dept COS Policy
workshop

Huma. Dep COS Ops. / concerned about trips logistics

Would have been weird to send HC emails direct.
possible only direct email during Royal Wedding

Had no knowledge HC working off personal server
knew didn't have computer on her desk.
* no electronics in office.

~~did not~~

only showed up as H. odd b/c convention
usually last, first.

assumed it was DOS b/c knew she had a
Blackberry.

All office emails came out from time to time

2005 w/ Blackwater in Iraq as FSO w/ DOS.
Email was only option back then.

2012-2013 @ [redacted] [redacted] VERY specific about email record.

no explicit conversation @ DOS.

Banner on computer
Always assumed way to do it - just assumed was for the record. no matter what.

POEMS - on poems system.

[when sent to Jake, Hanna, Milk had no idea would be forwarded to HC.

Everyone in a while received emails about system being hacked. Don't recall timing but someone from POEMS would talk to someone.
No specifics

4-10-2011 email

email result of unclass email from OPS center.
could be @ home or @ work.

① strip trail of emails - who sent it, etc.

so Hanna, Jake, Alice just get facts.

clean & make pretty.

May have fixed spelling.

probably put word (Important)
probably came from ~~the~~
person's account. S-ESD (cc'd).

b6
b7c

S-ESD.

(SES=O

OPS
Executive
Secretary
[redacted]
Joe McLannan

often times would get stuff from ops didn't push forward. or would brief orally.

Not to recollection of ops moving classified up.

Ops Specialist

Watch Fax/Machine hooked up to all of IC.
1 person on shift deals spec. w/ this

"Info comes from everywhere to DoS"

~~ops train to someone~~

Ops Specialists - majority Civil Service

extensive training - structured training

Most of training @ DoS. - field trips

↓
12-14 shifts
b/4 on own.

INR watch behind S/W

"Think discussion over email class is healthy.
min Prob v/ way DoS garners/uses info"

1A28

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number [redacted] - 302 b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 33

Date Received 11-23-2015

From [redacted] b6
b7C
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

[redacted]
(City and State)

By [redacted] b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Reference: Interview Notes
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of [redacted] b6
b7C

1A28

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 11-17-2016

RELEASE IN PART
B1,B7(D),B7(E),1.4(D),B7(A)

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:44 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: FYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection

Fyi:

Dep. Sec Und. Sec Political Affairs

From: Jones, Beth E
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 07:14 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: FYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Principal DAS NEA.
This preliminary, but very interesting, pls see below. FBI in Tripoli is fully involved.

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 07:01 PM
To: Jones, Beth E; Maxwell, Raymond D;
Subject: FYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection

b1 per DOS, FBI
b3 per FBI
b7A per DOS
b7D per DOS
b7E per DOS

Post reports that Libyans police have arrested several people today who may/may have some connection to the Benghazi attack. They were acting on information furnished by DS/RSC

B7(E)

B7(A)
B7(E)

[Large redacted block]

1.4(D) (S)
Overall, B1
B7(D)

this could lead to something operationary, or not, and it could lead to news accounts from Libya saying there is a significant break in the case, or not.

At this point, just FYI.

[Redacted box]

Department of State

[Redacted box]

A/Dep. Chief of Mission Tripoli (probably based on Phone Call)
Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 05/22/2015 ~ Class: SECRET/NOFORN ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 11/18/2032

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Spoke nearly every day.

11-23-2015

@ [redacted]

b6 per
b7C FBI

Roles during Sec in office

[redacted]

b6 Per FBI, DOS
b7C Per FBI, DOS

Sr. Working level expert [redacted]

Main interface through (NEA)
(CIA) ASIS
A/Sec Feltman (Jeffrey D.)

later Beth Jones

~~DOS~~ Janet Sanderson

Ray Maxwell

Didn't communicate directly w/ Sec Staff.

Never communicated directly w/ Sr/State

Don't recall comm directly w/ Sec ~~Cham~~ Staff

No w/ Mills

Maybe 1 or 2 w/ Sullivan.

Separate terminals for unclass v. classified
on phone every day talking to Amb. Lybia
talked regularly w/ Amb. (Stevenson) → both open & class
↳ limited classified capabilities
mobile share phones.

① Comen early - talk to Steven ~~star~~ on phone.

② brief DAS orally - DAS brief up important info to Asst Sec.
- Sometimes write an email if particularly

questions would come back down through chain of command

Feltman
or Egan

↓
J. Sullivan
C. Mills

No knowledge of external email / sender.
never received an direct email from Sec of State.
learned when stuff come out in Press

NOV 18, 2012 EMAIL

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

briefings usually in AM - email sent in PM
probably working although Sunday.
but may not have had others in office

If sent to Sullivan assumed forward. or brief to Sec of State.

Re: [Redacted] contact

everyday would brief contact ↑ via email or orally.
would log in notebook

b6
b7C

presume [Redacted] got from RSO or Legat/Cairo ^{visiting from}

SMART system

Didn't archive emails @ DoS.

only filing would be when email got full / slide over to free up mailbox.

~~Didn't~~ Congress ~~didn't~~

Language in email probably b/c of special circumstances.

never used ^{non} DoS email for work.

Never asked to move from high to low in a way that didn't seem right.

Worked w/ Ops Ctr. to set up calls etc.
couple x a week.

Crisis Mgt Group in Ops. during Crisis in Libya

Mgt. level

FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J76J18T80
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037
DATE: 11-17-2016

RELEASE IN PART
B1,B7(D),B7(E),1.4(D),B7(A)

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:44 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: FYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection

Fyi

DS (#2) v/s RSC FBI. Acc (#5)

From: Jones, Beth E
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 07:14 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Fw: FYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

This preliminary, but very interesting, pls see below. FBI in Tripoli is fully involved.

b1 per DOS, FBI
b3 per FBI
b6 per FBI
b7A per DOS
b7C per FBI
b7D per DOS
b7E per DOS

From: Roebuck, William V
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2012 07:01 PM
To: Jones, Beth E; Maxwell, Raymond D; [Redacted]
Subject: FYI - Report of arrests -- possible Benghazi connection

AS DAS

Post reports that Libyans police have arrested several people today who may/may have some connection to the Benghazi attack. They were acting on information furnished by DS/RSC [Redacted]

B7(E)

B7(A)
B7(E)

[Large redacted block]

1.4(D)
B1
B7(D)

(S)

Overall, this could lead to something operationally, or not, and it could lead to news accounts from Libya saying there is a significant break in the case, or not.

At this point, just FYI.

[Redacted box]

Department of State

[Redacted box]

*A/DCM TRIPOLI
PHONE CALL.*

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 05/22/2015 ~ Class: ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 11/18/2032

*RSC LEGAT IN
TRIPOLI
FROM CIA/DO.*

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Current: [Redacted]

Former: Director [Redacted]

• Introduction

- Voluntary / Can stop at any time
- NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS
- FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users. FBI is sensitive to conflicting opinions on the classification of materials – same info from two sources may have different classification levels based solely on the source of the info, i.e., sigint vs. diplomatic liaisons.

b6
b7C

• Brief overview of role(s) between 2/09 and 1/13.

- [Redacted] Guidance on what information is forwarded
- Access to / training on handling of classified information.
 - Guidance on handling classified leaks, or inquiries from press

- NEA / A/S Jeff [unclear]
Beta Jones → Sec.
- DAS.
- RAY [unclear]
- [unclear]

• Knowledge of the server

- Frequency of emails to / from
- Guidance on sending material to the server
- Procedure for communicating classified information to the Secretary (if applicable)
 - Did it vary when she was traveling, in NY, etc.
- Concerns with the use of the server or other communication channels

• Discussion of specific email(s)

- ICIG believed that classified information may be contained in email sent by [Redacted]
 Subject: FYI – Report of Arrest ... sent Sunday, Nov 18, 2011 to multiple parties, forwarded to Sullivan, then to Secretary
 Details surrounding the email chain in question.

b6
b7C

- What was the source of the information cited
- Knowledge of information being sent to the Secretary
- Was the information communicated via other channels as well
 - How, Why
- Typical of other communications made via email?

• Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.

• NDA request

1A29

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 34

Date Received 11/20/2015

From
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)


Description: Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

(SCANNED NOTES - ORIGINALS BEING SENT VIA DIP PACKET)

1A29

HRC-1185




b6
b7C

- Introduction
 - Voluntary / Can stop at any time
 - NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS
 - FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users. FBI is sensitive to conflicting opinions on the classification of materials – same info from two sources may have different classification levels based solely on the source of the info, i.e., sigint vs. diplomatic liaisons.

- Brief overview of role(s) between 2/09 and 1/13.

-
-
-



b6
b7C

- Background on Operations Center
 - Role of Watch Officer/Senior Watch Officer
 - Training
 - Chain of command
 - Guidance on what information is relevant/forwarded
 - How is information pushed forward (verbally/email)
 - Who receives information from the Watch? How?
 - Use of listservs – access to check? Typical delivery?
 - How is watch information documented/archived?
 - Who is responsible? Who has access?
 - Access to / training on handling of classified information.
 - Ever push classified from classified to unclassified?
 - Frequency? Directed? Protocol for doing so?
 - Guidance on press inquiries/leaks of classified information
 - Explanation of "The Line?"
- Knowledge of the server
 - Frequency of emails to / from HRC
 - Guidance on sending material to the HRC server
 - Procedure for communicating classified information to the Secretary (if applicable)
 - Did it vary when she was traveling, in NY, etc.
 - If not direct to HRC, who did you email?
 - Extent of interaction/relationship with Huma Abedin, Jake Sullivan, Cheryl Mills?
 - Concerns with the use of the server or other communication channels
 - Discussion of specific email(s)




o ICIG believed that classified information may be contained in email sent by [redacted]
[redacted] Subject: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call sent Friday, July 3, 2009
to SES_DutyDeputies, [redacted] [redacted] S_SpecialAssistants, Joseph
E. Macmanus, and Cc: SES-OSWO-Only, [redacted]

b6
b7C

- Details surrounding the email chain in question?
- Background on "DPRK conference call"
 - How did you come to learn of the call?
 - How was the call scheduled?
 - Who took notes on the call? [redacted] Is this typical for SWO?
 - Was the call secure? Unclassified?
 - Who was involved in the call? Job roles of participants?

b6
b7C

*UN High Ranking
@ NY @ time*



b6
b7C

- What was the original source of the information cited? *105 DD @ WTNSC for East Asia*
- Was the information communicated via other channels as well?
 - How, Why
- Typical of other communications made via email?

- Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.
- NDA request


@ UN poss DC or NY

Staffers for others on call.

Op Center Records?

11-20-2015

©




b6
b7C

Sept.



b6
b7C



Sr. WO Most Senior
3 shifts.

World events
Crisis

Liaison w/ Sec Staff while on travel.

Daytime v. Night Shift

7-6 PM
Bureau of Intel & Res.
INR

Ops Center.

Ops Center

Crisis Mgt Support

Sr. Watch in Middle.

1st to answer
WO Section phone @ cables

after 7PM

Emerg Act. Off. Stations "hot spots"

7-8 personnel

Ops Specialist - clerical work

fax monitor

Watch officers

emer civil service or 3rd year

Comm. Affairs WO - comm.

in touch w/ Sec Comm. people

Dip. Sec @ time - not sure if still there

Swing station -- extra body on shift during day shift

INR -- own operation but present @

prim helped to put together call
liaison w/ crisis Mgt support

SES Duties - Dep. Exec. Secretary - Has classification authority

don't recall if call if secure or not.

often on open line
considering topic

orig reporting came in from other agency prob CIA.
classified

11p-7a overnight shift

7^a-3p

3p-12a

Briefed [redacted] on info Sr. Watch after

[redacted] (2 people)

b6
b7c

Ops Ctr. log.

not every call logged.

any Sec or D./S. or Under Sec or Asst Sec Log.

archives of cables.

11/20/15

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

SR WATCH OFFICER

- MOST OF ~~AFTER HRS~~ ON SHIFTS (ROTATE)
- 3 SHIFTS
- WORLD EVENTS / CRISIS
FOR ITEMS ON INTEREST FOR SEC/PRINCIPALS
- "EYES & EARS" FOR SEC
- CO-LOCATED w/ INTR & CRISIS MGMT SUPPORT
- MORE PEOPLE 7A-7P
- AFTER HRS 7P-6AM - 7-8 WATCH OFFICERS
 - MORE JUNIOR PEOPLE
 - CIVIC SERVANTS

WATCH CENTER - FUNCTION SERVE SEC., UNDER SEC.,

- SEW. OF
- WATCH OFFICER (WO) - PHONES, CABLES

ASST SEC.

- EMERGENCY ACTION OFFICER
- OPS SPECIALIST
- CONSULAR AFFAIRS OFFICER
- DS OFFICER
- SWING STATION
- INR REP.

CONNECTED TO OTHER AGENCIES / OVERSEAS.

- NO ANSWERS PHONE

- GATHER INFO & PUSH OUT.


- OPEN SOURCE (TV)

- CABLES FROM DOS, CIA, DIA etc

- CABLES - SENT VIA INTERNAL SYSTEM FOR CABLES

b6 -
b7C

- URGENT MATTERS



↳ FLAGGED FOR DIRECTOR OPS CENTER.

→ AFTER HOURS. DEPT ASST SEC → TO Sec 3 COS

- FOR ^{URGENT} CLASSIFIED - CALL FIRST FOR GUIDANCE

NEVER EMAILED SEC DIRECTLY. (THAT SHE RELAYS)

- EMAILS VIA HUMA

↳ MIGHT ASK FOR A FOLLOWUP CALL ETC

- MASS EMAILS AT HOLIDAYS etc.

"FROM Secretary" (presumably STATE ACCOUNT)

- NO KNOWLEDGE OF "H" EMAIL ACCOUNT.

SPECIFIC EMAIL

- WAS ON CALL

Sec - RTH Sec. → Dept. Exec Sec. → TOLD TO CONDUCT CALL

- NOT SURE IF IT WAS SECURE CALL OR NOT,

BUT NOT UNCOMMON FOR IT TO BE UNCLASS. BK NOT EVERYBODY HAS A SECURE LINE AT RESIDENCE

- EXEC SEC ([REDACTED]) FOR DEPARTMENT of State

- NOT ACTIVE PARTICIPANT. → TOOK NOTES,

b6
b7C

FORWARDED TO PEOPLE WHO NEEDS TO

KNOW. BASED ON "CALL SHEETS" plus

Dept & Sec ADD ONS.

- CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ~ JUDGEMENT CALL

BY DEPT & SEC, WHO IS AN. OCA,

- ORIGINAL REPORTING.

↳ SOME AFTER ^{AND} REPORTING FROM Intel. Com (MAYBE AGENCY) MOST LIKELY CLASSIFIED.

AS CONFIDENTIAL AT THE LEAST.

EMAIL UNCLASS, NOT ALL HAVE CLUES ABOUT,

TYPICAL OF OTHER COMMS.

[REDACTED] - IN NY AT TIMES. High Ranking U.N. FUNCTION.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~Remove~~ - STAFFS FOR OTHER BUREAUS

[REDACTED]

- MAY HAVE BEEN FOLLOW ON DISCUSSIONS ON THE NEXT SHEET.

↳ [REDACTED] (SP?) SE W/OFF

~~FOIA~~ ON THE 4TH.

b6
b7C

- 2 SHIFTS IN B/TWN [REDACTED]

• WATCH LOG.

- ANY SEC CALL, Dept. Sec CALL, UNDER SEC AND ASST SEC CALLS, ALL LOGGED

CLASIFIED
MAY HAVE
SOME
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTES

- AND INCLUDES FOREIGN DIGNITARY (MAY BE CONFIDENTIAL)

• NO LOG FOR EMAILS.

• PRINT OR FORWARDED TO NEXT SHIFT, NO OTHER RECORD. S/WO EMAIL DISKED

LOG ENTRIES INCLUDE:

- PARTICIPANTS.
- TIME.
- SUBJECT / SUMMARY.

Roles

- WO - ANSWER PHONES, MONITOR CABLES, PUT TOGETHER CALLS, COORDINATE w/ PEOPLE ON FLOOR TO GET PARTICIPANTS. # OF CALLS DEPENDS ON EVENT. COULD BE ZERO.
- E.A.O. → WATCHES HOT SPOTS, LIAISON w/ CRISIS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT ~~TO~~ (TASK FORCES)
- SWING → EXTRA BODY DURING THE DAY TO HELP SWO.
- Ops Spec → CLERICAL WORK. FAXES, ^{SEE} COMMS PEOPLE TO GET INFO OUT.
- D.S. → IN HOUSE LIAISON w/ EMBASSIES / RESOX.
- CONSULAR AFFAIRS OFF → CONSULAR ISSUES AND OTHER AS NEEDED SUPPORT
- INR - STS IN BULLPEN BEHIND SWO ARE PLUGGED INTO INTEL COMMUNITY

1A30

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 35

Date Received 11/25/2015

From

b6
b7C

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

1875 Pennsylvania Ave.

(Address)

Washington DC 20006

By SA

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: 302
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

Property Receipt
Letter provided by Wilmer Hale

1A30

November 25, 2015

[REDACTED]
National Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 201530

[REDACTED]
b6
b7C

By Email: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Dear [REDACTED]

Pursuant to our letter agreement with the government dated September 10, 2015, today we voluntarily provided the FBI one black Western Digital brand My Passport Ultra external hard drive, Serial Number WXG1AA3M2130 ("WD Passport Drive"),¹ containing certain data requested by the government. We provided the WD Passport Drive for the purposes of DOJ/FBI's investigation of Secretary Clinton's personal email accounts.

The WD Passport Drive contains the following files:

1. Mr. Cooper's emails² to and from Secretary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State extracted from a copy of Mr. Cooper's personal and business files from his MacBook Air and MacBook Pro laptop computers.

As you know, we voluntarily provided the FBI with Mr. Cooper's MacBook Air and MacBook Pro on September 24, 2015, and October 5, 2015, respectively. Each machine contained Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State extracted from email files contained on those machines (along with back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's Blackberry device). Per our agreement with the government, Kroll identified those emails using the spotlight tool that was native to the laptops and worked exclusively on the laptop, *i.e.*, Kroll did not load or use any forensic tools to identify and isolate these emails.

WilmerHale retained a complete copy of Mr. Cooper's personal and business files removed from his MacBook Air and MacBook Pro by creating a "Time Machine" copy of those files. We then reviewed those Time Machine copies using forensic tools and identified Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton that are contained on the WD Passport Drive. We have securely deleted these emails from the personal and business files retained by WilmerHale.

¹ The WD Passport Drive is encrypted; we provided the password to the FBI.

² We treated any email addressed to or from Mr. Cooper as his email. As such, the WD Passport Drive contains not only those emails that were sent between Mr. Cooper and Secretary Clinton but also contains emails that were addressed to both Mr. Cooper and Secretary Clinton (within the same email). This letter refers to such email as "responsive" if it was also dated between January 21, 2009, and February 1, 2013 (Secretary Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State).

November 25, 2015
Page 2

b6
b7c

We believe that we previously produced a majority, likely a vast majority, of the emails on this portion of the WD Passport Drive and that our Time Machine inadvertently captured them as emails that were not produced. Our use of forensic software enabled us to identify, isolate, and remove them from the Time Machine.

2. Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State, as well as backup copies of Secretary Clinton's Blackberry devices, extracted from an archival image of Mr. Cooper's MacBook Air laptop computer dated December 30, 2013 ("12/30/13 Image").


WilmerHale is maintaining and securely storing a complete copy of all personal and business files removed from the 12/30/13 Image until such time that we reach a written agreement with the government as to what portion we should retain. WilmerHale is also temporarily holding a complete copy of the 12/30/13 Image. We will securely delete that complete copy in seven calendar days from today unless you advise us in writing that the files on the WD Passport Drive are corrupted or that their contents are otherwise irretrievable for reasons that could be cured with the copy we retained.³

3. Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State, as well as backup copies of Secretary Clinton's Blackberry devices, extracted from an archival image of Mr. Cooper's MacBook Air laptop computer dated August 30, 2015 ("8/30/15 Image").

This set of emails includes Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State extracted from backup copies of Mr. Cooper's Blackberry devices. By comparing MD5 hash values, Kroll determined that other known backup copies of Mr. Cooper's Blackberry devices were forensically identical to those on the 8/30/15 Image. For this reason, as we agreed with the government: (1) Kroll isolated (and we have produced) responsive emails from backup copies of Mr. Cooper's Blackberry devices located only on the 8/30/15 Image; and (2) we are retaining the non-responsive portion of the backup copies of Mr. Cooper's Blackberry devices with responsive emails from only the 8/30/15 Image.

WilmerHale is maintaining and securely storing a complete copy of all personal and business files removed from the 8/30/15 Image until such time that we reach a written agreement with the government as to what portion we should retain. WilmerHale is also temporarily holding a complete copy of the 8/30/15 Image. We will securely delete that complete copy in seven

³ As you know, we temporarily held images of the MacBook Air and MacBook Pro drives (including files that remained on those machines when they were delivered to the FBI) for the same purpose. You subsequently advised us that the FBI was able to open the files on those machines and we therefore securely deleted those images.


November 25, 2015
Page 3

b6
b7c


calendar days from today unless you advise us in writing that the files on the WD Passport Drive are corrupted or that their contents are otherwise irretrievable for reasons that could be cured with the copy we retained.

As we agreed on September 10, 2015, regarding our consent for the files remaining on the WD Passport Drive:

- We authorize the government to possess and review all of Mr. Cooper's emails to or from Secretary Clinton while she was Secretary of State (January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013). During that time, Secretary Clinton occasionally sent Mr. Cooper emails for hand-delivery to her husband, President Clinton. We are aware that some of those emails contain information marked "Attorney-Client Privilege."
- We authorize the government to possess the files labeled as back-up copies of Secretary Clinton's Blackberry device. These files do not belong to Mr. Cooper and we therefore lack the authority to consent to an examination of their contents.

We stated in our letters dated September 24, 2015, and October 5, 2015, that Mr. Cooper had not transferred, copied, or retained in any form the files that remained on the MacBook Air and the MacBook Pro. We have since determined that the 12/30/13 Image and the 8/30/15 Image described in this letter contained duplicates of certain files we provided to the FBI on the MacBook Air and MacBook Pro. As noted above, those files are contained on the WD Passport Drive; we will not transfer, copy, or retain those files except as described above. In addition, we have determined that our review/production protocol isolated and produced Mr. Cooper's emails to and from Secretary Clinton, but generally did not lead to us isolating and producing *duplicates* of those emails that were contained in longer chain emails that did not otherwise satisfy the criteria of your request. As you have requested, we are isolating those email chains for production.

Sincerely yours



b6
b7c

Enclosures

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized

File # _____

On (date) 11/29/2015

- item(s) listed below were:
- Received From
- Returned To
- Released To
- Seized

b6
b7C

(Name)

(Street Address) 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

(City) Washington, DC 20006

Description of Item(s): One (1) Western Digital My Passport Ultra external hard drive with Serial Number WX61AA3M2130.

b6
b7C

Received By: _____ (Signature)

Received From: _____ (Signature)

b6
b7C

1A31

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted]

302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WFD

Serial # of Originating Document

36

Date Received

12/7/15

From

[Redacted]

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

MID YEAR EXAM.

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

Original notes re interview of

EMAIL FROM

[Redacted]

DATED 12/7/15

b6
b7C

1A31

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2015 2:54 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: log

[Redacted]

For some reason I cannot find your email requesting I look for my phone logs. But I remember that I owe you a response. I have looked through the logs and records I kept. Unfortunately I only kept my notebooks right around and just after the Benghazi incident, i.e., in August and September 2012. I don't have any notebooks for later months. Sorry. Please let me know if there is anything else I can do. Regards, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

1A33

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number -302 b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 30

Date Received 12-14-15

From b6
b7C
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Washington DC
(City and State)

By ^{SH} b6
b7C

- To Be Returned Yes No
- Receipt Given Yes No
- Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
- Yes No
- Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
- Yes No

M. dyer Exam

Reference: Interview Notes
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of b6
b7C

1A33

12-16-15

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Didnt have access to classified ^{much} but had clearance. on class side some

~~in some parts of info~~

In mtgs where classified discussed

No prior relationship w/ HRC before ①

① Morning Meeting every day ^{rarely traveled w/ her.} 3-6 times a week when in town HRC not always there.

② didnt start emailing HRC until 6-8 mo

① didnt have email so would send to Huma

② some point HRC responded direct

③ [Redacted] asked Huma if okay to go direct

b6
b7c

"wasnt priv used lightly" - didnt think system was odd. Never in govt before but dealt w/ Gatekeeper system

when I email today I get back "H" believe before got back "S"

dont recall if PoS or private: dont think it shows.

No knowledge she was using her own server
peeps worked in class when some, but dont think [redacted]
ever emailed HC on classified system but
received training on use of class side

b6
b7C

[redacted] worked for [redacted] & may have emailed on
class side

Re: 9/12/2009 Email to Mills & Sullivan

"An"

view corruption was problem.
Big disagreement on issue.

this is

[redacted] writing. "I wouldn't have known this
stuff." "Good lord"

b6
b7C

Dont recall sending specifically.
Recall

Afghan Review in
process.

Furmer was [redacted] mentor, / talking to [redacted] as back channel
to HC. Made sure HC got a more diverse range of
views

[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] sent to [redacted].

b6
b7C

Noted email sent on Sat. - probably met w/ [redacted]
on phone. Probably forwarded from [redacted]
normal to cut out string b4.

After review believe info contained in books:

b6
b7C

5 & 6 showed a bit when re-read.

"wondering what extent I read... thought through carefully" (before sending up).

[redacted] bold thinker.

b6
b7C

get idea proposing not revealing
no idea what she meant by "Marja" Op.

Worked on class system little

[redacted]

prob sat entirely on class side
don't recall ever a conv. on unclass side that became
classified / would become confidential (smaller circle)

b6
b7C

In opinion - most policy & strategy
participating in conv. might have additional details
on class side.

Ran development speech for Ho.

2011 Email Op.Ed.

Dont recall ever being instructed not to use personal emails

- Used personal laptop.
- DoS Blackberry.
- Hard to get into DoS system w/ FOB.

- Routinely get into [redacted] @home & would switch back & forth.

b6 per
b7C FBI

Would get 5th emails from Mills - those werent DoS account - only one I remember. only VERY early.

Sullivan always on BB. dont recall ever using personal account.

Instructions mostly / think [redacted]

b6 Per FBI, DOS
b7C Per FBI, DOS

Dont think I ever

DoS Needs ↑ better technology.

C05759633

RELEASE IN PART
B1, B5, 1.4(D)

CLEAR WITH S/P,
S/SRAP

CONSULT DOD, CIA

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 7:48 AM
To: 'millsd@state.gov'
Cc: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'; 'abedinh@state.gov'
Subject: Re: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

Yes. Thx.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
To: H
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Sep 13 07:47:17 2009
Subject: FW: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

Is this what you are speaking of?

-----Original Message-----

From: Slaughter, Anne-Marie
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2009 9:23 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: [redacted] Abedin, Huma
Subject: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

*talked to every day. Determine what he
saw & what she didn't*

b6 per
b7C FBI

I had a long talk with [redacted]

[Large redacted area]

4(D)
14(D)
B5 (S)

b1 per
b5 DOS

01231


HRC-1213

~~SECRET~~

C05759633

b1 per
b5 DOS

(S)



01232

HRC-1214

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

- Introduction
 - Voluntary / Can stop at any time
 - NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS
 - FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users. FBI is sensitive to conflicting opinions on the classification of materials – same info from two sources may have different classification levels based solely on the source of the info,

- Brief overview of role(s) between 2/09 and 1/13.

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b6
b7C

- Frequency and method of communication with the Secretary
- Access to / training on handling of classified information.
 - Guidance on handling classified leaks, or inquiries from press

*- VA Cheryl -
Jane?*

- Knowledge of the server
 - Frequency of emails to / from
 - Guidance on sending material to the server
 - Procedure for communicating classified information to the Secretary (if applicable)
 - Did it vary when she was traveling, in NY, etc.
 - Concerns with the use of the server or other communication channels

- Discussion of specific email(s)
 - ICIg believed that classified information may be contained in email sent by Slaughter (subject "For S – for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow")

b6
b7C

- Details surrounding the email chain in question.
 - What was the source of the information cited
 - [Redacted]
 - How did you communicate sensitive / classified information
 - Typical of other communications made via email?

- Reservations about sending or unclass system

- Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.
- NDA request

*- when does party go from USS.
FBI June 03, 2011
Google email working*

[Redacted]

- Introduction

b6
b7C

- Voluntary / Can stop at any time
- NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS
- FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users. FBI is sensitive to conflicting opinions on the classification of materials – same info from two sources may have different classification levels based solely on the source of the info,

- [Redacted]

b6
b7C

- [Redacted]

- Frequency and method of communication with the Secretary
- Access to / training on handling of classified information.
 - Guidance on handling classified leaks, or inquiries from press
- Knowledge of the server
 - Frequency of emails to / from
 - Guidance on sending material to the server *NO*
 - Procedure for communicating classified information to the Secretary (if applicable)
 - Did it vary when she was traveling, in NY, etc.
 - Concerns with the use of the server or other communication channels

- Discussion of specific email(s)
 - ICIG believed that classified information may be contained in email sent by Slaughter (subject "For S – for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow")
 - Details surrounding the email chain in question.
 - What was the source of the information cited
 - [Redacted]
 - How did you communicate sensitive / classified information
 - Typical of other communications made via email?

b6
b7C

- Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.
- NDA request

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 11

Page 5 ~ Duplicate;

Page 6 ~ Duplicate;

Page 7 ~ Duplicate;

Page 67 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b6 - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 100 ~ Duplicate;

Page 101 ~ Duplicate;

Page 102 ~ Duplicate;

Page 103 ~ Duplicate;

Page 104 ~ Duplicate;

Page 105 ~ Duplicate;

Page 106 ~ Duplicate;

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
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1A45

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 52

Date Received 1/29/2016

From (see)

b6
b7C

NEW YORK, NY
(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

INTERVIEW NOTES

b6
b7C

EMAIL PROVIDED BY

1A45

[Redacted] (WF) (FBI)

b6
b7C

From: [Redacted]@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 2016 10:11 AM
To: [Redacted] (WF) (FBI)
Subject: [Redacted] Email Chain
Attachments: February 3 2016 Letter to [Redacted].pdf

Dear Special Agent [Redacted]

b6
b7C

As discussed, attached is the email chain.

Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions.

Warmly,

[Redacted]

February 3, 2016

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Special Agent
FBI, Washington Field Office

[Redacted]

Dear Special Agent [Redacted]

As discussed, below you will find the email chain we have been discussing. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions.

Very warmly,

/s/

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

1/29

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] joined DOS w/ [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Spec Assist

then

[Redacted]

left w/ [Redacted]

to join [Redacted]

- DIDN'T WORK DIRECTLY WITH HC
worked w/ Special Assistants w/ in BUREAU
C.M., H.A. (less), BP (social) J.C. (new)

- Political Appointee. SWORN IN, SECURITY BRIFING
TS/SCI (NO SAP/COMPARTMENTS), NO FOIA
ACTS OF FOIA TRAINING THAT SHE RECALLS

- DIDN'T EMAIL DIRECTLY w/ HC UNTIL SHE LEFT DOS.
HROD 17 (UNTIL SHE LEFT)

- KNEW SHE WAS USING A PERSONAL ACCOUNT.
DIDN'T KNOW IT WAS AN ISSUE UNTIL IN THE
PRESS

- USED STATE GOV ACCOUNT WHEN AT DOS.

- RECALLED OTHERS USING PERSONAL ACCOUNTS
i.e. [Redacted] might FORWARD EMAIL FROM PRINCETON.
Account.

b6
b7C

Policy
Doesn't
Recall
Official
Policy

- FREQUENTLY HANDLED CLASS INFO VIA HighSIDE

- DON'T KNOW HOW INFO WAS TRANSFERRED FROM
[Redacted] OR JS TO HC

b6
b7C


'NON PAPER'

- NOT FORMALLY SUBMITTED THROUGH THE SYSTEM. NOT FOR THE RECORD OF WORKING PAPER, NOT COSAR CBT, COULD BE A MEMO
- MAY BE ^{ON} A VARIETY OF TOPICS.
- COULD BE CLASSIFIED.



IPAD

- NO KNOWLEDGE OF.
- NEVER TRAVELED W/ HC WHILE AT DOS, W/ JS [REDACTED] ^{BT TRAVEL}
- NEVER AT RESIDENCES. (" "

PRIVATE OFFICE. AFTER DOS.



ZFS → LLC OR PRIVATE OFFICE



- PHONE CALLS, MEMOS, SUMMARIZING ARTICLES
- + [REDACTED]

Monica → Personal Assistant.



° NO MEMORY OF EMAILS BEING TURNED OFF
OR CALLED DOWN

PRN - JAN 2014

[] → WOULD GIVE ADVICE ON IT FOR THE TEAM. (INFRASTRUCTURE, BUYING LAPTOPS.) b6
b7c

- SPOKE FREQUENTLY

- I.E. ^{SHOULD WE!} GOOGLE BUSINESS, CLOUD BASED US OFFICE, etc

LAPTOP.

- SPOKE W/ MONICA APPROX 1 WITH AGO.

- NO RECOLLECTION OF RECEIVING IT.

[] WAS THE MAIN RECEIVER OF MAIL BUT b6
b7c

WOULDN'T OPEN IF IT WAS ADDRESSED TO []

* - HAS EMAILS W/ MONICA RE: ARCHIVE EFFORT, ^{FEB/MARCH 2014}

WILL PASS LAPTOP TO YOU.

~ MAYBE A MAC?

* - OCCURRED WHILE WORKING AT HOME WAS PROBABLY SENT TO THE FOUNDATION, NOT SURE HOW IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED IF NOT ADDRESSED TO HER

HACKS

RECALLS CYBER SECURITY AGENTS RE: PRC HACKING ACCOUNTS.

hrod17@

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

NY [Redacted] - worked from home [Redacted]

ZFS -

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Executive Asst.
briefing memos. / φ

[Redacted]

- April / May 2014
DD Sched.

b6
b7C

Huma cos.
Monia Valmoro - sched.

[Redacted]

PRN frequent

- Jan 2014 - July 14

NY office

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

gave advice on
IT Infrastructure

Cloud base

Mac
1 March
Feb 2014
Spoke April

↓ Mar!

Monica called 1-2 mo ago.
during period

Foundation

Sometimes take mail

~~SI/NTF~~

1A46

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 53

Date Received 2-1-2016

From Steven Mull
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

- To Be Returned Yes No
- Receipt Given Yes No
- Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
- Yes No
- Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
- Yes No

Midyear Exam

Reference: Interview Notes: Re Mull.
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Mull

1A46

~~SI/NTF~~

~~S/INT~~



~~S/INT~~

Mull
CDOS

2-1-16

2009-13

June 10 - Oct 12 - Executive Sec

2009 - June '10 - Sr. Advisor to Sec Pol Affairs

Nov 2012 - Aug 2015 - Amb Poland

In charge of entire ex. secretariat / in support of Sec. Dos.
Most interaction w/ Mills HRC Cas.

① Formal info processing to from Sec of State / OPS Ctr

② crisis mgt.

pull together TF to manage crisis on behalf of Sec Dos

③ support of travel - mng reporting (Mobile Comm)

④ IT support / Mobile # in office / All Sr. Principals
POEMS.

Didn't really know if personal email was common for
Sec of State.


Informal v. Formal commc.

Sec asked Mull to look into IPAD use. - carry Mills or Auma.

Re: Email "I think it was iPad"

Couldn't do b/c space.

Security personnel



b6
b7c

Never saw HC using mobile device in office
just famous pic of BB on plane. don't think
prohibition about it

Re: Email w/ HA about issuing DoS BB

set up terminal (usually)
normal means of comm not working so asked
for BB. from Exec. Sec.

told any comms subj to FOIA b/c DoS device
HA responded decided against.

Not aware HC ever issued DoS BB or ^{port} electronic device

Don't know who responsible for maintaining devices
or making sure within DoS policy.

Bluetooth vulnerabilities Email

Sec officer - wanted 7th floor to be aware
of vulnerabilities w/ BB or bluetooth
not sure what prompted.

b6
b7c

Some time in
2011

Concern private email accounts hacked

J. Sullivan

Heard from private emails compromised

b6
b7c

Everybody in the office on POEMS. Except the staff usually used POEMS. How much comm w/ them.

Assume blue tooth Cap on DAS devices disabled.

Sec private device - not aware S/Nap. out

MC comm team -

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

[Redacted]

Sec
for the office

John Bentel - head of POEMS.

Deputy for Admin Support
Direc Sup Mob team

(Tuli)

Mushingi

Now
Amb Nogadug /
Burkina Faso.

Ambassador Stephen Mull
Executive Secretary (2011)

[redacted] // Telephone [redacted] Office Manager [redacted]

b6
b7c

- Introduction
 - Voluntary / Can stop at any time ✓
 - NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS ✓
 - FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users.
- Brief overview of duties as the Executive Secretary
 - What were your duties as they related to the operation of the Secretary's private server, or other mobile comms platforms?
 - What were your duties as related to the Ops Center?
- Knowledge of the private server and email
 - Was there an approval process for the use of private email / email servers?
 - If so, what is the approval process for this arrangement? *Not responsible for setting up.*
 - What steps were taken to review the risks / benefits of this arrangement?
 - Who was involved in the review process?
 - Was this consistent with DoS policy at that time?
 - Did the server violate department policy as stipulated in the Foreign Affairs Manual?
 - What is the current policy today?
 - When / why did it change?
 - Who had knowledge of the server from DOS at the onset?
 - When did you become aware of the arrangement?
 - Did DOS have any role in setting up and / or maintaining the server?
 - If so, who specifically was responsible for this? *? dont know*
 - DoS employee, or a contractor?
 - If contractor, what steps to ensure actions were consistent with IMS-POEMS procedures, protocols?
 - If contractor, what steps to ensure appropriate threat monitoring?
 - Knowledge of Brian Pagliano's role? Payment structure?
 - What steps were taken to ensure appropriate security protocols were in place (updates, patches, antivirus, intrusion monitoring)?
 - Who paid for the set up costs and maintenance costs?
 - Were the secretary's server related expenses reimbursed by State?
 - If paid for by State, what is the policy on paying for the maintenance of personal property?
 - What guidance was provided by DoS regarding the transmission / storage of sensitive and/or classified information on the server?

No role in setting up / maintaining.
Not responsible for setting up.
knew Sec had own email account
Not aware of policy @ time

- What secure comms were available to the secretary at her home and when she was traveling?
 - Phone
 - Fax
 - Email (Classnet / JWICS)
- Discussion of emails
 - August 2011 email regarding state issued BB (connectivity issues following hurricane Irene)
 - November 2010 email regarding Bluetooth vulnerabilities (CLASSNET – SECRET)
 - Why was this sent to Cheryl? (i.e., was it requested, was it standard to send such alerts, etc)
 - Did they request the offered briefing / demo?
 - Were the implied recommendations to disable Bluetooth implemented?
 - By whom?
 - Who maintained her blackberry w/ respect to security etc
 - Did you have direct contact with them? How often?
 - Did they request information about DoS security recommendations? How often?
 - July 2010 Email (use of mobile device in office)
 - Background context on this?
 - What device are they referring to (ipad)?
 - What was the resolution – was she able to use it in her office?
 - Did she use other devices in her office?
 - Who else was involved in these discussions / approvals
- Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.
- NDA request

From: "Macmanus, Joseph E" <CLASSSTATE/CBPC ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP/RECIPIENTS/MACMANUSJE>
Sent: 10/6/2009 6:07:49 PM +00:00
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>; "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.sgov.gov>; "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: IT security in Moscow

Our Mobile Communications Team sent in an email on electronic surveillance and monitoring in Russia, which I've excerpted below. The gist of it is: what's yours is theirs.

We will brief staff at the airport before departure, and post the necessary warnings in the hotel.

From: Mobile Communications Team, Moscow Advance
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 10:40 AM
Subject: IT security in Moscow

b7E Per DOS

Yesterday at the RSO's security briefing, the RSO stated that the IT threat level here in Moscow currently [REDACTED]

The following are recommendations regarding IT security in Moscow:

b7E Per DOS

Strong recommendation against any classified material or conversations in the hotel, including STE conversations and any printed materials, whether brought to the hotel by the party or delivered by courier. No matter how well [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Secretary's suite as well as the Senior Bureau, the Secretariat, and all bedrooms will be [REDACTED]

[Redacted]

b7E Per DOS

Strong recommendation against the use of BlackBerries: when you bring your BlackBerry online in Moscow, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Strong recommendation against computers connected to the Internet in the hotel,

b7E Per DOS

[Redacted]

Authorized the use of FOBs in the hotel ONLY for use with government-owned laptops under 100% continuous positive control by a cleared American. If left unattended at any time, for example, while somebody goes downstairs for breakfast, they will be compromised.

NOTE: a lost or stolen FOB here in Moscow is a major security threat. All must take great care not to loose their FOBs. [Redacted]

b7E Per DOS

[Redacted]

DS Lead and DS Logistics indicated that they did not want computers and printers in their bedrooms per the IT requirements and would rather work in the Embassy. The laptops intended for them are being stored in the Embassy.

Communications set-up in Moscow:

Computers issued by MCT or supported by MCT (e.g., Abedin, Sullivan, Macmanus) will [Redacted]

b7E Per DOS

[Redacted] the Marines and DS will restrict access. Anyone in a bedroom outside of the [Redacted] must keep their laptops in their possession at all times

store them at the Embassy (for example in [redacted])

b7E Per DOS

Computers we set up in S offices and bedrooms will be laptops owned by the Embassy and will remain in our custody while outside of the Embassy. The traveling party should be notified that we will have to use laptops instead of desktops at this stop.

STEs in the S suite: the Secretary should be briefed [redacted]

b7E Per DOS

[redacted]

RSO recommends courier of documents to the hotel [redacted]

b7E Per DOS

[redacted]

RSO permits use BlackBerries. AS SOON AS users return to Washington, their Blackberry will need to be cleaned [redacted]

b7E Per DOS

[redacted]

Any government laptop used in the hotel and returned to Washington will need to be [redacted]

b7E Per DOS

The use of a personal computer is not recommended; [redacted]

b7E Per DOS

[redacted]

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 8/30/2011 9:34:07 PM +00:00
To: "Mull, Stephen D" <MullSD@state.gov>
Subject: Re: S Communications

Its pretty silly and she knows it.

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 05:18 PM
To: Abedin, Huma
Subject: RE: S Communications

Thanks for reminding all of this very helpful context!!! ☺

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 17:17 PM
To: Mull, Stephen D; Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Kennedy, Patrick F; Hanley, Monica R
Subject: Re: S Communications

Steve - let's discuss the state blackberry, doesn't make a whole lot of sense.
As for the equipment, the commo team was limited in some capacity because we did not have authorization from owners of residence to install equipment. We did it regardless. Additionally, as S knows, the team didn't have access to the property until a couple of hours before S arrived. Finally, as even the white house attested, this was a pretty wide spread problem, not just affecting us. So we should bear that in mind.

From: Mull, Stephen D
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 01:39 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Kennedy, Patrick F; Hanley, Monica R
Subject: S Communications

Cheryl,

Thanks again for alerting me to the communications issues the Secretary has been having. Here's a status report:

- On the immediate problem of the Secretary's not being able to have her calls transferred, [redacted] b7E Per DOS
[redacted]
[redacted] The technicians are onsite now [redacted]
[redacted]

- On the more long term issue, I've asked our team to develop an enhanced package of capabilities and equipment that we would propose deploying with the Secretary to be as closely co-located as possible with her when she is on travel away from her usual residences. The package will include things that anticipate the normally unexpected such as hurricanes, power outages, earthquakes, locusts, etc, such as generators, uninterrupted power supplies, supplementary satellite capabilities, including satellite phones for when local infrastructure fails (as it did in NY over the weekend).

Separately, we are working to provide the Secretary per her request a Department issued Blackberry to replace her personal unit which is malfunctioning (possibly because of her personal email server is down). We will prepare two versions for her to use – one with an operating State Department email account (which would mask her identity, but which would also be subject to FOIA requests), and another which would just have phone and internet capability. We're working with Monica to hammer out the details of what will best meet the Secretary's needs.

Please let me know if you need anything more for now, and I'll be in touch with the above longer term options soon.

Thanks,

Steve

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID:

[redacted]

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:

true

b7E Per DOS

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

[redacted]

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:

-5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:

876690920

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-23-2019 BY C66W46B11 NSICG

From: "Mull, Stephen D" <CLASSTATE/VCISNPM/RECIPIENTS/MULLSD>
Sent: 11/9/2010 4:32:28 PM +00:00
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: FW: Bluetooth Vulnerabilities

Hi Cheryl,

Here's the summary of Bluetooth vulnerabilities I mentioned. If you'd still like a briefing/demo (which I think you'd find pretty interesting/disturbing), let me know and I'll be happy to set up. Not that I normally like to disturb my boss!

Steve

From: Bentel, John A
Sent: Friday, November 05, 2010 4:23 PM
To: Mull, Stephen D
Cc: Lukens, Lewis A; Green, Milton V; Jacks, Yvette R
Subject: Bluetooth Vulnerabilities

Steve:

Listed below are vulnerabilities of Bluetooth on a Blackberry. Further down you will find more technical details should you wish to read more.


At the recommendation of our IT counterparts in DS - I have reached out to DAS Gentry Smith requesting to meet to see if it is possible to enable Bluetooth and adhere to a security posture.

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. Will keep you posted.

Thanks,

John

(S/NF)



(S)

b1 Per
b7E DOS

- Can be exploited from a considerable distance away and be undetected.
- Attacker can take full control of the device.
- Attacker can take every email on the device.
- Attacker can set up an attack to move to any new device swapped out using the same SIM.
- Attacker can listen to any phone conversation.
- Attacker can turn the phone into a listening device.
- Able to use the phone to send SPAM emails looking as the user.

Expanded details follow:

Biggest concern to the network:

- o During the August 2006 DEFCON (the annual Las Vegas "hacker convention"), a computer security consultant discovered an unauthorized path into corporate information networks - using the BlackBerry. The consultant developed a hacking program exploiting the trust relationship between the BlackBerry and a company's internal BES server. Because the data tunnel between the BlackBerry and the server is encrypted, intrusion detection systems at the perimeter of the network will not detect the attack. The technique is successful because most companies are not equipped to detect someone trying to deliver an exploit from inside a network. This is true in part because few view the BlackBerry as a plausible attack vehicle.

The first exploit is known as "BLUESNARFING". ALTHOUGH BLUETOOTH IS WIDELY CONSIDERED A SHORT RANGE NETWORK STANDARD, THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF THIS ATTACK CAN BE EXTENDED WITH HIGH GAIN ANTENNAS UP TO A MILE.

A GREATER THREAT INVOLVES WHAT IS REFERRED TO AS A "BLUEBUG" EXPLOIT, WHERE THE ATTACKER TAKES REMOTE SERIAL ACCESS TO THE DEVICE AND THEREBY GAINS FULL CONSOLE CONTROL. THIS ALLOWS THE ATTACKER TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

- > MAKE TOLL CALLS
- > CHANGE ANY AND ALL PHONEBOOK ENTRIES TO A RECORD AND FORWARD NUMBER TO MONITOR CONVERSATIONS
- > HACK/SEND SPAM EMAILS FROM A TARGET'S PHONE
- > HAVING SOMEONE'S PHONEBOOK WOULD ALLOW AN ATTACKER TO NAMEDROP AND SOCIALLY ENGINEER THE TARGET TO DISCLOSE SENSITIVE INFORMATION
- > TURN A PHONE INTO AN OPEN MICROPHONE BY CONFIGURING IT TO AUTOANSWER AN INCOMING CALL WITHOUT RINGING
- > LISTEN TO THE TARGET'S VOICEMAIL

READ OR SEND TEXT MESSAGES TO OR FROM THE TARGET, RESPECTIVELY.


The "BACKDOOR" attack creates a secret paired (authenticated) relationship between a target device and a rogue device, allowing trusted connectivity and compromising the target's local data and services. Some Bluetooth-equipped cell phones, for instance, don't erase their lists of paired devices when users' Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards are swapped, enabling this type of attack to be moved from one device to another.

The "BLUEJACKING" technique involves abusing the bluetooth "pairing" protocol, the system by which bluetooth devices authenticate each other. The technique uses the first part of the process that allows the exchange to take place, and is therefore open to further abuse if the handshake completes and the "bluejacker" successfully pairs with the targeted device. If such a pairing occurs, then all data on the target device becomes available to the initiator. This includes every mail stored on the device.

~~Sensitive~~

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Message Headers:



b6 Per DOS

Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2010 11:32:28 -0500



b6 Per
b7E DOS

From: "Mull, Stephen D" <MullSD@state.sgov.gov>
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>

Classification:
SensitivityCode:
AttachmentsClassification:
SMARTClassificationData:

UNCLASSIFIED
~~Sensitive~~

From: "Mull, Stephen D" <SBUSTATE/VCIIISNPM AG/RECIPIENTS/MULLSD>
Sent: 7/7/2010 12:37:35 PM +00:00
To: [REDACTED]
CC: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Subject: RE: HRC

b6 Per
b7C DOS

See you then!

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 08:37 AM
To: Mull, Stephen D
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Subject: Re: HRC

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Great, I'll swing by at 12:30

----- Original Message -----

From: Mull, Stephen D
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Wed Jul 07 08:32:22 2010
Subject: RE: HRC

I am; either time works.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 08:06 AM
To: Mull, Stephen D
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Subject: Re: HRC

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Steve are you by chance free either at 12:30, or 2pm?

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]
To: Mull, Stephen D
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thu Jul 01 11:33:11 2010
Subject: Re: HRC

Will do

b6 Per
b7C DOS

----- Original Message -----

From: Mull, Stephen D
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thu Jul 01 11:29:08 2010

HRC-1375

Subject: RE: HRC

Sure [redacted] that would be great, though we should probably talk first in person before involving others. Just let me know when's convenient for you when you get back.

b6 Per
b7C DOS

-----Original Message-----

From [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2010 09:58 AM
To: Mull, Stephen D
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Subject: HRC

Hey Steve,

Hope you're settling in to the nicest office at HST. When we're back from Europe, I'm hoping to sit with you and not sure who else is relevant. HRC wants to use an electronic device we bought for her in her office, wants me to figure out if it's doable or what we have to do to make it doable. I don't know who replaced Julia Hill, but I assume they should sit in too, maybe Cindy Almodovar who I think is the best IRM person in the department.

[redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Message Headers:

[Large redacted area]

b6 Per
b7E DOS

From: "Mull, Stephen D" <MullSD@state.gov>
To: "Reines, Philippe I" <reinesp@state.gov>
Cc: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS

AGE_ID:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:

[REDACTED]

state.sbu>

0

true

-1139874124

-6

b6 Per
b7E DOS

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMI

SSION_ID:

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE

VICE:

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:

[REDACTED]

true

true

b7E Per DOS

1A47

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

[Redacted] - 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

WF

Serial # of Originating Document

54

Date Received

2-3-2016

From

[Redacted]

(Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

Washington DC

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

Midyear Exam

Reference:

Interview of

[Redacted]

(Communication Enclosing Material)

b6
b7C

Description:

Original notes re interview of

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

1A47

[redacted] Video Transcript

[redacted] Clinton Admin

b6
b7C

In context as to what changed
Video quote: since last admin

[redacted]

margins
made how
we transmit
more
instantious

[redacted]

[redacted] - Not classified.

just the substance of how you do work.

[redacted] Clinton Admin

No way to have access to
unclass systems.

would communicate via cables.

- ① Is it classified
- ② Is it effecting sources & meth.

b6
b7C

When return.

- SIPR
- JWIKS.
- unclass
- Blackberries / unclass
- iPad (secure)

turned over personal
email from Gmail for
FOIA.
that related ^{even closely} to work.

DD FBI - anecdote:

[redacted] (cell)
[redacted]

b6
b7C

- Introduction
 - Voluntary / Can stop at any time
 - NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS
 - FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users.
 - Witness identifiers, 3rd party witnesses and affect on confidentiality
- Brief overview of duties as [redacted]
 - Clearance, training, frequency of handling classified information
- Knowledge of the private server and email
 - When did you become aware that the Secretary was using a private email / server?
 - Was this consistent with DoS policy?
 - Did you ever witness the email content that you felt was particularly sensitive even if it wasn't marked as classified?

b6
b7C

- Discussion of video
 - [redacted] 2013 speech to the American Foreign Service Association
 - [redacted]
 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

Video quote:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

- Can you provide some context to this statement?

- What did [redacted] mean by [redacted]
[redacted]
 - Was sensitive or classified information conducted on the system?
 - In this instance or ever?
 - Was [redacted] classified? – No
 - How would this be crafted pre-BB? Why?
- When does US strategy / policy or other diplomatic negotiations become classified in your mind?

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

- Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.
- NDA request

[redacted] 2-3-2016.

b6
b7C

w/ [redacted]

b6
b7C

@ DOS.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

~~TS/sci~~
of some compartments.

Everyday dealt w/ classified
PDB Everyday recipient.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Paper - to Secretary re: classified / on Mahag. Row.

No idea of personal account.

Dont recall what saw when email from HRC came up.

Nobody in DOS. uses a device w/o approval.

my assumption was whatever device she used was approved.

Not aware of DOS policy against use of private email.
Traveled a few times w/ Sec of State.

if classified by secure telephone
or by secure memo. / computer

who? →

think misconception about classification of documents.
only way to talk w/ foreign partners was via
email. * I'm sure later classified

Hack - I'm sure people tried to hack accounts of
team.

b6
b7c

Just
before
negotiations
2 yrs ago

[redacted]
traced back to Turkish server
DS.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

1A48

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 55

Date Received FEB 10, 2016

From (Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

1A48

[Redacted]

2-10-2016

b6
b7C

885 3rd Ave NY NY

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Reading Review/Memos
Controlling Info Flow.

Informal & Formal Mtgs w/ DOS.

PCM. - Principal Comm Meetings ^{deputy} DCM
coordinate packages. / coordinate w/ counterparts

PCM - few x week 0-4

DCM - 3-5 x week.


CDOS contacts. J. Sullivan
Joe Mc Mannus.

3 computers on desk
unclass, SIPR, JWICS.

Weekly lunch / Separate.
Sec Gates
Donlon
Clinton

3 phones
2 class, 1 regular


not



position

b6
b7c

Archiving functioning by NSC[^] Executive Secretary.



- Know Jake Sullivan from prior Govt. service

[redacted] Interview Outline

Professional Background

- [redacted] - current)
- [redacted] at DoD [redacted]
- National Security Council [redacted]
 - [redacted]
 - [redacted]
 - [redacted]
- [redacted]

b6
b7C

Question Outline

- Introduction
 - FBI's interest in the matter
 - NSLB disclaimer re: prior statements
 - Can consult counsel if necessary
- What is your current position?
- Brief description of role at NSC as relative to Department of State?
 - How often did you coordinate with DoS?
 - For what types of matters?
 - Who were you primary contacts at DoS?
 - What was the nature of the communications?
 - How often did you send / receive documents to DoS?
 - Examples of?
 - Classified, unclassified?
 - How were the documents transferred?
- Email regarding PC meeting
 - October 4, 2009 email chain with [redacted] regarding content for a Restricted PC meeting on October 5th, 2009 regarding Af-Pak. [redacted] recommendations - [redacted]
 - Do you recall the Restricted Principals Committee meeting? Can you provide general context on who / what was involved?
 - Do you recall if the final product for the PC meeting was classified?
 - At what level(s)?
 - EMAIL 1 -
 - What is being couriered and to whom?
 - Is this typical?
 - What is at the Secret level?
 - What is the DNI stuff that you are referring to? What was it classified?
 - Where did you get it from?
 - How can we track it down?
 - EMAIL 2a, 2b and 3 -
 - What was the 'DNI piece' specifically?
 - Who was the originating agency?
 - What was the classification of the piece?
 - Where was it couriered to, DOS? How would this have been done? Who would have sent it / who would have it been sent to?
 - EMAIL 4 -

Exec. Secy!
PC - 0-3H/WK.
DC - 3-5+/WK.
FORWAR
100% FORWAR
- WKLY COUNCIL

b6
b7C

WASHKAT.

[redacted] Interview Outline

b6
b7C

Professional Background

- [redacted] - current)
- [redacted] at DoD [redacted]
- National Security Council [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

Question Outline

- Introduction
 - ✓/o FBI's interest in the matter
 - ✓/o NSLB disclaimer re: prior statements
 - o Can consult counsel if necessary
- What is your current position?
- Brief description of role at NSC as relative to Department of State?
 - o How often did you coordinate with DoS?
 - For what types of matters?
 - Who were you primary contacts at DoS?
 - What was the nature of the communications?
 - How often did you send / receive documents to DoS?
 - Examples of?
 - o Classified, unclassified?
 - o How were the documents transferred?

b6
b7C

- Email regarding PC meeting
 - o October 4, 2009 email chain with [redacted] regarding content for a Restricted PC meeting on October 5th, 2009 regarding Af-Pak [redacted] recommendations - [redacted]
 - Do you recall the Restricted Principals Committee meeting? Can you provide general context on who / what was involved?
 - Do you recall if the final product for the PC meeting was classified?
 - o At what level(s)?

ways to cour. to Dos

- ① Wash Fax - Secure Fax
- ② courier.

EMAIL 1 - Don't have rec. of specific Mtg. - Asking for papers. frequent.

- What is being couriered and to whom? Not sure
 - o Is this typical?
- What is at the Secret level?
- What is the DNI stuff that you are referring to? What was it classified?
 - o Where did you get it from?
 - o How can we track it down?

Don't recall specific

- EMAIL 2a, 2b and 3 -
 - What was the 'DNI piece' specifically?
 - Who was the originating agency?
 - What was the classification of the piece?
 - Where was it couriered to, DOS? How would this have been done? Who would have sent it / who would have it been sent to?

Don't recall this particular DNI assessment.

In PC & DC principals provided w/ packet before.
 IC paper DOS paper DDD paper → Sent out ahead to HRC-1389 digest

Regular chann.

- ① NSC sends Mtg. notice & request for packages. Pack come in 3-4 days by edit

• What is the standard procedure for distro of the package. Who does it go to?

▪ EMAIL 5 -

- What is Washfax? Secure Fax.

▪ EMAIL 6 -

- What does Tab 2 refer to specifically?
 - Is it the same as the 'DNI piece' referenced above?
 - What was the classification level of this doc, TS?
 - DNI piece appears to be S, as you attempted to send it via SIPR
 - Does NSC / EOP archive content from each PC meeting?
 - What department / who is the POC for this?

don't recall what mtg was about outside email

& package would go out anywhere from 3 days by to right before

EMAIL 4 cont

▪ EMAIL 7 -

- Were there any follow up items?
- What would typically happen after a PC meeting with regards to specific policy / strategy?
- How would decisions from the meeting be disseminated to relevant agencies?

▪ EMAIL 8 & 8a - (header / footer email - tp on way forward in Afghanistan, Plan for PC tomorrow, meeting with Clinton and Petraeus)

don't recall

- What was the context of this email?
- Do you recall what supporting information was provided by DoS
 - Classification of it?
 - Is it maintained by NSC.

- Did you ever have concern about the transmission of sensitive / classified info on unclass, or non-government? → Not that I can recall.
- Any other relevant information?
- NDA

Don't recall ever emailing directly w/ HRC.

PC/DC

I chair

NSC staffer take notes (responsible for sub, matter) summary of Conclusions / cleared by NSC executive staff. go out through Exec Sec. Wash Fax.

sometimes would call staff of PC or DC to tell what agreed to do. - write memo etc.

Sometimes - info gets briefed to President

Wash Fax fairly large distro

- If very sensitive would try to send point to point

- ① get papers
- ② cover note by NSC
- ③ "Read Ahead" choreography of mtg.

SOC official

rec. of mtg. goes out to every attendee (not minutes) - do ours

DC Mtg - works on issue - Main focus

PC Mtg. "

President - take topic forward -

From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
Sent: 10/4/2009 11:06:59 PM +00:00
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/SULLIVANJJ>
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Thanks man. It's blood out of a stone with the Holbrooke team.

I'm going through the DNI stuff now. It's pretty decent, with a few exceptions.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:34 PM
To: Spence, Matthew J.
Subject: Re: How's it looking?

Yes

From: Spence, Matthew J. [redacted]
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:29:57 2009
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Gotcha. Another option is for us to courier this stuff out tonight, and then email out your paper very late tonight, since it's at the Secret level, right?

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:27 PM
To: Spence, Matthew J.
Subject: Re: How's it looking?

Moving as fast as possible.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [redacted]
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:20:27 2009
Subject: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Matt Spence
National Security Council

[redacted]

Message Headers:

Microsoft Mail Internet Headers Version 2.0
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:07:16 -0400
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:07:16 -0400
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with i
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:07:16 -0400
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu w
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:07:16 -0400
Received: from stimson2.state.gov [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:07:15 -0400
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov (mailhub-eop3.eop.gov [198.137.241.41])
by stimson2.state.gov with [redacted]
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Sun, 4 Oct 2009 18:52:33 -0400
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov ([198.137.241.41])
by Stimson-1.state.gov
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Sun, 04 Oct 2009 23:14:24 +0000
Received: from esgeop02.eop.gov by esgeop01.eop.gov [redacted] for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Sun, 4 Oc
X-SENDER-IP: [redacted]
X-SENDER-REPUTATION: None
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
[redacted]
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6619.12
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per
b7E DOS

HRC-1392

Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:06:59 -0400
 Message-ID: <891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61C0@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
 X-MS-Has-Attach:
 X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
 Thread-Topic: How's it looking?
 Thread-Index: [REDACTED]
 References: [REDACTED] state.sbu>
 From: "Spence, Matthew J." [REDACTED]
 To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Oct 2009 23:06:59.0921 (UTC) FILETIME=[REDACTED]
 Return-Path: prvs=52178f90d [REDACTED]
 X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: [REDACTED]
 X-TM-AS-Result: [REDACTED]
 X-TM-AS-User-Approved-Sender: No
 X-TM-AS-User-Blocked-Sender: No

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per NSC

[REDACTED]

Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset=[REDACTED]
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

[REDACTED]

Content-Type: text/html;
 charset=[REDACTED]
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

b6 Per
b7E DOS

[REDACTED]

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:	<891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61C0@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-3
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	-2021940588
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true

b6 Per NSC

From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
Sent: 10/5/2009 12:46:30 AM +00:00
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/SULLIVANJJ>
Subject: Just sent you the DNI piece on SIPR

Matt Spence
National Security Council
(202) 456-9481

b6 Per
b7E DOS

Message Headers:

Microsoft Mail Internet Headers Version 2.0
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 20:46:37 -0400
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 20:46:37 -0400
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu w
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 20:46:37 -0400
Received: from stimson2.state.gov [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Sun, 4 Oct 2009 20:46:37 -0400
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov ([198.137.241.41])
by stimson2.state.gov with [redacted]
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Sun, 4 Oct 2009 20:32:04 -0400
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov ([198.137.241.41])
by Stimson-1.state.gov
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 05 Oct 2009 00:53:46 +0000
Received: from esgeop02.eop.gov by esgeop01.eop.gov [redacted] for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Sun, 4 Oct
X-SENDER-IP: [redacted]
X-SENDER-REPUTATION: None
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative:
[redacted]
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange [redacted]
Subject: Just sent you the DNI piece on SIPR
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2009 20:46:30 -0400
Message-ID: <891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61CF@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Thread-Topic: Just sent you the DNI piece on SIPR
Thread-Index: [redacted]
From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 05 Oct 2009 00:46:30.0953 (UTC) FILETIME=[redacted]
Return-Path: prvs=522d21f15=[redacted]
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver [redacted]
X-TM-AS-Result [redacted]
X-TM-AS-User-Approved-Sender: No
X-TM-AS-User-Blocked-Sender: No

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per NSC

Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=[redacted]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
[redacted]
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=[redacted]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
[redacted]

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID: <891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61CF@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -3
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -1375815399
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true

From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
Sent: 10/5/2009 11:35:36 AM +00:00
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/SULLIVANJJ>
Subject: State paper

b6 Per NSC

Hey man -

Sorry to sound like a broken record, but know when you all could shoot that paper over?

I also saw that the DNI thing I sent on SIPR didn't go through for some reason. But the package was couriered over, so you all should have it by now.

Matt Spence
National Security Council
(202) 456-9481

Message Headers:

Microsoft Mail Internet Headers Version 2.0
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with I [redacted]
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu w [redacted]
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Received: from stimson3.state.gov [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov ([198.137.241.41])
by stimson3.state.gov with [redacted]
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 5 Oct 2009 07:29:48 -0400
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov ([198.137.241.41])
by Stimson-2.state.gov
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 05 Oct 2009 11:45:18 +0000
Received: from esgeop02.eop.gov by esgeop01.eop.gov [redacted] for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 5 Oc
X-SENDER-IP: [redacted]
X-SENDER-REPUTATION: None
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative:
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange [redacted]
Subject: State paper
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2009 07:35:36 -0400
Message-ID: <891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61D8@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Thread-Topic: State paper
Thread-Index: [redacted]
From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 05 Oct 2009 11:35:36.0974 (UTC) FILETIME=[redacted]
Return-Path: prvs=522d21f15-[redacted]
X-TM-AS-Product-Version: [redacted]
X-TM-AS-Result: No-[redacted]
X-TM-AS-User-Approved-Sender: No
X-TM-AS-User-Blocked-Sender: No

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per NSC

b6 Per
b7E DOS

Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=[redacted]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=[redacted]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID: <891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61D8@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -3
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -1680938066
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true

From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
Sent: 10/4/2009 11:53:27 PM +00:00
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/SULLIVANJJ>
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Gotcha.

I'm gonna send this out now, but you'd help your cause a lot with Tom if you could have something that he can read when he walks in tomorrow morning (which I could read first).

The DNI assessment is actually pretty lame and doesn't help. But it's secret, so I'll send it to you on SIPR.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 7:37 PM
To: Spence, Matthew J.
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

This is tough, but part of it is S engagement. She wants to see final and edit before it goes.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 7:07 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Thanks man, it's blood out of a stone with the Holbrooke team.

I'm going through the DNI stuff now. It's pretty decent, with a few exceptions.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:34 PM
To: Spence, Matthew J.
Subject: Re: How's it looking?

Yes

From: Spence, Matthew J. [redacted]
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:29:57 2009
Subject: RE: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Gotcha. Another option is for us to courier this stuff out tonight, and then email out your paper very late tonight, since it's at the Secret level, right?

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:27 PM
To: Spence, Matthew J.
Subject: Re: How's it looking?

Moving as fast as possible.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [redacted]
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:20:27 2009
Subject: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Matt Spence

From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted] b6 Per NSC
 Sent: 10/4/2009 11:06:30 PM +00:00
 To: "Jones, Paul W" <SBUSTATE/MANILA AG/RECIPIENTS/JONESPW2>; "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/SULLIVANJJ>
 CC: "Tien, John K." [redacted]; "Lebson, Eric M." [redacted]
 Subject: RE: How's it looking?

The folks here have asked you to send it here, and we'll do the distro with the package. It'll come on SIPR? Can you send a draft here, which we won't distro beyond the few folks working on it here?

Looping in our folks handling this.

From: Jones, Paul W [mailto:JonesPW2@state.gov]
 Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:45 PM
 To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Spence, Matthew J.
 Subject: RE: How's it looking?

It is not ready for distro - still a number of items. I think we need to email late tonight. Just let me know the address(es).

Jake,

We can provide a draft now for S, if needed.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
 Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:36 PM
 To: [redacted] Jones, Paul W
 Subject: Re: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Adding Paul. Paul what's our ETA?

From: Spence, Matthew J. [redacted]
 To: Sullivan, Jacob J
 Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:29:57 2009
 Subject: RE: How's it looking?

Gotcha. Another option is for us to courier this stuff out tonight, and then email out your paper very late tonight, since it's at the Secret level, right?

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
 Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 6:27 PM
 To: Spence, Matthew J.
 Subject: Re: How's it looking?

Moving as fast as possible.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [redacted]
 To: Sullivan, Jacob J
 Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:20:27 2009
 Subject: How's it looking?

b6 Per NSC

Matt Spence

National Security Council

b6 Per
b7E DOS

Message Headers:

Microsoft Mail Internet Headers Version 2.0
 Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
 Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:06:37 -0400
 Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
 Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:06:37 -0400
 Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Micr
 Sun, 4 Oct 2009 19:06:37 -0400

HRC-1397

From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
Sent: 10/5/2009 9:44:10 PM +00:00
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/SULLIVANJJ>
Subject: Checking in

b6 Per NSC

Hey man - Let me sort out the follow-ups from this mtg, then give you a call to check in on all of this...

Matt Spence
National Security Council

[redacted]

Message Headers:

Microsoft Mail Internet Headers Version 2.0
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft [redacted]
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu w
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu [redacted] by [redacted] state.sbu with Microsoft
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov (mailhub-esgeop01.eop.gov [198.137.241.41])
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 5 Oct 2009 17:38:32 -0400
Received: from esgeop01.eop.gov ([198.137.241.41])
by Stimson-2.state.gov
for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 05 Oct 2009 21:54:02 +0000
Received: from esgeop02.eop.gov by esgeop01.eop.gov id n95LIN3G009494 for <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Mon, 5 Oct
X-SENDER-IP: [redacted]
X-SENDER-REPUTATION: None
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative: [redacted]
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange [redacted]
Subject: Checking in
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2009 17:44:10 -0400
Message-ID: <891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61EE@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Thread-Topic: Checking in
Thread-Index: [redacted]
From: "Spence, Matthew J." [redacted]
To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 05 Oct 2009 21:44:10.0403 (UTC) FILETIME=[redacted]
Return-Path: prv5=522d21f15-[redacted]
X-TM-AS-Product-Ver: [redacted]
X-TM-AS-Result: [redacted]
X-TM-AS-User-Approved-Sender: No
X-TM-AS-User-Blocked-Sender: No

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per NSC

Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=[redacted]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=[redacted]
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

b6 Per
b7E DOS

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:
PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:

<891D44DBD1E2C94EBE988E74EE0C2216013B61EE@SMEOP18EVS.eopds.eop.gov>
true
-3
true
-1882870175
1
true

om: "McClure, Kimberly M" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/MCCLUREKM>
nt: 10/5/2009 12:20:00 PM +00:00
i: "Jones, Paul W" <JonesPW2@state.gov>; "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
o: SSRAP_StaffAssistants <SSRAP_StaffAssistants@state.gov>
ibject: RE: Materials for wh

e just talked to Matt Spence. We're having it washfaxed now.

--Original Message-----

om: Jones, Paul W
nt: Monday, October 05, 2009 8:09 AM
i: Sullivan, Jacob J; McClure, Kimberly M
ibject: RE: Materials for wh

e-emailed and Kim will follow up to ensure they received. If not, we will washfax.

--Original Message-----

om: Sullivan, Jacob J
nt: Monday, October 05, 2009 8:04 AM
i: Jones, Paul W; LaVine, Christopher M; Beale, Courtney A Kramer
ibject: Materials for wh

hite House is having email probs so can you guys washfax and re-email to wh folks?

⌘_RIM_INTERNET_MESS [REDACTED]
⌘_RIM_ID: state.sbu>
⌘_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true
⌘_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -3
⌘_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE CE: true
⌘_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID: [REDACTED]
⌘_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -1837087385
⌘_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1
⌘_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true
_6:

b6 Per
b7E DOS

b6 Per
b7E DOS

From: "Toiv, Nora F" <CLASSTATE/SES AG/RECIPIENTS/TOIVNF>
Sent: 10/5/2009 12:35:25 PM +00:00
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: FW: FW: Final Pak Memo w/ attachments
Attachments: Tab 7 - Proposed Signature Assistance Program.pptx; Tab 1 - Riedel Objectives.docx; Tab 3 - Pakistan's Support for Taliban and Terrorism - FINAL.docx; Tab 4 - Security Assistance Proposal.pptx; Tab 5 - Stabilizing Pakistan.docx; Tab 6 - Current US Civilian Assistance.docx; Tab 8 - PakistanStrategy Abbreviated version.pptx; Tab 10 - Alternative Approaches.docx; Tab 9 - Intl Support for Pakistan.docx; MEMO - U S interests in Pak Paper 10-04.pdf; 09-10-5 SEC-JONES MEMO on PAK.pdf

From: Beale, Courtney A
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2009 8:31 AM
To: Toiv, Nora F; Laszczych, Joanne
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants
Subject: FW: Final Pak Memo w/ attachments
Importance: High

From: McClure, Kimberly **MO n Behalf Of** SSRAP StaffAssistants
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2009 8:18 AM
To: S_SpecialAssistants
Cc: SSRAP_StaffAssistants
Subject: FW: Final Pak Memo w/ attachments
Importance: High

Courtney, Zia, Dan -

I just wanted to make sure a copy of this had made its way to you as well. This is for today's restricted PC on Af-Pak.

Klm McClure

Special Assistant

Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

HRC-1400

202-647-4134

From: McClure, Kimberly **MO**n **B**ehalf **O**f SSRAP StaffAssistants
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2009 8:15 AM
To: Dubose, Mary L
Cc: D(L); SSRAP_StaffAssistants
Subject: FW: Final Pak Memo w/ attachments
Importance: High

Mary,

Here is the package for today's NSC meeting (there is no Tab 2, as it is a TS doc that will be provided by ODNI). Please note that an Annotated Agenda was submitted to the Line on Friday. They will have the latest version of that document.

Kim McClure

Special Assistant

Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

202-647-4134

From: Jones, Paul W
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2009 4:09 AM
To: Spence, Matthew; Sullivan, Jacob J; 'Kobs, David M.'; 'Tien, John K. Jr.'; 'Lute, Douglas E.'; Lebson, Eric
CIV OSD POLICY; Chollet, Derek H
Cc: SSRAP_StaffAssistants
Subject: FW: Final Pak Memo w/ attachments
Importance: High

Dear NSC colleagues,

Pls find attached a cover memo from Secretary Clinton, the State Dept memo U.S. interests in Pakistan, and ten tabs, for the Principals meeting on Tuesday afternoon. We would appreciate your circulating these materials to attendees at the Principals committee meeting.

Note 2- Tab 2 to be provided by ODNI.

Best regards,

Paul

RELEASE IN PART B5,B6

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 8:18 AM
To: H
Subject: Re: [redacted]

B5

They say they've had issues sending secure fax. They're working on it.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:00 AM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: [redacted]

?!!! Checking

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 07:52 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: [redacted]

I didn't get the TPs yet.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 05:51 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: [redacted]

You'll get tps this eve. They're coming together.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 04:15 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: [redacted]

B6

B5

[redacted]

1A49

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number - 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 56

Date Received 2-18-2016

From
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

Washington DC

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Midyear Exam

Reference: Notes from Interview
(Communication Enclosing Material)

b6
b7C

Description: Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

1A49




2/18/2016




b6
b7C

- Current CIA GOV in 2013.




b6
b7C

- TEAM MEMBERS HAD ACCESS TO intel



b6
b7C

"



b1 Per
b3 CIA

- Regular interaction w/ DoS.

@ [redacted] → DoS close relationship



(Actions, Analysis etc)
close coordination on ALL MATTER B/C of DoS.

b6
b7C

Entity.

- [redacted] & HC had prior relation & close working.

b6
b7C


- interacted weekly on average.

@ [redacted] → more frequent interaction w/ DoS.

b6
b7C




HC



had weekly lunch, coordinated on EVERYTHING "DOWN RANGE"

known since



Sec's SE TEAM/Front OFFICE

OFFICE

Primary Contacts = MILLS, SULLIVAN, [redacted] sometimes w/ AMBASSADORS.

b6
b7C

- "My boss & your boss should talk about."

How did you com?

- PHONE AND EMAIL Connectivity.

- "intersecting TRAVEL"

- EMAIL / PHONE, less FREQ MEETINGS.

b6
b7C

° USED CLASSIFIED EMAIL SYSTEMS AT BOAT AGENCIES.

[redacted] → PRIMARYLY ON UNCLASS SYSTEM ^{computer.}

b6
b7C

HAD SIPR & JMWIC.

↳ POLYTYPE STUFF → more sensitive.

b6
b7C

→ MAIN PHONE WAS "open line"

RED PHONE (yellow) was secure

→ MAY HAVE HAD A BACKUP.

→ use people at [redacted]

HAD STE [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] - with phone (CLASSIFIED) → INTERNAL

phone

→ external, COORDINATION.

BACK (UNCLASSIFIED)

- DEFAULT IS HIGH SIDE

EMAIL

- Agency Information Network (low side)

[redacted]

b6
b7C

→ STE AT HOME, AND A SAFE

TRANSFER TO DOS

- DOESN'T RECALL PHYSICAL TRANSFER TO DOS

- EMAIL ON BOAT HIGH & LOW SIDE

↳ NO DIRECT EMAILS w/ HC

→ NO KNOWLEDGE OF SERVIC (EMAIL)

[redacted] HAD DIRECT CONTACT w/ HC [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

mostly in person
MAYBE PHONE BUT RELIED
ON TEAMS

HRC-1406

MESSAGES FROM [] TO HE. CONSIDERED BY [] WOULD PASS TO HE SR. STAFF AS APPROPRIATE.

b6
b7C

EMAIL 1 []

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per FBI
b7C Per FBI

- few weeks AFTER [] STARTS POSITION.
- SLIGHT RECOLLECTION.

- NOT "OFFICIAL DOWNLOAD" THAT WOULD BE []
[] ^{1 -> NIX BRUSE.} THIS WAS AN INTERESTING

b3 Per CIA

EXCHANGE / SIDENOTE

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per FBI, CIA
b7C Per FBI

EMAIL 2 []

[] (SOME OF THIS []

[] CAUSED BY E.A. IN OFFICE. CONTACTED []

[] ASKED THEM TO CONTACT Pres (w/ HI), VP, CHAIRMAN of Joint Chiefs, Sec State, Sec Def.

- DON'T RECALL SPECIFIC CALL FROM []
MAY HAVE BEEN VIA STE

- DOESN'T RECALL CALL W/ [] BUT MOST CALLS THAT DAY WERE ^{most likely} ON UNCLASS LINE (DUE TO EMERGENCY OF THE SITUATION).

b6
b7C

- MAY HAVE BEEN FOLLOW UP CALLS ON THE STE, ETC
- THIS IS A "GIVE YOUR BOSS A HEADS UP TYPE MESSAGE"

EMAIL 3 - [] EMAIL

b6
b7C

- DOESN'T THINK THIS IS RIGHT HAS A [] EMAIL
- GENERAL PRACTICE -> GOV EMAIL FOR WORK, BUT MAY HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONS
 - o WORK EMAIL NOT WORK
 - o EMAIL RECEIVED VIA ~~EMAIL~~ ^{CONGRUOUS &} REPLIED w/o THINKING / CHALLENGING SYSTEMS
 - o DON'T REMEMBER WHAT EMAIL WAS ON [] BB

b6
b7C

EMAIL 4 - [] IN ISRAEL

b3 Per CIA
b6 Per FBI
b7C Per FBI

- FROM GMAIL TO J.S. GMAIL & JS STATE
- DON'T RECALL WHY
- NORMALLY WOULD EMAIL JS AT STATE
- NO INSTRUCTION FROM DOJ EMPLOYEES TO COMMUNICATE VIA GMAIL
- MULTIPLE CHANNELS PROVIDE MEANS TO CONTACT HILL

EMAIL 5 - LIBYA

- SERIES OF MEETINGS ON 9/11 IN [] OFFICE (MAY HILL ~~TRANSCRIPTS~~ ^{TRANSCRIPTS} ON THE BENIGALI EVENTS)

b6
b7C

- 1 - DEPLOYMENT ORDERS MEETING (REGULAR)
- 2 - CAREFULLY HURRY UP DEPLOYMENT FOR (AS NEEDED) DECIDED OVER A FEW DAYS

3 - ON THE FLY QUICK REACTION DEPLOYMENT (ONLY REUSURFER THIS HAPPENING AFTER BENIGALI)

SMAC 6 - GREEN ON BLUE (REDACTED VERIFIED)

• RAPID COORDINATION ESTABLISHED [REDACTED] & DoS b6 b7C

PUBLIC AFFAIRS RE: TELETYPE ATTACK

[REDACTED] WAS DoS PR POC. b6 b7C

[REDACTED] WAS [REDACTED] PR POC

re: Needs [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b6 b7C

→ DIDN'T SAY [REDACTED] (S) b1 Per CIA b6 Per FBI b7C Per FBI

DIDN'T KNOW IF IT IS TRUE

[REDACTED] (S)

- NO CONCERNS REGARDING DoS HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED INFO.

[Redacted] Interview Outline

b6
b7C

Professional Background

- Founder and Managing Director [Redacted] (2013 - Present; founded [Redacted])
- [Redacted]
- Various roles on [Redacted]

Intel Matters until [Redacted]

Educational Background

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Question Outline

- Introduction
 - FBI's interest in the matter
 - NSLB disclaimer re: prior statements
 - Can consult counsel if necessary
- What is your current position?
- Brief description of role as [Redacted] as relative to Department of State?
 - How often did you coordinate with DoS?
 - For what type of matters?
 - Who were you primary contacts at DoS while at [Redacted]
 - What was the nature of the communications? (in person, email, telephone)
 - How often did you send / receive documents to DoS?
 - Examples of?
 - Classified, unclassified?
 - How were the documents transferred?
 - Did you ever email directly with Secretary Clinton?
 - Were you aware of Secretary Clinton's use of a private email address? Private server?
 - Did [Redacted] ever acknowledge to you he was aware Secretary Clinton was using a private/non DoS email account?

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
b6 Per FBI
b7C Per FBI

More frequent

Down range coordination

Close Relationship

Very close coordination all levels all the time weekly.

Default Email @ [Redacted] on High Side - used more rarely
worked for wife. knew Clinton for 20+ years

Mills Sullivan

Amb. occasionally

b6
b7C

START of emails during [Redacted] Tenure...

- Email #1: [Redacted] (March 21, 2009)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted] forward to HRC from his personal email [Redacted] is this the account to which you would have sent?
- [Redacted]
- Was it common practice to send [Redacted] this kind of information?

Unclass came up. Mostly work on SIPR - general FP. Jwills... TS or more intel.

Main line opening Yellow but called Red. NS Advisor

Official downloads went to WH. poss NAT Sec. Advisor.

weekly lunch w/ [Redacted]

DoS Sec. HRC-1410

NSA Chairman SC

call
COJC
Sec Def
Sec State

How did you receive info.

@ home in Carmel Valley.
Pres. Hawaii
VP on travel.

- Email #2: [redacted] (December 30, 2009) from [redacted] to Secretary Clinton referencing call with [redacted]
 - o Do you recall how the call referenced in the email with [redacted] was conducted? (secure/unsecure) Assume "open line" means unclass? Initial call from [redacted] EA
 - o Reason for call being on an open line?
 - o Reference "details are thin and couldn't get into more detail on an open line..." Where/How do you draw the line between what can be discussed on an open line vs. move to a classified venue? b3 Per CIA
 - o Were you aware or did you assume [redacted] would forward the information on to the Secretary?
 - Were you aware he would email the information? Unclass? From Gmail Account? b3 Per CIA

- Email #3: [redacted] Email" (February 10, 2010)
 - o [redacted] was this the unclassified account you primarily used for work purposes?
 - [redacted] (until [redacted] → work email not available.
 - [redacted] (starting on [redacted] → BB w/ unclass [redacted] email

- Email #4: [redacted] n Israel" (November 20, 2010)
 - o This was sent from Gmail to Sullivan via Gmail...
 - Can you recall why you emailed via Gmail at the time?
 - Common practice in regards to Sullivan? Instructions to do so for this instance?
 - When would you email Sullivan via Gmail vs. DoS account? b3 Per CIA

START of emails related to [redacted] TENURE...

- Email #5: "Libya" (Dated September 11, 2012) – B5 Redaction
 - o Source of the information a conversation between [redacted] and the Joint Staff? Consultation
 - Any official documentation of conversation?
 - Classification of material? b6 b7C

- Email #6: "This am Green on Blue" (October 13, 2012) – B1 Redaction
 - o Explain email?
 - o Recipients? Why [redacted] and [redacted] Military Handoff
 - o Reference to [redacted] and [redacted] (S)
 - o [redacted]
 - o [redacted]
 - Confirm [redacted] quote
 - To whom?
 - Circumstances? Rapid coordination DoS. Public Affairs [redacted]

Sent [redacted] Email w/ view "jacked up"

- Did you ever have concern regarding the transmission of sensitive / classified info on unclass, or non-government, systems?
- Any other relevant information?
- NDA

From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, March 21, 2009 2:58 PM
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: [redacted]

b3 Per DOS, CIA

I think you know that my close friend Jeremy Bash is now Panetta's Chief of Staff at CIA. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

###

From:
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2009 12:52 PM
To: H
Cc: CDM; Huma Abedin; Jake Sullivan
Subject: CIA

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Separate from what's happening in regards to the Christmas attack, Jeremy Bash just called me because Director Panetta wanted him to relay through me that the CIA suffered a terrible incident yesterday in Afghanistan.

Seven of their agents were meeting with a contact when an explosion killed them all. To the extent it's currently being reported, they are being identified as DoD personnel, not Agency.

The details are thin and he couldn't get into more detail on an open line, but they believe the contact they met with set them up and was either carrying the explosive or detonated it.

They believe this is the greatest loss of life to a single incident in the Agency's history, and the first time that Agency personnel have been so deliberately targeted in Afghanistan.

Director Panetta's at home in Monterey, CA, and likely returning to DC in the coming days.

From: [redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Sent: 2/10/2010 12:17:53 AM +00:00

To: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>

Subject: Re: Bash email

That's what he uses

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
To: [redacted]
Sent: Tue Feb 09 19:16:28 2010
Subject: Re: Bash email

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Work email?

From: [redacted]
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: [redacted]
Sent: Tue Feb 09 18:31:51 2010
Subject: Re: Bash email

b6 Per DOS, CIA
b7C Per DOS

[redacted]

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
To: [redacted]
Sent: Tue Feb 09 18:30:13 2010
Subject: Bash email

b6 Per
b7C DOS

Can you send me Jeremy's email?

Message Headers:

Microsoft Mail Internet Headers Version 2.0
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu ([redacted])
[redacted]
Tue, 9 Feb 2010 19:17:53 -0500
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu
[redacted]
Tue, 9 Feb 2010 19:17:53 -0500
Received: from [redacted] state.sbu
Microsoft [redacted]
Tue, 9 Feb 2010 19:17:52 -0500

b6 Per
b7E DOS

From: Bash, Jeremy CIV SD [redacted] (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 7:19 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Sherman, Wendy R; Nides, Thomas R
Cc: Miller, James HON OSD POLICY; Winnefeld, James A ADM JCS VCJCS; Kelly, John LtGen
Subject: SD; martin.dempsey [redacted] (b)(6)
 Libya

State colleagues:

I just tried you on the phone but you were all in with S.

After consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham and the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak. They include a [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(5)

Assuming Principals agree to deploy these elements, we will ask State to secure the approval from host nation. Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to us.

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] (b)(5)

Jeremy

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D),1.4(C),B6

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 10:11 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: This am Green on Blue

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016 ~
Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(C), 1.4(D) ~ Declassify
on: 10/12/2027

----- Original Message -----

From: Reines, Philippe I
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 09:53 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: This am Green on Blue

----- Original Message -----

From: Bash, Jeremy CIV SD [mailto:]
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 09:45 AM
To: Little, George CIV OSD PA < >; Reines, Philippe I
Cc: Kelly, John LtGen SD < >; Waldhauser, Thomas LtGen SD < >
Subject: This am Green on Blue

B6

As you'll be hearing from ISAF, an Afghan NDS officer pulled the ripcord on a vest in front of coalition guys loading a helicopter. Total of 14 either killed or wounded -- some US, some Afghans.

Right now, we think 1 US mil killed and one wounded.

[Redacted]

1.4(C)
1.4(D)
B1

George, please lash up with [Redacted]

B6

HRC-1418

NEWS FEB 4 2016, 5:00 AM ET

Clinton Emails Held Indirect References to Undercover CIA Officers

by KEN DILANIAN

A handful of emails forwarded to Hillary Clinton's personal server while she was secretary of state contained references to undercover CIA officers — including one who was killed by a suicide attack in Afghanistan, according to U.S. officials who have reviewed them.

But contrary to some published reports, three officials said there was no email on Clinton's server that directly revealed the identity of an undercover intelligence operative. Rather, they said, State Department and other officials attempted to make veiled references to intelligence officers in the emails — references that were deemed classified when the messages were being reviewed years later for public release.



Hillary Clinton takes a question at a rally in New Hampshire on Feb. 3, 2016. ADREES LATIF / Reuters

In one case, an official said, an undercover CIA officer was referred to as a State Department official with the word "State," in quotes, as if to suggest the emailer knew the officer was not actually a diplomat. In another case, an email refers to "OGA" for "other government agency," a common reference to the CIA. Yet another now-classified email chain originated with a member of the CIA director's staff, leading some officials to question how Clinton could be blamed.

Related: Judge Sets Hearing Date in Clinton Email Case

Clinton campaign spokesman Brian Fallon said no intelligence officer had been identified in the emails, and that misleading details from the emails were being leaked to hurt the candidate.

"This shows yet again how the leaking of selective details gives a completely false impression about what is actually contained in the emails forwarded to Hillary Clinton," said Fallon. "Whenever the full contents of these emails are learned, there is invariably less than meets the eye."

Twenty-two of the emails were fully withheld from public release last week on the grounds that the information in them is "Top Secret," meaning its disclosure now would cause "exceptionally grave damage to the national security." But intelligence officials and congressional officials who oversee them are divided over whether that is actually the case.

Nonetheless, the issue promises to dog Clinton's presidential campaign. Since the messages are classified, people with the clearances to see them are free to characterize them as they wish. Republicans tend to see them as highly problematic for Clinton, while Democrats see the opposite. The FBI is investigating the security of Clinton's email arrangement, and the FBI would also have jurisdiction to investigate the mishandling of classified information.

Sen. Marco Rubio, the Florida Republican running for president, serves on the Senate Intelligence Committee. "If someone on my staff did what she did...they would be fired and they would be prosecuted," he said recently.

But Rep. Adam Schiff of California, a Clinton supporter who is the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, offered a different view after reading the emails.

"The determination that something is top secret, for many people connotes that these are the most closely held secrets, that their revelation would be extremely damaging," he said. "There are potentially programs that are talked about all the time in the press that fit within that category."

Schiff may have been referring to CIA drone strikes, which officials have said are discussed in the now-classified emails. The strikes are highly classified but are also widely discussed over unclassified channels in Washington and elsewhere.

**"WHENEVER THE FULL
CONTENTS OF THESE
EMAILS ARE LEARNED,
THERE IS INVARIABLY
LESS THAN MEETS THE
EYE"**

The email message about the dead officer was created by a Defense Department official, Jeremy Bash, who at the time was chief of staff to then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It concerned Dario Lorenzetti, a Fort Worth native — later revealed to be a CIA officer — who died Oct. 13, 2012, when an Afghan intelligence operative detonated a suicide vest in a so-called "Green on Blue" attack. The email was sent on the day of the attack after Lorenzetti's death was confirmed.

Lorenzetti's association with the CIA was leaked by anonymous officials to reporters four days after his death and widely reported in the news media, though his CIA cover was not lifted until later. Some of his obituaries listed him as a State Department officer.

"As you'll be hearing," the Bash email begins, "an Afghan (intelligence) officer pulled the ripcord on a vest in front of coalition guys loading a helicopter. Total of 14 either killed or wounded — some U.S., some Afghans. Right now we think one U.S. mil killed and one wounded."



U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton speaks as her husband former President Bill Clinton and their daughter Chelsea accompany her at a campaign rally in Des Moines, Iowa January 31, 2016. BRIAN SNYDER / Reuters

The next paragraph of the email, which was released Friday and is now posted on the State Department's website, has been whited out and classified "Secret." Officials who have reviewed the uncensored version say Bash was attempting to preserve the CIA officer's cover. But some of the language he used, now that Lorenzetti is known to have been a CIA officer, could be read as a U.S. government acknowledgement that CIA officers pose as State Department personnel in a specific country, Afghanistan — something widely known but not formally admitted. Therefore, the section of the email was classified and blocked from public release.

Bash, who was Panetta's chief of staff while Panetta was CIA director, sent the email to four people — including George Little, a Pentagon spokesman who was a former CIA spokesman, and Philippe Reines, an aide to Secretary of State Clinton.

Bash ends the email by instructing Little, the former CIA spokesman, to "please lash up with (blank)" — presumably either the spy agency or one of its employees.

Reines forwarded the email to Clinton State Dept. aides Cheryl Mills and Jake Sullivan, who forwarded it to Clinton. There is no record of Clinton commenting.

**"IF SOMEONE ON MY
STAFF DID WHAT SHE**

Bash, in an interview, said the email was not classified when it was sent or forwarded, and "did not reference the individual's name, employer, nor any identifying description or information."

DID...THEY WOULD BE FIRED AND THEY WOULD BE PROSECUTED"

Once the CIA posthumously lifted Lorenzetti's cover, Bash added, "the original unclassified email could be read to confirm the general use of cover, prompting the redactions we now see. But any suggestion that this email contained confirmation about the person or his cover, or any inappropriate information, is flat wrong."

The 2012 email wasn't the only one referencing a CIA officer or program, officials said. The references were indirect, and Clinton made no comment about them, the officials said.

Some of the references to covert intelligence officers, and other discussions of CIA drone strikes, were against classification rules and were "sloppy," one official said. But views are split on whether they were damaging to national security.

It's unclear, the officials said, whether the emails would have provided significant insights to foreign intelligence agencies, if, as many experts say is possible, Clinton's private server was penetrated or hacked.

The messages at issue are part of a longstanding pattern of senior officials at the State Department and other government agencies trying to talk around classified information over email, sometimes unsuccessfully.

What makes Clinton's case different is her use of a home server to transmit emails about government business. The issue has continued to be a factor in her front-running campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination. However, given that the State Department's email system has been penetrated by hackers linked to Russian intelligence, it's far from clear whether the material would have been any more secure had Clinton used State's unclassified email system.

Clinton and her senior aides had access to secure messaging and telephone systems, but they were not as convenient as email.

As the Associated Press has reported, State Department emails previously made public show a history of classified information slipping into unclassified email. Examples have been posted on the State Department's website in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. Although the classified information has been redacted, it is possible to glean insights into the sensitivity from the context.

In emails about the 2012 attack on a U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya, department officials using state.gov accounts discussed the movement of Libyan militias and the locations of key Americans.

An email from diplomat Alyce Abdalla, sent the night of the attack, appears to report that the CIA annex in Benghazi was under fire. The email has been largely whited out, with the government citing the legal exemption for classified intelligence information. The existence of that facility is now known; it was a closely-held secret at the time.

In five emails from state.gov email accounts that date to Condoleezza Rice's tenure as secretary of state during the Bush administration and have been publicly released after FOIA requests, large chunks are censored on the grounds that they contain classified national security or foreign government information.

They include a December 2006 email in which diplomat John J. Hillmeyer appears to have pasted the text of a confidential cable from Beijing about China's dealings with Iran and other sensitive matters.

Large portions of the email were marked classified and censored before release.

Clinton insists she didn't send or receive information marked classified. But she signed a non-disclosure agreement acknowledging that information can be classified regardless of whether it is "marked or unmarked."

1A50

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 219999 57

Date Received 2-19-2014

From Boswell
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Washington DC
(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: Interview Notes
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Boswell

1A50

ERIC J. BOSWELL

WAE / When Actually Emp Status w/ DoS.
Resigned from DoS ^{Nov/} Oct 2013 [Fall]

Overall responsibility for sec of comms, people, programs, etc.
for entire DoS.

① SA in charge of 7th floor. - security officer
I name direct oversight
over Mag.

2009 - no knowledge of p. server
no knowledge p. email
no knowledge.

1st aware when news broke in press.
Found Sec State very responsive to security issues

Show Redacted Memo

drafted early in Administration

Inquiries from staff about using BB Config
for Classified

asked staff to brief on what on possible
& informed it was not.

Concern over Sec Staff (most came through campaign)

using BBs on Mahog row. - told to stop & they
did

No specific instances.

No previous instances.

Not sure Sec State used a work station.

secure phones & staff w/ all kinds of ways to communicate.

show of redacted email:-

3 days after office

Lon Lucans - ex director of executive sec
Chief Admin Officer.

Stand alone work station - means to Boswell.

a work station not necessarily one off the system.

Dont have recollection of any further discussion.

DS didnt sanction use of BlackB. on Mang Row.

Kennedy, Patrick F

From: Lukens, Lewis A
Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 8:26 PM
To: Kennedy, Patrick F
Subject: Re: Series of questions

RELEASE IN PART B6

I talked to Cheryl about this. She says problem is hrc does not know how to use a computer to do email - only bb. But I said would not take much training to get her up to speed.

From: Kennedy, Patrick F
To: Lukens, Lewis A; 'habediri'; 'cmills'
Cc: Smith, Daniel B
Sent: Sat Jan 24 20:22:20 2009
Subject: Re: Series of questions

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Frank Tumminia, Senior Reviewer

That is why this is the best solution

From: Lukens, Lewis A
To: 'habediri'; Kennedy, Patrick F; 'cmills'
Cc: Smith, Daniel B
Sent: Sat Jan 24 19:49:30 2009
Subject: Re: Series of questions

She'll be able to.

From: Huma Abedin
To: Kennedy, Patrick F; Lukens, Lewis A; Cheryl Mills
Cc: Huma Abedin ; Smith, Daniel B
Sent: Sat Jan 24 19:48:27 2009
Subject: Re: Series of questions

Yes we were hoping for that if possible so she can check her email in her office.

-----Original Message-----

From: Kennedy, Patrick F <KennedyPF@state.gov>
To: Lukens, Lewis A <LukensLA@state.gov>; Cheryl Mills
CC: Huma Abedin; Smith, Daniel B <SmithD2@state.gov>
Sent: Sat Jan 24 19:29:25 2009
Subject: Re: Series of questions

Cheryl

The stand-alone separate network PC is on on great idea

Regards

Pat

From: Lukens, Lewis A
To: 'cmills'

B6
B6
B6
B6
B6

B6

Cc: h Abedin; Kennedy, Patrick F; Smith, Daniel B
Sent: Sat Jan 24 19:10:33 2009
Subject: Re: Series of questions

We have already started checking into the NSA bb. Will set up the office across the hall as requested. Also think we should go ahead (but will await your green light) and set up a stand alone PC in the Secretary's office, connected to the internet (but not through our system) to enable her to check her emails from her desk. Lew

From: Cheryl Mills
To: Lukens, Lewis A
Cc: Huma Abedin ; Kennedy, Patrick F
Sent: Sat Jan 24 19:05:24 2009
Subject: RE: Series of questions

so I have now read up more on POTUS' bb (which appears not really to be a bb but a different device).

is there any solution to her being able to use an encrypted bb like the nsa approved one he has in the vault and if so, how can we get her one.

and if not, let's set up the office across the hall for her to use - it needs a phone etc. so she can go across the hall to check her bb.

cdm

From: Lukens, Lewis A [mailto:LukensLA@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, January 23, 2009 6:54 AM
To: Cheryl Mills
Subject: Re: Series of questions

Questions 1 and 2 - yes. Will give you more details this morning

On the bb for hrc, can we chat this morning? I may have thought of a workaround but need more info on her bb use from you.

Lew

From: Cheryl Mills
To: Lukens, Lewis A
Sent: Fri Jan 23 06:47:59 2009
Subject: Series of questions

Lcw -

who can I talk to about:

1. can our email be accessed remotely through the web using a non-DOS computer like my laptop?
2. I am traveling to the M-E tonight – will my DOS bb work there and is there a cell phone attached?
3. spoke to Dan re: bb for HRC (and reports that POTUS is able to use a super encrypted one which)
4. spoke to Dan re: setting up Counselor office for HRC so she can go across hall regularly and check her email.

cdm

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(G),1.4(E),B7(C),B6,1.4(C)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DECL: 03/02/2019

REVIEW
AUTHORITY:
1.4(E) Barbara Nielsen,
1.4(G) Senior Reviewer
B1

INFORMATION MEMO FOR CHERYL D. MILLS – S

FROM: DS – Eric J. Boswell

SUBJECT: Use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row

We have worked closely [redacted] to review all options that would allow Secretary Clinton, you, and a small number of staff to use Blackberries [redacted]

[redacted] Our review reaffirms our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweigh the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops. [redacted]

[redacted] We also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.

As an alternative, we suggest that DS work with S/ES-IRM to make access to the Secretary's OpenNet account on her desktop workstation as easy and convenient as possible. For example, we are happy to work with IRM to lengthen or even eliminate the time-out function to allow the Secretary's Special Assistant to log-on to review her emails and schedules.

[redacted] While we cannot recommend using Blackberries inside the Mahogany Row, we do not want to stand in the way of issuing Department Blackberries to the Secretary and her senior staff for use outside Mahogany Row. Those Blackberries can be synchronized with your OpenNet Microsoft Outlook accounts, provide full cellular, e-mail, and internet functionality, and provide unclassified mobile technology when you are away from Mahogany Row.

I cannot stress too strongly, however, that any unclassified Blackberry is highly vulnerable in any setting to remotely and covertly monitoring conversations, retrieving e-mails, and exploiting calendars. I am attaching reports from DS's

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified by DS – Eric J. Boswell

~~FOI 17958 Reasons: 1.4 (c) (d) and (e)~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- 2 -

Office of Computer Security's Cyber Threat & Analysis Division that give further background on those risks. [redacted]

[redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted]

[redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Excerpts from DS/CS/CTAD Reports on Blackberry Vulnerabilities

Tab 2 - [redacted]

Tab 3 - New York Times Article: "Obama's Phone Security and Yours"

Tab 4 - Washington Post Article: "Your Cell and Your Berry: Tools for the Enemy"

1.4(C)
1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

Eric J. Boswell

Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security (1996 to 1998, and 6/2008 to 12/2012) –

Director of the Office of Foreign Missions (DS/OFM) (6/30/2008) –

Assistant Deputy Director for Security ODNI (2005 to 2008)

- Introduction
 - Voluntary / Can stop at any time ✓
 - NSLB Disclaimer re: Garrity / not interested in prior statements to DOS
 - FBI's interest in this matter is to assess whether classified information was stored or transmitted on the server and if it was compromised by either authorized or unauthorized users.
 - Discussion of classified topic, if necessary
- Brief overview of duties
 - What is your current position?
 - What were your duties at DoS?
 - What were your duties as the A/S of DS, as relevant to the security of the Secretary's communications?
- Knowledge of the private server, email system, and other devices?
 - Did DS have any role in the set up, or maintenance of the server?
 - If so:
 - What was there an approval process for the use of private email / email servers?
 - What steps were taken to review the risks / benefits of this arrangement?
 - Who was involved in the review process?
 - Was this consistent with DoS policy at that time?
 - Did the server violate department policy as stipulated in the Foreign Affairs Manual?
 - What is the current policy today?
 - When / why did it change?
 - What role did DS play with respect to providing secure communications to Secretary?
 - Did DS provide any guidance / recommendations on the use of devices?
 - What secure comms were available to the secretary at her home and when she was traveling?
 - Phone, Fax, Email (Classnet / JWICS)
- Discussion of Memo
 - What was the context of this memo?
 - Who requested to use BB on Mahogany Row?
 - Had this been done by previous secretaries?
 - Why did she need her BB on Mahogany Row?
 - Do you (or DS) know of requests made by Cheryl Mills for a standalone system that wasn't on the DoS network?

- It appears that the issue is connecting to private server / email from DoS. How was this resolved? – i.e, BB on Mahogany Row, separate computer system, other?
- Can you please explain the last paragraph?
 - *If after considering the vulnerability that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use BB in Mahogany Row [redacted]*
 - What was the Secretary's decision?
- References to Office of Computer Security Cyber Threat & Analysis Division
 - What were the primary threats facing DoS at that time?
 - How was threat information relayed to the Secretary and her team? *Memo / DS.*
 - Are there any specific threats that you recall? *Individual or Mass Memo*
 - Were there any other issues or concerns regarding general security posture of the Secretary and her team? (i.e., Egregious actions, not minor infractions)
 - Who was the primary POC in the Office of Computer Security Cyber Threat and Analysis Division at that time?
 - How does Office of Computer Security fit in to world of IRM, IRM-S/ES, PACE, etc?

*one is Security Side
one is IRM.*

*DS tests systems
tries to ID
classified*

*job to detect
breaches.*

*pushes
out info*

*Spear phishing
Hostile Govt.*

- Is there anybody else that we should talk to regarding this matter?
- Any other thoughts / concerns regarding this matter.
- NDA request

1A54

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 61

Date Received 12/22/15

From Bryan Pagliano
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Washington, DC

(City and State)

By SA

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A54

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: 302
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

- Bryan Pagliano interview notes
- Documents displayed to Pagliano

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

12/22/15

Background

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

2006 - Senate campaign → Presidential

↳ IT Director of Presidential campaign

↳ After, archiving, wiping & reinstalling

Talked w/ Capricia Marshall (Friends of Hillary)

b6
b7C

+ Al. Rubin about working for state)

b6 Per
b7C DOS

~ early 2011

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

at SD → wrote performance reviews/weekly mtgs

Moved into

Not hands on at SD - did not have admin accounts

his place

↳ Mostly writing recommendations/memos

2012

↳ mostly mobile computing, small branch for BBs

b6 Per
b7C DOS

[Redacted]

had issues at 1st then turned into good program

transitioned out

↳ ITTI program

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(current employer) around that time interviewing

Fall 2008 JC w/ Pres Clinton's office (from WH) + personal affairs

was Mac OS X G5 or G4 → called or emailed him on HC email. Heard about liquidation of

Email Server equipment. Can sell him equipment? Dell, Bell, UPS, FW, Server

↳ Asked for help setting up equipment

Bought Microsoft SBS 2008, BES, A/V, Syslog server, 515EPIX

↳ JC skill level at time - yr 1 or 2 Sys Admin

Weekend trip Installed server in Chap, NY. New he had existing email setup

March 2009 ↳ took all user names + passwords. Pull popmail to Outlook client into Exchange server

Part of migration on site. Finished offsite

12/22/15

March 2009 - Equipment:

Airport

Printer (HP) - support IPP (port 9100). Opened it up to internet

So they could print from Hailem Office

b6
b7C

[redacted] had physical access but not admin

OSX Server - G4 or G5 -> later ^{intention was} got installed as a workstation

12U Rackee - BISE FW

[redacted] JC or

Dell unmanage switch

PE 1950

PE 2900

3U Power supply

3TB hard drive -

No tape backups

Disk to disk backup so they could do backups

Optimum ISP - bought internet from AboveNet

Mac OSX
When migrated mail, would have chosen not to keep a copy on old server

2 Domains - presidentclinton.com & clintonemail.com

b6
b7C

↳ pointed both to 2900

JC provided name accounts/passwords

[redacted]

Justin, Huma (didn't migrate at 1st)

[redacted]

↳ Did not migrate Hillary's email to new server

New - everyone had access to either domain for receiving email.

- Reply address set as clintonemail.com

12/22/15 SBS Setup

Email only

Behind Firewall - only server

[redacted] - tech interested - talked to him about Sharepoint site
JC - said it was an option but didn't appear to be used

(Campaign-Pre) PE - used as SQL server
1950 - 20-25 servers on campaign in Ballston

↳ may not have wiped them b/c staying w/in the campaign

↳ For rest of servers, did a RAID reconfigure / bit "wipe"

No file access. Sharepoint was turned on but appeared no use.

password = Forefront was 2nd choice

[redacted]

Main server - Ran Microsoft tool to turn off services

- Windows Firewall

- Forefront. Wanted to use Postini (cloud filtering)

↳ JC didn't want to use Postini (didn't like cloud)

↳ was not stable on SBS until ~ 2010

Just doing

DNS (not DHCP)

- scanned mailboxes & then acted as virus scanner on Windows server

- MS backup service -> start w/ external HD

Don't think he

did WINS

1st in, 1st out

↳ schedule - full 1x week, differential every day

- WSUS - automatic patching & reboot overnight

FW Filtering

Inbound

filtering. Talked

to SS guy

he recommended

filtering

Remote access was BFA. Set up Windows server logs to alert JC

every time of failed logon attempts. Just do IP filtering

↳ led to discussion of upgrades

↳ sent to his blackberry account w/ IP address, username

Do IP blocking. Some accounts

2nd - Server - Windows 2003 - MS virtual server w/ BES

↳ before upgrade in 2010

- Kiwi Syslog server on it - Collected FW logs HRC-1458

- Didn't get a chance to review them

- Only looked at them ~ 1x month. JC wouldn't have

12/22/15

The one ← Utility server. Telnet was on server (console access)
that was exposed → 2003 server ^{virtual} _{as workstation} used initially to migrate mailboxes

↳ RDP Thought JC didn't know how to login to mailbox

ASA FW Cisco. Tried to do 2-factor authentication for RDP only
↳ certificate server. Put it on 2nd different workstations

Tested ← it but wasn't reliable so didn't shut off RDP + only used RDP
Use local account on Utility server to remote into Exchange Server
JC + BP's workstation - Certs on machines, RDP 2nd level auth

BP - sent a lot of screenshots to JC about how to set up accounts

Summer 2009 - noticed an account that said "H"

- hdr (3 #s) hdr22@clintonemail.com
or hdr17@

Can receive on either domain presidentclinton.com
or clintonemail.com

Summer 2009 - [redacted] or [redacted] (unclear) b6
b7C

- both foreign service officers. Knows a lot of IT

IRM under Mgmt Bureau. IRM on 7th floor [redacted]

↓ BP for everyone else b6
b7C

They called him into the office + asked about the clintonemail.com domain
asked him about it

Relayed the convo to [redacted] had conversations about the server. Expressed concerns about the server being used as records retention. (couldn't get thru to inner O' (unsure))

BP - Scheduled mtg w/ CM about the issue - late 2009, maybe 2010

CM - cited conversation or something Colin Powell said. Don't let them take your smart away. This is ok.
↳ [redacted] (sp?) assistants to CM. b6 Per
b7C DOS

Later conversation w/ [redacted] about security concerns

[redacted] propose TLS tunnel btw State Server + Server in Chap b6
b7C

↳ assumption was that it was only for personal use HRC-1459

[redacted] got involved:

12/22/15

① Issue where clinton email was not getting delivered to State.gov

②

③ When internet connection got knocked out b/c storm (optimum)

Vend - US21 Inc → invoice JC directly

2009 - more b/c setting it up

2010 - hardly any work done

2011 - spiked again b/c of 2nd install, more technology

2012 - Spiked a little b/c of transition

Intrusion attempts - alot of BFAs, see IP + username attempted to log on, generic u/p

BP did not have an email account

If user they recognized, ask if there were login problems

USB drive failing - left it behind the server in the rack

2011 Summer? Transition to NAS - more than 1/2 for backup [60/40 or 70/30]

① Cisco NAS

- just pointed the backups to the new NAS

② Managed switch -

- offloaded the syslogs to the NAS

- for iSCSI

③ ASA FW 5500

- security upgrade - Cisco's botnet filter bought - helped w/BFA

↳ had to go thru

- Intrusion Protection Service (IPS) from Cisco

FW to get thru to servers

BP - JC had more flexibility to create accounts

Export of archives [redacted] wanted his email (never deleted email)

Export of [redacted]? (not sure)

Import Humans contacts from state.gov account

12/22/15

SBS Environment

↳ Devices → no visibility

↳ Monica talking about a laptop - started to talk to her around 2012

↳ BB HC used bought in 2008 - that broke

↳ Monica said she liked it + wanted the old model - found 4 phases

↳ JC on trip

↳ "We" activated the mail ~ Winter 2011?

↳ Monica gave impression that there was a laptop being used

Mailbox scanning document - ^{assume it was} coming out of Forefront - Virus scanning

Exchange log

JC - handed him usernames + passwords, but would not have had

Bryan admin password

- He did setup 3/9/2009 - Install under Administrator account

- He did upgrade

- He did not do uninstall

Conf call b/w [redacted] JC - wanted a more robust system

Then [redacted] CM got involved, then [redacted]

Convo with CM about security of the system - B+ on security

[redacted] decides on PRN

Bluesheet #11 → "clean up" → If you delete a msg or more mailboxes, the [redacted] doesn't decrease in size. Built-in "cleaning" function [redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

winter storm of 2011

12/22/15

Sandy = gmail accounts

- told JC advice, can change MX records to set server at Chap to 10 ~~they~~ then gmail to 20, when I can't find 10, go to 20
- Huma + HC likely, but JC would have done this
- Didn't have admin access
- Google for business - push to a domain

Back up document -> Would have been backed up to NAS - 2013

July 2014 - phone call w/ CM or PRN

b6
b7C

July 2014 - He - thinks it was [redacted] (engineer on HC campaign)

He used a reg. Expression text editor

Summer/
Fall 2013

Convos w/ [redacted] -> questions of how to work w/ pst files
context of Benja z

b6 Per
b7C DOS

-> questions on sorting emails, searching

-> ASKED details on timestamps

↳ ~~she~~ wanted to know what would happen to date stamps if opened a file (modified date)

OR if ~~she~~ moved file

↳ she didn't want to give impression that she was modified

↳ Assumed PRN gave her a pst to work with

July 2014 - CM + PRN

- explain the "gap" of emails

- individuals that received emails from her address prior to the emails PRN was able pull

12/22/15 "Gap" in emails - July 2014

- ↳ Found out From JC there was a BB using BIS/BIZ?
- ↳ AT&T BB - prior to the one JC setup on the system ^{he built}
- ↳ only other place to look would be on the file system itself

Call/Talk w/CM - Fall 2013

- ↳ had convos about archiving data + repurpose machines
- ↳ Boden N' Nuke => E He used before. But can't recall the tools.
- Explaining what type of deletion process to use when repurposing
- She explained what tools PRN was proposing to use
- Explained difference btw "bit" wiping + just deleted
- She was being told by PRN

Call w/CM - Spring 2015

- ↳ would you talk to David Kendall, JC talked to him
- ↳ Told DK shorter version of story

b6
b7C

[redacted] would check in on him every once in a while - Not advising

Conf call w/security team - 1/11/2011 - Maybe call w/ [redacted] - Re. outbound filtering

b6
b7C

HC-014 [redacted] contact at USZI

b6
b7C

HC-014 BES IT Security policy - reding of the policy, Restricting Bluetooth

HC-023 [redacted] - pushed security policies individually

b6
b7C

HC-001 Nov 28, 2011 payment - Cisco VPN (2-factor), power outage on 8/28 - moved NAS to be syslog server


HC-002 - Configure VPN - no user VPN, just admin

HRC-1463

- IPS went in place when Cisco ASA went in
- tuned it over time. Turned on logging mode
- some point turned it off logging mode

12/22/15

mailbox wickoff - was for



b6
b7C

HC-004 Push security policies for iPad - probably for HRC

↳ He did not configure it for her

Patch for BES server

↳ saw the email address

↳ Does not know if this was a new device


HC-010 Jan 2013

↳ Potential "H" email issue - btw 2/2013 - 3/2013

↳ could have been when dealing w/ Monica about 4 RBs

↳ Rec. for CM. Document the state & where we should be going

↳ sent in email




b6
b7C

↳ only CM accounts are gmail, state (old NYU)

HC-012 July 2013

↳ Msg delivery failures - no specifics

↳ Conf calls w/



b6
b7C

12/22/15 10:15am






b6
b7C


2006 Senate Campaign ramping stuck crowd for press campaign.
Cynthia Marshall HRC/PAAC - interviewing at State Department cited for 4 yrs.
No admin record at State. Writing memo advocacy for progress.

b6
b7C

- State - mobile computing. ITTI - transformational initiative.
[redacted] to [redacted] early 2011. [redacted]



b6 Per
b7C DOS



Fall 2008

JC with BC for some time. Called me. Email introduction. I know that
you're liquidating equipment. We have a server we are transitioning from.
2950, 1950, 12u120, UPS, switch, firewall. no software. Didn't know HRC would be
SoP. I did work at KStreet we had anti-syslog, config pix 515E, exp with
Forefront.

- Mac OSX server running open source software. People starting to use.
- JC year or 2 yrs admin skills.

- Taking user names, passwords JC gave me - pop mail from Mac to Outlook client.

- JC, me, USU, OF - Physical equipment in - some migration started onsite, but
continued in my hotel room. March 2009

Apple

65 or 4 towers - airport, (outside firewall), printer HP and support 1PP ->
opened to internet to print, OSX server, desk slideout.

- Iptix 12u120 Bell managed switch, 1950, 2950, 3U APC power supply,
2950 - 1TD hard drive - disc to disc back-ups. - couldn't rotate tapes

No KVM - One generator for the house. Cable modem. Optimum - bought internet from that net.

App Server - Don't know other functions.

Migrate AS - PS - 2 domains - pres.clubn.com and clubn.eval.com

Acts: [redacted] JC, Home had acct didn't

Didn't know if there was a Hillay Account but didn't migrate. from

JC gave direction.

On New server - would receive on both domains only send from.

[redacted] or JC could monitor printer but I don't know.

[redacted] had physical access - hard drive failed on utility and he did it. New Tech.

Don't know who installed AS. JC had admin access to AS.

No known upgrades for AS.

After AS migration - we discussed repurposed. ^{JC} How reinstalled as a workstation.

someplace in Ch. Also used as a work station the 2nd time I went to

Ch. In basement.

Don't know how users connected to AS.

Changed DNS and MX records. Nothing to AS anymore after weekend.

When I moved, would have popped out - No distinct memory.

Discussion with JC about moving to basement. Only one internet connection.

Didn't want to. JC wanted to have physical access to servers

- more reliability.

BP server - Function of equipment prior - email system. Mhsmail. Poweredge server equal server. 1950 - don't know. Corporate HQ 4420 W. Farther Drive. Data center air-conditioning.

2950 and 1950 - may not have wiped. Used RAID utility to wipe discs. for the rest. Prob. good practice

BPsans

- picked SBS. After 2007, it was good. My choice. I've used before.
for 500, or 900 go-fort EX, etc.

- Physical access - anyone in the house could've walked down door. Of, JC.

- Sharepoint was turned on - but no one used file access. No one used.

- Sec services - Fire front. Main box - baseline security analyzer. FTP was
off. Chaged sgr was password [redacted] Windows fire wall.

b7E

- I installed up updated patches - we used on campaign. JC didn't want.

No cloud. Fire front was the option. Wasn't stable until 2007 later.

found some virus. Nothing of great concern. We used Microsoft back-up
ex HDD - first in - first out. Would our write. Runs once a week,
Differential every day. Windows server back-up - schedule task. Key it
clean. Just Micro.

- automatic scheduled patching. Auto patch, auto reboot. For 6-72
SBS ad utility.

Biggest concern. BFA. Set-up logs to alert JC for failed log-in. IP filtering.

SISE
straight IP block.

BFA's increased over time. Started to have an upgrade discussion 2011. manual.
losing space. Was doing DNS. Paul didn't do WINS. On se ^{inbound filtering} firewall.

On secondary box, had BES, had K181 sgr log (tried to pull firewall log
files) Once a month or so. JC did not. Symantec, Power.

- USSJ - [redacted] - JC said talk to his guy. Don't recall why. Said
do out bound filtering.

b6
b7C

- We had password policies.

- I would login through RD Service account. JC did not know how.

- I would do that to troubleshoot for USSJ.

- (MSO management service SISE at ASA

- Telnet on all servers. That one was exposed to the internet.

Bd gaur

- Discr / Mailboxes not migrated.
- 2 factor. On ASA stated to do. expected with. Put it on 2 workstations
Bd and JL. My idea. RDP showing weaknesses. Good practice. It correctly results.
- JL was same to 2 factor. Wanted RSA servers.

- I would try to talk to JL. We evolved. He understood more later.
- Domain: clinton email, pres clips. Didn't do DNS management.
- JL changed MX records.

- trained JL on systems.
- In summer of 2009, I noticed an account that said H. I asked JL
what this is. He said Hillary. I assumed personal email.
- APR 22 @ clinton email.com
- Changed to Hood 109 after Sid Ploncutt.

- In summer 2009, met [redacted] at [redacted] 6th FSO.

b6
b7C

- brought us to 7th floor. Do you know about clinton email.com domain.
Don't know how they knew about personal email. Ext relationship with
[redacted] since. Didn't drill down in first meeting. Relayed to [redacted] via oral creation.
- 2nd conversation - we at server being a record retention issue. Can't
get through to inner circle. - can you? late 2008 maybe 2010. I
raised issue with Cheryl Mills. She said after JCS had done. CP
said CP had done. Person to person in her office. Weeks between meeting.

- [redacted] didn't want to know anymore. They had returned to JL.

b6
b7C

- 3rd conversation with [redacted] - security [redacted] travel with DOS - in Chicago - Didn't talk
to anyone.

- 'It be reviewed if classified information wasn't being transmitted.' Don't know who
Didn't know what prompted him to raise it - thought email was personal.
or when

- Through CM assistants.

- ce.com wasn't being delivered to state. you [redacted] got involved.

b6
b7C

- optimum connection went down for sandy. Couldn't get second connection feasible.
- Hardware paid for Clinton family campaign. Worked with US21 computers. would invoice JC directly.
- No contract - No scope - came with JC. He wanted retainer, but I did hourly. 2009 - stand-up 2010 - hardly anything. 2011 - second install 2012 - transition
- Once at DoS, 2008 - didn't know install - I did know. How to server never in another location.
- no security breaches. A lot of DFAs. user names weren't close. No email acct. Just admin. Only [] - it was Ken.
- no giant spikes through ADAs.
- email: ex HOO to NAF. Disc failing. CISCO makes good products. Maybe corrected US21. Non-rack. More than half to back-up 60/40 to back-up other to site. Unplug USB - pointed to NAF. Didn't use back-up to NAF.
- End upgrade June 2011 - added memory & utility server. CISCO WAS, Gigaswitch, ASA ⁵⁷⁶⁰ firewall, offloaded logging to NAF, more toward firewall upgrades. DFAs were non-targeted and random. Thought botnet so bought botnet filter from CISCO. Also did intrusion protection, replaced batteries on UPS. Upgrades, maintenance.
- check on BES for software patch. In 6/11, went from BES 5.0 to 6.0.
- I did upgrades pushing updates - JC to users.
- User accounts: JC. Can't remember.
- 2 admins - JC and me.
- ~~to~~ Import. Export - [] wanted his email when leaving. 40GB. May have done [] for export. Nitrate.
- Import Home - state.gov contacts to server.

b6
b7c

b6
b7c

- Show acct: 4/8: Don't recognize all names. Don't know how archive after by poll boxes - I don't know.
- Ways connected: inside fire wall was me. Any client they wanted to be open to them.
- Clouded memory - Monica talking about a laptop. That was downloading Outlook email.
- HRC had 2008 bb. Met with MH in 2012-12 tried to contact a bb.
- No migration between HRC. Account name changed.
- Mailbox scanning - shown - out of Fox front - scanning for viruses. Most likely.
- Would've talked to JC about DFA of Bethot theory. No countries stuck out.
- Didn't know classified - No one ever told me.
- Never accessed content on server.
- Ex time stamp shown - 3/09 - initial redaction. JC had passwords - not by accident.
- 8/12 - service pack upgrade.

PRN transition

- [redacted] doing her own thing. [redacted] JC, DP talks about future of server. b6
b7C
- More people get involved [redacted] CM. Not sure of [redacted] interest.
- JC got requests to add. We had limitations. Spoked discussions.
- [redacted] gets involved. Don't know how [redacted] handled. She looked for vendors. Presentation - 3 candidates. Asked for my opinion. I said PRN. b6
b7C
- [redacted] made ultimate decisions to PRN. b6
b7C
- Arch details to PRN. - giving passwords. Details.
- [redacted] Wasn't in Chicago - a. b6
b7C
- Convo [redacted] Talked once twice.
- Clean-up - Exchange - clear out white space. [redacted] email box. b6
b7C
- trim.

Winter 2011

~~Hurricane Sandy~~ - ISP had no power. Time was going to take a while.

I suggested to ret server at Chappaque 10 and gmail to 20. DNS record goes to gmail. Not sure who he set-up. Squelchy deals case Home and Hillay. So most likely, didn't push the buttons.

gmail for business - can't push a whole domain.

NAS had 500GB - target could've been either. Based on time NAS.

PRN - No involvement in their selection. We talked cloudjacket, 2factor.

b6
b7C

Maybe [redacted]

- JATTO heard in conversations. [redacted] what he should do.

- 07/2014 - archive email options -

b6
b7C

- 07/14 - email - [redacted] engineer for Hillay capture.

- Conversation with [redacted] - details how to work with PST

b6 Per
b7C DOS

files. How do time stamps happen? Responding to Benghazi. Summer to Fall 2013. Sorting through. Reopening up file, does it change modified stamp. She didn't want to give impression that she was changing. Probably from PRN.

- BP, CM - explain gap in emails. Individuals that received ^{email} prior to what PR was able to pull. In conversations with JC - found out black berry before mine. Gap in Jan 2009 + March 18, 2009.

- No other memory with BP, CM PRN convo after.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

- Fall 2013, CM calls and says PRN was going to arrive. Using 2 vendors. PRN would have used.

- Spring 2015, CM would you mind talking to David Kendall - I did. Before counsel. Shorter version of this. Nothing I told him that I didn't tell you.

HC-001- 3/30/2007- includes expenses. rental car.

6/17/2011- expenses.

lost check. asked in to set up payment.

HC-014- cont call security team - [redacted] outbound filtering.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is contact at US21.

[redacted]

- Rec config for BB - SoS turned off Bluetooth except Justin. Maybe [redacted]

- Justin could wipe & restore a device that was lost.

HC 023- [redacted] - one by one

b6
b7C

HC001- 11/28- CISCO VPN, Power outage, patching BES, NAS sys log.

HC002- VPN- Efactor solution not just RDP. Didn't do VPN.

IPV when ANA

HC008- mailbox kick-off - [redacted] export mailbox. Fix corruption.

b6
b7C

- Talk to [redacted]

HC 004- SoS 1 ped. I didn't configure. Don't know when she started using it.

You could see what email account.

HC006-

HC 010- rec for CM - analysis on security. B+ grade. What can we do.

where we need to go. I'm not trying to take you there. CM has state at gmail. NYU she abandoned.

- Next entity to support.

HC 012- md failures - don't know.

- cont calls - [redacted]

Network & Tech for cluster bandwidth

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5
Page 14 ~ Duplicate;
Page 15 ~ Duplicate;
Page 16 ~ Duplicate;
Page 17 ~ Duplicate;
Page 36 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

#60

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 73

Date Received 5/24/2016

From HEATHER SAMUELSON
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A60

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

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
HEATHER SAMUELSON

DOCS SHOWN TO SAMUELSON

5/24/16 3:50 PM

HEATHER SAMUELSON

BETH, ALEX, HAR



①
b6
b7c

CURRENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT TO THE SA
DDS JOG - MARCH 2013 W/ CIAISON OFFICE
ASSISTANT → HEAD OF OFFICE
MARCH 2014 → 1 YR W/ BASEL OFFICE

- INTERACTED W/ CHERYL, NOT W/ S VERT OFFICER.
- TS/SCI (STILL HAS IT TODAY)
 - REINVESTIGATION WHEN LEFT THE WH (IN 2014)
 - REINVESTIGATION TRAINING, BUT NOT THE DETAILS.
 - ↳ ALSO TRAINING @ REINVEST
 - NONE OF FOIA, FED RECORDS ACT → NOT AT STATE BUT AT WH ON PROS, RECORD ACT.
- OUT PROCESSING AT DDS → NO GUIDANCE ON INFO TO RETAIN
- CORRESPONDED ON STATE.GOV ACCOUNTS.
DIDN'T KNOW PRIVATE EMAIL UNTIL SERVING AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY.
- SERVER → VIA KNOWLEDGE AS ATTORNEY.
- ONLY GOT 2 EMAILS WHILE AT STATE - BDM, GRADY.

REVIEW - CHERYL'S OFFICE (FRIENDSHIP THREATS)

- PRN NOT INVOLVED IN PRN TRANS. → VIA REPR
- ADHOC (NOT CONTEMPORANEOUS)
NO KNOWLEDGE AT THE TIME, ONLY VIA REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY.
- HRC OFFICE LOCATION OF LAPTOP / THUMB DRIVE → NO KNOWLEDGE
- KNOWS SHE CHANGED EMAIL
UNDERSTANDING IS NO EMAILS WERE TRANSFER, WAS A NEW ACCOUNT FOR HER
- DON'T KNOW HOW HE/HA ACCESSED

(DOS REQUEST FOR EMAILS)

2

late early
July/August 2014

- NOT IN INITIAL DISC.
- ASKED TO ASSIST CHERYL
- CHERYL SPOKE W/ THE DEPARTMENT
- 10/28/2014 LETTER FROM ^{US} KENNEDY TO CHERYL
- NO SPECIFIC DATE
- NOTICED GAPS IN RECORD KEEPING → HC & OTHER FORMERS FOR RECORDS IN THEIR POSSESSION
- NO GUIDANCE FROM DOS THAT HS IS AWARE OF
- WAS HC REQUEST TO SORT WORK/NONWORK
- HS WAS ON
→ CALL W/ LEGAL ADVISORS AT STATE FWD LNW
- SEC REPRESENTATION - DAVID KENDALL & OTHERS FROM W/C

Collection
FROM
PRJ

[REDACTED]

WAS ONLY PERSON H.S.

b6
b7c

SPOKE W.

- JAN 2009 - FEB 2014 } REQUESTED ALL EMAILS.
- JAN 09 - MARCH 09 - ASKED PRJ TO DOUBLECHECK BUT THEY DIDN'T HAVE THEM.
- UNDERSTOOD ALL EMAILS ON BB AND NOT ON A SERVER → NOT RETRIEVABLE.
- GOOGLE/HURRICANE SANDY → DID NOTICE FEW EMAILS W/ [REDACTED] @EMAIL, LOGGED IT AND ONLY FOUND 1 EXCHANGE.
- OLD APPLE SERVER - NO CONTEMPORANEOUS KNOWLEDGE
- ASSOC/MH → NO DIDN'T REACT OUT, DID KNOW THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE ANY DOCS.
- NOT SURE ELSEWHERE (NOT ON SERVER/CLOUD, ETC)
- [REDACTED] SENT LINK, DOWNLOADED FILE → PUT ON CDROM FOR HS.

b6
b7c

b6
b7c

Techn. Diff.

.GOU EMAIL TRANSFER

- NOTHING IN POSSESSION ALREADY BEFORE CONTACTING PRN
- NO INFO FROM PRN ON LOCATION OF FILED EMAILS → LIVE MAILBOX → ARCHIVE WERE FROM JUST "AND RESUMES"
- SAME PROCESS TO RESEND FILES

- ① .GOU FILES - END JULY / EARLY AUGUST
FULL EXPORT
- ② ALL EMAILS (TOOK .GOU)
- ③ WANTED .GOU BACK (SOME MISSING)
- ④ GOT MINI PETS THAT WERE MISSING

• LINK VIA EMAIL → [] LOGS ON TO COMPUTER. b6
b7c
 DOWNLOADS FILE → PW PROJECT (TOLD HS. VERBA) IN OUTLOOK
 • [] → IMPORTED IT INTO OUTLOOK → wasn't waiting.

- DON'T RECALL NAMES OF FILES / LOCATION ON COMPUTER
- DON'T RECALL DISC OF ENCRYPTION, ETC.
- DID MAKE THUMBDRIVE OF EMAILS PROVIDED TO DOS.

• OTHER DATA SETS → ONLY EMAIL ACCOUNT.
 • DIDN'T CONSIDER USE OF E-DISCOVERY TOOLS FOR THE REVIEW.

LENOVO YOGA 2 → IN PETH'S POSSESSION (SILVER)
 ↳ ONLY USED IT FOR PHONE
 2ND COMP B/C SPILT WATER ON YOGA 2
 ↳ WAS LOADED W/ EMAILS PROVIDED TO DOS.
 IN FIRST POSSESSION FROM W/CONNOLLY.

PC {
 • → LOOKS LIKE COMPUTER. (SILVER YOGA)
 • "HCPRIME 2" USB - DOESN'T KNOW
 • USB THUMB DRIVE - " "

- BOTH PERSONAL LAPTOPS BUT FOR WORK RELATED MATTERS.

- WIFI AT CHERYL'S OFFICE & AT HOME

- YES - ANTI-VIRUS

- DIDN'T REPURPOSE

- FACTORY RESET (BREAK REQUIRED)

FACTORY RESTORE

COMP 1 - YOGA 2 - FACTORY RESTORE CD 'NO'

b6
b7c

~~WIFE~~ - JAN 2014 - [] REMOVED PST FROM LAPTOP
KEPT USING AFTER WATER SPILL -> NOW DOESN'T POWER ON
DELETED IN COURSE OF WORK, BUT NOT ATTEMPT TO 'WIPE'

u/s KENDALL (COMP 2 - NO 'WIPE' TO REMOVE WORKING COPY (IN NETWORK)
DOS => DELETE CLASSIFIED ON COMPUTER.

RETROACTIVE CLASSIFIED - DOUBLE DELETE

MAY 22ND 2015 -> 1ST RELEASE

THUMBDRIVE W/ PRODUCTION SET WAS IN KENDALL'S
POSSESSION EMAILS NOT DELETED

PRN - NO DVD COPIES TO HIS KNOWLEDGE

DOS "RESTORE ACCESS" DON'T RECALL WHAT
THAT MEANS, DOESN'T REMEMBER LOSING
ACCESS

• GOV

• PRINTED ALL, REVIEWED FOR PERSONAL CONTENT
ON PAPER

• CHERYL & DAVID REVIEWED ALSO

- TOOK WEEKS TO REVIEW, DON'T RECALL WHEN IT
END OR IF PRIOR TO FULL SET FROM

↳ NON PRODUCTION -> SHIPPED
PRODUCTION -> DOS

FULL ARCHIVE

• TO ENSURE FULL PROTECTION BEYOND GOV

• ~~REPOSITORY~~ OF FULL -> NO IDEA ON SOURCE

• ~~TOP~~ DON'T RECALL DUPLICATES IN DATA SET

• ACTUAL TRIPS TO DOS -> EMAIL CAME UP IN
MULTIPLE SEARCHES

• IF SAW 2x, PULLED IT BUT NOT REGULAR/CONSISTENT

PRN DIDN'T HELP W/ DE-IMP PROCESS.

= REVIEW HRC ARCHIVE?

↳ DIDN'T KNOW WHERE IT WAS FROM

→ FULL SET LATE SEPT / EARLY OCT?

= SAME COMPUTERS AS BEFORE

• PST TO CM COMPUTER? → CAN'T SPEAK TO

FOR
GOV OR
FULL

• DON'T RECALL NAME, EXCEPTION OF FILE.

• NO COPIES OF THE FULL EXPORT THAT SHE RECALLS.

• DON'T RECALL PROCESS.

• E. DISC → NO

= DIRECT ACCESS TO MAILBOXES ON SERVER

NO FOR SELF, NOT AWARE OF OTHERS.

- NO ADMIN ACCESS TO THE SERVER (OR ANY OTHERS)

= REVIEW → NO NON AGENTS OF THE SECRETARY / INVOLVED

LATE SEPT / OCT → PROVIDED TO DDS 12/5/14

FINISHED NEARLY DAY BEFORE.

- SAME LOCATION & EQUIPMENT AT GOV REVIEW.

- PRINTED IN OFFICE, MIGHT STILL BE IN O'NEILL'S OFFICE
NOT SURE (BLAND - ??, WAS BIG).

- NO ACCESS BY NON AGENTS.

METHODS
OF REVIEW

- GOV TO / FROM → PRIMARY PRACTICE FOR WORK

- FULL EMAIL ARCHIVE FROM TEMPLS

1. MIL

2. Dpt, A/S, U/S, AMB, POLICY BOARD, SR AIDES

3. SENDER / RECEIVERS → CONGRESS, FOREIGN LEADERS

4. KEY WORD SEARCHES TO SPOT CHECK.

AG. CUBA, BENGHAZI, ETC

HER → BILL BURNS (SUSPECT) → work

HER → DOCTOR → NOT WORK.

6

- PERSONAL → TO/FROM SUBJECT

- LOOKED AT EVERY EMAIL IN THE BOX

"LAI D EYES ON" DIDN'T READ IF IT WAS OBVIOUS

HS/DAVID/CHERYL → DEVELOPED PROCESS

CHANGED? - NOT SURE HOW TO SPEAK TO

INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED W/ JUST AGENTS → NO

NO REASON TO BELIEVE CLASSIFIED WAS
IN MAILBOX. NOT MARKED AS SUCH.

→ DISC ON HOW TO HANDLE IF FOUND → NO T/C
DIDN'T THINK ANYTHING WAS CLASSIFIED.

HUMA EMAILS → SUBJECT LINE, HER ACCOUNT
WAS ^{PRIMARILY} FOR FAMILY RELATED MATTERS AND NOT
RELEVANT. BUT WOULD LAI EYES ON. @CLINTONEMAIL

- AWARE EMAIL WAS CHANGED IN 2013

- NOTICED HEADLINE WAS STRIPPING TO SENDER BUT DIDN'T
HAVE ACCOUNT AT TIME. ASKED [] WITH - DIDN'T ^{b6}
UNDERSTAND RESPONSE, NO RESOLUTION. _{b7c}
NO ONE ELSE CONSULTED.

REESTABLISH CONNECTION IN 11/12/2014

- NEVER LOST CONNECTION, ASIDE FROM ASKING
.GOU BACK.

- USED .GOU AS BASE AND ADDED FILES
FROM FULL FILE TO CREATE PRESERVATION COPY
NOTICED .GOU'S IN FULL, NOT IN .GOU SET.

DOC10

DIDN'T RECALL WHAT IT WAS ABOUT.

DOC11 " " CAN'T SPECULATE ABOUT.

DIRECTION TO PEN ^{→ would delete contents in the mail.} ⑦
 12/2014 → EMAIL TO GODAYS RETENTION. ^{and email when they want deleted}
 - DIDN'T DIRECT PEN TO REMOVE EXPORTED PST ON SERVER
 - " " " " MAILBOXES ON SERVER

Additional

- NO REVIEW BY NON AGENTS.
 - HS PRINTED
 - PST PROVIDED TO FBI
 HS CREATED PRESERVATION COPY ON THUMB DRIVE TO DAVID (BELIEVING IT WENT TO FBI)
 - NAME - DOESN'T KNOW.
 2ND COPY FOR HS ATTORNEY'S TO KENNEDY ALSO.
 NO COPY OF MASTER ~~FILE~~ DATA SET ^{↳ PST on LAPTOP #2.}

- NO CONVO'S w/ DAS on THEIR PROCESS
 - [REDACTED] → KNOW NAMES, DON'T KNOW THEIR ROLE IN PROCESS b6
b7C

OFF OF LEGAL ADVISOR

↳ DISC @ HS HER ATTORNEY/
 → U/S KENNEDY TO CONFIRM DOCS WERE REVIEWED.

DELETION/REMOVE

[REDACTED] REMOVED IN. ^{CAREFUL NOT TO USE "WIPE" TO KEEP IT FROM BEING RECOVERED.} b6
b7C
 • SYSTEM THAT WOULD REMOVE/"WIPE" BS/OS
 DELETING SO NOT RECOVERABLE - DIFFICULT/IMPOSSIBLE TO RECOVER.
 • NO SPECIFICS OF SOFTWARE/PROCESS
 • IN JAN 2015 POST HOLIDAY
 • NEAR LAPTOP WHILE IT OCCURRED.
 ON SPEAKER PHONE w/ HIM WHILE DOING IT.
 • DON'T RECALL SELF DELETIONS PRIOR TO PEN.
 " " DISC OF FREE SPACE
 DIDN'T WANT ANYMORE
 • ASKED HIM TO REMOVE
 • NO NON-PRIV CONU RE WIPING
 • NO RECALL RE "BSACHBIT"

PRIOR TO TODAY RETENTION

- DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS BEFORE
- " " WHO MADE THE DECISION TO CHANGE
- CONCERN

DOE14

- DON'T WANT TO SPEAK TO BK DOESN'T KNOW HOW HE LABIES
- OCCURRED AFTER DOG PROVIDED TO DOS. CHANGED POLICY TO GODAYS
- MULTIPLE CALLS DON'T WANT TO SPEAK ON A SINGLE TICKET.
- JAN 2015 REMOVED FILES FROM COMPUTER.

DELETIONS BEYOND ABOVE?

PRN - NOT AWARE OF

MARCH 2015 PRN TO DATA CENTER?

- DIDN'T INSTRUCT THEM TO
- AWARE VIA REPRESENTATION

SEPT 2015 PRN EXPORT / DELETIONS?

- NOT AWARE?
- NO MAINT REQUEST IN SEPT 2015

PRN

PERSONAL / WORK MIXED CONTENT EMAILS

HA -> HC NOT PROVIDED

- > HWA HAD EMAILS THAT HC DIDN'T HAVE JAN - MARCH
TIME PERIOD
- > MIXED HC REVIEWED CONTENT TO BEST OF ABILITY.

MECHANICS

- SORT BY ADDRESS
-> REVIEW FOR WORK RELATED, SUBJECT CASE
- PUT IN FOLDER AND PRINTED FOLDER. (MIX RECOLLECTION)
- LEFT PERSONAL ONES IN THE BIN NEXT
- DIGITAL COPY MADE BY HS.

- SMALLER DATA SETS -

- NOTICED .GUV EXPORT HAD MISSING EMAILS

- ASKED ABOUT ADDITIONAL MISSING DOCS

↓ TOOK [] A COUPLE TRIES TO SEND IT

b6
b7C

PATTERN OF WHEN A .GUV WAS MISSING. ASKED

[] TO PULL (SOMETHING ABOUT WHEN IT WAS IN THE .OC LINE)

b6
b7C

REMOVED BY [] IN 2015 w/ OTHER INFO

b6
b7C

#61

FD-340 (Rev. 4-1-
File Number **802**

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence **WF**

Serial # of Originating Document **74**

Date Received **5/28/2016**

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By **SA**

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A61


**MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED**

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of
CHERYL MILLS

5/28/2016 - Cheryl Mills, 8:30A

Petes.
David



b6
b7C

- After state, personal counsel for Clinton
 - started immediately after
 - Chevy chose - for email review @ firm

Alex
Beth
Hail

• HS became part of CM firm in 2014

• CM assisted w/ transition to PRN

? • Clinton Financial Manager recommended as tech broker



b6
b7C

• Coordinated needs

• cm doesn't recall requirements, but non-technical focused on experience.

? • President's office looked at recommendations + selected.

• CM negotiated cost & privacy w/ PRN

• CM doesn't know if email transitioned

• No knowledge of what happened to Pag. server at time

• No PRN security concerns

• BP served as a reference point / technical translator

• No security concerns about BP server, ^{outsource} _{account}

• Did not know about MA laptop @ time & ship in 2014

• Does not know if clintonemail.com email was transferred to hrcoffice.com.

• DM does not believe ARC had access to old email

• cm does not know how HTA accessed

If not on 7th floor, system taped over. + even for some on 7th floor

Summer 2014, State producing last materials for Benhabzi. Dos raised concern about lack

[redacted] - meeting with [redacted] email

?

[redacted] ^{electronic} not records for HRC + other staff

b6
b7C

- CM suggested searching for chtr email address
- Dos requested seeing if CM could find email
- Dos contacted CM - phone + meetings
- State no initial deadline, followed by letter
- CM impression was not that State requesting b/c of FOIA

• HRC asked CM + DK to oversee process, no others

[redacted]

• State told CM it was HRC/CM obligation to filter out personal. No written doc.

b6
b7C

• If sent over .gov, State would not filter.

PRN

• [redacted] - CM requested [redacted] provide all email from HRC tenure.

b6
b7C

• Jan-March 2009 - HS noticed email missing. CM probably talked to [redacted] about it. [redacted] said PRN did not have.

b6
b7C

• Did not reach out for any other providers

• CM does not recall if reached out to AT&T for Jan-Mar 2009. Found out at some point AT&T doesn't

• No knowledge of gmail contact [redacted]

Keep rec

b6
b7C

→ No knowledge of other gmail contact

• CM did not communicate w/ HRC on any gmail.

- Apple Server - doesn't recall if tried to access
- Did not request records from others
- learned of MH laptop after representing
- provided a remote link - first on later HS. Put file on computer
- No source other than PRN
- No knowledge of where PRN pulled email
- CM requested all .gov email from IHRC tenure
- CM doesn't believe PRN was asked or searched HA account.
- ".gov" search was to be global (header, text, forwards)
- late summer 2014 - transfer to CM computer
- assisted CM remotely. would send a permission request then transfer, CM revoke permission
- Doesn't know where saved or if encrypted. Were password protected
- No copies of .gov. or transferred to other media
- Imported into outlook
- Did not consider any discovery tools
- Dell work laptop, some personal use
 - in CM's attorney possession
 - no other computers
- connected to internet, yes antivirus
- not wiped or reset, continued to use

.gov export

b6
b7c

b6
b7c

• Dell still in use when turned over

• CM never rec'd DVDs. Discussed DVDs, but recommended secure remote transfer

b6
b7c

3 • CM ^{July 28} does not recall conference call - archived email options

• Does not recall any other conversations w/ about .gov. b6
b7c

• HS conducted reviews - doesn't know process HS
• ~~separate .gov.~~ using at that time

• CM requested full export in fall (CM doesn't believe .gov review complete)

• Requested full archive to review any non .gov work related

• Doesn't know mailboxes, etc. searched

Full archive • CM requested all email from tenure (Jan 21, 2009 - 2/1/13)

• CM did not instruct PRN to search HT email

• CM doesn't know email addresses

• PRN used remote transfer to HS.

• CM doesn't recall if ~~status~~ transferred to her

• PRN only went back to 3/18/2009

• CM doesn't know what effort to recover 1/2009-3/2009, but outcome unclear.

• CM rec'd no other transfers, HS smaller transfers when HS identified gaps

• Only conv. CM recalls about gaps was 1/09-3/09

• CM does not know of a USB master copy

• CM never had direct access to mailbox

• HS only one reviewing full set

- Process
 - filter .gov
 - key words
 - senders
- Review took several months. Took place @ Mills' office
- HS used her computer
- HS would sometimes ask CM for guidance ^{print review}
- Email printed after review
- Made copy & gave to W&C
- CM did not review 30k
- Might have been duplicates - not sure
- Not involved in attempt to de-duplicate
- Collectively developed process
- Doesn't know why work related between HA & ~~HA~~ ~~email.com~~ not in what produced to State
- Not aware of any distinction between treatment of HA state.gov & HA clintonemail.com
- No consultation w/ non-agents
- Mixed use treated as work related
- Not aware of any efforts to de-dup
- HS review took months.
- Docs turned over to State Dec 2014
- Emails not altered
- PRN explained email would display as whatever current mail
- Nothing removed w/c ^{of concerns} classified organization

• No memory of HS needing to have connection re-established

• Doesn't recall 11/24/2014 urgent call w/ PRN

• Doesn't

• CM not on all calls w/ PRN. HS would sometimes talk directly to PRN.

• Records turned over Dec 2014

• No separate review after ~~CM~~ HS complete

• After review, official copy of .pst given to DK + HS kept working copy on computer. CM does not know who produced or what named.

only recall remote trans of gov + delete.

• Remote session on 1/2015 w/ [] - he removed & looked around for any other files. Link-permission-acknowledged & deleted w/ program - revoke permission.

More than recycle bins. Looked w/ [] to verify. Does not know which program.

• May have discussed wiping software w/ BP. no memory

• No non-agent - wiping

• Doesn't know what BlackBit is or what PRN used.

Dec 2014
- Jan 2015

• After HRC decided she didn't want to retain email, moved to 30-60 day retention policy & did not need ^{specifically} any historical
• CM did not instruct to remove reported .pst or archive mailboxes

• Around 1/5/2015 was when [] removed files from computers. Only [] - no others

• Not aware of any deletions in 3/2015 by PRN

- 3/2015 - Instructed PRN to visit datacenter
 - reviewing old systems from 2013 - that were Christen's
 - wanted to confirm no other records on old equip.
 - PRN could not locate anything on old systems
 - Told PRN to maintain equip.
 - Sent document retention to PRN in 3/2015
 - Did not request HRC Archive deleted in 3/2015
 - No instruction to delete any other pst
 - No inst. to delete data.
 - No inst. to delete pst w/ BleachBit on 3/31/2015.
 - No request to create additional exports in 9/2015 ^{maintenance, deletions}
-

- No discussions of potentially classified
- Direction from state after production to delete classified (retro)

#63

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number -302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 78

Date Received 6/10/16

From JOHN BENTEL
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A63

MIDYEAR EXAM

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

JOHN BENTEL

REFERENCED DOCUMENTS

~~Handwritten?~~

John Bentell

JB DOS tenure - 39 yrs.

Always exec sec

Director of S/ES 08 - '12

Lew Lewkins

Tule Mus

IRM
POEMS

80-85
under JB.

- SUPERVISOR

2 deputies

~~Handwritten~~

b6

Server - learned when it came out in paper.

had no knowledge of personal server during tenure.

b6
b7c

1st EMAIL - "Sec Res. Installation Hotwash"

don't remember email

[Redacted]

secure comms / phones @ front office & residence

b6
b7c

[Redacted]

- contractor in [Redacted] section.

"Hotwash" - Summary of equipment installed by DOS in HRCs home.

ref. to server in basement closet" - Not sure

what it would have been in ref to.

Under JB / but not the specific

sent to JB b/c of position: likely a collective

not sure would have looked @ the email.

→ in detail.


2nd email 2yrs later after Irene. / don't recall email.

"I wouldn't have used term Chap Server"


Don't recall ^{HRC} losing connectivity during Irene.

or conversations re: connectivity [Monica Hanley]

don't recall any conversations re: email outages.



also talked to:



JB didnt get a lot of direct calls from 7th floor.
Not HA or CM.

Re: OIG report

still w/ DOS. dont recall conversations

Not style - wouldn't have responded that way.
would have tried to settle let wouldn't have shut down.

Didn't talk w/ anyone @ DOS re: server.

S/ES IRM - no know of setup of server

Met Bryan Paq - not sure when / casual.

worked for "BIG IRM" - maybe mobile comm division
- no knowledge of support on side.

EMAIL

"dont remember when i learned"
knew she had a personal email
didn't know using personal email for DOS business
dont remember if HRC had a DOS email account.

→ until paper

Help desk handled.
Never aware of issues being reported about sec/
personal email.

~~Edoardo~~

haven't spoken to anyone @ DoS. to matter since learning.

Aug 30, 2011

Email 3 - don't recall, but ack. write email during Hur Irene.

email address - systems admin likely set up.
don't know why previously set up.

FOIA remark - "Just when you have a DoS device
it was subj to FOIA" - "Just wanted her to know"
If using for personal messages - subj to FOIA

RMD - not responsibility:

don't recall ever discussing FOIA w/ [redacted] maybe staff wise

b6
b7c

SMART - somewhat familiar: ^{function to} decide what is/isn't a record.

not used by POEMS S/ES IRM - not opposed
getting bugs out. Didn't want to implement
until fixed Exec Sec / Mull would have decided on rollout.
~~Hand~~

I just don't remember that @ all. [Re: server]

From: Lee, Purcell N
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2009 1:35 PM
To: Wagganer, Kevin L; Bentel, John A; Scott, Andrew C
Cc: Duncan, Bruce E
Subject: Secretary Residential Installation Hotwash
Attachments: Secretary Residential Installation Hotwash.docx

Attached is the agenda/talking points for the hot wash.

Secretary Residential Installation Hotwash

1. Equipment location:
 - a. **Unclassified Partner System:**
 - i. **Server: Basement Telephone Closet**
 - ii. **Telephone Set: Various rooms**
 - b. **Classified Fax:**
 - i. **STE/Secure Fax: Third Floor**
 - c. **Classified Red Switch: Third Floor**
2. Status of Installation:
 - a. **Unclassified Partner Telephone System: Completed.**
 - b. **Classified STE/Fax: Completed**
 - c. **Classified Red Switch: Completed**
 - d. **Unclassified Ops Drop: Verizon is still working to finalize path.**
 - e. **CMS Classified Video: Declined**
 - f. **CMS Classified Voice: Declined**
3. Issues:
 - a. **T1 Telephone Services were not available upon arrival**
 - b. **Analog lines (2) for the Partner system was not ordered.**
 - c. **Red Switch Technicians arrived 2 days later than scheduled.**
 - d. **SDS Data Cable was left in Washington**
 - e. **Former President's wireless headset was disconnected**
 - f. **Secretary Clinton's headset noise cancelling was not selected**
 - g. **Speed Dial for Secretary Clinton Unclassified telephone was not working properly.**
 - h. **Secretary's Clinton's business lines were not set up in a "Hunt Group"**

From: "Hanley, Monica R" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/HANLEYMR>
Sent: 8/30/2011 5:32:36 PM +00:00
To: 'huma@clintonemail.com'; "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Subject: HRC blackberry

John bental (202-647-4656) just called me abt getting hrc a new blackberry for the paris trip. He said that he heard that the chapp server is down. He said that the she spoke to the comm guy directly abt it this morning.

It looks like she's receiving email on her ipad. Does she want a state berry for the trip? They wld like to know this afternoon so that they can set up.

I told him that I wasn't sure and that I wld ask you.

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS [REDACTED]
AGE_ID: .state.sbu>
PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true
_3_6:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -1561860114
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -6

b6 Per
b7E DOS

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID: [REDACTED]

From: "Hanley, Monica R" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/HANLEYMR>
Sent: 8/30/2011 10:09:28 PM +00:00
To: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Subject: Re: S berry

Do you want a different address?

----- Original Message -----

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 05:19 PM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: Re: S berry

That can't be it.

----- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 04:19 PM
To: Abedin, Huma
Subject: Fw: S berry

SSHRC@state.gov

----- Original Message -----

From: Bentel, John A
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 04:15 PM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Subject: RE: S berry

Monica: We actually have an account previously set up: SSHRC@state.gov. There are some old emails but none since Jan '11 -- we could get rid of them.

You should be aware that any email would go through the Department's infrastructure and subject to FOIA searches.

Let me know if any questions and what you would like us to do.

Thanks!
John

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 3:59 PM
To: Bentel, John A
Subject: S berry

Do you know what her email address would be on a state dept berry?

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS

AGE_ID: state.sbu>

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

b6 Per
b7E DOS

HRC-1796

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -1805720130

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -6

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID:



b6 Per
b7E DOS

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Partner

[Redacted]



b6
b7C

ABU DHABI AUSTIN BEIJING BRUSSELS DALLAS DUBAI HONG KONG HOUSTON
LONDON MOSCOW NEW YORK PALO ALTO RIO DE JANEIRO RIYADH WASHINGTON

FD-340 (Rev. 4-1-
File Number [redacted] - 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 91

Date Received 6/6/2016

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A75

MIDYEAR EXAM;

MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of
[redacted] and documents
provided by [redacted]

b6
b7C

6/6/2016

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

3/5

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Commercial / Open source - No USG info systems
used to create.

Works for

[Redacted]

(Defense Contractor)

b6
b7C

• Missile Space Air Force, + Intel

Owns

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

• focuses on acq. of domestic data

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

• 60 billion records

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DHD - Dark Horse Data, Inc ← Reginald Hyde (owns)

four DASDI ←

• Works w/ foreign data

• Can contract w/ govt

• embed w/ client

Project

b6
b7C

• June 2015 - [redacted]

• [redacted]

• [redacted] Sr. Staff on senate judiciary comm.

June/July
2015

• [redacted] concerned w/ email server data ending up
overseas

b6
b7C

• Was it hacked? If so, OCONUS? If OCONUS,
foreign power?

• Three sons marines, worried would endanger
upset as staff & citizen.

• [redacted] asked [redacted] how to figure out

b6
b7C

• [redacted] said need known data

• [redacted] asked [redacted] what end product/state

• looking for genuine, authentic, relevant

↓
from HRC
server

↓
not altered

↓
from HRC server
moved OCONUS

place where foreign actor could
access?

• Not yet being paid.

Aug/sep.
2015

• [redacted] goes to Newt Gingrich for guidance

b6
b7C

• [redacted] meet w/ NG. [redacted] briefs potential project

• All three bothered by potential data was comp.

• NG wanted to talk w/others

b6
b7C

• [redacted] pitched to several organizations (needed funding)

Dec 2015 • NG tells [redacted] to meet w/ [redacted] (Judicial Watch)

• Phase 1 was HRC server directly or ind. attacked?

• Phase 2 "SB"

• Phase 3 was data moved outside of 4 walls

• Phase 4 exposed to foreign service.

[] said if he thought data classified, would have to report

b6
b7C

o Discussed what to do if found classified

[] discussed

b6
b7C

o Then moved to law firm of Judicial Watch.

Jay/Feb
2016

o Firm's view was couldn't be from hacking, but found via open source, no obligation to report.

↳ following 4 phase process.

o Funding/pace of Judicial Watch actions not paced around elections.

o 3 funding streams for contractor (self-funded, gov't funds, or data arbitrage)

o Funders invest in litigation on prospect of judge awarding fees at end. (gov't would have to pay fees)

o Phase 1 - \$32k from Judicial Watch to []

b6
b7C

- [] was told JW confident he understood data, dark web, etc.

on original work-papers agreed orally

- [] had one condition - if found classified, would turn over fruits of project, even given att.-client priv.

- Ended in March 2016

Feb 2012
[]
has on
insider threat

→ - Where to get data?

- HRC + SB email acct of limits

- Offshore servers of limits

- Sidebar - company wanted to index deep/dark-web

- intake entire deep/dark web onto own servers + index

- company could be good solution to problem

- [] is name of company

b6
b7C

Feb/March
2016

[redacted]

b6
b7C

• Their data allowed [redacted] to go into deep/dark web w/o going to Guccifer ~~at~~ servers.

b6
b7C

• [redacted] asked [redacted] to do search [redacted]

• Principal had left in 12/2015

• [redacted]

b6
b7C

• [redacted] asked [redacted] ^{was} to find indication under 4pt. plan

b6
b7C

• [redacted] gave [redacted] check for \$2500

• [redacted] gave [redacted] back a schematic. obtained from email; provided by JW.

• [redacted] created search logic/code (HRC, IP address, blumenthal domain.)

[redacted] believed SB had physical server

b6
b7C

[redacted] does not look @ webmail

• only attachments, no email in deep/dark web

• Believes was back of workstation b/c no email

• Files land on server in Romania

→ meets four point criteria

• 84.232.^{210.154} - some say Guccifer server

- ~~others~~ co-conspirator

- others foreign service

• Word, Excel docs among 200 files

- some appear to be his wife's

- look @ titles

[redacted] believed

b6
b7C

- Blamethal server hit multiple times
- 5/22/2009 hack of server - could not recall - possibly from public report. Looked & cannot find source
 - Did not find evidence of intrusion to HRC server in docs reviewed.

- Very sensitive - targeting data
 - did not come from SB server
 - contained IP block range that incl. Clinton server
 - link leading to document
 - names of known/suspected jihadists in Libya
 - lower portion of document in Russian
 - Excel

• After viewing document project stopped

- ^{20th} Jan 2012 - Person came to [redacted]
 - compare to SB dates [redacted]

b6
b7C

• Rogue nation judgement recovery program

[redacted] Naturalized US Cit [redacted]

- 2013/4 meets w Tyler Drumheller
 - wanted to stand up program
 - contract w/ opposition gov't. - access to Libyan central bank data.

Phase 1 complete - about to deliver final product

Would pull down 371c


Talk w/ [redacted] re: rogue nation

b6
b7c

Libyan FM.

Only used [redacted] data

Likely will remove 5/22/2009 reference



Notes

b6
b7C

PREPARED BY [redacted]
DATE 06/06/16

Interview 10:00AM - 12:30PM
Washington Field office

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-01-2016 BY J76J18T8D NSICG

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

1 [redacted] b6
2 [redacted] b7C
3 [redacted]
4 [redacted]
5 [redacted]

6 - All material is his opinion, not USG;
7 no USG databases used/accessed

8
9 - Three hats: ^{Hat #} Employee of [redacted] b6
10 [redacted] (space, air force, b7C
11 defense, intel) - direct military contractor

12 Hat #2 owns [redacted]
13 does no investigation, focuses on data -
14 ← domestic acquisition. [redacted]

data fusion

b6
b7C
b7E

15 [redacted]
16 [redacted]
17 [redacted]
18 [redacted]
19 [redacted]
20 [redacted]
21 [redacted]
22 [redacted]

23 - [redacted] talked b6
24 to each other & created one of the b7C
25 largest databases out there.

26 [redacted] b6
27 - Background in [redacted] b7C

28 [redacted] HRC-1808

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

Haitt (3) DHD - Dark Horse Data, Inc

- [redacted] owned by Reginald Hilde b6 b7C
(former DAS DNI)

- Adv. proving tech as it relates to data, b6
mainly does/focuses on foreign data. b7C

- [redacted] does not contract with govt. (USG)

- DHD works directly within USG
agencies as contractors

[redacted] b6 b7C

Around 6/2015, woman by name of

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] approached [redacted] because

she's concerned about the email server.

- Concern is two pronged: foreign govt
acquisition of data / risk to US,
general concern as an USPER.

- Poses question: is there a way to
figure out if the concerns ~~are~~ can
be proven (loss of data, etc.)

- objective: ← & was it acquired/
available to foreign intel

- Research would be open source,
Deep / Dark Web

HRC-1809

Sr. staff member on
Sen. Judiciary
Committee

Data:

• Genuine
Did it come from
where it purports?

• Authentic
Is it real?

• Relevant
Did it come from
fipc server, was it moved offshore,
did it reside in a place a for. govt. had access to it?

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

Aug/Sept 2015

1 [redacted] was convinced there would be people interested in this

b6
b7C

2
3 [redacted] asks Newt Gingrich for advice on whether to execute the plan for the project.

4
5
6 - Gingrich, [redacted] all "revised" by the server event

b6
b7C

7
8 - Approached companies for funding/interest but [redacted] not impressed by them.

9
10 - Around Dec. 2015, Gingrich says to go see [redacted] (sp?) [redacted] of Judicial Watch.

b6
b7C

11
12 - [redacted] lays out Phase I plan to [redacted]

- 13 ① was Clinton's server attacked
- 14 ② was Blumenthal's server attacked
- 15 ③ was the data stored outside the U.S.
- 16 ④ was data exposed to for. service

17
18 - The 'what if we find classified info' came into play ← concern of [redacted]

19
20 [redacted]

b6
b7C

21
22 - Law firm for Judicial Watch states info has to come from open source, no hacking allowed, and data acq. had to follow four-point plan/criteria

23
24
25 - NO real answer from law firm about what happens if classified data is found.

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

Data Projects

1 [redacted] adds Judicial Watch's motivation
2 was no political (i.e. related to the elections)
3 but it was more of a longer-term interest.

b6
b7c

- 5 1. self-funded - you assume risk
- 6 2. Govt funded - govt assumes all risk
- 7 3. Data arbitragers - invest \$, like seed money

9 Judicial Watch goes to funders, and
10 states project will yield returns if
11 J.W. wins litigation with State Dept.
12 - This is the reason J.W.'s agenda
13 is not political

15 Phase I: \$32,000 from J.W. to [redacted]

b6
b7c

16 [redacted] believes he was selected over others
17 because of his familiarity with data
18 (running things from inception to end)

19 - caveat [redacted] adds: if data he
20 comes upon, deemed classified,

b6
b7c

21 the data would be turned in
22 to the authorities

- 24 - Feb/March 2014 ~ project is funded
- 25 - Where are you going to get the data
26 without hitting the server? HRC-1811
- 27 - Solution: [redacted]

[redacted] thinks [redacted]
This could be the solution

b6
b7c

Included in the original work papers. It wasn't, it was clearly relayed/ agreed upon orally.

brought in to

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

Feb. 2012 or 2011

1 to index the deep/dark web. (2009 time f.)

2 - company name is [redacted] which
3 had a commercial & govt. services

4 [redacted] b6
5 [redacted] b7C

6 - for [redacted] attractive because it
7 allowed him to query the data w/o
8 hitting any servers - anonymizers
9 were too much a risk b6
b7C

10 - went to [redacted] and
11 asked to conduct a query in Dec. 2015
12 but guy was no longer available
13 when the funding became available

[redacted] because [redacted]

leaves comp. in Dec.

14 [redacted] (NFI)
15 o might've had to do with the
16 business model the company
17 was running.

18 [redacted] explained to [redacted] by [redacted] b6
19 the same guy he had approached b7C
20 in Dec. 2015.

21 [redacted] needed an indication, b6
22 based on specific data queries, b7C
23 that data had originated from
24 the Clinton server. b6
25 b7C

26 - [redacted] returned a schematic
27

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

1 - two spreadsheets: ⁽¹⁾ chron order data
 2 is first seen w/ yellow highlights
 3 that hit on the query logic
 4 - yellow = hit on keywords

5 keyword search: hrc, Blumenthal, Libya, clintonemail.com
 7 IP address of Clinton server, and
 8 possibly Blumenthal's server IP.

obtained from email header (from J.W.)

10 - [] believes Blumenthal did have a server, and that's how the data
 11 spilled (meets data project criteria #1)
 12 - Blumenthal clicks on a link/attach. #2
 13 and comp. content is exfiltrated.
 14 Substantiation is the fact that
 15 only documents, not emails (.pst
 16 files) are found by []
 17 b6
 18 b7c

19 - Data resides in server overseas,
 20 which meets criteria #3

22 ⁽²⁾ second spreadsheet: belief this
 23 is the Russian anonymous server.
 24 - opinion that it isn't Guccifer's
 25 server. It's someone else.

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

1 - of 200+ Sidney docs, other than the
 2 memos, there are word and excel docs.
 3 keyword search: diff. family
 4 members, etc. "ctrl+F: blu"
 5 infers this number based on filenames.

7 - Hacking Blumenthal server more than
 8 once (Enclifur)

9 - Based on the fact that the data
 10 is first seen on different dates

12 - May 22, 2009 penetration of Clinton server
 13 - Not sure about where this came
 14 from, but prob. an open source.

"It was told to
 me"

- probably
 from [redacted]

16 - In assessing memos' tone, Blumenthal
 17 amped up the data provided to him by b6
 18 sources and Drumheller. b7c

20 - of the 200+ [redacted] only got/read b6
 21 the ~20 memos. b7c

23 - The "smoking gun" doc: it did not
 24 come from the Blumenthal server
 25 but the doc - email with IP block
 26 that went ^{to link} back to the Clinton
 27 server.

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

"smoking gun document":

- purported names of terrorists/
jihadists in Libya. (per filename)

- Names not checked

- lower/bottom half contains
Russian/Cyrillic script.

- scenario: doc goes from hand
to hand and spills.

b6
b7C

Not approved yet

Phase II has been presented

"Look very carefully into
this guy's
background"

Euy came to [redacted] in Jan. 2012 (maybe
Jan. 20, 2012)
which [redacted] is the date the Blumenthal
memos

[redacted] claims he was hired by the
Libyan opposition govt. Judgment

b6
b7C

- Libyan Rogue National Recovery
program

b6
b7C

for recovery of
Ghaddafi assets

[redacted] & Drumbheller & [redacted]
[redacted] probably all knew
each other

Questions whether
Blumenthal was
involved

[redacted] met Drumbheller, who
was involved in the Recovery
Program

b6
b7C

- The customer was the opposition
govt.

PREPARED BY _____
DATE _____

_____ PAGE NO. 9

PROJECT ACTION NOTES

PROJECT PLANNING NOTES

1 - Blumenthal, if involved in the Recovery
2 program, wrote memos as a "shake
3 and bake" tactic.
4
5 - Has not done any Deep/Dark web
6 research of his own - too risky
7
8 - Might pull the May 22, 2009 statement
9 out of the final report.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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22
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24
25
26
27
28

3 June Meeting – Proposed Agenda

Here is a proposed agenda, but I defer to the host to change or delete any portion that it feels is unnecessary or inappropriate

Introduction and Background

- Background of the Principals,
- Caveats –Not a USG Project; no systems, sources, methods, means, personnel, data, or any other resources of the USG were employed, only commercial off the shelf resources, both known and unknown to the principals.
- Background of Project as authorized by customer JW.
- The Phase I Scope and Order of Magnitude

b6
b7c

I. Results of Phase I – Was SB server or computer entered and if so, did the data move offshore?

1. SB Server was entered directly and data was moved to Guccifer server or computer.
2. SB server contents was then moved from Guccifer server to a second IP nearby.
3. Not clear who this second server is owned by, but data was definitely moved.
4. Data includes memos from SB to HRC and found on SB server.
5. The secondary source has over 37,000 files on it, and many (over 200) trace to SB. Of these, 25 or so were traced and recovered, all of which show positive indications as having been authored by SB, sent to HRC, and recovered.
6. The discussion within these memos suggest SITREPs and alleged Intel Assessments using HUMINT on the ground in Libya.

II. Results of Phase II – Was HRC attacked directly or indirectly?

1. Of the 37,000 files, we would need to open each and trace back the content to the original server. The Phase I assignment did not include a scope of this magnitude.
2. However, Key word searching of the spreadsheet show many references to HRC and other symbols that may be files that came directly from the HRC server. It is unknown at this time whether there was a direct, pernicious attack and wholesale exfiltration, based upon the evidence assembled to date.
3. One file was recovered but the providence is not clear. This file has attributes that are similar to other Libyan-based SITREPS, that were found. The time, topic, context, names, and background all seem to align with these suspected attacks. However, much additional research is needed to trace this document to its original source.
4. The document did not come from SB or was not found among files that came from his computer. It did bare, according to one source, signatures of the IP for the HRC server

and is suspected to have come from her computer or at least a computer linked to an IP address that ties to where the server was in 2009.

5. If this document is deemed to be genuine, authentic and relevant to the issues here, it represents a major loss of grave concerns.

III. Results of Phase I – What was the possible motive of SB? Was it to create a quid pro qua?

1. Rogue National Judgment Recovery Work.
2. Work with the Libyan Opposition Government
3. Work with the new foreign minister as a back channel

IV. Way Forward

1. A number of possible ways to obtain more specific evidence as to SB motive and to check the veracity of the Rogue National Recovery Program connection to SB and others.
2. Recover all 37,000 files under the International Bulk Data Silo Procurement Program. Could be done by the host, or could be contracted or could be part of Phase II. Many different options on where, how and when to collect the data and subject to analysis.
3. Check the provenance of the key document and try to trace it back to the original source.

Questions or Comments

b6
b7C

in:sent

UPU 9

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-01-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

Move to Inbox

Gmail

COMPOSE

Phone call

Inbox x

Inbox

Starred

Important

Sent Mail

Drafts

Circles

Deleted Messages

Notes

Personal

Saved

Travel

More

[redacted]

Please send as we discussed. Thank you and look forward to meeting yo

b6
b7C

[redacted]

Hey [redacted] I couldn't download the file via the link sent in a separate email....

b6
b7C

[redacted]

Thanks - I was able to download all the files. On Thu, Jun 2, 2016 at 10:17 A...

b6
b7C

[redacted]

to [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

A somewhat urgent update:

For the past six weeks when the hypothesis of the SB portion of the report was over the dates of the seminal events, the key name of the person, and the con with any evidence tending to support the timeline.

Sign in

Signing in will sign you into Hangouts across Google
Learn more

I finally recalled the way to track this down much to my relief because for a whi recollections on this issue and confusing facts. Indeed, I was not. Below are s lines as a means to determine whether the hypothesis has any merit at all.

- Friday, January 20, 2012 1145 AM [redacted] Email to [redacted]
- Friday, January 20, 2012 1150 AM [redacted] EMAIL TO [redacted]
- Monday, January 16, 2012 1015 AM [redacted] EMAIL TO [redacted]
- Monday, January 16, 2012 1015 AM ver2
- Saturday, January 07, 2012 1103 AM From [redacted] AOL
- Thursday, January 26, 2012 1111 AM [redacted] EMAIL TO [redacted]

b6
b7C

If you wish, I can update the draft memo to reflect context of this over the week have discovered.

Revert to the old chat

I will highlight the relevant section in Yellow so that it fits the story line and con

Let me know if this is something you wish, or if you just want an oral brief as a should be done at some point, only because it is really important data and has have been mystified about since I was engaged on this matter.

Take me to Inbox

HRC-1819

6/6/2016 7:29 AM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

In addition to the above, the Phase I Study resulted in some other detailed findings that are best summarized below:

1. The computer of Sidney Blumenthal was positively identified as hosting many emails and attachments originating from Hillary Clinton's server and others from the Clinton Foundation. In Phase I, we recovered at least 20 memos from Mr. Blumenthal to Mrs. Clinton that contained Situation Reports (SITREPS) allegedly based upon intelligence sources in Libya.
2. Mr. Blumenthal's server was successfully attacked by Marcel Lazar Lehel, originally from Bucharest, who is also known as *Guccifer* or "Small Fume".
3. While one spreadsheet shows that over 37,000 files were found on a closed encrypted and password protected site of someone other than *Guccifer*, only a full analysis of the spreadsheet will reveal all of the files traced back to Mrs. Clinton's server directly, or to that of Mr. Blumenthal. These files were traced to a computer that was using an application to access the Peer-to-Peer networks. The computer was traced to IP address 84.232.210.154, which points to Bucharest, Romania.
4. One search revealed that data that originated from Mr. Blumenthal's server was transferred to the computer at 84.232.210.154 on July 5th 2014 at 07:12 (Bucharest Time), and yielded many references to "HRC" within the spreadsheet. This would suggest that the content of the computer traced to IP 84.232.210.154, was not *Guccifer*, but someone else who accessed his server. The reason is that this "migration" occurred long after *Guccifer* was identified, arrested, and incarcerated in Romania. Several possible explanations exist:
 - (a) *Guccifer* had a co-conspirator that continued to operate the collection from various sources as a "get out of jail free card";
 - (b) The computer doing this collecting did belong to *Guccifer*, and he allowed it to run long after he was arrested. This scenario seems unlikely for a number of technical reasons.
 - (c) This computer belongs to a foreign service or someone else who attacked the *Guccifer* server and transferred the data to computer 84.232.210.154.
5. Notwithstanding the above, data from both the Blumenthal computer and the Clinton email server migrated to *Guccifer*, and then to a computer tied to IP 84.232.210.154, both of which were located outside of the United States and outside of the control of the US Intelligence Community. Assuming

either contained overtly classified data or retrospectively classified data, this is considered a major Counterintelligence concern and of interest to the Community.

6. *Guccifer* entered the Blumenthal computer several times, first through Blumenthal's AOL account. It is not clear whether *Guccifer* targeted Blumenthal because he represented an opportunity of interest, or because a foreign service directed him to the account. Also, it is not clear whether the account was entered after he first entered the Clinton server or that of someone else on the Clinton domain server.
7. During Phase II, much additional information can be obtained on the sequence, timing and chronology of when the two servers in question were accessed and in what order and how many times.
8. We found indications that *Guccifer* or person or persons acting on his behalf or persons impersonating *Guccifer* did a secondary penetration of Mrs. Clinton's server on May 22, 2009, and other penetrations thereafter.
9. We confirmed that *Guccifer* used an anonymous server located in Russia to conduct the penetration, and therefore, there is a high possibility that the Russian services that monitor these anonymous servers likewise have a copy.
10. One file that was found on Mrs. Clinton's server was not found on the Blumenthal server. This file represents a major loss to the Intelligence Community because it appears to be targeting data. The data is first in Russian and then converted to Arabic. It represents a list of targets that quite possibly was created by a Russian source, located or intercepted by our services, and transmitted to Mrs. Clinton by some unknown person. The file then left her server and was found in the Deep Web and Dark Web.
11. The above cited file, an excel spreadsheet, we assess, would enjoy the highest level of classification if submitted to a person who has original classification authority. The file was found stripped of its collars (if they ever existed). If it is determined by the FBI that this file ever was overtly classified, it will serve as a potential "smoking gun document."
12. *Guccifer* penetrated a number of targets and we recovered over 37,000 files from a computer traced to IP 84.232.210.154 that he obtained. We created a mapping of those files as they appear in the Deep Web. We then tested the spreadsheet and the content behind the spreadsheet (the 37,000 files) using key word fuzzy logic. We confirmed the following Blumenthal memos were found on the Clinton Server and vice versa:

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_algeria_ljbya_061713	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	12 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_aasad_s_plans_091012	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	13 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_Comprehensive_Intel_Report_on_Libya_010412_1	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	21 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_Comprehensive_Intel_Report_on_Libya_310412	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	41 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_Dirt_tear &_investig_080812	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_Georgia-US_elections_flashpoint_090212	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	26 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_intel_barkir_morsi &_opposition_120812	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	18 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_Latest_French_Intelligence_Reports_on_Algerian_Hostage_Crisis011012	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_ljbya_benghazi_cil_121013	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_ljbya_cabinet_100612	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_ljbya_internal_govt_011512	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_ljbya_new_president_083312	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	16 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_Libyan_Leadership_Private_Discussions_102512	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_magnaf_attack_on_US_in_Libya_091212	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_merkel_german_eco_intel_090412	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	21 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_morsi_magnaf_private_rsaa_091312	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_morsi's_moments_081412	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_morsi's_private_conversations_091412	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_petraeus_october_surprise_111013	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	12 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_petraeus_october_surprise_111212_1	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	12 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_turkey_v_syria_plus_iran_100212	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
84.232.210.154\hr_memo_egypt_morsi_now_031313	7/5/2014 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB

13. A complete copy of the Blumenthal memos sent to Mrs. Clinton were opened recovered in original format and deserves critical analysis by counsel. Most all were word documents and related to a number of issues. These can be provided to counsel as a means to substantiate the claims of Guccifer.

14. We did not actually collect the content of Mrs. Clinton's server or the content of computer 84.232.210.154 at Phase I; we merely validated the major premise and hypothesis that data originating from either or both of the Clinton and Blumenthal servers were attacked, directly or indirectly, and then were moved outside of the US to *Guccifer*; and then migrated to computer IP 84.232.210.154, owned and operated by unknown persons. Additional research is required to cull through the 37,000 files found to select those that pertain to Mrs. Clinton and which came directly from her server.

15. We note that there are profound legal questions regarding Phase II because it is not clear what our obligations may be regarding recovery of potentially classified data that may or may not contain actual collars that overtly show the content was classified at the time they were sent to Mrs. Clinton; or emails and attachments that were retrospectively classified but were released in truncated form. Our recovery of such content would be untruncated and in original condition.

16. It is conceivable that one possible motive for Mr. Blumenthal's decision to feed Mrs. Clinton the SITREP reports was to promote his group as a quality private intelligence group in Libya capable of obtaining detailed intelligence from various unnamed, disparate sources as to the thinking, actions, planning and intentions of key operators in the region. We do not opine on

the accuracy of the intelligence provided, only the tone and intent of the memos. Our assessment is that they are essentially, crafted as “shake and bake” intelligence assessments, done to promote a need by the Blumenthal group, and not to turnover information because of some legal or moral obligation.

17. There is objective evidence to indicate that a person identified as [redacted] [redacted] telephone [redacted] (circa. 10 January 2012) began to solicit Senior Intelligence Analysts with experience in repatriation of assets plundered by the Qaddafi family. This person began the solicitation process on approximately January 25th 2012, claiming that he led was dealing with representatives of a “high level political types in the US within the State Department” and that he personally had high level contacts within the new Libyan Opposition Government that he would have a contract with to begin the repatriation process.

18. [redacted] has a rather controversial history within the US Intelligence Community, particularly at [redacted] His links to [redacted] was one of the prime operatives in Libya. Notwithstanding his reputation in the US Intelligence Community, he was believed to have highly placed contacts within Libya which could have been mined for creation of a Rogue Nation Asset Recovery program, but for his limited technical and intelligence analyst resources.

Phase II

The proposed Phase II study includes:

1. Recovery and sorting of all *Guccifer* data on the server in Romania, to obtain all data that came from Mrs. Clinton’s server as well as Mr. Blumenthal’s server.
2. Analyze all of the content of the computer IP 84.232.210.154, which appears to be different from the *Guccifer* server, although both apparently are located in the Bucharest, Romania area.
3. *Guccifer* claims in recent reports that the secret server contains about 2 Terabytes of data and represents all of his hacking efforts. We opine this statement is most likely accurate. The spreadsheet that we obtained which maps the secret server substantiates this claim, assuming a portion of it originated from the *Guccifer* server.
4. The Clinton smoking gun data document needs to be mapped back to her server to make the clear connection which has not been satisfactorily established.

5. **The IP address and email addresses of Mrs. Clinton and her colleagues who used this server need to be checked to determine whether any content traced back to the server or the email address can be recovered from the Deep Web and the Dark Web sources to which we have access.**
6. **The recovered data content needs to be date stamped and placed in a chronological arc to triangulate against the activities of Mrs. Clinton, particularly around the time when she was dealing with the Benghazi investigation.**
7. **Counsel needs to determine from quality counsel with National Security experience and intelligence experts, the legal obligations by cleared persons to report and surrender data that may have overtly labeled classified data; or data that would objectively be considered classified had it been hypothetically subjected to a person possessing original classification authority.**

PHASE I SEARCH RESULTS

Introduction and Overview

In an effort to determine whether there was evidence to indicate if a search of the open source spheres using mid-level recovery tools was fruitful, the customer requested that we begin our research on a limited basis, and provide results for Phase I only. The critical search terms are the email server MX codes, the headers or footers of the email server, or at a minimum, the domain server name which is fairly unique.

The study, a worldwide search, was done in less than 30 days and the cost was approximately \$33,000. The objective was to determine whether the server of Hillary R. Clinton was directly or indirectly entered by outside sources, and the content found within the Deep Web or the Dark Web. The client has not funded, nor authorized Phase II and Phase III, a much deeper probe that is dependent upon the results of Phase I.

The client was advised that this research was pursuant to the attorney-client privileged communications privilege and was intended for use in the pending federal litigation involving the Hillary Clinton's private email server.

The customer has agreed that the only exception to this privilege (which would otherwise be reserved only to the client and its law firm) is the discovery of any evidence whatsoever suggesting (directly, indirectly, overtly or otherwise) classified data (without regard to whether we do not possess original classification authority) had been absconded from the United States (wherever situated) and placed on an outside server or device and discovered by us.

Should this have occurred, or is suspected to have occurred, we advised the client that we have legal obligations to turn over that information as well as the context of that information to the appropriate authorities, inside or out of the Intelligence Community. (e.g., Federal Law Enforcement within the Criminal Division, as opposed to the National Security Division) of the FBI. The client has specifically agreed to this single condition or exception to the privilege.

Specific Findings

During this phase, we were not engaged to determine who accessed the server or where its contents ultimately landed or came to final rest. However, we were able to determine that:

- (a) Sidney Blumenthal's server was directly hacked by *Guccifer* and Hillary Clinton's server was indirectly attacked by *Guccifer*, probably as a result of first hitting Mr. Blumenthal's server.
- (b) The Blumenthal content was transferred to a computer or server located south of Bucharest, Romania by *Guccifer*; but we also found this content outside of his server or computer where it still remains to this day and is under another IP address.
- (c) We confirmed that it was possible the same person or persons acting on *Guccifer*'s behalf or persons impersonating *Guccifer* did a secondary penetration of Mrs. Clinton's server on May 22, 2009.
- (d) While the first "pop" where the Clinton/Blumenthal content landed could have been at the *Guccifer* server, the place where we recovered the files containing this content was not the same server as where *Guccifer* hid the files, based upon our limited scans to date. The

reason is that this server IP address is continuing to collect to this day, and moreover, the date when the content was first seen after when *Guccifer* was apprehended and jailed in Romania. More clarification of this point is needed at Phase II as to who truly are the creator and owner of the server where we found this content and report it here.

(e) We believe that the IP address where we found the files is 84.232.210.154, which is not a server, but is actually a computer using an application that accesses files on Peer-to-Peer localities. In essence, the computer is utilizing the Direct Connect P2P application which disclosed the content of the computer to others on an open network known as the Deep Web or Dark Web. Upon checking IP address 84.232.210.154, we recovered in excess of 37,000 files, of which at least 200 appear to have come from Mr. Blumenthal's computer. Of the 200+, we verified the authenticity of a representative sample of over 20 having been documents authored by Mr. Blumenthal, and sent to Mrs. Clinton, according to the headers.

(f) From a counter-intelligence perspective, if classified data is located on the above IP address, it represents a major problem for the National Security interests of the United States because by its very nature, data falling into the Dark Web from a computer means it is "open source" and therefore publicly available. In essence, if we found it, others have found it – nothing that we are doing in our trawling represents a "secret sauce" or source. Our tools used may be different or better from a forensic trawling perspective, but these resources are generally available.

(g) There is subjective evidence suggesting that Mr. Blumenthal and two others may have had a motive to present to Mrs. Clinton "tree-shaking" Intelligence SITREPs, hoping for a possible quid-pro-quo of sorts, but this is our unconfirmed, raw assessment. The possible deal may have included participation in the rogue national judgment recovery program for the Libyan Opposition Government, in exchange for the State Department Intelligence File that existed on the Qaddafi family asset seizure.

(h) There is objective evidence to indicate that a person identified as [redacted] [redacted] telephone [redacted] circa 10 January 2012) began to solicit Senior Intelligence Analysts with experience in repatriation of assets plundered by the Qaddafi family. This person began the solicitation process on approximately January 25th 2012, claiming that he led was dealing with representatives of a "high level political types in the US within the State Department" and that he personally had high level contacts within the new Libyan Opposition Government that he would have a contract with to begin the repatriation process. [redacted] has a rather controversial history within the US Intelligence Community, particularly at [redacted] His links to [redacted] [redacted] was one of the prime operatives in Libya. Notwithstanding his reputation in the US Intelligence Community, he was believed to have highly placed contacts within Libya which could have been mined for creation of a Rogue Nation Asset Recovery program, but for his limited technical and intelligence analyst resources.

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(i) After the above scheme floundered, others representing the Libyan Opposition Coalition Government sought to re-start the contract that we believe Mr. Blumenthal and his colleagues had. This re-ignited effort occurred as recently as December 2015.

Deep Web Search Methodologies

Searching the Deep Web and the Dark Web is not the same as conventional searching using a normal web browser. One not only must have a different tool, but also have the tool with the correct protocol to access a specific site. Often, to gain access to an IP address containing hidden files, such as what we see here, the protocol tool is uniquely different and it often takes considerable effort to find the correct, corresponding protocol tool so that one has complete and unfettered access.

Employment of these protocols is done by the owner of the site where the files are located in order to maintain the integrity and security of the site where the hidden files are located and to keep “prying eyes” out.

Once the location of the files is identified, the next step in the process is gaining access to the site, obtaining, collecting and acquiring all of the files, and downloading them to a safe and secure environment.

In this case, the computer of Sidney Blumenthal was positively identified as the host of many documents sent to the server of Hillary Clinton and others from the Clinton Foundation. Mr. Blumenthal’s server was successfully attacked by Marcel Lazar Lehel, also known as *Guccifer* or “Small Fume,” originally from Bucharest. While one spreadsheet shows that over 37,000 files were found, only a full analysis of the spreadsheet will reveal all of the files traced back to Mrs. Clinton’s server directly, or to that of Mr. Blumenthal.¹

It was believed initially, that the content was the hidden *Guccifer* server that he kept and maintained in secret, or allowed to continue to run and collect data from various sources whilst he was incarcerated. However, this assessment seems both farfetched and not particularly logical. More likely, the content we discovered at the IP address cited above is an unknown person that originally collected some of the Blumenthal/Clinton content from the *Guccifer* server, and then moved it to where we located it. If this assessment is correct, it is particularly damning, because it means that if the content contains national security information, it has escaped the first landing spot, and has migrated to an unknown destination.

We assess that it is possible *Guccifer* entered the Blumenthal computer several times, first through Blumenthal’s AOL account. It is not clear whether *Guccifer* targeted Blumenthal because he represented an opportunity of interest, or because a foreign service directed him to the account. Also, it is not clear whether the account was entered after he first entered the Clinton server or that of someone else on the Clinton domain server. During Phase II, much additional information can be obtained on the sequence, timing and chronology of when the two servers in question were accessed and in what order and how many times.

What is known is that *Guccifer* is a wholesale, sociopathic hacker who conducts pernicious attacks, not for reasons of ideology or retaliation – rather he does it for money and to sell data to the highest bidder. As a result, he was indicted and jailed in Romania and at the behest of the US Justice Department and the FBI, extradited to the United States where he was also charged and where he recently pled guilty. While *Guccifer* was tagged for extradition by the FBI before the Clinton email scandal erupted into the public domain, it is curious that his transfer comes exactly at the time when the FBI most needs him, when they are finalizing their prosecutive memo to the Justice Department.

Guccifer hopscotched among the accounts of victims such as [redacted]

[redacted]

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¹ For additional information on files extracted from the server of Sidney Blumenthal by “*Guccifer* only”, and found on a Password Protected, encrypted server of “*Guccifer*” in Bucharest, Romania, please see Attachment #3 Blumenthal Server Traced to Bucharest First Attack

Along the way, *Guccifer* gathered the cell phone numbers of [redacted] the private e-mail addresses for [redacted]

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By breaching Blumenthal's account, *Guccifer* was able to access files that go back to at least 2005 involving an array of Washington insiders, including political operatives, journalists, and government officials. Based on screen grabs made by *Guccifer*, he specifically zeroed in on Blumenthal's emails to and from Hillary Clinton, sorting Blumenthal's account so as to single out all e-mail sent to Clinton.

Additionally, *Guccifer* further sorted the mail so that he could download all Word files attached to e-mails sent to Clinton, as well as the emails, .pdf documents as well as .rar and .zip files. We created a spreadsheet of the entire drive of where the Blumenthal as well as the Clinton files landed, a private server in Bucharest, and identified nearly 37,000 records, not all of which came from the Blumenthal/Clinton Server, but represent the fruits of the *Guccifer*'s labors over time.

Meaning, this is the location where his successful hacking efforts were stored, and for which direct and indirect attacks upon Mrs. Clinton's email server were found. This IP address has been identified, tested and found to be legally accessible. However, the tool needed is quite costly and could not be done at Phase I.

Moreover, the content is so massive that it would take a high quality Senior Intelligence Analyst to do all of the post-processing analysis upon such a large bulk of data. One search revealed that an attack was done upon Mr. Blumenthal's server on July 5th 2014 at 07:12 (Bucharest Time), and yielded many references to "HRC" within the spreadsheet.

An explanation of the spreadsheet discussed in this memo is summarized below:

Original file name: [redacted]

MDS and NMS: High values for associated file... digital DNA of the [redacted]

These rows contain file assets data assigned by the users computer software configuration. (E.g. MS Word with author and company fields to reflect company and user). Some users do not to configure these files.

First and last dates that file was sent on: FTP network

Author: possible name of user, sys-admin or other user

Company: name of company, computer owner or other user

Content type: file type by extension (E.g. doc, xls, pdf, etc.)

Size: refers to file objects size in kilobytes

TOR: Files with "TOR" (The Onion Router) in the file name were collected from the "Dark Web" (dark, hidden, network). This is an anonymous and complex proxy network almost impossible to attribute to an individual IP.

Picasa: These files are from a popular website designed for uploading and storing files and for exposing tagged/checked data.

Zip file: compressed folder containing many individual files

**Example of Files Recovered from Sidney Blumenthal
That Came From Hillary Clinton Server**

Examples of just a few of the indexed entries from the spreadsheet that represent emails that were the consequence of a "direct attack" upon Mrs. Clinton and were sent to Mr. Blumenthal are found below:

rec_memo_algeria_libya_021713.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	3b19394b6080134e2ac38943b963134044	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_issued_e_places_091812.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	f81a0c9077b0e5565ca002526127e4e00703	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_comprehensive_intel_report_on_libya_010	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	2e1664b6b6e57a2b760690300b763137360	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_egypt_morocco_nor_031313.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	002b21182e630bca050f3089844cdec78c	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_euro_fair_&_loading_080812.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	3ae16dec06a18942d6789eac6871896304	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_georgia_us_missions_flashpoint_090212	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	4e491d5910b0e537893f0e16019897d2d0e4	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_intel_budie_morosi_&_opposition_120811.doc	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	01400e087d3661a7a28b27786c02d583e0	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_latest_moroccan_intelligence_reports_on_alg	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	94a15d1d7b978790ae577e3d2e041e4389	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_libya_berghati_0111011.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	ca04f0e0b3b0785d1d6ee0e2958d6f0b	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_libya_cabnet_100812.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	301301120b781adda137d45a7c2e79647	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_libya_internet_gov_011312.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	989f209978bc13074e35d974e17b3f8a02	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_libya_new_president_022112.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	d07e70e3a2430b8760f3587730215a17e	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_libya_leadership_private_discussions_101	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	ee6f0c501b321e7661d111f0ca0597e0587	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_magyarf_estack_on_us_in_libya_091112.doc	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	ea33030e41109e76d1d68d9672bea2447c	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_moroccan_mission_ers_intel_090412.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	042ca0e0e06795d13e527279e591504e82c	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_moroccan_mission_private_reas_091312.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	085014754be67168303dab776b0ec38011	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_moroccan_mission_091412.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	0b37c7e28451b114b0a99115ac2f0d1e4d4	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_moroccan_mission_private_conversations_091412.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	946e319380ab0176d1e2730cc1b372869d	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_moroccan_mission_corporate_111712.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	f1b8816c46745ec798119e0d00638361381	7/5/2014 7:12
rec_memo_moroccan_mission_plus_intel_100312.docx	Sidney Blumenthal	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document	ec4d748487407e0c9d113d6104856e030	7/5/2014 7:12

It is not clear whether the cited memos were created by Mr. Blumenthal and sent to Mrs. Clinton or whether she was the original creator of the memos and sent them to Mr. Blumenthal. What is abundantly clear is that sensitive memos between the two were found on the Dark Web and in a foreign country.

Thus, the above chart meets or exceeds the objective and mission of the Phase I inquiry. Each of the items cited in the sample above could be recovered with additional research and work, and then traced back to the creator. The moment that this type of data, using these kinds of key words, phrases, hashtags, and addresses appear in the Dark Web, foreign intelligence services would become aware, and then mine and exploit them.

Suspected Location of IP Address 84.232.210.154

While we cannot determine the exact location where the computer is that links to IP address 84.232.210.154, the Internet Service Provider for the box is located at 71-75 Dr. Staicovici, Bucharest, Romania, telephone +40 21 30 10 888, telefax number +40 21 30 10 892.

This company is known as Romania Data Systems NOC, and its contact email address appears to be dan.epure@rcs-rds.ro. The IP location, according to one report source is listed as Chiajna Rcs and Rds Residential, but this has not been checked through ground sources.

IP Location	Romania Chiajna Rcs & Rds Residential
ASN	AS8708 RCS-RDS RCS & RDS SA, RO (registered Mar 11, 1998)
Resolve Host	84-232-210-154.rdsnet.ro
Whois Server	whois.ripe.net
IP Address	84.232.210.154

Quick Stats

IP Location Romania Chiajna Rcs & Rds Residential
ASN AS8708 RCS-RDS RCS & RDS SA, RO (registered Mar 11, 1998)
Resolve Host 84-232-210-154.rdsnet.ro
Whois Server whois.ripe.net
IP Address 84.232.210.154

* Abuse contact for '84.232.192.0 - 84.232.213.255'
in 'abuse@rcs-rds.ro'

inetnum: 84.232.192.0 - 84.232.213.255
netname: RO-RESIDENTIAL
descr: RCS & RDS Residential
descr: City: Bucuresti
country: RO
admin-c: RDS-RIPE
tech-c: RDS-RIPE
tech-c: RDS2013-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
notify: notify-ripe@rdsnet.ro
mnt-by: AS8708-MNT
mnt-lower: AS8708-MNT
created: 2015-08-12T06:10:21Z
last-modified: 2015-08-12T06:08:21Z
source: RIPE

role: Romania Data Systems NOC
address: 21-75 Dr. Stalcovici
address: Bucharest / ROMANIA
phone: +40 21 30 10 990
fax-no: +40 21 30 10 892
e-mail: nps@rcs-rds.ro
abuse-mailbox: abuse@rcs-rds.ro
admin-c: GEFU1-RIPE
admin-c: VIG10-RIPE
tech-c: GEFU1-RIPE
tech-c: VIG10-RIPE
nic-hdl: RDS-RIPE
mnt-by: AS8708-MNT

```

remarks: | ABUSE CONTACT: abuse@rds-rds.ro
IN CASE OF HACK ATTACKS, |
remarks: | ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, VIOLATION, SC
ANS, PROBES, SPAM, ETC. |
remarks: | !! PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT OTHER PER
SONS FOR THESE PROBLEMS !! |
remarks: +-----+
created: 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z
last-modified: 2015-10-07T05:29:53Z
source: RIPE

role: RCS RDS
address: 71-75 Pr. Staicovici
address: Bucharest / ROMANIA
phone: +40 21 30 10 888
fax-no: +40 21 30 10 892
e-mail: dan.apura@rds-rds.ro
abuse-mailbox: abuse@rds-rds.ro
admin-c: GEFU1-RIPE
tech-c: GEFU1-RIPE
nic-hdl: RDS2012-RIPE
mnt-by: RDS-MNT
remarks: +-----+

remarks: | Please use abuse@rds-rds.ro
for complaints and only after |
remarks: | you have tried contacting directly
our customers according |
remarks: | to the details registered in RIPE
database. |
remarks: +-----+

remarks: | DO NOT CALL, FAX, OR CONTACT US BY
ANY OTHER MEANS EXCEPT |
remarks: | abuse@rds-rds.ro

remarks: +-----+

created: 2012-01-24T08:33:39Z
last-modified: 2013-05-11T03:16:10Z
source: RIPE


route: 24.232.128.0/17
descr: RCS & RDS S.A.
origin: ASB708
notify: npe@nimacit.com
mnt-by: ASB708-MNT
created: 2006-06-09T13:04:06Z
last-modified: 2006-06-09T13:04:06Z
source: RIPE

```

*Personal Background Searches
How Data Is Catalogued and Accessed Collection
Acquisition Methodology*

In real terms, every person today has a data fingerprint, much like a skin fingerprint. As people operate in the e-commerce world, the "Data DNA" of their digital fingerprint leaves an indelible mark that is rarely deletable. Spending patterns, financial transactions, telephone call pattern analysis, credit card transactions, travel habits, subscriptions to magazines and online computer behavior cannot be altered. While people often try to conceal or obfuscate their tracks, computer forensics can be employed to detect their connection.

Humans today translate into digital images, both structured and unstructured. Data, pictures, sounds, cyber visits – all of it compose a person's data DNA that is unique to that person. It looks something like the illustration below:




Advanced analytics are used to do data extraction, recognizing that:

- ◆ **80% of the world's digital content is unstructured or semi-structured, to include:**
 - ◆ Newspapers data sources
 - ◆ Financial statements contained deep within web sites
 - ◆ Government reports that are both open and closed
 - ◆ Press releases on the surface Web
 - ◆ Websites, both open and closed
 - ◆ Emails that are dumped into the public domain
- ◆ **Semantic extraction is typically used to**
 - ◆ Discover entities and identify their structural ownership and links
 - ◆ Discover relationships between entities
 - ◆ Discover events
 - ◆ Taxonomy generation
 - ◆ Categorize documents

- ◆ A high-performance data-extraction system that consists of
 - ◆ A design-time *compiler*
 - ◆ A run-time *engine*
 - ◆ A powerful *Integrated Development Environment (IDE)*
 - ◆ Several utility programs

- ◆ Semantic extraction is typically used to
 - ◆ Discover entities
 - ◆ Discover relationships between entities
 - ◆ Discover events
 - ◆ Categorize documents

Technically, entity extraction operates somewhat in this manner:



***Positive Location of Sidney Blumenthal Server Location
And Links to Hillary Clinton Email Server Files***

As stated at the outset, this investigation is a multi-phase project starting with the Phase I inquiry, and once the results are obtained, we can probe the leads deeper and trace back related information, if any, to the original source. Based upon the spreadsheets showing that several direct and indirect attacks were executed upon Mr. Blumenthal and Mrs. Clinton jointly, we focused first on Mr. Blumenthal's background in an effort to identify the server location.

Sidney Stone Blumenthal born [redacted] and currently resides at [redacted] telephone [redacted] as well as [redacted] [redacted] Mr. Blumenthal's Social Security account number is listed as [redacted] originally issued from [redacted] We note that he traces to numerous iterations of his given date of birth, to include [redacted] as well as [redacted]

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Aside from his known AOL email address, Mr. Blumenthal also traces to [redacted] which was also hacked around July 2015.

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We checked another database² and found some of the reported IP addresses that were linked to Mr. Blumenthal's email addresses, as well as his home address, based upon a search of his Social Security account number. The registry is abstracted below:

Name	Address	SSN / DOB	Phone	Flags									
				AR	BK	CR	EV	JG	PL	SO	TL	WW	
BLUMENTHAL SIDNEY S	[redacted] 3x Reported: 07/11/2015 - 05/29/2016 County: [redacted]	Issued: [redacted] DOB: [redacted] Age: [redacted]	Landline: [redacted]	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
BLUMENTHAL SIDNEY S AKA: SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL AKA: SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL	[redacted] 1x (POSSIBLE HIGH RISK) Reported: 05/09/2000 - 01/30/2014 County: [redacted]	Issued: [redacted] DOB: [redacted] Age: [redacted]		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
E-mail	[redacted] IP address		Phone	Reported: 10/18/2011									
E-mail	[redacted] IP address		Phone	Reported: 10/06/2011									
E-mail	[redacted] IP address		Phone	Reported: 04/25/2009									

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We also expanded the search to a scan of the address itself [redacted]
[redacted] We obtained the following results:

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Search Criteria

Address: [redacted]
City: [redacted]
State: [redacted]
Zip: [redacted]

Flags: Arrests, Bankruptcies, Criminal Records, Evictions, Civil Judgments, Professional Licenses, Sex Offender Records, Tax Liens, Warrants
Options: E-mail Records, High Risk Addresses

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Name	Address	SSN / DOB	Phone	Flags									
				AR	BK	CR	EV	JG	PL	SO	TL	WW	
BLUMENTHAL SIDNEY S	[redacted] 3x Reported: 07/11/2015 - 05/29/2016 County: [redacted]	Issued: [redacted] DOB: [redacted] Age: [redacted]	Landline: [redacted]	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
AKA: [redacted] AKA: [redacted] AKA: [redacted]	[redacted] 1x Reported: 03/14/2014 - 03/14/2014 County: [redacted]	Issued: [redacted] DOB: [redacted] Age: [redacted]		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
AKA: [redacted] AKA: [redacted]	[redacted] 1x Reported: 01/08/2006 - 01/08/2006 County: [redacted]	Issued: [redacted] DOB: [redacted] Age: [redacted]		N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
[redacted]	[redacted] 1x Reported: 02/28/1993 - 02/28/1993 County: [redacted]	Issued: [redacted] DOB: [redacted] Age: [redacted]		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

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² For additional information, please see Attachment #6 [redacted] Syd Blumenthal IP and SSN Scan

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We created a chart of known or suspected relatives, friends, associates and acquaintances, based upon his digital profile, which is summarized at page 310-312 of the basic [redacted] report attached.³

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Mr. Blumenthal is an American journalist, activist, writer and former political aide of President Bill Clinton as well as a long-time confidant to Hillary Clinton; and a journalist, especially on American politics and foreign policy. He was editor of several departments and wrote for a number of publications including *The Washington Post*, *Vanity Fair*, and *The New Yorker*. He is the father of Max Blumenthal who is also a journalist and political activist.

Mr. Blumenthal was born in Chicago, to Claire (née Stone) and Hyman V. Blumenthal. He earned a BA in sociology from Brandeis University in 1969, and started his career in Boston as a journalist who wrote for *The Boston Phoenix* and *The Real Paper*, two alternative weeklies of the day. Mr. Blumenthal resides in Washington DC but also has offices and connections to California and Chicago.

Mr. Blumenthal has also used numerous iterations of his true name, to include:

SSN:

[redacted]
issued in [redacted]

AKAs:

1) BLUMENTHAL, SIDN

SSN: [redacted]

DOB: [redacted]

2) BLUMENTHAL, SIDNEY S

3) BLUMENTHAL, SIDN

4) BLUMENTHAL, SIDNEY S

SSN: [redacted]

DOB: [redacted]

5) BLUMENTAL, SIDNEY

SSN: [redacted]

DOB: [redacted]

6) BLUMENTAL, SIDNEY

7) BLUMENTHAL, SIDNEY S

DOB: [redacted]

8) BLUMENTHAL, SIDNEY

SSN: [redacted]

9) BLUMENTHAL, SIDNEY S

SSN: [redacted]

10) BLUMENTAL, SIDNEY

SSN: [redacted]

11) SIDNEY, BLUMENTHAL

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Based upon our initial research, it appears that Mr. Blumenthal's computer or server had been connected at [redacted]. However, we do not know at this juncture whether he used a lap top, desk top, or if the computer was portable (such as a device) at the time of the attack.

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We note that Mr. Blumenthal has a number of devices that he uses, to include phones, but this attack was not done upon a mobile device. Every indication is that it was a static and stationary server, such as a laptop or desk top. We checked a number of databases and found that Mr. Blumenthal traces to a number of other addresses in the Washington DC area, to include:

³ For additional information regarding locations of Sidney Blumenthal, and his servers and email addresses, please see Attachment #1 SYD BLUMENTHAL Basic [redacted] Report

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[Redacted]	TransUnion Experian Experian Gateway Historic Credit Bureau Deed	[Redacted] Not Available
[Redacted]	TransUnion Historic Credit Bureau	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	Experian Experian Gateway	[Redacted]
Phone [Redacted]	Phone Record	Not Available
Phone [Redacted]	Phone Record	Not Available
[Redacted]	Historic Credit Bureau	Not Available

Historical Background of Sidney Blumenthal and Connections to Hillary Clinton

Mr. Blumenthal has long time connections to both President as well as Mrs. Clinton. As stated, he served as assistant and senior adviser to Bill Clinton from August 1997 until January 2001. His responsibilities included advising the President on communications and public policy as well as researching information in the general media about the White House. He became a major figure in the grand jury investigation that ended in the impeachment of President Clinton.

While working on the White House Staff, Mr. Blumenthal was known for his loyalty to the Clintons, and for attacks on their adversaries, which is one reason Rahm Emanuel, original chief of staff for President Obama, barred Blumenthal from holding a position in Hillary Clinton's State Department.

After the House Judiciary Committee and the United States House of Representatives impeached Clinton, the matter then passed to the United States Senate. Mr. Blumenthal was one of four witnesses called to testify before the Senate. No live witnesses were called; the four were interviewed on videotape.

His testimony addressed the key "lie": that President Clinton was allegedly pressuring Betty Currie and Mr. Blumenthal to attest that it was Ms. Lewinsky who initially pursued the President, not vice versa. Ms. Lewinsky stated she was the one who instigated the relationship. With the assistance of other evidence and arguments, the Senate acquitted President Clinton of perjury and impeachment proceedings ended.

In 2008 Mr. Blumenthal joined the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign as a "Senior Advisor" in November 2007. While on a trip to advise Clinton on her presidential campaign, [Redacted]

[Redacted] We find it curious that at Attachment #2, there is no mention of [Redacted] which normally would be reported. It is possible that he was able to [Redacted] not an easy effort.

After her January 2009 appointment as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton wanted to hire Blumenthal. However, Obama's chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, blocked his selection due to lingering anger among President Barack Obama's aides over Blumenthal's role in promoting negative stories about Obama during the Democratic primary.

According to a report in the New York Times, "Emanuel talked with Mrs. Clinton ... and explained that bringing Mr. Blumenthal on board was a no-go. The bad blood among his colleagues was too deep, and the last thing the administration needed, he concluded, was dissension and drama in the ranks. In short, Mr. Blumenthal was out...."

Possible Motives of Sidney Blumenthal – Libya Memos and Repatriation of Ghaddafi Assets

Mr. Blumenthal, a longtime confidant of Bill and Hillary Clinton, earned about \$10,000 a month as a full-time employee of the Clinton Foundation. During the 2011 uprising in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi, Mr. Blumenthal prepared, from public and other sources, about 25 memos which he sent as email word attachments to Mrs. Clinton in 2011 and 2012, which she subsequently shared through her aide, Jake Sullivan, with senior State Department personnel. Written in the form of intelligence briefings, or "SITREPs" the memos sometimes touted Blumenthal's business associates and, at times contained rather dubious sourcing.

The client should note that separately, there is evidence that tends to suggest that the entire Benghazi aspect of the Clinton probe maybe somewhat "objectively misplaced" in that our evidence shows that Mr. Blumenthal was involved with a group of intelligence professionals seeking to repatriate asset which were plundered and then exfiltrated by the Gaddafi family and hidden in various offshore localities. One of the devices used by his lawyers and advisors was the infamous Panama Papers law firm that has recently been referenced in the news. This program is better known as *Rogue National Judgment Recovery Litigation*, for which we have much experience, sources, and knowledge generally.

However, in order for Mr. Blumenthal and his associates to be successful with this program, they needed high quality FINCEN intelligence analysts that formerly worked as liaisons with the CIA; he needed complete access to the Libyan Central Bank to do the financial traces; and most important of all, needed access to the State Department Intelligence Bureau file regarding the Libya Frozen Assets Fund, which consisted of about \$30 billion in frozen and recovered assets.

During the last several years, the new Libyan coalition government had a strong desire to hire a group of professionals that could identify other Gaddafi family assets plundered from the country which is suspected of being about \$66 billion. Mr. Blumenthal touted his and his associate's ability to find the money and thus become the preferred contractor for the coalition government.

However, he needed "bait" to entice the State Department to release the data, using his direct contacts with Hillary Clinton.⁴ Thus, the constant Libyan memos, which he and his associates crafted based upon information supplied to them by high-ranking coalition members. It was, consistent with one aspect of the FBI investigation, an example of an official *quid pro quo*. By giving Mrs. Clinton Libyan data as bait, he could justify his value and worth and in exchange obtain State Department intelligence on the Gaddafi money; and then with this valuable

⁴ For additional information, please see a small sample of memos sent from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Clinton that represent "bait" to entice State Department to release Intelligence file on assets recovered, Attachment #5 Sidney Blumenthal Sample Memos to HRC Regarding Libya

classified intelligence; combined with the Libyan Central Bank intelligence use the combined files and data silos to track down the missing money for the coalition government.

As an illustration of how profitable this Program can be, since the Blumenthal group had a contingency contract with the coalition government, if they found just \$1 billion in assets⁵; and the contingency agreement was just 10% of the funds recovered (which is extremely conservative and considerably below industry standards), it would mean the group would earn a windfall of \$100 million gross.

Assuming expenses of 10% of the gross, which would be extremely generous, the net to the group would be nearly \$90 million. The only obstacle separating Mr. Blumenthal and the money was the State Department intelligence; and the key to getting it was Mrs. Clinton, his long-time patron.

For these reasons, we assess that the true motivation behind Mr. Blumenthal's willingness to move mountains of data about Libya to Mrs. Clinton was all about the money and to get access to or actually obtain the State Department intelligence file, notwithstanding the fact that it would be highly illegal for the file to be released to a private citizen.

Part of the reason that we make this assessment is that we know a number of the members of the proposed Blumenthal team who reached out to intelligence professionals familiar with rogue nation judgment recovery work and particularly those that are experts in tracing missing money. We also are aware that this team created a corporate vehicle offshore; and we know that a draft agreement was crafted between the team and the coalition government to work on the project. What we do not know is whether the team was actually operationalized or if the attendant publicity surrounding the email server effectively shut down the Blumenthal team's efforts.

Above we opined the Blumenthal memos had dubious sourcing. The *New York Post* asserted that Blumenthal's "intel was shoddy, with basic errors like mixing up Libyan politicians with similar names. In one instance, Blumenthal asserted that a businessman named [redacted] was among 'the most influential' of the Libyan prime minister's new economic advisers—without mentioning that Blumenthal was advising a group of contractors courting [redacted] as a potential business partner."

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The House Select Committee on Benghazi, headed by Representative Trey Gowdy (R-SC) served a subpoena on Blumenthal on May 19, 2015 for a deposition to be held on June 3, according to Reuters. Blumenthal's name came up during the October 22, 2015 full committee public questioning of Hillary Clinton regarding the Benghazi incident, as one of the alleged sources of Hillary Clinton's intelligence. During this hearing Democratic members asked that Blumenthal's deposition transcript be made public so that comments regarding his involvement could be placed in context. The motion was defeated by a voice vote, followed by a roll call vote along party lines.

Mr. Blumenthal has a dubious litigation history: In 1997, Blumenthal instigated a \$30 million libel lawsuit against Internet blogger Matt Drudge (and AOL, who had hired Drudge) stemming from a false claim Drudge had made of spousal abuse attributed to "top GOP sources". Drudge retracted the story later, saying he had been given bad information. In *Blumenthal v. Drudge*, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998), the court refused to dismiss Blumenthal's case for lack of personal

⁵ Published reports suggest that the Coalition Government believes that between \$60 billion and \$100 billion in assets was absconded by the Gaddafi family and exfiltrated from the country and laundered.

jurisdiction. Drudge later publicly apologized to the Blumenthals. Mr. Blumenthal dropped his lawsuit and eventually reached a settlement involving a payment to Drudge over having missed a deposition. In his book, *The Clinton Wars*, Blumenthal claimed he was forced to settle because he could no longer financially afford the suit.

Global Scan Search

We did a very basic scan on Mr. Blumenthal,⁶ mostly in an effort to isolate the email addresses, IP addresses, and identity of devices that he was using to communicate with Mrs. Clinton.

A Global Scan could not be done on Mrs. Clinton because of a number of technical, legal and practical reasons, but every indication is that her server was located at her home, but copies were maintained in later years at various hosting companies.

For purposes of this study, the issue is whether Mrs. Clinton's server was impermissibly entered by unauthorized persons either before or after the entry of Mr. Blumenthal's server.

It is our opinion, based upon experience in cyber defensive and offensive operations, that once Mr. Blumenthal's server was compromised and data was found that included many emails, attachments, and other data which originated from Mrs. Clinton, such persons would immediately target Mrs. Clinton's server.

Rogue National Judgment Recovery Work – Suspected Contract

As discussed above, we understand that Mr. Blumenthal and others were involved in the Rogue National Judgment Recovery litigation as it pertains to Libya generally and the Qaddafi family specifically. As stated above, there is evidence⁷ to suggest that one of the possible reasons that Mr. Blumenthal was engaging with Mrs. Clinton on matters related to Libya was to involve her in a "quid-pro-quo" relationship whereby he would trade intelligence from HUMINT sources in exchange for access to the State Department Intelligence Bureau file on missing Ghaddafi money.

By way of brief background, in some quarters of the legal community today, there are law firms which participate in Rogue National Judgment Recovery litigation. This type of legal work involves filing actions against middle-level political, military and intelligence persons who, having plundered a nation's treasury for personal gain, but no longer enjoy any form of diplomatic immunity. The Libyan Opposition Government had strong evidence that the Ghaddafi regime had absconded with somewhere between \$60 billion and \$100 billion dollars using a number of devices, vehicles and straw persons.

As such, the Libyan Opposition Government was soliciting law firms and intelligence operators to assist them to recover the missing money and repatriate it to the Government.

⁶ For additional information on Sidney Blumenthal, including location of his email accounts and servers, please see Attachment #1 SYD BLUMENTHAL Basic Report

⁷ We note here that the evidence is in part subjective, but there are some objective clues that support this theory as a motive. Much of this section is based upon assessment by qualified intelligence analysts, but requires much additional research at Phase II in order to either substantiate this theory or set it aside.

There is information suggesting that Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Tyler Drumheller, (deceased 2 August 2015) born 12 April 1952, and Mr. William D. Murphy had formed a relationship whereby they contracted with the Opposition Government to try and identify, locate, and recover the missing money, in concert with a law firm that does this type of work.⁸

Mr. Drumheller, formerly the Chief of the European Division of the CIA, and following his retirement created a private intelligence gathering service.

Mr. Drumheller and Mr. Blumenthal have a long-time relationship that goes back to at least 2007, when Mr. Blumenthal wrote about claims that Mr. Drumheller had information from a source identified as [redacted] of Iraq who claimed that Iraq did not have WMD or any components thereof. This debunked the Bush Administration's narrative for the need to invade Iraq, at least according to reporting by Blumenthal, quoting his source Mr. Drumheller, who claims the intelligence came from [redacted] around 2002.

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Normally, the operators and the law firm work in tandem and enjoy a percentage of that which is recovered. However, someone must fund the start-up operation which can be quite expensive because it involves specialists who are experts in big data analytics, money laundering, and concealment of assets, identity resolution, and tracing of converted assets.

In this unique circumstance, Mrs. Clinton had jurisdiction over the control of the State Department Intelligence Bureau file that contained much analysis and ultimate success in freezing nearly \$30 billion in Ghaddafi money. Thus, with such a file in Mr. Blumenthal's possession, combined with what he could obtain (the Libyan Central Bank data from the Libyan Opposition) he could sling shot ahead of the opposition in finding "the missing treasure."

Assuming that another \$20 billion was identified as missing, and assuming that Mr. Blumenthal and his colleagues could use the legal writs of Moravia to freeze just \$1 billion of the \$20 billion and assuming that he was working on a 10% contingency, the net to his group would be \$100 million. But, key to such an arrangement and its success would be the State Department intelligence file; combined with the Libyan Central Bank file.

So, according to this theory, Blumenthal is sending all of these SITREPs to Mrs. Clinton in an effort to "prime the pump" and obtain the file with the argument that every dollar that his group is able to re-patriot to the Libyan government, either directly or indirectly (via the State Department) is a dollar that the US taxpayers do not have to fund.

There is also objective evidence to indicate that a person identified as [redacted] [redacted] telephone [redacted] [redacted] (circa 10 January 2012) began to solicit Senior Intelligence Analysts with experience in repatriation of assets plundered by the Qaddafi family.

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
⁸ While Mr. Murray has a long-time relationship and connection with sources in the Middle East, partly as a result of his long-time service at the CIA as a Senior Executive Officer, but also through his company Alphom Group, LLC. However, the Rogue Judgment Recovery Work assignment, it is believed (no sourcing) was not done through Alphom, but through some other offshore vehicle.

[redacted] has several other companies, to include [redacted] as well as other addresses in [redacted] and elsewhere. A full brief can be provided on him as necessary, but basically [redacted] dissent who has been a naturalized citizen in the US since around [redacted] He has long-time connections to the US State Department that date to the 1990's and was actually covered as [redacted] where he served as [redacted] as he was [redacted] His primary employer as [redacted] at the time was [redacted] As such, he was also a self-styled liaison from the State Department to a number of US-based intelligence services owing to his experience in the Middle East. A full brief on him can be done, as necessary.

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This person began the solicitation process on approximately January 25th 2012, claiming that he was dealing with representatives of a “high level political types in the US within the State Department” and that he personally had top-level contacts within the new Libyan Opposition Government; and that he would have a contract to assist in beginning the repatriation process.¹⁰ Proof of [redacted] involvement in participating in the program, and seeking the guidance of others, is found in this post-meeting summary memo that was sent to him:

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The dates when these contacts were made by [redacted] fit the time line of when Mr. Blumenthal was crafting the memos regarding Libya and other issues to Mrs. Clinton. While he never overtly states that he is need of information regarding Qaddafi plundered assets; the memos clearly contain language that is amateurish, would not inspire a lot of faith and credence by Senior Intelligence Analysts that put together all source HUMINT and SIGINT packages for planners and policy makers.

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As recently as 2014, according to published reports, [redacted] is quoted as claiming he had a direct contractual relationship with the Libyans to track down “assets that had been spirited out of the country by Gaddafi’s inner circle”. One of the leads that he was focusing on at the time was the Aman Bank, which allegedly was used by the family as an exfiltration vehicle.

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Sourcing embellishments and characterizing the level of access, and the placement of HUMINT sources, and claiming multiple unconnected HUMINT and compartmented intelligence is a dubious practice. Reports Officers simply do not craft SITREPs or presentations using these kinds of characterizations.

Rather, the ring to these memos is that it is being done to “shake and bake” and provide Mrs. Clinton fodder for arguing that an exchange of data might inure to the benefit of the US (looking at it in the light most favorable to the parties implicated) Community and the American people, as well as the Libyan Transitional Government who were totally reliant upon US funding and strength.

¹⁰ Indeed, unbeknownst to this author at the time (January 2012) [redacted] was – it is now suspected – trying to assemble a team of former high level CIA operatives with Middle East experience to help him round out the “technical team”. In January 2012 [redacted] did not state to this author that he was working directly or indirectly with Mr. Blumenthal; only that he was part of a team being assembled, that they had a contract, that they had a funding vehicle for needed seed money, that they had a Chicago-based law firm and that all members were former USG Intelligence Operations Directorate personnel.

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[redacted] has a rather controversial history within the US Intelligence Community, particularly at [redacted]. His links to [redacted] was one of the prime operatives in Libya, providing [redacted]. Notwithstanding his reputation in the US Intelligence Community, he was believed to have highly placed contacts within Libya which could have been mined for creation of a Rogue Nation Asset Recovery program, but for his limited technical and intelligence analyst resources.

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Is it a stretch to believe that at one time or another [redacted] did not stumble upon Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Drumheller and Mr. Murray, who were creating the “shake and bake” SITREPs, and for which he would provide access to the Opposition Government to contract for recovery of the plundered Qaddafi assets? While the time line and the relationship, connections, links and possible association atmospherics do fit; it is still just circumstantial at present.

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But, so goes the possible theory – If Blumenthal was able to locate and re-patriate the money, it would be a huge win for the US State Department as it could claim they suppressed the money laundering efforts of the Ghaddafi family and repatriated the money to the rightful owners, and moreover, saved the American people the cost to fund reconstruction of Libya through this repatriation effort.

However, the legality of such an arrangement, outside of normal US Government channels, authorities and governances is questionable. Such a “quid-pro-quo” would be looked upon from within the Community with great caution and disdain, particularly after it was learned that Mr. Blumenthal also had a pecuniary relationship with the Clinton Foundation.

Again, we caution here: We have no definitive evidence that Mr. Blumenthal actually was involved in the above engagement with the Libyan Opposition. All we know for certain is that he was soliciting Senior Intelligence analysts during this period to participate and lend a hand and was doing so using Mr. Murray and Mr. Drumheller.

We know that the Libyan Opposition Government was attempting to contract with intelligence professionals to engage in this program. We also know that they were seeking – through intermediaries – legal counsel who have long experience and achieved some success in rogue national judgment work. And, we know that Mr. Blumenthal was passing to Mrs. Clinton dubious SITREPs that he was characterizing as atmospheric HUMINT reports from alleged intelligence sources in Libya. As stated above, we also know that [redacted] definitely did have a contract with the opposition Government as recently as around 2014, according to his self-confessed claims.

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Further, we also know that the Libyan Opposition, as recently as December 4th 2015 was seeking to re-ignite this program using a man identified as [redacted]¹¹. Our information suggests that [redacted] was working directly for the new Libyan Foreign minister “on an initiative to locate and freeze Libyan assets that were hidden by Kaddafi around the globe.” He also stated “...Until the political situation in Libya becomes stable and a democratic government is elected, all these assets are in danger of being squandered or misused by politicians or treasure hunters.”¹²

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¹¹ The email address for [redacted] is identified in December 2015 at [redacted]

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¹² For additional information on this event, please see abstracted and a truncated version of an email dated 4 December 2015 from [redacted] seeking to partner with a local law firm to recover assets. Attachment #8 LIBYA ASSET ROGUE NATIONAL JUDGMENT RECOVERY PROGRAM

We note that [redacted] and as of December 2015 and January 2016, was seeking not only Senior Intelligence analysts, but legal counsel in Washington, DC.

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By way of brief background, [redacted]

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After working for [redacted] for several years, [redacted] started several private enterprises including [redacted]

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In addition to operating several businesses in the United States, [redacted] also served as a [redacted] has served on the board or executive committees of several non-profit and community organizations. Most recently he has been [redacted]

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[redacted] is passionately interested in [redacted] and has [redacted]

He has strong links to [redacted] who lives in [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] has been active in the Libyan revolution since its inception in February 2011. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] is active in Washington DC's political circles with extensive networks and relationships about Libya and its democratic transition. He frequently participates in programs in prominent think tanks and meets regularly with policy makers and government officials regarding Libya. He maintains strong relationships with important political actors in Libya and continues to advise successive Libyan governments regarding Libya-US relations.

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[redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Another person linked to both [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

His business career started in [Redacted] owned and operated [Redacted] [Redacted] He also owned and operated [Redacted] Currently, he owns and operates [Redacted]

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An active community member, [Redacted] is involved in local and state politics. He is a member of various community and political groups and is especially interested in inter-faith work. Prior to [Redacted] was a member of [Redacted] While he resides in [Redacted] maintains an extensive network of contacts in Libya where he travels frequently to meet with political leaders and civil society groups.

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We are not suggesting that any of these men engaged with Mr. Blumenthal. However, what we do have proof of is that this group is working directly for the Foreign Minister, and are seeking to recruit American Senior Intelligence analysts and legal counsel to contract with the Libyan Opposition Government and seek to recover the assets, and did so as recently as 4 December 2015.

Thus, while there may be circumstantial evidence that a scheme was underway; to this day, there is no concrete evidence showing that Mr. Blumenthal actually did achieve a successful *quid pro quo* with Mrs. Clinton.

However, at Phase II, we would recommend that it might be worthy to make contact with the aforementioned organization and see whether the Libyan Opposition Government ever contracted with any groups, organizations or individuals and received reports, memos, work product, contracts, corporate vehicles, etc., regarding asset repatriation, without regard to the Blumenthal group.

Normally, if [Redacted] had indeed hired a new group of forensic financial experts or Senior Intelligence Analysts, this follow-on organization would ask for copies of all memoranda. They would want to have this so not to duplicate past efforts that proved fruitful, or mine the data that was recovered for additional leads. If the Libyan Opposition Government did indeed contract with Mr. Blumenthal, it is logical that [Redacted] has the ability to obtain the data.

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*Example of Data Traced from Hillary Clinton Server
Directly to the Deep Web*

While we cannot state for certain at this juncture in the research, that Mrs. Clinton's server was directly penetrated, we did find a sample of a particular document within the Dark Web that traces back to her exact IP address where her domain email server was located. This document is a summary of known and suspected Libyan terrorists who were in and around the Benghazi area.¹³ If genuine, this document would enjoy the highest level of classification because it could be used for targeting and would be a record that the Ambassador-in-country would have access to as it was probably obtained by the Chief of Station or an Operations Officer under his authority.

Moreover, this document was not found on Mr. Blumenthal's server so it was not sent by him to anyone and was not received by him from any source.

Rather, it was found in the Deep Web and traced back to Mrs. Clinton's IP only. Therefore, one possible explanation -- using every reasonable inference -- is that it came from Mrs. Clinton and that her server was penetrated. Much more analysis would need to be done on this and other documents that could be recovered to determine when, if and how Mrs. Clinton's server was penetrated and where the documents landed.

Use of the Global Scan Search Vehicle to Locate Suspect Document

Attempting to trace back to the provenance of this one document (Attachment #2) and identify all places where it landed, would take some effort. The client may wish to expand the research to include a complete GlobalScan search, which represent the deepest and most in-depth scans that are available in the commercial database world today. Reports can range from 800 to 4000 pages long, when including exhibits.

Global Scan can be done on any person in the world, and costs depend on the name, address, age and other identifiers for the person. To date, we have processed over 20,000 GlobalScans since our inception. After 1996, the GlobalScan always included digital media data, usually from the original source so that they could be used in a legal proceeding.

Since we have much experience in complex digital intelligence research that involves databases and electronic sources, our experience has shown that the only effective way to conduct such a study is the Global Scan® on each person or company or document that we find and trace it back through the movement evolution.

We assume permissible purpose exists for conducting all appropriate database searches. This matter must be confidential and privileged and done pursuant to the privileged communications doctrine and the attorney work-product doctrine.¹⁴

¹³ For additional information on a sample of one file that was recovered from the Deep Web and the Dark Web which came only from Hillary Clinton Server, please see Attachment #2 COPY OF LYBIAN JIHADIST TRACED TO CLINTON SERVER EMAIL

¹⁴ Please note that some searches require a permissible purpose as defined under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, Title 15, USC 1681, et. seq., as well as other local, state, federal and international laws. You are required to certify to that any search is in compliance with both FCRA, as well as the 1999 Graham-Leach Bank Privacy Act. By placing any order with the client represents that the client has fully complied with all local, state, federal and international laws and assumes all responsibility assumes no responsibility for determining

However, as stated at the outset, the only exception to the privilege when using Global Scan is if records are found that are demonstrably apparent to be classified, even if not overtly marked as such. If this is found, we must stop, turn over the implicated material to the FBI, and seek their guidance and support.

This search permits us to cite the costs for obtaining all other information within each "information corridor" that may be identified during the initial scan.


It also enables the ultimate client to maintain control of the scope, direction, and cost of a more extensive investigation. Each proposed search item is listed at the end of initial report.

For example, a Global Scan® will cite the name and address of a bank, an account number, the signatures on the account, and when it was opened, but will not provide information regarding balances or activity. However, the Global Scan® will cite the exact cost for obtaining that next level of information.

Normally, GlobalScan® always includes the following categories of data:

- a. **Banking, financial and credit relationships, including addresses and names of institutions.**
- b. **Real estate holdings, real estate trusts, and real property conveyances.**
- c. **Corporate affiliations, executive associations, and self-confessed employment.**
- d. **Credit reports and personal financial scans.**
- e. **Litigation, including criminal arrests in their areas of residence.**
- f. **Newspaper, magazine, trade journal, and wire service reports.**
- g. **Known associates, family members and close personal friends who may be used to transfer or convey assets.**
- h. **Vehicles, boats, mechanized equipment, and recreational devices traced to merchant's name, address or SSN.**
- i. **UCC filings recorded in the name of the merchant, based upon a scan of the person's name, SSN, or past addresses, a triple secured search. Included is both debtor and secured party searches.**
- j. **Identification of trade creditors, credit card companies, utility companies, banks, or other entities that the target would be paying with some type of instrument. These searches do not include identification of the bank that a check is drawn upon, or the account number, just the bill that is being paid.**
- k. **Identification of telephone numbers, cellular numbers, and mobile telephone numbers; together with long distance carriers. This search does not include a detail of the numbers dialed, or the subscribers to the numbers dialed, which can only be obtained at the next level of searching.**
- l. **All past addresses, historic use of addresses, names of relatives, names of persons traced to addresses used by the merchant, names of relatives and the statistical identifiers of those that reside in the same household as the merchant.**

In actuality, the data flow appears something like that which is depicted below:



Global Scan® is conducted on a flat fee basis only, and is marketed that way because clients seek to have a guaranteed fee structure cited in advance. Moreover, before any Global Scan® can be prepared requires that all cited fees and expense surcharges be paid in advance.

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does not bill by the hour for its services nor use "general price lists". Rather, it uses the "bundled billing" approach. In short, the fee is guaranteed and includes all research time, computer data downloads, analysis, report preparation and delivery. We may consult with counsel by telephone or email following transmission of our report, should there be a need to clarify a few points in our report. This approach guarantees the client all available information for a pre-cited charge without regard to the amount of information obtained.

Specialized In-Depth Searches

We also can conduct deeper probes, depending on the requirements of counsel, the permissible purpose to obtain the information, etc. In addition to the above mentioned eight categories of data, we can, under certain circumstances provide a more in-depth report and other kinds of advanced searching. The cost for each depends on the nature of the request. We checked Mr. Blumenthal's digital data and found some or all of these indicators are present:

1. **Social Security Numbers and DOB Search**
2. **Social Security Trace for all addresses, verify date of issuance, state of issuance and whether used regarding banking, financial or credit transaction**
3. **Date of Birth Records**
4. **Death Records**
5. **Change Of Name Records**

6. **Marriage and divorce Records**
7. **Criminal Records State or federal sealed or unsealed felony or misdemeanor**
8. **Warrants of Arrest**
9. **Order of Protection, domestic violence offender scans**
10. **Probation Records, special offender searches, including sex offender registries, or habitual offender status**
11. **Property Tax Records**
12. **Utility Bill Records**
13. **Current Address**
14. **Driver's License Information**
15. **Car Insurance Records**
16. **U.S. Postal Service Forwarding Address Records**
17. **True owner of U.S. Postal Service PO BOX Records**
18. **Magazines or Newsletters that you are the owner of. (Postal Records)**
19. **Bulk Mail Permit records (US Postal Service)**
20. **Magazines that someone may subscribe to**
21. **Books that are obtained from a library**
22. **Junk Mail/Catalogs register**
23. **Credit Card Records**
24. **Credit Records**
25. **Banking, financial and credit relationships that include name and address of bank**
26. **MVR Reports**
27. **TAG & VIN Traces**
28. **License Plates (Name and address can be found by doing a license plate search**
29. **Full Driving Records, including searches of National Major Offender Database**
30. **Military Records Search, including discharge status, branch job and rating, dates of Enlistment, Reasons for Discharge**
31. **List of Hospital admissions and possible diagnosis codes**
32. **Telephone Number Historical Index**

33. Cell Phone Trace
34. Unlisted Phone Numbers Decodes
35. Illegal Alien Database Scan
36. Government Job Registration Scan
37. Worker's Compensation Settlement or Claim Scans
38. Automobile and Personal Injury Insurance Fraud Database
39. Real Estate, Co-Op and Full Title Search scan for 50 years
40. Leads for identifying hidden or secreted assets that are in the form of T-bills, bonds, stocks, "offshore" bank accounts, or funds in tax haven countries
41. College Records Search, verification of college attendance, degrees conveyed and special awards
42. Terrorist or Cult Member Dossiers
43. Professional Certification by various professional trade associations
44. Business Conduct Searches through databases such as Better Business Bureau
45. Federal Bankruptcy Database Scans, including whether cited in an adversarial proceeding, or as a claimant in any bankruptcy action by others
46. Catalogs, Mailing Lists, and Department Store searches
47. Employment Searches for a period of 20 years, including job titles and descriptions, addresses, and possible level of compensation
48. All Professional Licenses Scan
49. Business licenses, motor vehicle licenses, pilot licenses
50. Evictions and Tenant Landlord Database Scan
51. Voter Registration Database and scan of historic voting record
52. Email tracing service and complete Web Site Domain.

Understanding Deep Web Intelligence Methodology

By way of background, the "Deep Web" — a vast reservoir of Internet content that is 500 times larger than known "surface" World Wide Web material. What makes the discovery of the Deep Web so significant is the quality of content found within it. Deep Web searches are intended for cases where historic data needs to be obtained and which otherwise tends to "fall off" current-day data tables.

Searching on the Internet today can be compared to dragging a net across the surface of the ocean. While much can be gathered from the top, there is a wealth of information that lies deeper, and therefore is missed by the average person.

There are hundreds of billions of highly valuable documents hidden in searchable databases that cannot be retrieved by conventional search engines. The reason is simple: basic search methodology and technology has not evolved significantly since the inception of the Internet.

Traditional search engines create their card catalogs by spidering or crawling "surface" Web pages. To be identified, a page must be static and linked to subsequent other pages. Utilized in this manner, standard search engines cannot "see" or retrieve content in the Deep Web and the crawlers used by them cannot probe beneath the surface. The result is that enormous amounts of data remains untapped and effectively "hidden" to the crawler, while in reality, the material is in plain sight.

The discovery of the Deep Web is the result of groundbreaking search technology developed by the Intelligence Community. Private companies have only recently developed search technology capable of identifying, retrieving, qualifying, classifying and organizing "deep" and "surface" content from the World Wide Web.

The Deep Web is qualitatively different from the surface Web. Deep Web sources store their content in searchable databases that only produce results dynamically in response to a direct request. But a direct query is a "one at a time" laborious way to search.

Our search system automates the process of making dozens of direct queries simultaneously using multiple thread technology. It allows searchers to dive deep and explore hidden data simultaneously from multiple sources using directed queries.

Businesses, researchers and consumers now have access to the most valuable and hard-to-find information on the Web and can retrieve it with pinpoint accuracy. If the most coveted commodity of the Information Age is indeed information, then the value of Deep Web content is immeasurable.

When conducting Deep Web intelligence studies on companies or individuals, we access a much different class of documents. Included in the search results are not only the standard information retrieved by conventional search engines but many other possible leads. Some of the highlights of the Deep Web search include:

1. **Public information on the Deep Web that is 400 to 550 times larger than the commonly defined World Wide Web;**
2. **7,500 terabytes of information, compared to 19 terabytes of information in the surface Web;**
3. **550 billion individual documents compared to the 1 billion of the surface Web;**
4. **Information from an additional 100,000 Deep Web sites;**
5. **60 of the largest Deep Web sites collectively contain about 750 terabytes of information — sufficient by themselves to exceed the size of the surface Web by 40 times;**
6. **On average, Deep Web sites receive about 50% greater monthly traffic than surface sites and are more highly linked to than surface sites; however, the typical (median) Deep Web site is not well known to the Internet search public;**


7. **The Deep Web is the largest growing category of new information on the Internet;**
8. **Deep Web sites tend to be narrower with deeper content than conventional surface sites;**
9. **Total quality content of the deep Web is at least 1,000 to 2,000 times greater than that of the surface Web;**
10. **Deep Web content is highly relevant to every information need, market and domain. More than half of the deep Web content resides in topic specific databases;**
11. **A full 95% of the deep Web is publicly accessible information — not subject to fees or subscriptions.**

To put these numbers in perspective, we estimate that some of the largest search engines, such as Northern Light, individually index only 16% of the surface Web. Since they are missing the Deep Web, Internet searchers are therefore searching only 0.03% — or one in 3,000 — of the content available to them today.

Clearly, simultaneous searching of multiple surface and Deep Web sources is necessary when comprehensive information retrieval is needed.

We have automated the identification of Deep Web sites and the retrieval process for simultaneous searches. We have also developed a direct-access query engine translatable to about 20,000 sites, already collected, eventually growing to 100,000 sites. Our experience has shown that when the hit scores fall below 65%, they are not deemed reliable and the hits tend to be unrelated to the target of the inquiry.

Graphically, size comparison of the Deep Web compared to the “surface web” looks something like this:




Dark Space Searching


During the past several years, the Department of Defense, led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been steadily working on a project called the NOISE database, known as Name Only Index Searching and Exception. The acronym NOISE came from the negative consequence of conventional searching of the Open Source, Web-enabled applications such as:

www.altavista.com
www.northernlight.com
www.lycos.com
www.opendirectory.com
www.waybackmachine.org
www.google.com
www.cuil.com
www.msn.com

Visually, the process of gathering information on a person or entity looks something like the figure below:



WHAT IS OSINT? (Open Source Intelligence)



Traditionally, these are “Name Only” or “Business Name only” or “Telephone Number Only” searches that return massive, unrefined results. When the search criteria is common, the return results is often “NOISE” and burdens the analyst with a vast amount of irrelevant information.


In the commercial or legal markets space, the same is true, but the pressure is even greater to obtain results quickly, efficiently, and within a reasonable budget.

The commercial version of the NOISE application is particularly useful in certain kinds of litigation such as the current Clinton case. It has been used to “walk back” information claimed to be gleaned from foreign IP sources as it can be fished out of the Deep Web and effectively converted for use by analysts.

For that reason, we suggest that NOISE application and the data searches be considered here because of the relatively common names of Advantage and the key individuals.

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It is the union of the NOISE application and the restricted access data within that is only available with a permissible purpose that allows for a highly relevant, targeted search approach. It looks something like this:



In the DoD contracting space, DARPA was tasked with the order to find a means to take granular data about a person (All known names, dates of birth, ages, past addresses, phone numbers, faxes, email addresses, web site addresses, businesses, names of relatives, etc.) or the so called digital fingerprint of a person, and inject that intelligence into the web-enabled application for a more definitive results.

For common names, the leads are culled down from perhaps 12,000 to 120. Moreover, the data is highly accurate and is considered rifle-shot searching. Because the name *Hillary Clinton* or *Sidney Blumenthal* are so common and lead to millions of stories and hits; this is the perfect tool to cull through the mountains of data that exist on both within the Deep Web.


The second compelling reason this new form of search technology was developed is that the Internet and the Deep Web is much larger and vaster than any database source on the planet today. The "Deep Web", sometimes known as the Internet Dark Space or the Deep Web Intelligence Center, is a vast reservoir of content that is 1,000 times larger than the known "surface" World Wide Web. What makes the discovery of the Deep Web so significant is the quality of content found within. In a very real way, the Dark Space of the Internet is much like the outer space: Its depth and size is not measureable, indefinable, and endless.

The old way of searching, looks something like this:



However, the new way, including use of NOISE and data that can be granularized, looks something like this:

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This new capability allows searchers to dive deep and explore hidden data from multiple sources simultaneously using directed queries.

When you combine the tools of being able to “Deep Dive” into the Internet, with the ability to access restricted and protected personal data that is mostly available only to law firms or those with a permissible purpose (Name, DOB, Past Addresses, etc.), one can significantly expand not only the searchable data mass, but do so with highly accurate results.

Businesses, researchers and consumers now have access to the most valuable and hard-to-find information on the Web and can retrieve it with pinpoint accuracy. Searching on the Internet today can be compared to dragging a net across the surface of the ocean.

However, there is a wealth of information that is deep, and therefore missed, hence, the Deep Web. The reason is simple: basic search methodology and technology have not evolved significantly since the inception of the Internet. Traditional search engines create their card catalogs by spidering or crawling “surface” Web pages.


To be discovered, the page must be static and linked to other pages. Traditional search engines cannot “see” or retrieve content in the Deep Web. Because traditional search engine crawlers cannot probe beneath the surface, the Deep Web or Dark Space of the Internet has heretofore been hidden in plain sight.


The Deep Web is qualitatively different from the surface Web. Deep Web sources store their content in searchable databases that only produce results dynamically in response to a direct request. But a direct query is a “one at a time” laborious way to search.

NOISE automates the process of making dozens of direct queries simultaneously using multiple thread technology, and takes private, non-pubic financial information and pulverizes it for inclusion into the search query. If the most coveted commodity of the Information Age is indeed intelligence, then the value of Deep Web content is immeasurable.

Today, more and more people are “self-confessing” their habits and haunts; their biases and prejudices and their flavors and peccadillos. It is most predominantly done on such Social Media web sites as Facebook, MyLife, LinkedIn, and hundreds of other public and private chat portals. All of these locations are trawled, but the key is the search instrument or vehicle used and the advanced analytics applies.

Our technology specializes in the developing of these wide and deep data mining nets and tools, where it is launched upon an endlessly sized ocean of data. Some of these data sources include:





Summary and Conclusion

The Phase I research confirms that Sidney Blumenthal's server was the target of repeated attacks by *Guccifer* and his colleagues. The penetration resulted in the exfiltration of Hillary Clinton's communications directly from Mr. Blumenthal's server to Bucharest, Romania, where it was placed on a password protected, and encrypted server domain. The data then moved to a second IP address that does not appear to be controlled by *Guccifer*. This is troubling because it demonstrates that data moved outside of the control of *Guccifer* to some unknown third party. It is prima facie evidence of a rolling spill that, at least in part, included data that directly or indirectly originated from the computers or servers of Hillary Clinton and Sidney Blumenthal.

This Romanian domain locality then collected nearly 37,000 files and hosted them for a long period of time, many of which came from a direct attack upon the server of Mr. Blumenthal, but also include direct attacks of others.

One of those persons is believed to be the email domain server of Mrs. Clinton because one document was found on the Romanian domain that traced to the IP address of Mrs. Clinton, and one document was recovered successfully, but many others could exist. We just do not know because in order to definitively determine this, one would need to download all of the 37,000 files, and then open each to see whether any can be directly linked to the Clinton server.

The Clinton security people claim that "security logs of the server show no successful penetrations or attacks." This statement or assessment is without basis in our opinion. In reality, one cannot determine from internal security logs alone whether a sophisticated pernicious attack was executed.

There is a multitude of ways that a penetration and exfiltration can occur and no trace is found within the internal security logs of the targeted server. This includes direct, indirect and collateral attacks upon the email domain server, such as was most likely done here.

It is inescapable that a security breach and a violation of basic server security occurred here, both with Mr. Blumenthal and Mrs. Clinton.

The State Department and the IC basic security protocols regarding email servers for personal use was also systematically violated by Mrs. Clinton. The fact that we found emails regarding attachments that describe the names and identities of targets for attack in Libya that date to about the time of the Benghazi attack is particularly troublesome. Such a document, if authored by a US Government employee who enjoyed original classification authority would enjoy the highest level of classification, most probably Top Secret – SCI and a SAP Code. The fact that this document was found in “the open” and has no security classification collars is highly suspect and deserves critical review and analysis.

In this limited, Phase I inquiry, we were asked to (a) determine solely whether Mrs. Clinton’s server was directly or indirectly attacked; (b) whether any of its contents could be found within the Deep Web and the Dark Web (c) whether a sample of such records could be obtained (d) and whether the attack was a pernicious attack from a foreign source (e) where the records might on a domain server outside of the US.

The answers to each of these questions is in the affirmative but further studies are recommended to determine whether more records to include original emails can be obtained and recovered, mindful of classification issues and our legal obligations as discussed above.

Separately, we assess that Mr. Blumenthal’s true motive for being so aggressive in providing information to Mrs. Clinton regarding Benghazi and Libya was to “bait” her into releasing the State Department intelligence file (a classified record at the SECRET level at a minimum because it came from foreign in-country diplomatic or official sources) that contain a roadmap on how the State Department seized the Qaddafi family assets that had been plundered from the country. The \$30 billion was only a portion of what the coalition government suspect was taken from the Libyan people.

We understand that Mr. Blumenthal presented a proposal to the coalition government that included a team of experts in money laundering and repatriation of absconded assets, but it was wholly dependent upon his ability to obtain quality digital data from disparate sources to fuel the tracing and tracking software. We believe that Mr. Blumenthal team members made clear that he would need:

- (a) The complete financial database image files of the Libyan Central Bank during the Qaddafi years;
- (b) The complete State Department intelligence file containing all information on how they identified, located, and then seized the Qaddafi money;
- (c) The complete Qaddafi CINFIN file to which the State Department would have access;
- (d) Identification of the corporate vehicles created by the Qaddafi family to exfiltrate the funds.

If Mr. Blumenthal were able to obtain all of these records, it would then be possible for the team to perhaps succeed in tracing the funds to their present day location and use a legal team to commence seizure proceedings using the *Moravia Writ* legal method. The potential reward to the Blumenthal team would be tens of millions of dollars, but depended entirely on his ability to leverage his relationship with Mrs. Clinton. The plot was disrupted when the email server, and the memos (samples of which are found at Attachment #5) became public.

The bottom line here was “No Data – No Dollars”, and absent this political quid pro quo, the team’s efforts would be doomed.

In addition to the above, the Phase I Study resulted in some other detailed findings that are best summarized below:

1. The computer of Sidney Blumenthal was positively identified as hosting many emails and attachments originating from Hillary Clinton’s server and others from the Clinton Foundation. In Phase I, we recovered at least 20 memos from Mr. Blumenthal to Mrs. Clinton that contained Situation Reports (SITREPS) allegedly based upon intelligence sources in Libya.
2. Mr. Blumenthal’s server was successfully attacked by Marcel Lazar Lehel, originally from Bucharest, who is also known as *Guccifer* or “Small Fume”.
3. While one spreadsheet shows that over 37,000 files were found on a closed encrypted and password protected site of someone other than *Guccifer*, only a full analysis of the spreadsheet will reveal all of the files traced back to Mrs. Clinton’s server directly, or to that of Mr. Blumenthal. These files were traced to a computer that was using an application to access the Peer-to-Peer networks. The computer was traced to IP address 84.232.210.154, which points to Bucharest, Romania.
4. One search revealed that data that originated from Mr. Blumenthal’s server was transferred to the computer at 84.232.210.154 on July 5th 2014 at 07:12 (Bucharest Time), and yielded many references to “HRC” within the spreadsheet. This would suggest that the content of the computer traced to IP 84.232.210.154, was not *Guccifer*, but someone else who accessed his server. The reason is that this “migration” occurred long after *Guccifer* was identified, arrested, and incarcerated in Romania. Several possible explanations exist: (a) *Guccifer* had a co-conspirator that continued to operate the collection from various sources as a “get out of jail free card”; (b) The computer doing this collecting did belong to *Guccifer*, and he allowed it to run long after he was arrested. This scenario seems unlikely for a number of technical reasons. (c) This computer belongs to a foreign service or someone else who attacked the *Guccifer* server and transferred the data to computer 84.232.210.154.
5. Notwithstanding the above, data from both the Blumenthal computer and the Clinton email server migrated to *Guccifer*, and then to a computer tied to IP 84.232.210.154, both of which were located outside of the United States and outside of the control of the US Intelligence Community. Assuming either contained overtly classified data or retrospectively classified data, this is considered a major Counterintelligence concern and of interest to the Community.
6. *Guccifer* entered the Blumenthal computer several times, first through Blumenthal’s AOL account. It is not clear whether *Guccifer* targeted Blumenthal because he represented an opportunity of interest, or because a foreign service directed him to the account. Also, it is not clear whether the account was entered after he first entered the Clinton server or that of someone else on the Clinton domain server.
7. During Phase II, much additional information can be obtained on the sequence, timing and chronology of when the two servers in question were accessed and in what order and how many times.
8. We found indications that *Guccifer* or person or persons acting on his behalf or persons impersonating *Guccifer* did a secondary penetration of Mrs. Clinton’s server on May 22, 2009, and other penetrations thereafter.
9. We confirmed that *Guccifer* used an anonymous server located in Russia to conduct the penetration, and therefore, there is a high possibility that the Russian services that monitor these anonymous servers likewise have a copy.

10. One file that was found on Mrs. Clinton's server was not found on the Blumenthal server. This file represents a major loss to the Intelligence Community because it appears to be targeting data. The data is first in Russian and then converted to Arabic. It represents a list of targets that quite possibly was created by a Russian source, located or intercepted by our services, and transmitted to Mrs. Clinton by some unknown person. The file then left her server and was found in the Deep Web and Dark Web.
11. The above cited file, an excel spreadsheet, we assess, would enjoy the highest level of classification if submitted to a person who has original classification authority. The file was found stripped of its collars (if they ever existed). If it is determined by the FBI that this file ever was overtly classified, it will serve as a potential "smoking gun document."
12. *Guccifer* penetrated a number of targets and we recovered over 37,000 files from a computer traced to IP 84.232.210.154 that he obtained. We created a mapping of those files as they appear in the Deep Web. We then tested the spreadsheet and the content behind the spreadsheet (the 37,000 files) using key word fuzzy logic. We confirmed the following Blumenthal memos were found on the Clinton Server and vice versa:

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_algeria_010112	05/01/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	11 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_asaad's_plans_021812	02/18/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	13 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_Comprehensive_Intel_Report_on_Libya_010413-1	01/04/13 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	21 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_Comprehensive_Intel_Report_on_Libya_010412	01/04/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	21 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_euro_fear_of_loathing_090812	09/08/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	19 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_Georgia-US_elections_highpoint_090212	09/02/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	26 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_intel_badia_mura_&_opposition_120812	12/08/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	18 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_Latest_French_Intelligence_Reports_on_Algerian_Hostage_Crisis111812	11/18/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	16 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_libya_benghazi_01_121012	01/10/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_libya_cabinet_100812	10/08/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	19 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_libya_internal_govt_011512	01/15/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	17 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_libya_new_president_081212	08/12/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	16 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_Libyan_Leadership_Private_Discussions_102512	10/25/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	18 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_magnat_attack_on_US_in_Libya_091212	09/12/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_market_gouman_acc_intel_090412	09/04/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	21 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_moroc_maginfat_private_rea_081312	08/13/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_moroc_moves_081412	08/14/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	19 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_moroc_private_conversations_081412	08/14/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	15 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_petraeus_october_surprise_111212	11/12/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	12 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_petraeus_october_surprise_111212-1	11/12/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	13 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_tarkenton_0916_091312	09/16/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	14 KB
[84.232.210.154]src_memo_tarkenton_nov_021212	11/02/12 7:12 AM	Microsoft Word Document	16 KB

13. A complete copy of the Blumenthal memos sent to Mrs. Clinton were opened recovered in original format and deserves critical analysis by counsel. Most all were word documents and related to a number of issues. These can be provided to counsel as a means to substantiate the claims of *Guccifer*.
14. We did not actually collect the content of Mrs. Clinton's server or the content of computer 84.232.210.154 at Phase I; we merely validated the major premise and hypothesis that data originating from either or both of the Clinton and Blumenthal servers were attacked, directly or indirectly, and then were moved outside of the US to *Guccifer*; and then migrated to computer IP 84.232.210.154, owned and operated by unknown persons. Additional research is required to cull through the 37,000 files found to select those that pertain to Mrs. Clinton and which came directly from her server.
15. We note that there are profound legal questions regarding Phase II because it is not clear what our obligations may be regarding recovery of potentially classified data that may or may not contain actual collars that overtly show the content was classified at the time they were sent to Mrs. Clinton; or emails and attachments that were retrospectively classified but were released in truncated form. Our recovery of such content would be untruncated and in original condition.
16. It is conceivable that one possible motive for Mr. Blumenthal's decision to feed Mrs. Clinton the SITREP reports was to promote his group as a quality private intelligence group in Libya capable of obtaining detailed intelligence from various unnamed, disparate sources as to the thinking, actions, planning and intentions of key operators in the region. We do not opine on the accuracy of the intelligence provided, only the tone and intent of the memos. Our assessment is that they are essentially, crafted as "shake and bake" intelligence assessments, done to promote a need by the Blumenthal group, and not to turnover information because of some legal or moral obligation.

17. There is objective evidence to indicate that a person identified as [redacted] telephone [redacted] (circa 10 January 2012) began to solicit Senior Intelligence Analysts with experience in repatriation of assets plundered by the Qaddafi family. This person began the solicitation process on approximately January 25th 2012, claiming that he led was dealing with representatives of a "high level political types in the US within the State Department" and that he personally had high level contacts within the new Libyan Opposition Government that he would have a contract with to begin the repatriation process.

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18. [redacted] has a rather controversial history within the US Intelligence Community, particularly at [redacted]. His links to [redacted] was one of the prime operatives in Libya. Notwithstanding his reputation in the US Intelligence Community, he was believed to have highly placed contacts within Libya which could have been mined for creation of a Rogue Nation Asset Recovery program, but for his limited technical and intelligence analyst resources.

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Phase II

The proposed Phase II study includes:

1. Recovery and sorting of all *Guccifer* data on the server in Romania, to obtain all data that came from Mrs. Clinton's server as well as Mr. Blumenthal's server.
2. Analyze all of the content of the computer IP 84.232.210.154, which appears to be different from the *Guccifer* server, although both apparently are located in the Bucharest, Romania area.
3. *Guccifer* claims in recent reports that the secret server contains about 2 Terabytes of data and represents all of his hacking efforts. We opine this statement is most likely accurate. The spreadsheet that we obtained which maps the secret server substantiates this claim, assuming a portion of it originated from the *Guccifer* server.
4. The Clinton smoking gun data document needs to be mapped back to her server to make the clear connection which has not been satisfactorily established.
5. The IP address and email addresses of Mrs. Clinton and her colleagues who used this server need to be checked to determine whether any content traced back to the server or the email address can be recovered from the Deep Web and the Dark Web sources to which we have access.
6. The recovered data content needs to be date stamped and placed in a chronological arc to triangulate against the activities of Mrs. Clinton, particularly around the time when she was dealing with the Benghazi investigation.
7. Counsel needs to determine from quality counsel with National Security experience and intelligence experts, the legal obligations by cleared persons to report and surrender data that may have overtly labeled classified data; or data that would objectively be considered classified had it been hypothetically subjected to a person possessing original classification authority.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 3
Page 11 ~ Duplicate;
Page 12 ~ Duplicate;
Page 13 ~ Duplicate;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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72

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 87

Date Received 6-23-2014

From Monica Hanley
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Washington DC
(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Midyear Exam

1A72

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Monica Hanley
from 6-23-2014

disposed.

Monica Hanley

- Why did you create the email archive? SPRING 2013
 - Confirm date of creation [believed to be March 2013. In addition, we see HDR22 accessing mailbox from a Mac from 3/23/13 – 4/1/13.]
 - Why both a laptop computer and a thumb drive?
 - Who instructed who to create it?
 - Who helped her create the archive? Did you work with Bryan Pagliano or Justin Cooper to create the archive? [previously mentioned – wrong time frame]
 - Who gave you the login credentials/password for HDR22?
 - Was that the first time you logged in to the mail account? If not, explain.
 - Did anyone else ever log in to her mail account (Huma, etc.)?
 - Did you access the mail using the Macintosh Mail application or via webmail?
 - How did you create the archive? How did you save it (i.e., files on your laptop, thumb drive, CD, kept in the Mail app)? Where did you save it?
 - Did you, or someone else, delete any emails from Clinton's active mailbox after this transfer was completed?
 - Did Clinton change her address from hdr22@clintonemail.com to hrod17@clintonemail.com before OR after the archive was created?
 - Who, if anyone, had access to the laptop until you sent it to PRN?
 - Did anyone request access?
 - After you downloaded the emails to the laptop, did you use the laptop?
 - After you downloaded the emails to the laptop, did you ever access the emails?
- Do you remember showing you how to access this archive remotely?
 - What did this archive look like? On what computer did you access this archive?
 - Do you recall the steps? The password/login credentials?
 - Did you provide these credentials to anyone else?
- From where did you purchase Clinton's BlackBerry devices?
- What source document did Clinton use to write her State memoir, *Hard Choices*?

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b6
b7C

6/23/2016 Monica Hanley

- March 2013 - created archive
- After SB email hack, conf. call
 - email in one place off server
 - HA, JC, [] ^{maybe} on call (No CM)
 - changing email address
 - HA - choose email address, JC assisted w/ tech transfer
 - [] advisor - group decision to create
 - JC gave Mtt laptop, Mtt took it home
 - Mac Mail (built in application)
 - Remotely log on to server
 - JC walked through steps to transfer
 - ^{↳ on phone}
• took day or two
- Mtt had HRC credentials to check email
 - e.g. HRC looking for old email, Mtt reforward
 - HRC didn't have pwd - someone would enter on BB
 - HA may have had login creds for HRC
 - If pwd change, Mtt would tell HA or either JC or BP
- Apple laptop - not Air, Pro (had ethernet port)
 - seemed newer model, silver - created thumb drive archive on computer, too.
- MacBook in one residence, thumb drive in other
 - drive might have been given to HA
 - when Mtt left office, gave remaining items to HA

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

HRC-2228

likely

- Was thumb drive laying around house - didn't purchase
 - Intention was to delete off server at house
 - Person likely would have been JC.
 - Mtt apt. - stored in drawer or on desk. in [redacted] Apt. No ^{else} over used computers. Was pwd protected. [redacted]
 - HRC changed email ^{address} ~~after~~ before archive created.
 - Sent laptop to [redacted] in 2014
 - Tried to send email remotely - didn't work, so sent to [redacted] 10/9/2013
 - Was at HRC residence, used laptop to connect to HRC WiFi in Chap., NY. [redacted] tried to remote in, but didn't work.
 - BB purchase - AT&T store in Dufont, Amazon (after state) [redacted] someone in Pres. Clinton's office had AT&T contact, another from Pentagon City AT&T store.
 - HRC would ask Mtt to print chapters as wrote memoir
 - No knowledge of authors having email.
 - Multi hour meetings, HRC would talk about material from book
- <https://broker.gotoassist.com>

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b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

Monica Hanley

After Sid Attack - but who's idea?

- Why did you create the email archive? SPRING 2013
 - o Confirm date of creation [believed to be March 2013. In addition, we see HDR22 accessing mailbox from a Mac from 3/23/13 - 4/1/13.]
 - o Why both a laptop computer and a thumb drive?
 - o Who instructed who to create it?
 - o Who helped her create the archive? Did you work with Bryan Pagliano or Justin Cooper to create the archive? [previously mentioned [redacted] - wrong time frame]
 - o Who gave you the login credentials/password for HDR22? *ie. How did you access the account*
 - o Was that the first time you logged in to the mail account? If not, explain.
 - o Did anyone else ever log in to her mail account (Huma, etc.)?
 - o Did you access the mail using the Macintosh Mail application or via webmail?
 - o How did you create the archive? How did you save it (i.e., files on your laptop, thumb drive, CD, kept in the Mail app)? Where did you save it?
 - o Did you, or someone else, delete any emails from Clinton's active mailbox after this transfer was completed?
 - o Did Clinton change her address from hdr22@clintonemail.com to hrod17@clintonemail.com before OR after the archive was created? *email changed before archive.*
 - o Who, if anyone, had access to the laptop until you sent it to PRN? *where was it stored in the apt?*
 - Did anyone request access?
 - o After you downloaded the emails to the laptop, did you use the laptop? *Secured?*
 - o After you downloaded the emails to the laptop, did you ever access the emails?
- Do you remember [redacted] showing you how to access this archive remotely? [redacted] @ PRN
 - o What did this archive look like? On what computer did you access this archive?
 - o Do you recall the steps? The password/login credentials?
 - o Did you provide these credentials to anyone else?
- From where did you purchase Clinton's BlackBerry devices? *Aftermarket?*
- What source document did Clinton use to write her State memoir, *Hard Choices*?

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b6
b7C

b6
b7C

https://broker.gotassist.com/h/
CITIXASSIST?Question=68051-438-752

10-9-13

Pretty sure they didn't have access to emails
stated w/ long mtgs where she would talk about.

After S.B Hack - changing email address

Implementer - not decision maker

HA, JC, [] (not entirely sure) ^{advisor after}

↓ ↘ assisted in transfer of info.

decided on email

b6
b7c

b6
b7c

Drove to NY from []
got laptop from JC.

never wrote down pswd

MacMail - built in mail application

log on remotely to server.

Change of Pswd.
HA - inform

Justin & Brian

Did have Pswd.
Sometimes checked
account.

- to pull up.

HRC -

~~Mac - not air~~

~~Computer - data port - probably pro had ethernet
port - newer model. looked never used.
think silver.~~

~~Thumbdrive - 1 res.~~

~~Macbook - 1 res.~~

Initial goal to get into from laptop
to server

tried to send remotely but didnt work.

NY Residence

website

BB.

ATT Store - Dupont

Ebay /
1 x @ Amazon - after DoS

[] Je asst.
1 x Pres Clinton's Staff

liaison from NY AT&T

b6
b7c

Pentagon City Mall.

HRC-2234

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

2-11-14

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

password# or #password.

#74

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 302

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WF

Serial # of Originating Document 89

Date Received 7-1-2016

From / Monica Hanley
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A74

Midyear Exam

Reference: Emails between Hanley &
(Communication Enclosing Material)

b6
b7C

Description: Original notes re interview of
Emails between Hanley &

b6
b7C

[Redacted] WF) (FBI)

b6
b7C

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, July 01, 2016 1:04 PM
To: [Redacted] WF) (FBI)
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Hanley [Redacted] emails
Attachments: Hanley [Redacted] Email 2.10.2014.pdf; Hanley [Redacted] Email 2.11.2014.pdf; Hanley-
[Redacted] Email 9.23.2013.pdf; Hanley [Redacted] Email 10.7.2013.pdf; Hanley [Redacted]
[Redacted] Email 10.9.2013.pdf; Hanley [Redacted] Email 10.16.2013.pdf

Dear Special Agent [Redacted] as requested, attached are copies of Ms. Hanley's email communications with [Redacted]
[Redacted] related to the laptop/email archive matter. Please let us know if there is anything else you require. I
apologize for the delay in sending this, but I was out of town earlier this week and just returned today. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Washington, DC 20001-4412 [Redacted]
[Redacted] TEL [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Download V-Card](#) | [View Biography](#)

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIALITY WARNING: This email may contain privileged or confidential information and is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any unauthorized use or disclosure of this communication is prohibited. If you believe that you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it from your system.



Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

HRC emails

20 messages

Monica Hanley [redacted]

Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 8:55 PM

b6
b7C

To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]@gmail.com>

Hi [redacted]

I am no longer with HRC's office [redacted] but I wanted to try to finish the HRC email project which requires sending all of her archived email to your server. You recall that we couldn't figure out a way for you to connect to the laptop that I have in my possession.

Do you have time to try tomorrow? Last time, I tried from HRC's home but tomorrow I can try from my home, which has good wifi.

I'm adding [redacted] for her situational awareness. [redacted] as soon we've transferred the email, I'll figure out a way to get the wiped laptop to you.

best,
Monica

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:02 PM

b6
b7C

To: Monica Hanley [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]@gmail.com>

Hi [redacted]

I should be able to work with you on this tomorrow morning, can we shoot for around 11a EST?

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]

Sent: Monday, February 10, 2014 8:55 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: HRC emails

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

This email has been scanned for email related threats and delivered safely by Mimecast.

For more information please visit <http://www.mimecast.com>

Monica Hanley [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]@gmail.com>

Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:03 PM

b6
b7C

sounds great
if tomorrow falls through for you, we can find another time. Will email you in the morning.
[Quoted text hidden]

Monica Hanley [redacted]
To: [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:00 AM

b6
b7C

does this morning still work for you?
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:08 AM

b6
b7C

Sure thing

Can you fire up the Mac that has the emails on it, and go to this address from that Mac ?

<https://broker.gotoassist.com/h/citrixassist?Question=DR077-267-692>

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 11:00 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: HRC emails

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

Monica Hanley [redacted]
To: [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:11 AM

b6
b7C

done. let me know if you can see the screen
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:11 AM

b6
b7C

To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

Monica, I can see your screen now. Can you call me real quick? [redacted]

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]

b6
b7C

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 11:00 AM

To: [redacted]

Subject: Re: HRC emails

does this morning still work for you?

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

Monica Hanley [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:18 AM

b6
b7C

To: [redacted]

[redacted]

[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 12:28 PM

b6
b7C

To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

Monica, my remote session disappeared, maybe the laptop went into sleep mode?

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]

b6
b7C

Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 11:18 AM

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

mon [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 12:34 PM

b6
b7C

To: [redacted]

will check I'm out but headed back to the apt now

[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 12:34 PM

b6
b7C

To: mon [redacted]

No worries, let me know when you can get back over there to power it up

From: mon [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:34 PM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

Monica Hanley [redacted]
To: [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 12:56 PM

b6
b7C

i'm home now
should i click on the same link that you sent this morning?
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 12:59 PM

b6
b7C

I'll have to send you a new one, standby

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:57 PM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 12:59 PM

b6
b7C

<https://broker.gotoassist.com/h/citrixassist?Question=DR960-073-880>

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:57 PM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:03 PM

b6
b7C

I am back in, thanks.

I am still having problems connecting to the server. I am enlisting [redacted] help since he has a similar setup, he should be sending me some screenshots soon

b6
b7C

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:57 PM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]@gmail.com> Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:42 PM
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Hi guys - just following up on this. Let me know when the wiped laptop is ready to be shipped. [redacted] best to send it to the foundation at:

Hillary Rodham Clinton
c/o [redacted]
1271 Avenue of the Americas
42nd Floor
New York, NY 10020

Let me know once it's gone out so we know to expect it. Thanks [redacted]

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 9:03 PM, Monica Hanley [redacted] wrote:
[Quoted text hidden]

b6
b7C

[redacted]@gmail.com> Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 10:09 AM
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Just checking back on this. [redacted] is it still with you? Thank you [redacted]
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted] Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 10:11 AM
To: [redacted]@gmail.com>, Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

Sorry, missed this the first time around. Yes, the email has been imported into an archive mailbox on the server, and I can send the mac back to you soon

From: [redacted]@gmail.com]

b6
b7C

Sent: Friday, April 04, 2014 10:10 AM

To: Monica Hanley

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re: HRC emails

b6
b7C

Just checking back on this [redacted] is it still with you? Thank you [redacted]

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

Monica Hanley [redacted]
To [redacted]
Cc [redacted]@gmail.com>

Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 11:54 AM

b6
b7C

hi!
I know I don't work with you anymore so no need to reply to me but if HRC wants access to her email, can she now access it through the web? [redacted] I think you should update Huma and [redacted] on where all of her old email is.

[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]@gmail.com>
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]
Cc [redacted]

Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 1:55 PM

b6
b7C

makes sense! would love the details - thanks!
[Quoted text hidden]




Monica Hanley [redacted] b6
b7C

[redacted] address

5 messages

[redacted] Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:23 PM b6
b7C
To: "Monica Hanley" [redacted]

Here's my home address where I work from:



This email has been scanned for email related threats and delivered safely by Mimecast.
For more information please visit <http://www.mimecast.com>

mon [redacted] Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 11:29 AM b6
To: [redacted] b7C

finally sent this out so u will receive tomorrow.
tracking number is 8046 1373 3770
pw is either [redacted]

let me know if you need anything and thanks!
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted] Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 11:40 AM b6
To: mon [redacted] b7C

Thanks!

From: mon [mailto:[redacted]] b6
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 11:29 AM b7C
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: [redacted] address

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted]
To: mon [redacted]

Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:22 PM

b6
b7C

Monica, I received the laptop, I will put some time on my calendar this week to get the email exported and put onto the server. Best of luck in your next job!

From: mon [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Monday, February 24, 2014 11:29 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: [redacted] address

b6
b7C

finally sent this out so u will receive tomorrow.

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

mon [redacted]
To: [redacted]

Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 2:02 PM


b6
b7C

terrific. thank you!

[Quoted text hidden]



Monica Hanley




b6
b7C

HRC - time sensitive

3 messages

Mon



Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 8:14 PM

b6
b7C

Reply-To



To



Hi [redacted] its monica w HRC. Her berry got creamed. I'm on my way out to buy a berry for her but are you avail to help with the enterprise activation tonight? Pls let me know [redacted] is my cell.

Monica Hanley



Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 4:35 PM

b6
b7C

To:



hi [redacted] so we are going for the transfer tomorrow
pw for enterprise activation is still the same as you told me on the phone?

[Quoted text hidden]

Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 4:37 PM

b6
b7C

To: Monica Hanley



I will set it again- it clears after each activation. It will be [redacted] again.

I'll be around tomorrow if you run into any problems

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]

Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2013 4:35 PM

To:



Subject: Re: HRC - time sensitive

[Quoted text hidden]

b6
b7C



Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

HRC BB
9 messages

[redacted] Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 11:38 AM
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

Hi Monica-

I take it everything went fine with HRC's new blackberry, since we didn't receive any calls/emails from you. Let me know if otherwise J

[redacted]

b6 Per FBI, DOS
b7C

Mon [redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 9:52 AM
Reply-To [redacted]
To [redacted]

Hi [redacted]

Yes the enterprise activation went off without a hitch [redacted] did the switch. There are a couple of preference and apps that [redacted] can't figure out how to download (like a google search app) but I'll take a stab at it when I see her on sunday. I have the laptop today and good wifi if you have time to do the email switchy-transfer thing today.

From [redacted]
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 15:38:47 +0000
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]
Subject: HRC BB

b6
b7C

Hi Monica-

I take it everything went fine with HRC's new blackberry, since we didn't receive any calls/emails from you. Let me know if otherwise J

[redacted]

[redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 9:54 AM
To [redacted]

b6
b7C

I'd like to set up a remote control session on the Mac- what email address would be best to send the link to, for

you to get it on the archive laptop ?

From: Mon [mailto: [redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2013 9:53 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: HRC BB

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

Mon [redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 9:56 AM
Reply-To: [redacted]
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

This one [redacted]
Also, can we reset her password at some point today?

From: [redacted]
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 13:54:25 +0000
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: HRC BB

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 9:59 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

We can reset HRC's password anytime you'd like. You can either tell me what to set it to, or the more secure option would be to login to webmail, then click Options > Change password in the upper right corner of the webmail interface. Let me know if you need any help with that.

Here's the remote control code for the archive laptop, please fire this up from the laptop and accept any prompts to open/run/download/etc and we should get hooked up. The code is only good for 30 min, so if you're busy and we need to delay this a bit, let me know when you're ready and I can generate a new one.

<https://broker.gotoassist.com/h/citrixassist?Question=DR988-932-848>

[redacted]

From: Mon [mailto: [redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2013 9:57 AM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

Mon [redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 10:00 AM
Reply-To: [redacted]
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Yes sorry won't be by wifi until 11am. Is that ok?

From: [redacted]
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 13:59:40 +0000
[Quoted text hidden]

b6
b7C

[redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 10:03 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Totally fine, send me another email when you're good to go

From: Mon [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2013 10:01 AM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]

Monica Hanley [redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 11:15 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

ready!
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted] Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 11:17 AM
To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

Here you go: <https://broker.gotoassist.com/h/citrixassist?Question=DR963-617-436>

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2013 11:16 AM

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]
[Quoted text hidden]



Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

Remote link

1 message

[redacted]

Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 11:40 AM

b6
b7C

To: Monica Hanley [redacted]

<https://broker.gotoassist.com/h/citrixassist?Question=DR051-438-752>



Monica Hanley [redacted]

b6
b7C

Computer

8 messages

Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com> Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:01 AM

b6
b7C

To: [redacted]

I cannot get into my outlook.
Keeps saying my name or pw isn't correct. Did they do something to our system?

Monica Hanley [redacted] Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:11 AM

b6
b7C

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com> [redacted]

not that i know of.
Did you use this website?
<https://mail.clintonemail.com/owa>

Adding [redacted] to confirm.
[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted] Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:20 AM

b6
b7C

To: Monica Hanley [redacted] Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Hi Huma- Please let me know what method you are using to access your email (web, Outlook, mobile device, etc). Also please try your username/password on the site below from Monica. I can reset your password if necessary.

[redacted]

From: Monica Hanley [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:12 AM
To: Huma Abedin; [redacted]
Subject: Re: Computer

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com> Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:31 AM

b6
b7C

To: [redacted]

On the web using that site below.
Keep getting same message

From: [redacted] [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 09:20 AM Eastern Standard Time

b6
b7C

To: 'Monica Hanley' [redacted] Huma Abedin
Subject: RE: Computer

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

[redacted] Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:41 AM
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com> [redacted]

b6
b7C

Huma- I have set your password to not expire, please try again. If it still gives the same message, I will reset your password and you can change it to whatever you'd like

From: Huma Abedin [mailto:Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:31 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: Computer

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com> Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:42 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

SUCCESS

thank you!

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 9:41 AM
To: Huma Abedin; [redacted]
Subject: RE: Computer

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com> Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:41 AM
To: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Not sure what you did but it works after 35 times of trying!

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 09:31 AM Eastern Standard Time
To: [redacted]
[redacted]
Subject: Re: Computer

b6
b7C

[Quoted text hidden]

[Redacted]

Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 9:42 AM

b6
b7C

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

[Redacted]

Great! I set your password to not expire, I think it had just run out of time. It won't do so again

From: Huma Abedin [mailto:Huma@clintonemail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:42 AM

To: [Redacted]

Subject: Re: Computer

b6
b7C

Not sure what you did but it works after 35 times of trying!

[Quoted text hidden]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-0

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Page 6 ~ Duplicate;

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Page 9 ~ b1 - Per Dos; b6 - Per Dos; b7C - Per Dos; b7E - Per Dos;

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Page 11 ~ b1 - Per Dos; b6 - Per Dos; b7C - Per Dos; b7E - Per Dos;

Page 12 ~ b1 - Per Dos; b6 - Per Dos; b7E - Per Dos;

Page 13 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 14 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 15 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

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Page 17 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 18 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 19 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

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Page 22 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 23 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 24 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 25 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 26 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 27 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 28 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 29 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 31 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 32 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 33 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 34 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 35 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 36 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 37 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 38 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 39 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 40 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 41 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 42 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 43 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 44 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 45 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 46 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 47 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 48 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 49 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 50 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 51 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 52 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 53 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

Page 54 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

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Page 56 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 57 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 58 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 59 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 60 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 61 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 62 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 63 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 64 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 65 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 66 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;
Page 67 ~ b1 - Per DOS; b6 - Per DOS; b7C - Per DOS; b7E - Per DOS;

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X For this Page X
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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number - PRESPRO

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document 29

Date Received 10-29-15

From
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

DS/IC/CI
(Address)

Arington VA
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

1A21

Title: Midyear Exam

Reference: DS (16) & signed SF-312(5)
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

DS (16) & signed SF-312(5)

b3
b7E

b6 Per
b7C DOS

b6
b7C

b7E Per DOS

b7E Per DOS



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 29, 2015

MEMORANDUM

TO: FBI - [redacted]

b6
b7C

FROM: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

SUBJECT: Receipt of Files Transfer for DS/ICI/CI Case **PI-00-US-15-57**

This memo serves as a transfer receipt from the Diplomatic Security Counterintelligence Division to the Federal Bureau of Investigations for the following items:

- Personal files of [redacted]
- Personal files of [redacted]
- Personal files of [redacted]
- Personal files of [redacted]
- Personal Files of [redacted]
- Personal files of [redacted]

b6
b7C

- [redacted] database search results responsive to the October 6 record request; and
- Signed SF-312 forms responsive to the October 6 record request.

b7E Per DOS

Signature below acknowledges receipt on behalf of the FBI:

[redacted signature box]

b6
b7C

10-29-15
Date



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 15, 2015

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
MEMORANDUM

TO: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted] Investigations Division Chief
THROUGH: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted] NASA Section Chief
FROM: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted]
SUBJECT: PI-00-US-15-57
FBI 811 request for Production of Records:

b6 Per
b7C DOS

~~(S//NF)~~ On 06 October 2015, DS/ICI/CI received a request for DS/ICI/CI database records for 35 State Department records in. The information was requested to satisfy a Section 811(c) that the FBI received from the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

b1 Per Dos
b6 Per Dos
b7E Per Dos

~~(S//NF)~~ In furtherance of this investigation DS/ICI/CI was able to find records in [redacted] (S) [redacted] for 16 of the 35 subjects. The employees with records found were [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~(S//NF)~~ A special note: [redacted]
[redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

~~(S//NF)~~ DS/ICI/CI was only able to find five signed SF-312 forms from the October 6, 2015 addition; [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

~~(S//NF)~~ DS/ICI/CI has attached all of the found records from the employees.

APPROVED: [redacted] 10/15/15 DISAPPROVED: _____
(Initial and Date) (Initial and Date)

b6 Per
b7C DOS

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Classified by [redacted] Division Chief DS/ICI/CI
Reason: 1.4c; Declassify: 10/15/2040

FBI-811

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-09-2016 BY J76J18T80 NSICG

HRC-6306

HRC-6309

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

b1 Per DOS
b6 Per DOS
b7C Per DOS

TITLE Counterintelligence Debriefings of U.S. Employees, American Embassy [redacted] **CASE CLASSIFICATION** [redacted]

FIELD OFFICE DS/CMI/CI(EFY) **DATE REPORTED** 08/25/93 **DATES INVESTIGATED** Since 1/1/92 **REPORTING AGENT** [redacted]

SYNOPSIS [redacted] (S)

[redacted] During CY 1992, approximately 48 employees departed post after completing a permanent change of station or a temporary duty assignment. The employees interviewed represented various U.S. government civilian and military agencies, and they were either interviewed by Special Agents of the Diplomatic Security Service or by Security officials of the other U.S. government agencies. Reports of interviews are normally required, and copies are to be sent to the Regional Security Officer at the employees' last post. In addition to conducting the interviews, DS/CMI/CI officers tracked the employees to their new assignments (when possible) to insure that debriefings were completed. If information requiring additional investigation or follow-up was developed this office made every effort to see that it was done. Developed leads were forwarded to RSOs, other Federal agencies and other interested parties. All reports, related letters, memoranda, and correspondences are filed in the case file. Attached to this form is a list of the employees who were tracked and interviewed. This case is considered closed.

- CLOSED -

REFERENCE: [redacted]

APPROVED [redacted] S/CI
(Special Agent In Charge)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

COPIES REFERRED 1 - [redacted] Original DS/CMI/CI

Date Received

REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR

(Date) (Initials)

50249-101

(Formerly DS-838)
OPTIONAL FORM 249
MARCH 1975
DEPT. OF STATE



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 15, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM

TO: DS/CMI/CI - Mr. [redacted]
FROM: ICS - John J. Stein [initials]
SUBJECT: SY-56-RS-92-151 (Missing Classified)
Request to Close Case File

b6 Per
b7C DOS

92 Moscow 35238 advised that several confidential documents were missing from the files of political officer [redacted]. Subsequent investigation by DS/CR/SI and RSO Moscow indicated that the documents probably never left the core, and the political section damage assessment indicated that the documents may have been inadvertently shredded. DS/CR/SI considers the matter closed. Consultations with DS/CR/SI and a review of the case papers did not surface anything of CI interest.

b6
b7C

No further CI action warranted. Request case be closed.

APPROVE [initials] _____

DISAPPROVE _____

DATE: 3/15 _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

Drafted: [redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 15, 2015

~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~
MEMORANDUM

TO: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted] Investigations Division Chief
THROUGH: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted] NASA Section Chief
FROM: DS/ICI/CI - [redacted]
SUBJECT: PI-00-US-15-57
FBI 811 request for Production of Records:

b6 Per
b7C DOS

~~(S//NF)~~ On 06 October 2015, DS/ICI/CI received a request for DS/ICI/CI database records for 35 State Department records in. The information was requested to satisfy a Section 811(c) that the FBI received from the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

~~(S//NF)~~ In furtherance of this investigation DS/ICI/CI was able to find the employee records for 16 of the 35 subjects. The employees with records found were [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ A special note: [redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ DS/ICI/CI was unable to find any signed SF-312 forms for everyone on the October 6, 2015 addition except for [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ DS/ICI/CI has attached all of the found records from the employees.


APPROVED: _____ DISAPPROVED: _____
(Initial and Date) (Initial and Date)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified by [redacted] Division Chief DS/ICI/CI
Reason: 1.4c; Declassify: 10/15/2040

b6 Per
b7C DOS

SF-312



HRC-6371

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN

AND THE UNITED STATES

(Name of Individual – Printed or typed)

b6
b7c

1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in Section 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4(e) of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for the classification of information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, Title 18, United States Code, *the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States code, and the provisions of the intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in the Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any disclosure, publication or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last granted me a security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Sections 793 and/or 1924, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

(Continue on reverse.)

10. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12958, Section 7211 of Title 5, United States code (governing disclosures to Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); Section 2302(b) (8) of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 and 1924 of Title 18, United State Code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

11. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered: I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Section 2003.20) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.

SIGNATURE	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) 02/03-2009 02-03-2009	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)	b6 Per DOS
ORGANIZATION (IF CONTRACTOR, LICENSEE, GRANTEE OR AGENT, PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER) (Type or print)			

Circle one: GS FS PSC WAE Contractor Intern Other

Bureau Assigned: S Telephone: () -

WITNESS		ACCEPTANCE	
THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED.		THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.	
SIG	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) 02-03-2009		DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) 02-03-2009
NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print) SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066		NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print) SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066	

SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that I (have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security debriefing.


SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)
NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the denial of your being granted access to classified information.

*NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN



AND THE UNITED STATES

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b7c

(Printed or typed)

1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in Section 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4(e) of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for the classification of information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, Title 18, United States Code, *the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States code, and the provisions of the intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in the Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any disclosure, publication or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last granted me a security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Sections 793 and/or 1924, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

(Continue on reverse.)

10. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12958, Section 7211 of Title 5, United States code (governing disclosures to Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); Section 2302(b) (8) of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 and 1924 of Title 18, United State Code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

11. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the information referenced in this agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Section 2003.20) so

b6 Per DOS

SIGNATURE	[Redacted]	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)	02-27-2009	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)	[Redacted]
ORGANIZATION	[Redacted]				

(Type or print)

PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER)

Circle one: GS FS PSC WAE Contractor Intern Other

Bureau Assigned: Telephone: () -

WITNESS	ACCEPTANCE
THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED.	THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) 02-27-2009	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) 02-27-2009
NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print) [Redacted] SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066	NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print) [Redacted] SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066

b6 Per
b7C DOS

SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified information have been returned to the appropriate authority; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any attempt by an unauthorized person to obtain classified information from me; and that I (have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security debriefing.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	[Redacted]	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)	[Redacted]
NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)	[Redacted]	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS	[Redacted]

b6 Per
b7C DOS

NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the denial of your being granted access to classified information.

*NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.

STANDARD FORM 312 BACK (Rev. 1-00)

HRC-6375

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN

[Redacted Name]

(typed)

AND THE UNITED STATES

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1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in Section 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4(e) of Executive Order 12958, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for the classification of information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, Title 18, United States Code, *the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States code, and the provisions of the intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in the Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any disclosure, publication or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last granted me a security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Sections 793 and/or 1924, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

(Continue on reverse.)

10. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12958, Section 7211 of Title 5, United States code (governing disclosures to Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); Section 2302(b) (8) of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 and 1924 of Title 18, United State Code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

11. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Section 2003.20) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.

SIGNATURE	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER <small>(See Notice below)</small>	b6 Per DOS
[Redacted]	NOV 17 2008	[Redacted]	

ORGANIZATION (IF CONTRACTOR, LICENSEE, GRANTEE OR AGENT, PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER)
(Type or print)

Circle one: GS FS PSC WAE Contractor Intern Other

Bureau Assigned: 5 Transition Telephone: (202) 471-5633

WITNESS		ACCEPTANCE	
THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED.		THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.	
[Redacted]	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) NOV 17 2008	SIG [Redacted]	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy) NOV 17 2008
NAME AND ADDRESS <i>(Type or print)</i>		NAME AND ADDRESS <i>(Type or print)</i>	
[Redacted] SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066		[Redacted] SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066	

SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that I (have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security debriefing.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)	b6 b7C
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
NAME OF WITNESS <i>(Type or print)</i>	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS	
	[Redacted]	

NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the denial of your being granted access to classified information.

*NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN

AND THE UNITED STATES

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b7c

(Name of individual - printed or typed)

1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in Sections 1.1 and 1.2(e) of Executive Order 12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.

2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.

3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) responsible for the classification of the information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or the termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.

5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation of classified information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.

6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.

7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law. I agree that I shall return all classified materials which have, or may come into my possession, or for which I am responsible because of such access: (a) upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States Government; (b) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last granted me a security clearance or that provided me access to classified information; or (c) upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.

8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.

9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

10. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; Section 7211 of Title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); Section 2302(b)(8) of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

(Continue on reverse.)

HRC-6378

11. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this Agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Section 2003.20) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.

SIGNATURE	[Redacted Signature]	DATE	9/16/99	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)	[Redacted SSN]	b6 Per DOS
		ORGANIZATION, PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND, IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER)				

WITNESS		ACCEPTANCE	
THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED.		THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. b6 Per b7C DOS	
SIGNATURE	DATE	SIGNATURE	DATE
[Redacted Signature]	SEP 17 1999	[Redacted Signature]	SEP 17 1999
[Redacted Name] DS/ISP/APB Department of State 2201 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20520		[Redacted Name] DS/ISP/APB Department of State 2201 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20520	

SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that I (have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security debriefing.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE
[Redacted Signature]	[Redacted Date]
NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
[Redacted Name]	[Redacted Signature]

NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the denial of your being granted access to classified information.

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CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN

AND THE UNITED STATES

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2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
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4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, Title 18, United States Code, *the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States code, and the provisions of the intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in the Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
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9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

(Continue on reverse.)

10. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12958, Section 7211 of Title 5, United States code (governing disclosures to Congress); Section 1034 of Title 10, United States code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); Section 2302(b) (8) of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 and 1924 of Title 18, United State Code, and Section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. Section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

11. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the Executive Order and statutes referenced in this agreement and its implementing regulation (32 CFR Section 2003.20) so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.

	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (See Notice below)	b6 Per DOS
	01-26-2009	[Redacted]	
(Type or print) EMPLOYEE, GRANTEE OR AGENT, PROVIDE: NAME, ADDRESS, AND IF APPLICABLE, FEDERAL SUPPLY CODE NUMBER)			

Circle one: GS FS PSC WAE Contractor Intern Other__

Bureau Assigned: S Telephone: () -

WITNESS		ACCEPTANCE	
THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS WITNESSED BY THE UNDERSIGNED.		THE UNDERSIGNED ACCEPTED THIS AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.	
	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)		DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)
01-26-2009		01-26-2009	01-26-2009
NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)		NAME AND ADDRESS (Type or print)	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066 </div>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> SA-20, 13th fl. DS/IS/APD 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 571-345-3066 </div>	

SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I reaffirm that the provisions of the espionage laws, other federal criminal laws and executive orders applicable to the safeguarding of classified information have been made available to me; that I have returned all classified information in my custody; that I will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or organization; that I will promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit classified information, and that I (have) (have not) (strike out inappropriate word or words) received a security debriefing.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	DATE (mm-dd-yyyy)
NAME OF WITNESS (Type or print)	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations, or possibly result in the denial of your being granted access to classified information.

*NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.

