



October 1, 2020

KATELYN POLANTZ, CNN
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1909 K STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20006

FOIPA Request No.: 1433273-000
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01626
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller

Dear Ms. Polantz:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find checked boxes under applicable statutes for the exemptions asserted to protect information exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the processed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions. An Explanation of Exemptions is enclosed to further explain justification for withheld information.

Section 552		Section 552a
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)
<u>Federal Rules of</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
<u>Criminal Procedure 6(e)</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3)
<u>50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4)
<u>31 U.S.C § 5319</u>		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)		<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7)

821 pages were reviewed and 496 pages are being released.

- Deletions were made by the United States Custom and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP), Department of Justice/National Security Division (NSD), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of the Inspector General (FDIC OIG), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the United States Marshal Service (USMS)

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request and the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
- This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures
Additional Information:

In response to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI (19-cv-1278)-5373 through FBI (19-cv-1278)-6193. The enclosed documents represent the eleventh interim release of information responsive to your request.

Additionally, included in this release are 2 pages of previously processed material. This material is being provided to you per a court order. This material consists of Baker 302 Bates 19-cv-177-1-2.

Revisions were made to withholdings in documents previously released to you. Enclosed is an updated copy of Bates Stamped document FBI (19-cv-1278)-674-685.

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your litigation. A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed in the following Bates Stamped documents FBI(19cv1278) 1027-1038, 1936-1951, 2152-2163, 2182-2184, 2236-2249, 2506-2517, 2792, 2830-2843, 2997-3002, 3003-3004, 3013-3023, 3293-3297, 3320-3329, 3535-3542, 3545-3551, 3553-3555, 3742-3743, 3744, 3745, 3746, 4304-4305, 4467-4468, 4978-4980.

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626

FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000

PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 11 Bates 5373-6193

Total Withheld Pages = 325

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 2182	b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E; b7F
FBI(19cv1278) 2183	b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E; b7F
FBI(19cv1278) 2184	b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E; b7F
FBI(19cv1278) 2792	b3 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2830	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2831	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2832	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2833	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2834	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2835	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2836	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2837	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2838	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2839	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2840	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2841	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2842	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 2843	b3; b6; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3320	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3321	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3322	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3323	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 3328	b4; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 5379	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 5381	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 5383	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 5384	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 5385	Referral/Consult

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 5386	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 5399	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5400	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5401	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5402	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 5406	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 5408	b7A; b7E
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FBI(19cv1278) 5501	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(19cv1278) 5512	b3; b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
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
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FBI(19cv1278) 6099	Referral/Consult



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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 06-26-2019

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/10/2017

(U) MARY McCORD, date of birth [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Participating in the interview were Special Agents (SAs) [Redacted] and Office of the Special Counsel attorneys Andrew Goldstein and Elizabeth Prelogar. SA [Redacted] advised McCord that it is a violation of criminal law to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which McCord acknowledged. After being advised of the purpose of the interview, McCord provided the following information:

(U) McCord's Note-Taking Practice

(U) McCord took notes on a variety of things, given the scope of her responsibilities. For example, she took notes at White House meetings in order to be able to debrief others when she returned from the meetings. On matters related to Russia, she took notes because the topic was complex and she wanted to remember the details. During phone calls, she took notes on things she needed to do based on the content of the calls. She didn't take notes in the same notebook every time, often using whatever was handy. When she was close to leaving her position in the Department of Justice (DOJ), McCord went back to her various folders and notebooks, pulled out materials related to Russia, and gave them to her colleague George Toscas to hold on to, assuming they may be needed at some point in the future.

(U) Employment History

(U) After law school, McCord clerked for U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Hogan for two years, and then spent two years at the Department of Treasury Office of Legal Counsel. In 1994, she joined the District of Columbia United States Attorney's Office (DC-USAO). She took a leave of absence in 1997, when her husband got a job in Japan. When she returned, she went back to the DC-USAO. In 2001, McCord and her husband left DC and moved to North Carolina, but returned to the DC area about a year later. When they returned, McCord again went back to the DC-USAO. In

~~Reason: 1.4(c)
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Investigation on 07/17/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/20/2017
by [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (U) (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 2 of 12

2012, McCord became the Criminal Chief, where she remained until May 2014, when she left to go to Main Justice.

(U) McCord started at DOJ as the acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division (NSD). In August 2014, she became the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, where she remained until October 2016. In October 2016, after John Carlin's departure, McCord served as acting Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for NSD. McCord's last day at DOJ was May 12, 2017. She currently works at the Georgetown University Law Center.

(U) During the time McCord served as the acting AAG, there was no Principal Deputy in place, so she performed the duties of both positions simultaneously. Her duties included assisting in running NSD's various components, which include the Office of Law and Policy, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, the Appellate Section, and the CFIUS Unit. On occasion, McCord would attend Deputies Committees (DCs) and Principals Committees (PCs) at the White House when Yates was unavailable.

(U//FOUO) The FBI Investigation on LTG Mike Flynn

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] McCord first learned of the FBI's investigation into Mike Flynn on a phone call with FBI Deputy Director Andy McCabe on January 3, 2017. In that call, McCabe told McCord the FBI had been planning to close their investigation on Flynn before discovering his telephone calls with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak [redacted] (McCord [redacted] (S) referenced page #1 in her notes.]

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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] McCabe explained to McCord that an intelligence product was in the works to address the lack of Russian reaction to the U.S.'s December 2016 sanctions. There was a lot of speculation regarding the minimal response from the Russians which was not "what was expected." While the draft product was in the review stage, [redacted] calls between Kislyak and Flynn [redacted] (S) were discovered, leading analysts to wonder if those calls were related to the lack of response. McCabe described to McCord, based on what he had been told, the content of the calls.

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(U//FOUO) Page 2 of McCord's notes indicate General Counsel at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Bob Litt raised the issue of a possible Logan Act violation. McCord was not familiar with the Logan Act at the time and made a note to herself to look it up later.

(U//FOUO) Also on page 2 of her notes, McCord noted mention of a "referral," and noted that ultimately no referral was required, as the FBI maintained the information and would not refer a matter to themselves. Her notes also indicate that at the time, the individuals at FBI and ODNI that were aware of the issue were Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Litt (ODNI), Jim Baker (FBI), and Tricia Anderson (FBI).

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 3 of 12

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~~(S//NF)~~ McCord later learned of the FBI's existing counterintelligence cases on George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and Mike Flynn, which she initially understood were not criminal investigations. McCord later learned of the ongoing Manafort criminal investigation.

~~(S//NF)~~

In the immediate aftermath of learning of the Flynn calls, McCord was not thinking about a criminal investigation. It seemed logical to her that there may be some communications between an incoming administration and their foreign partners, so the Logan Act seemed like a stretch to her. She described the matter as "concerning" but with no particular urgency. In early January, McCord did not think people were considering briefing the incoming administration. However, that changed when Vice President Michael Pence went on Face the Nation and said things McCord knew to be untrue. Also, as time went on, and then-White House spokesperson Sean Spicer made comments about Flynn's actions she knew to be false, the urgency grew.

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~~(S//NF)~~ On January 13, 2017, the FBI provided a briefing to DOJ on the background of the Flynn investigation, as well as the other pending related FBI counterintelligence cases. McCord recalled the participants on the FBI side to be Deputy Assistant Director Pete Strzok, Assistant Director Bill Priestap, and possibly attorney Sally Moyer. The DOJ participants were McCord, Toscas, Stu Evans, and maybe Tashina Gauhar. The briefing consisted of the "Crown" material, Flynn, and the cases she had already been briefed on. This was the first time McCord heard about these cases in detail, though she was aware of the ICA. Page 3 of her notes indicate President-Elect Trump was not briefed on the existence of the FBI investigations in his early January briefing on the ICA. [Agent note: ICA refers to the Intelligence Community Assessment entitled "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections."]

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~~(S//NF)~~ McCord did not recall what her notation of "Flynn payment" on page 4 of her notes referred to, but surmised it might be related to Russia Today. Also on page 4, McCord made note of a David Ignatius column on Flynn's call and a potential Logan Act violation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord recalled that she and others at DOJ queried the FBI as to their investigative plan if the case ended up moving into the criminal sphere, and Priestap relayed that a tasking to develop a plan had gone out.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Page 5 of McCord's notes say something to the effect of "re: Flynn. Most pressing as NS Advisor. Need to decide what to do w/it and how to discuss w/ incoming." McCord could not recall specifically what that meant, but thought it was when discussions started on what to do with the Flynn information and how to do it. McCord noted they were not thinking about criminal statutes at that point.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord , On 07/17/2017 , Page 4 of 12

(S) [redacted] (S//NF) [redacted] Page 10 of McCord's notes reference a defensive briefing. McCord believed (U) those notes related to a conversation with Priestap in which he said a defensive briefing would be difficult, given it seems as though people within the White House are not being honest with one another. If Flynn was lying to people within the White House and is potentially compromised, the value of a defensive briefing was questionable. McCord thought Priestap was likely thinking from a purely counterintelligence perspective, not criminal.

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(S) [redacted] (S//NF) [redacted] McCord did not recall exactly when she saw the transcripts of the Flynn calls, (U) but believed she asked to see them after Pence's statements about Flynn on Face the Nation. [Agent note: Pence was on Face the Nation on January 15, 2017.] McCord believed she probably had the transcripts by January 19, 2017, possibly having come over SIPRnet from Strzok. After reading them, she felt they were "worse" than she initially thought; she noted that her recollection of them is that Flynn proactively raised the issue of sanctions, and she feels it is hard to believe he would forget talking about something he raised himself.

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(U) Decision to Notify the White House

(S) [redacted] (S//NF) [redacted] Consulting pages 15 and 16 of her notes, McCord recalled an evening (U) unclassified telephone call she had with Yates and Matt Axelrod. McCord was not certain of the timing of the call, but it might have been after Pence was on Face the Nation or after a January 17, 2017 call with McCabe. The three of them discussed what to do with the Flynn information and agreed someone should discuss their concerns with McCabe. They were concerned because at that point, Pence had said something untrue to the American people, and the Russians knew it was untrue. The implications of that were that the Russians believed one of two things – either that the Vice President was in on it with Flynn, or that Flynn was clearly willing to lie to the Vice President. They ultimately decided McCord would make the call to McCabe to discuss their concerns.

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(S) [redacted] (S//NF) [redacted] When McCord called McCabe, he told her the FBI did not want to compromise (U) their counterintelligence investigation, which is what would happen if the White House was notified. McCord believed her notes on page 15 document their phone call.

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(S) [redacted] (U//FOUO) Page 17 of McCord's notes relate to another call with McCabe. McCabe relayed to (U) McCord in that call that the FBI was not convinced of a need to notify, the FBI has no "duty" to notify, and the FBI was concerned it would look like a political stunt.

(U) [redacted] (S//NF) [redacted] Around January 17 and 18, 2017, prior to the inauguration, McCord and others (U) at DOJ began soliciting views of others in the Intelligence Community on whether or not the incoming administration needed to know about the existence and content of Flynn's calls with Kislyak. The initial DNI view was that they were "comfortable" with the information being shared, but that it was ultimately the FBI's information, so the FBI should make the final decision. There was some

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 5 of 12

discussion of whether Congressional notification was required, and it was ultimately decided there was no obligation to notify at that point in time. McCord's notes on page 18 indicate that if Congress were to be notified, notification should be to Gang of 8 members only.

(S) [redacted] Consulting pages 7 and 8 of her notes, McCord believed that on January 19, 2017, Comey was visiting the ODNI, and at that time DOJ was still trying to "drum up support" to notify the White House of the Flynn calls. On a phone call with ODNI attorneys Litt and Brad Brooker that day, it was relayed that the DNI agreed the information should be brought to the attention of the President-Elect and Vice President-Elect, but the primary equity was the FBI's, so they should make the final call. McCord relayed that Yates wanted to be able to say to Comey in a later conversation that the "DNI agrees" with the need to notify, and asked if Clapper and Brennan would call Comey. McCord was told Brennan may have been at the ODNI at the same time (as Comey), and someone would try to arrange for Comey and Clapper to talk. Later, McCord learned that Clapper and Comey talked, but Comey said he would not brief the White House.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates and Axelrod were increasingly frustrated with the FBI at this point. One reason for the frustration was their perception that the FBI's perspective on the matter "morphed." Initially, the FBI's resistance to notify was attributed to the desire to protect the FBI's counterintelligence investigation, but later Comey told Yates he was concerned about compromising a criminal investigation. McCord was not sure when the discussion about the criminal investigation occurred, but said it definitely had happened by the week after the inauguration.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord "pushed on Andy McCabe" about the FBI's unwillingness to notify the White House. She asked him about the FBI's plan and raised the fact that the DNI and the CIA concurred with the need to notify. She believes the FBI was concerned the FBI would be criticized for appearing to be politically motivated, especially after the reactions to the way the Clinton investigation was handled.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Flynn Interview by the FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 23, 2017, McCord, Yates, Axelrod, and Guahar had a discussion about the Flynn matter, and reinforced their collective position that the White House should be notified. Yates had a conversation with Comey after their discussion, but he did not change his position.

(S) [redacted] On January 24, 2017, Yates held a meeting in her conference room, attended by McCord, Toscas, Gauhar, Scott Schools, and perhaps others, where Yates said she decided she was going to tell Comey he had to tell the White House Counsel's Office about the Flynn-Kislyak calls. In Yates' view, it was an FBI responsibility. Yates left the room to make the call to Comey and when she returned, reported that Comey told her he just sent FBI Agents to interview Flynn. The

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord , On 07/17/2017 , Page 6 of 12

DOJ group was "flabbergasted." McCord's impression was Yates was "dumbfounded" and didn't ask many questions of Comey in their call. Yates, Axelrod, and others were annoyed that they hadn't had an opportunity to weigh in on the decision or offer any input on the interview strategy.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Following the Flynn interview, Priestap, Strzok, [Redacted] and FBI General Counsel Baker went to DOJ to brief them on the interview. The DOJ attendees included Axelrod, Gauhar, Jim Crowell, Toscas, Stu Evans, and possibly Schools. Strzok provided a readout of the Flynn interview, since he and another agent had conducted it. The FBI's provided rationale for doing the interview was that the existence of the investigation had already leaked, so Flynn was already aware that the information was being discussed publicly and there was no element of surprise. Priestap told the group the goal of the interview was to determine whether or not Flynn was in a clandestine relationship with the Russians. The FBI did not want to insinuate the existence of a criminal investigation to Flynn. To that end, they did not give a Title 18 USC 1001 warning. Toscas raised the issue of the lack of warning, since he and others, after hearing Strzok's description of the interview, thought Flynn lied to the FBI. Toscas also felt there were some loose ends to clean up based on Flynn's answers. However, the FBI position was that there was no need to re-interview at that time.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) January 26, 2017 Meeting with White House Counsel's Office

(U//~~FOUO~~) The evening of January 25, 2017, Yates called McCord and said she had decided to brief the White House Counsel's Office on the Flynn matter, wanted to do it the following day, and wanted McCord to go with her. McCord believes Yates wanted McCord to go with her because first, she wanted a witness and second, she wanted that witness to be a career employee, rather than a political appointee.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] The next day, McCord reviewed the Flynn transcripts and pulled out excerpts for Yates to reference in the discussion with the White House Counsel's Office, should they be necessary.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 26, 2017, McCord accompanied Yates to the White House, where they met with White House Counsel Don McGahn and another attorney from his office, James Burnham. The four of them were the only ones at the meeting. Neither Yates nor McCord took notes, but McGahn and Burnham both had notepads with them during the meeting. McCord is not sure if they actually took notes.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates did most of the talking in the meeting, and started the conversation by saying there was something she felt they needed to know about Flynn; in light of Pence's interview on Face the Nation, she wanted them to know that what he'd said about Flynn's calls with the Russians was not true. McGahn asked how Yates knew this, and she explained that [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 7 of 12

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] She told them that the conversations made it clear that there were discussions on Russian sanctions in those calls, contrary to what Vice President Pence had said on TV. Yates explained to them her concerns were twofold - first, the Vice President needed to know he'd been misled, and second, the Russians themselves knew that what the Vice President said was not true. This posed a potential compromise situation for Flynn.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) McGahn asked if Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI and Yates told him that he had been interviewed two days previously, on Tuesday. McCord got the impression that McGahn did not know about the interview before Yates told him. He asked where the interview had taken place, and Yates told him it was in Flynn's White House office. McGahn asked "how'd he do?" and Yates declined to answer. McCord did not think it was a serious inquiry, but just something he said because he was shocked and did not know what else to say. McGahn also asked what he could do with the information, and Yates told him he could do what he needed to do with it. McCord specifically recalled that McGahn at one point asked something to the effect of, "Would it be okay for me to ask if you have a criminal investigation?" to which Yates replied, "It's okay for you to ask, but it's not okay for me to answer."

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord remembered Burnham raising the Logan Act, mentioning it was in the news, but they didn't talk about it at length. McGahn asked if he could talk to Flynn about the matter, and Yates said he could.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Toward the end of the conversation, McGahn asked about another case where an individual had been prosecuted for taking highly classified pictures of a submarine. Flynn knew this person and had previously openly asked the President to pardon him. McCord thinks someone may have given them a heads up that this would be raised, as she recalled having looked up the details of the case prior to their meeting. Yates explained to McGahn the role of the Office of the Pardon Attorney to McGahn and Burnham in response to their question.

(U//~~FOUO~~) After about fifteen minutes, the meeting ended.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Upon returning to the Department of Justice, McCord and Yates debriefed Axelrod, Schools, Gauhar, Evans, and Toscas. No one from FBI was present - McCord did not think they told the FBI they were going to tell the White House.

(U//~~FOUO~~) January 27, 2017 Meeting with White House Counsel's Office

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord , On 07/17/2017 , Page 8 of 12

(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 27, 2017, McCord learned McGahn had asked for a follow-up meeting, and that one had been scheduled for that afternoon. Based on a review of her calendar for that week, McCord believed it was a 2:30 pm meeting. b1 per FBI and ODNI b3 per FBI and ODNI b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord described the second meeting as "not really significant." She thinks McGahn and Burnham were so dumbstruck the first day, they hadn't had time to fully process the information. Now that they had more time to think about it, they wanted to rehash the material but also to focus on the restrictions on what they could and couldn't do with the information. They may have asked about discussing it with the Vice President in this meeting. Yates reiterated that there were no restrictions on what they could do with the information. The actual [redacted] were never shown to them, so there was no need to specify that any particular thing could not be shared. (S)

(U) (S//NF) [redacted] McGahn asked about getting access to the underlying information, asking "is this something we could see?" Yates responded that they would have to take that question back for discussion. McCord is not sure if Yates characterized the underlying information as "FBI information" but Yates made it clear that the FBI had interviewed Flynn [redacted] (S)

[redacted] McGahn or Burnham may have asked if, in doing whatever they needed to do with the information, they should be worried about harming a criminal investigation. Yates responded that she would not discuss criminal violations with them.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord said they did not discuss what McGahn and Burnham did with the information provided the previous day. Neither McGahn nor Burnham gave any indication they had talked to anyone else about the information. Based on their discussion and reactions, McCord believed McGahn and Burnham were caught off guard by the information.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord did not think anyone at the White House Counsel's Office ever communicated that they didn't believe there was a legal issue, but she did recall them saying something along the lines of not wanting to jeopardize an investigation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At the conclusion of the meeting, Yates agreed to come back to them with what underlying information could be made available.

(U) Notification Follow-Up

(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 28, 2017, McCord received an email from Flynn's email account, but signed by John Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs. The email stated it was a follow-up to McCord's interactions with McGahn, and asked for a time to have a

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 9 of 12

secure call. Given that the email was from Flynn's email account, McCord opted to not reply to the email directly. She got Eisenberg's email from a contact at the National Security Council and emailed Eisenberg to set up a time to talk the following day.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord was initially shocked to receive an email from Flynn's email account. She surmised at the time that Flynn and Eisenberg had been discussing the DOJ notification regarding Flynn and had agreed that Eisenberg would reach out to McCord, and then had accidentally sent the message to her from Flynn's account.

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] When McCord and Eisenberg connected on the telephone on January 29, 2017, Eisenberg told McCord he had been in Flynn's office prior to his sending the email to McCord and an assistant had switched his and Flynn's telephones when giving them back. He explained they had the same password, so Eisenberg accidentally sent the email to McCord from Flynn's phone. Eisenberg told McCord he would be handling the Flynn matter from that point on [redacted]

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(S) [redacted] (S)

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] On January 30, 2017, McCord and Eisenberg had another telephone call, to discuss some follow up issues, but McCord could not recall specifically what those issues were. Also on that day, Yates had a telephone call with McGahn [redacted] To McCord's knowledge, Yates did not meet personally with McGahn on January 30, 2017.

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(S) (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] On January 30, 2017, McCord, Toscas, Gauhar, and Evans went to the FBI [redacted] (S) [redacted] The DOJ personnel wanted [redacted] prior to giving access to the White House. FBI personnel in attendance were Strzok, Lisa Page, Priestap, and possibly McCabe.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) On January 31, 2017, McCord emailed Eisenberg to tell him the material he had requested was available, and put him in touch with Strzok to coordinate the details.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 1, 2017, McCord emailed Eisenberg to ask if he'd been able to get access to the material.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg told McCord he was available that day to review the material.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on Eisenberg's communications, McCord assumed Eisenberg would be the one reviewing the material. The FBI had the lead on coordinating with Eisenberg, so McCord is not aware of exactly when he reviewed the material, but she had the impression it took a while to happen.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Vice President Pence's Review of [redacted] Transcripts (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 10 of 12

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] McCord recalled McCabe calling her on February 10, 2017. He relayed he had been at the White House, possibly for a Deputies Committee meeting, and as he was leaving, he received a call from his office saying the White House was looking for him. He had not gone far from the White House, so turned around and went back. Once there, he learned that Pence wanted to see the Flynn transcripts. McCabe did not have the transcripts on him, so he returned to the FBI to retrieve them and returned to the White House Situation Room. There, he met with Pence; Pence's Chief of Staff; The President's Chief of Staff, Reince Priebus; and possibly others, and they reviewed the transcripts. Pence, while reviewing, directed his Chief of Staff to get the transcript of his (Pence's) Face the Nation interview, which he then compared to [REDACTED] transcripts. At one point in the meeting, Priebus said he'd seen enough and left the room. McCord was not sure if anyone was with McCabe.

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(U) Flynn's Resignation and Aftermath

(U) On February 13, 2017, Flynn resigned from his position as National Security Advisor.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On February 16, 2017, McCord participated in a briefing to Acting Attorney General Dana Boente on Flynn and the other Russia-related investigations, to include Papadopoulos, Manafort, and Carter Page. McCord's notes (page 42) reflect that at that time, analysis of Flynn's phone records was nearly done.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ By that point in time, McCord's understanding is there was both a criminal and a counterintelligence investigation into Flynn. At that point, the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA) was the central point for criminal process related to the investigations, a decision that had been made by Boente. Prior to that decision, legal process was being handled in other Districts as appropriate. McCord pointed out that if legal process was being used, it was clearly a criminal investigation.

(U) Additional Contact with White House

(U) ~~(FOUO)~~ At some point in the spring of 2017, the same day the President's Twitter account stated Trump Tower had been tapped, McCord received a call from Eisenberg. He said to her, "What would we have to do to find out if this exists." McCord noted this was a highly unusual request and asked Eisenberg if he was asking her "if this coverage exists." Eisenberg replied, "I guess so." McCord asked Eisenberg to tell her exactly what he was asking for. Eisenberg told her he would send her an article, and he wanted to know if she could tell him if it was true. McCord told Eisenberg she would get back to him. McCord doesn't recall if he sent her an article or if she looked it up on her own, but she recalled reading an article from the Breitbart website on Trump's statements about Trump Tower being tapped. She never heard back from Eisenberg on that matter.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 11 of 12

(U//~~FOUO~~) Later, ODNI attorney Brooker told McCord he'd gotten a similar request and hadn't called Eisenberg back. McCord considered it inappropriate for Eisenberg to ask for information of that nature.

(U) Congressional Interactions

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Agent note: Pages 53-81 of McCord's notes are various drafts of a document entitled "Talking Points re Crossfire Hurricane Cases." The talking points in the document were drafted in preparation for a Congressional briefing on the FBI's investigations into ties between Russia and members of the Trump campaign. The pages include handwritten comments as well as in "track changes."]

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord believed that after briefing Boente on the investigation, the topic of a Congressional briefing to the "Gang of 8" was raised. It was decided they should work on a draft to "see what talking points would look like." Given what was already out in the public, it would be hard to not provide some level of information to Congress. The FBI sent over a set of talking points for DOJ review, and the documents went back and forth with various edits. The DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs was involved in the discussions on who should be briefed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) After reviewing the documents, McCord believed the initials "pps" may refer to Strzok, and "SNS" may be Scott Schools. The edits attributed to "NSD" were either made by McCord, Toscas, or Evans. After examining the documents, McCord thinks it is possible she made handwritten edits and then those edits were later entered as track changes.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Page 73 of the handwritten notes indicate McCord had a telephone call with McCabe in which they both agreed that the level of detail in some of the talking points would lead to a lot of follow up questions that they would not necessarily want to address. McCord believes the talking points were eventually pared down.

(U) Comey Firing and Appointment of Special Counsel

(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord had no advance notice of Comey's termination as FBI Director; she learned about an hour before she was due to give a speech. McCord did not talk to McCabe, Sessions, or Rosenstein about it in the immediate aftermath. She had no part in writing the letters written by AG Jeff Sessions and DAG Rod Rosenstein.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 10, 2017, the morning after Comey was fired, McCord attended an investigative update meeting with Rosenstein and others from DOJ. Also present were Brandon Van Grack, Evans, Gauhar, Jim Crowell, and David Laufman. Rosenstein asked them if anyone there thought he should appoint a Special Counsel for the investigation. Laufman responded that he did

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Mary McCord, On 07/17/2017, Page 12 of 12

not think it necessary, as the prosecutors in DOJ's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section could handle it. Rosenstein followed with something like, "So nobody here thinks I should appoint a Special Counsel?" McCord was the only one who spoke up, and she told Rosenstein that a Special Counsel may not be legally required, but they needed to consider their tolerance for public perception of the impartiality of the investigation.

Administrative

(U//~~FOUO~~) Copies of McCord's notes from her time as Acting Assistant Attorney General for DOJ NSD were provided by DOJ to SAs [Redacted] and [Redacted] on July 13, 2017 (documented in serial 50 of this case file). A subset of those notes was used in the interview of McCord. SA [Redacted] numbered the pages 1 - 90 for ease of reference; those numbers are used in the text above. The numbered notes will be maintained in the case file.

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


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(U//~~FOUO~~) McCord provided nineteen pages of unclassified emails and a calendar printout, which she had pulled and reviewed in advance of the interview to refresh her memory. Those documents will be maintained in the case file.

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FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 08-15-2019

(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/07/2017

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(U) SALLY YATES, date of birth [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office spaces at 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. Yates was accompanied by her personal counsel, David O'Neil, telephone number [Redacted] and email address [Redacted] from the law offices of Debevoise & Plimpton. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] & [Redacted] and Special Counsel's Office attorneys Andrew Goldstein and Elizabeth Prelogar. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing team and the purpose of the interview, Yates provided the following information:

~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted] Yates' Awareness of the Flynn-Kislyak calls: (S)

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~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted] Yates first learned of the December 2016 calls between [LTG Michael] Flynn and [Russian Ambassador to the United States, Sergey] Kislyak on January 5, 2017, while in the Oval Office. Yates, along with then-FBI Director James Comey, then-CIA Director John Brennan, and then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, were at the White House to brief members of the Obama Administration on the classified Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian Activities in Recent U.S. Elections. President Obama was joined by his National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, and others from the National Security Council. After the briefing, Obama dismissed the group but asked Yates and Comey to stay behind. Obama started by saying he had "learned of the information about Flynn" and his conversation with Kislyak about sanctions. Obama specified he did not want any additional information on the matter, but was seeking information on whether the White House should be treating Flynn any differently, given the information. At that point, Yates had no idea what the President was talking about, but figured it out based on the conversation. Yates recalled Comey mentioning the Logan Act, but can't recall if he specified there was an "investigation." Comey did not talk

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: National Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20421231~~

(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

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Investigation on 08/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/16/2017

by [Redacted]

FBI(19cv1278)-1027

[redacted]
(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 2 of 12

about prosecution in the meeting. It was not clear to Yates from where the President first received the information. Yates did not recall Comey's response to the President's question about how to treat Flynn. She was so surprised by the information she was hearing that she was having a hard time processing it and listening to the conversation at the same time.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Upon leaving the White House, Yates called Mary McCord, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division (NSD) at the time, to ask what was going on and why Yates hadn't been aware of it previously. Yates and McCord briefly spoke when Yates returned to DOJ, and McCord had already scheduled a meeting for that afternoon to discuss the Flynn information. Yates kept the previously scheduled afternoon meeting on the calendar. Yates learned McCord and George Toscas had been briefed on the Flynn information by the FBI the day before, and they then told Yates what they knew. Yates could not recall whether DOJ had in their possession [redacted]

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[redacted] (S)

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Yates, McCord, and others had a discussion in that meeting about whether this constituted a violation of the Logan Act, but there was no close analysis of the substance of the Flynn-Kislyak discussions. The feeling among NSD attorneys was Flynn's behavior was a technical violation of the Logan Act, but they were not sure this would have a lot of jury appeal, or if pursuing it would be a good use of the power of the Justice Department. Yates had the impression the FBI was more eager to pursue prosecution initially.

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(U) Discussions Regarding Notification to White House

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] In early January, DOJ began to "ramp up" their discussions regarding Flynn, in reaction to a David Ignatius column describing the phone calls in early January 2017, followed by a statement by Sean Spicer around January 13, in which Spicer denied there was sanctions talk on the calls and stated that the Flynn calls were logistical. The false statement by Spicer, which Yates assessed to be the White House "trying to tamp down" the attention, caused DOJ to really start to wonder what they should do.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] On January 15, 2017, things "really got hot." On that day, Vice President Pence was on Face the Nation and stated publicly he'd spoken to Flynn and had been told there had been no discussion of sanctions with Kislyak. Yates recalled she was in New York City that weekend, and received a call from McCord notifying her of the

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 3 of 12

statements. Prior to this, there had been some discussion about notifying the White House, but nothing had been decided. Until the Vice President made that statement on TV, there was a sense that they may not need to notify the White House, because others at the White House may already be aware of the calls.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Following January 15, 2017, discussions regarding Flynn and notification to the White House amplified. Yates described several different combinations of people having conversations about the Flynn case, to include internal DOJ discussion, DOJ/NSD and FBI discussions; DOJ/NSD and the intelligence community; Yates and the Deputy Director of the CIA, David Cohen; Yates and Mike Dempsey from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and McCord and the General Counsel at ODNI, Bob Litt. According to Yates, the feeling among the intelligence community was that the White House needed to be notified, because the Vice President was entitled to know he'd been saying something untrue to the public. Yates believed Flynn put the Vice President in a position to lie to the American people, creating a compromise situation for Flynn. As this was happening before the Inauguration, Yates' view was the White House should know what the National Security Advisor had been doing before he was officially "in the chair" and in the job.

[redacted]

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Prior to inauguration, Yates recalled a conversation with either Comey or Deputy Director Andy McCabe regarding notification, and recalled that the FBI was resistant to the idea. Yates recalled Comey's view was that no one really knew if the Vice President was aware of the calls. The DOJ response was that they shouldn't assume the Vice President was aware and had knowingly lied. Yates said at the time that DOJ wanted to treat the incoming administration the same as the outgoing, and thinks Comey agreed that if this had happened to the Obama Administration, he would have just called Denis McDonough [Chief of Staff to President Obama]. Yates thought the FBI's position was driven by a sense that the FBI didn't want to mess up future relations with the incoming administration, since "we're going to have to work with these guys."

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However, Yates didn't think that was the sole factor in not wanting to notify.

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(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 4 of 12

(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI said at some point that notification would mess up an ongoing investigation, but Yates said it was not always clear what exactly the FBI was doing to investigate Flynn.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In the days immediately leading up to inauguration, Yates was really pushing to notify, while Comey was still very resistant. Yates explained that she understood the criminal equities, but other things should be factored in, such as whether the Logan Act would be prosecuted. It was important to Yates that they all be on the same page and noted that Cohen in particular agreed with her position.

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~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] On or around the day before inauguration, there was an event at which Comey, Brennan, and Clapper were all present. Cohen relayed to Yates that Clapper and Brennan were going to pull Comey aside to talk to him about notification at that event. That night, Cohen called her and said Comey had said something to the effect of there being an "ongoing criminal investigation" and notification would interfere with it. Generally, when the Intelligence Community learns of a "criminal investigation," their reaction is to back off and defer to the FBI; [redacted]

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[redacted] Yates did not herself believe the investigation would be negatively impacted, but Brennan and Clapper backed off after their talk with Comey.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Inauguration day passed without any notification to the White House regarding Flynn, but Yates still felt they had to figure out what to do.

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~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] The Monday following inauguration, Spicer "doubled down" on the Flynn calls. He was "quite emphatic" that Flynn had one call with Kislyak, there were four topics, and sanctions weren't one of them. At that point, Yates decided "enough was enough" and decided it was time to notify the White House. She talked to the trial attorneys in NSD, and they collectively agreed it was more important to notify than to protect any investigation at that point.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The next day, Tuesday, Yates gathered her staff and they discussed notification to the White House. They agreed Yates should be accompanied by Mary McCord, an NSD career attorney and subject matter expert on the topic. Yates placed a call to Comey and the group waited for him to call back. When Comey called later - Yates is not certain now if he was returning her call or placing a new call - he informed her that two agents were on their way to interview Mike Flynn at the White House.

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(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 5 of 12

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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Yates was very frustrated in the call with Comey. She felt a decision to conduct an interview of Flynn should have been coordinated with DOJ. There were trial attorneys at NSD working with the FBI and it was not "solely" an FBI investigation. In Yates' view, the prosecutors should be involved in coordinating the type of approach and interview questions. [redacted] (S)

[redacted] She also thought there should have been a discussion about recording the interview. In raising these things with Comey, he said something like "you can understand why I did this," to which Yates replied "no" and Comey responded he didn't want it to "look political." Yates was offended by the implication.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates relayed to her team that the FBI was conducting an interview and they "hit the roof." She believed the agents had been tasked to do the interview, likely because of the recent Spicer statements. Yates added the interview was problematic to her because as a matter of protocol and as a courtesy, the White House Counsel's Office should have been notified of the interview. The FBI's approach was inconsistent with how things had been done.

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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Yates received a brief readout of the interview the night it happened, and a longer readout the following day. The gist of what she was told was that Flynn was very accommodating, but the agents had not confronted him directly with the information [redacted] but he was "nudged" at one point and he said something like "oh, thank you for reminding me." Yates could not recall the specifics of that interaction. Flynn denied having a conversation about sanctions.

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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Yates did not speak to the interviewing agents herself, but understood from others that their assessment was that Flynn showed no "tells" of lying and it was possible he really did not remember the substance of his calls with Kislyak. On the other hand, the DOJ prosecutors were very skeptical that Flynn would forget the discussion. After the interview NSD asked FBI if they wanted to do another interview, and the FBI said no. McCabe also said as much to McCord. Yates does not know why the FBI did not want to re-interview, but recalled them being pretty emphatic about it. Yates does not recall if they had a discussion on any exposure to 18 USC 1001, but she did remember McCord effectively "cross examining" the statements Flynn made to the interviewing agents as compared to the transcripts.

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[redacted]
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 6 of 12

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates reiterated that in hearing about the interview, the DOJ prosecutors thought Flynn was lying, but the FBI didn't say he wasn't lying, just that he didn't exhibit any "tells" that he was lying.

(S) (S//NF) [redacted] McCabe told Yates that [redacted] (S) [redacted] he was convinced Flynn was lying. He noted that Flynn wasn't as engaged in the conversation until the part about the sanctions. NSD told Yates at some point that the interviewing agents hadn't [redacted] (S) [redacted] read the full transcripts prior to the interview.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) After the readouts of the Flynn interview, DOJ held internal discussions about what to do next, as they still wanted to notify the White House. After confirming the FBI did not want to do a second interview, Yates decided they should notify. She called Comey and told him she was going to notify the White House Counsel about Flynn. She wanted to gauge his reaction to her decision, and Comey said it was a great idea, and agreed a "lawyer to lawyer" talk made sense.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates acknowledged there was a chance that notifying would have some impact on the investigation, but it was outweighed by the national security concerns.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates notified Mike Dempsey at ODNI and a woman whose name she could not recall at CIA in advance of her notification to the White House.

(U) January 26, 2017 White House Notification

(U//~~FOUO~~) The morning of January 26, 2017, Yates called Don McGahn, the White House Counsel and told him she had a "sensitive matter" to discuss with him and she couldn't do it over the phone. They agreed to meet that afternoon. Yates and McCord met in McGahn's office with him and one of his associates from the White House Counsel's Office.

(S) (S//NF) [redacted] Yates and McCord did not have [redacted] transcripts with them, (U) but they took a document that summarized [redacted] because Yates (S) wanted to be able to give them some examples while they talked. She did not take notes and does not recall if McCord took notes. Her impression is that McGahn's associate took notes, but she does not recall if McGahn took any.

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(U) (S//NF) [redacted] Yates set up the conversation by laying out the fact that Flynn's conversation with the Russian Ambassador had been the subject of a lot of interest lately. She mentioned the Vice President's appearance on (S) Face the Nation and Spicer's statements. Yates then explained that they

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(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 7 of 12

knew what the Vice President and Spicer said was not true, and then told them how they knew it. She told them how they knew, because she didn't want them to think there was a wiretap on Flynn, but she did want them to know they had hard evidence. She told them that not only did Flynn discuss sanctions, [Redacted] and provided specific examples.

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~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted] Yates pointed out that Flynn actually made a specific request to Kislyak that the Russians not overreact and that they minimize their response, and Kislyak affirmed he had "taken it to the highest levels" and their response was because of the request.

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[Large Redacted Block]

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~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted] The specific asks Flynn was making, and the back and forth between him and Kislyak, were contrary to what was being represented in the media at the time. Yates added she was not saying the Vice President was being deliberately misleading, and McGahn noted that he could guarantee anything the Vice President said he'd heard directly from Flynn.

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~~(S//NF)~~ Yates also told McGahn Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI that week. McGahn asked Yates "how he did" but Yates declined to answer. She "sort of shrugged" in response and wanted to give the impression that "all was not good." McGahn asked Yates if the FBI's investigation was criminal, and Yates declined to answer. She added that she wouldn't normally answer that question.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates stated it is a violation of the Logan Act for someone not a member of the administration to advocate a position contrary to the current administration position. When asked, Yates recalled the Logan Act

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[redacted]
(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

[redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 8 of 12

definitely came up in her second meeting with McGahn but could not recall if it came up in the first one.

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Yates told McGahn the reason they were telling him about the calls was that the underlying conduct itself was problematic, plus Flynn lied to the Vice President, Spicer, and the Chief of Staff, causing those people to in turn lie to the American people. The fact that the Russians were aware of the lie created a compromise situation for Flynn.

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~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (S) [redacted] Yates explained she was providing the information to McGahn so he could take whatever action he deemed appropriate. She described McGahn and his associate's reactions as "reeling." She cannot recall if they asked her what they could do, but she did not offer a recommendation. She did personally think privately that Flynn would be fired.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) At the conclusion of the meeting, which was about thirty minutes, McGahn and his associate thanked them, and Yates and McCord left. Yates and McCord remarked to one another that the meeting "went better than they thought it would." Yates thought McGahn and his associate fully appreciated the seriousness of what was discussed.

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Yates was not sure if she expected a follow up to the meeting. She did expect McGahn to ask to read the transcripts [redacted] but he didn't in that initial meeting.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (S) [redacted] Yates does not recall if she called [redacted] b1 per ODNI
Comey personally to let him know, but she does believe someone at NSD b3 per ODNI notified someone at FBI.

(U) January 27, 2017 White House Meeting

(U//~~FOUO~~) On the morning of Friday, January 27, 2017 Yates received a call from McGahn in which he requested another meeting, ideally for that evening. They ultimately scheduled a meeting for late afternoon that day, and Yates again took McCord with her to the White House for the meeting where they met with McGahn and the same associate as the previous day. The second meeting was a distinct "tenor change" from the first. While the first meeting didn't feel adversarial, McGahn started the second meeting with something like, "What's it to DOJ if one White House official lies to another?" Yates was a little taken aback by that and explained again the same reasons for their concern that she had the day before. She told McGahn that there was more to this than one official lying to

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[REDACTED]

(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 9 of 12

another, and Flynn's actions themselves were problematic, especially when followed by lies and the public getting a false statement. Yates described McGahn's initial commentary was as almost as if he was saying "what's the crime?" McGahn said to her at one point something along the lines of "Oh, come on, what are the chances DOJ will prosecute the Logan Act?" Yates' impression was McGahn was trying to let her know he knew the Logan Act had never been prosecuted and was minimizing the seriousness of Flynn's actions. Yates got the sense that McGahn had done some research and clearly knew what the Logan Act was by that point.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates told McGahn that putting aside whether or not anyone had been successfully prosecuted for a Logan Act violation, they were missing the point that they had a potential compromise situation with their National Security Advisor.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McGahn asked Yates if Flynn should be fired, and she told him it was not for DOJ to make that call.

(U//~~FOUO~~) McGahn told Yates the White House did not want to take any action that would interfere with the investigation, and she replied that he should not worry about it, that DOJ had made the notification specifically so the White House could act on it. Yates does not recall if she told McGahn the investigation into Flynn was a "criminal" investigation, but she knows at the time there was no official decision on prosecution.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates had the impression McGahn was looking for a reason not to act, and DOJ did not want the White House to be able to use the ongoing investigation as an excuse not to act. Yates "really hammered" that the White House could and should act because she wanted to make sure they couldn't use the investigation as a shield.

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] McGahn asked Yates if the White House could review the transcripts, and she said they were inclined to agree, but would get back to them. At that point, DOJ had already agreed they would probably provide access to the transcripts if asked, but they would need to talk to the FBI.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates had no sense of what happened between the two meetings. Yates did not get the impression McGahn was fishing for more information on the investigation, but would have shut down that line of questioning if he had. She doesn't recall whether McGahn asked about 1001 violations or the FBI interview of Flynn in the second meeting. She did not say that DOJ was or wasn't going to prosecute the Logan Act, as she

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[REDACTED]

(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 10 of 12

doesn't think it was decided at that point in time. Yates added she wouldn't have told the White House if it had been decided.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates believed McGahn "got it" that they couldn't use the ongoing investigation as a reason not to act on Flynn.

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(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] The second meeting, which was shorter in duration than the one the day prior, ended shortly after the request for transcripts.

(S) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] En route to DOJ, Yates and McCord discussed the transcripts and agreed McCord would talk to the FBI about accessing the transcripts, which McCord would do that weekend.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Upon returning to DOJ, Yates likely told Matt Axelrod about the meeting with McGahn. It's also likely Axelrod and McCord told others about the meeting. Yates is not sure if she told Comey about the second White House meeting herself, but she is sure someone at NSD told someone at the FBI.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates was scheduled to spend that weekend in Atlanta, and as she was getting ready to go to her plane, Axelrod called her to let her know about the travel ban that had been announced that afternoon. She spent the rest of her weekend working on issues surrounding that.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates was not aware at the time that Comey had dinner with President Trump the evening following her second meeting with McGahn. She first learned about it when Comey testified before Congress in June.

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(U) White House Follow-Up

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] On the morning of Monday, January 30, 2017, Yates called McGahn, and not reaching him immediately, asked for a call back. McCord had told Yates that the FBI had made the arrangements for the transcript review, so Yates wanted to let McGahn know the transcripts were ready. By the time McGahn called her back that afternoon, Yates had issued a directive to the Department of Justice not to defend the travel ban that had come out the previous Friday, so she assumed McGahn wanted to talk about that. She realized once they started talking that he didn't know about her directive on the travel ban and instead was asking only about the transcripts. Yates told McGahn the transcripts were available but he would need to go to the FBI to review them, and then decided she should tell him about her directive regarding the travel ban. Yates was surprised he didn't know, having assumed the senior administration official at DOJ would have told the White House by then.

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(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates , On 08/15/2017 , Page 11 of 12

(U//~~FOUO~~) A few hours after Yates told McGahn about her actions regarding the travel ban, she was fired.

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Yates was gone by the time the White House reviewed the transcripts, but she heard it was some period of time before they did the review. Her understanding was the arrangement for the review would take place at the FBI.
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(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates was aware of another Flynn related issue happening around the same time, specific to a FARA violation. She was aware NSD attorneys were interacting with Flynn's counsel, but the specifics had not risen to her level at the time. She did not share that information with McGahn.

(S) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Yates did not interact with the media regarding the Flynn-Kislyak calls or her interactions with the White House.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates was surprised Flynn wasn't fired earlier, given the reaction to the first meeting.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates noted her schedule at DOJ might provide some insight into her meetings, but not everything made it to her calendar. Her assistant at the time of her departure was Josh Mogil.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Yates said Spicer's characterization of her notification to the White House as a "heads up" was not accurate. She believes the notification, along with the way it was done, sent a more deliberate message than merely a "heads up."

(U) Administrative

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[redacted] As Yates no longer has an active security clearance, FBI Assistant Director Bill Priestap, an Original Classification Authority, provided authorization for Yates to review and discuss the classified material. Yates signed an FBI "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement" both on August 14 and August 15, 2017.

(U) (S) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] FBI Assistant Director Bill Priestap also provided clearance authority for [redacted] to remain present in the interview in the event classified information was discussed. [redacted] signed an FBI "Classified Information Non-Disclosure Statement" prior to the interview.

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(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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
(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Sally Q. Yates, On 08/15/2017, Page 12 of 12

(U//~~FOUO~~) The original Non-Disclosure statements are being maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

(U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted] (S)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/29/2019

Stephen K. BANNON was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Bannon was accompanied by his attorneys [Redacted]. Present for the interview were Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst (IA) [Redacted] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, Senior Assistant Special Counsels Jeannie Rhee and Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. During the second half of the interview, Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad and Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) [Redacted] were present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, BANNON provided the following information:

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Roger STONE had told BANNON, by phone and other methods, that he had a relationship with Julian ASSANGE. STONE had been bragging about his relationship with ASSANGE on Twitter, during interviews, etc. The conversation where STONE told BANNON he had a relationship with ASSANGE was about other things and STONE had brought up his relationship with ASSANGE. This was prior to BANNON joining the Trump Campaign. STONE was kind of a "braggart" and the conversation might have been around a time when STONE came on Breitbart Radio. STONE described the nature of his relationship with ASSANGE in a way that STONE knew him or had a personal relationship. It was implied that STONE knew ASSANGE and knew what ASSANGE was doing. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

On 10/4/2016 ASSANGE was supposed to have a press conference which didn't happen and was a non-event. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

BANNON's relationship with STONE prior to 8/13/2016 was one where STONE would brag to BANNON while he was at Breitbart. STONE was known as the "Trump whisperer". [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Investigation on 10/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] SM-2284941, [Redacted]

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Date drafted 10/29/2018

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by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 2 of 16

[Redacted]

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As far as what WikiLeaks had, the implication from STONE was that it would be good for Donald TRUMP. The implication that it would be stuff damaging or embarrassing to the CLINTON camp. BANNON wondered how they could verify the authenticity. If it was somehow linked to the 33,000 missing emails, that would be the "money shot". BANNON thought the white whale was the 33,000 missing emails from CLINTON. BANNON spent the spring of 2016 trying to find them. BANNON thought the 33,000 missing emails were the Holy Grail, but even if they found them, there was no way to verify that they were real. STONE's contact with BANNON typically regarded [Redacted] STONE bragging. STONE never talked about the 33,000 missing emails. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The weekend after the 10/7/2016 WikiLeaks release somebody was trying to take credit for the timing of the release of the Podesta emails after the "Billy Bush thing". BANNON described the events surrounding 10/7/2016 as the sum and substance of the campaign. BANNON could not remember who it was, but someone on the campaign was relaying that someone who was not on the campaign was trying to take credit for the timing of the WikiLeaks releases and getting ASSANGE to release the information. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] BANNON speculated it could have been [Redacted]

[Redacted] The person trying to take credit for the timing of the WikiLeaks releases was likely STONE. STONE was the only person, to BANNON's knowledge, who was claiming to have a relationship with ASSANGE and WikiLeaks.

BANNON was shown an email dated 10/04/2016, Bates stamped SB_00068079. When BANNON wrote "What as that this morning???" and "He didn't cut deal

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 3 of 16

w/ Clintons???" he was referring to ASSANGE.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

BANNON didn't have a professional relationship with [Redacted] during the summer of 2016. BANNON could barely remember [Redacted] during his time on the Trump Campaign during the fall of 2016. [Redacted] was a volunteer and he could remember seeing her coming in and out of the "war room". BANNON described [Redacted] as "another person walking around". [Redacted] was working on [Redacted] [Redacted] was not a senior level person and she would help to put people in touch with BANNON.

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[Redacted] BANNON couldn't remember any instances that occurred during the campaign time frame. During the campaign, BANNON knew [Redacted] through BOSSIE and [Redacted]. BANNON described [Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] BANNON couldn't remember ever talking with [Redacted]. BANNON couldn't remember [Redacted] BANNON couldn't remember ever talking with [Redacted], but he wouldn't be surprised if he did.

On 10/7/2016 [Redacted] might have been on the 14th floor at Trump Tower, but BANNON didn't specifically remember seeing her there. BANNON could remember a lot of women associated with the Trump Campaign being there, such as Kellyanne CONWAY and Hope HICKS, and [Redacted] might have been one of those. BANNON had be preparing to shoot a film with candidate TRUMP that would be posted on Facebook. The plan was to have the movie posted by 7 p. m., but it ended up being done at 12:00 a.m. BANNON wouldn't be surprised if he got a text from [Redacted] saying "well done", since he thought the film was well done.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] STONE would pester BANNON. STONE talked about what he was trying to do in order to be put in touch with donors. BANNON was giving the impression that he would, but didn't remember ever doing it. STONE had contacted BANNON in order to be put in touch with the [Redacted] BANNON thought he put STONE in touch with the [Redacted] lawyers. STONE might have sent some spots to BANNON regarding the information he was putting out, or sent him some online videos, but BANNON doesn't recall looking at them.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 4 of 16

BANNON was shown a text dated 8/27/2016, from BANNON to STONE. BANNON didn't remember this text message. BANNON never heard of the [Redacted] plan referenced in the text and BANNON didn't remember a [Redacted] project. BANNON was aware of a plan [Redacted]

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[Redacted] not involved in this plan, but BANNON was upset that STONE was taking credit for it. [Redacted] came to BANNON 10-14 days after BANNON took over the Trump Campaign. There were ideas on how to do this, and to get Fox News and Sean HANNITY to do it, but Fox News and HANNITY waived off. The film was to be done on "Billy Bush day" with it going to the news shows that weekend. STONE tried to take credit for the effort which BANNON thought was lunacy and "B.S."

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Breitbart did not follow up on it.

BANNON was shown an email dated [Redacted]

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BANNON was shown an email dated [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] BANNON barely knew [Redacted] at the time of this email. BANNON talked with [Redacted] about meeting with the Special Counsel's Office (SCO).

BANNON was aware that [Redacted] but wasn't aware of the content [Redacted] The only thing [Redacted] told BANNON

[Redacted]

BANNON described Jerome CORSI as a Harvard guy who works at World Net Daily. BANNON thought CORSI was [Redacted]

[Redacted] BANNON called CORSI and said [Redacted] because now [Redacted]

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[REDACTED] SM-2284941

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[REDACTED] During the campaign, BANNON didn't remember talking to CORSI although CORSI may have reached out.

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BANNON was shown an email dated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BANNON didn't recall any conversations about [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] At the time, BANNON was unaware of Ted MALLOCH's relationship to [REDACTED] Before the election win, BANNON didn't know MALLOCH or hear about him. BANNON thought that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were all "wing-nut promoters". BANNON did have contact with MALLOCH once BANNON was in the White House. BANNON didn't know if MALLOCH had a relationship with [REDACTED]

In 2010, BANNON came up with BOSSIE to talk to TRUMP about possibly running for president. The meeting lasted approximately two hours on the 26th floor of Trump Tower. Michael COHEN was there. At the end of the meeting TRUMP asked BANNON what he thought about STONE. BANNON said he didn't know STONE very well but thought [REDACTED] [REDACTED] TRUMP asked if STONE was connected. BANNON replied that STONE is [REDACTED] While BANNON was at Breitbart in 2013-2015, BANNON had a strong relationship with [REDACTED] BANNON heard from [REDACTED] STONE was still talking to TRUMP and was an advisor. STONE subsequently made those statements to BANNON as well. BANNON was suspect and upset. BANNON believed you had to keep TRUMP "on program". While BANNON was on the Trump Campaign he never heard any mention of STONE from TRUMP or anyone else on the campaign. Corey LEWANDOWSKI had said that STONE was not part of the Trump Campaign. After the win, STONE tried a full court press in order to get a meeting with TRUMP. [REDACTED] eventually set up a meeting with TRUMP and STONE in early December 2016 on the 26th floor of Trump Tower. TRUMP didn't want to take the meeting with STONE. TRUMP told BANNON to be in the meeting and that after 5 minutes, if the meeting hadn't concluded, to throw STONE out. STONE came in with a book he wrote and possibly had a folder and notes. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] TRUMP didn't say much to STONE beyond "Thanks, thanks a lot". To BANNON, this reinforced STONE [REDACTED] After five to six minutes, the meeting was over and STONE was out. STONE was [REDACTED] due to the fact that during the meeting TRUMP just stared. This reinforced what BANNON thought about STONE, that STONE was a [REDACTED] BANNON never heard TRUMP talk about STONE. The 2010 conversation with TRUMP about STONE was the only time, to the best of BANNON's recollection. BANNON never heard that STONE was talking to candidate TRUMP while BANNON was on the campaign. BANNON never asked then candidate TRUMP if he talked with STONE. Candidate TRUMP could have talked to STONE, without BANNON knowing about it, and he had the opportunity to do so. BANNON was not aware of who TRUMP talked to in

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 6 of 16

the evenings and they could have had a phone call. BANNON was not aware of who TRUMP was talking to in the evening, but he was definitely talking to people. BANNON did not have visibility into that. TRUMP was not shy about throwing names out of people he had talked to, and he never said STONE.

[Redacted] that BANNON fired at Breitbart. [Redacted] who was doing research on Barack OBAMA's time at Harvard. At ANDREW BREITBART's funeral, [Redacted] was saying how he had a solution to OBAMA's birth certificate. BANNON was not interested in OBAMA's birth certificate and was interested in how the Harvard research was going. While [Redacted] he was calling BANNON saying he heard from kids at a madrassa that OBAMA was a Muslim. At that point, in April 2012, BANNON fired [Redacted] BANNON didn't want a story out saying that Breitbart was asking kids at a madrassa about OBAMA being a Muslim. Breitbart was not interested in OBAMA's birth certificate, only the research about OBAMA's time at Harvard from the files at NYU. BANNON's contact with [Redacted] was only occasional texts and emails from [Redacted] to BANNON in which BANNON did not respond.

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BANNON was shown an email dated [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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BANNON was shown an email dated [Redacted]

subject: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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During the transition timeframe, [Redacted] reached out and sent emails to BANNON offering help, for example saying he knew the Polish Prime Minister. BANNON didn't remember any outreach from [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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BANNON knew [Redacted] and described him as a [Redacted]

BANNON was not aware of [Redacted] but he wouldn't be surprised if he did. [Redacted] was into stuff like that. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 7 of 16

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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BANNON was shown an email dated [Redacted]
[Redacted] When BANNON wrote "Love it" in the email, he was saying he thought it was fantastic, epic, and that he wasn't going to get back to you. There would be no follow on. BANNON described it as a "quasi blow-off". [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] When BANNON wrote "Love it" he was not approving it, or else he would say he was approving it. It also did not indicate that he was going to do something. At that time, in June 2016, BANNON was going to go over to cover Brexit for Breitbart. BANNON had spent a lot of time and effort trying the find CLINTON's 33,000 missing emails. At the time, BANNON did not think that was dangerous as he was part of a media company. In 2017, [Redacted] was totally blown out of proportion to the point where it was purported that [Redacted] was TRUMP's [Redacted] BANNON believed this story metastasized into something that was totally misconstrued and it made a tacit connection to the Trump Campaign. When BANNON wrote "Love it", he was not saying not to do it. In June 2016, there wasn't any reason why doing it would be wrong. In his role at a media company it was a good idea.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted] SM-2284941

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted] The "FLYNN thing" caught them by surprise and [Redacted]

[Redacted] It concerned BANNON since he had dealings with foreign governments. Back then talking with a foreign government was ok. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) was a part of the indictment. BANNON was concerned he would be investigated for dealing with foreign governments even though he did nothing wrong. The Special Counsel's Office had an "open writ" and was a fishing expedition. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED] SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 9 of 16

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

BANNON was shown an email dated 11/05/2016, from BANNON to Jared KUSHNER and BOSSIE, subject: Re: Securing the Victory. After BANNON came onto the Trump Campaign he didn't interact with Paul MANAFORT. BANNON didn't know who MANAFORT was talking to on the campaign after his departure. At one time BANNON heard that candidate TRUMP was still meeting with MANAFORT and taking his calls. BANNON thought he might have heard this from BOSSIE, [REDACTED] or Reince PRIEBUS. BANNON was unaware of the content of the calls, and assumed that they were campaign related. BANNON didn't hear candidate TRUMP talk about MANAFORT. On 8/13/2016 to 8/14/2016 BANNON didn't want MANAFORT fired, just kept on with no power or authority. After the New York Times article came out about MANAFORT, BANNON knew MANAFORT was done. BANNON told TRUMP and KUSHNER that no one should have contact with MANAFORT, [REDACTED] BANNON never talked with MANAFORT during the transition timeframe. BANNON "picked up in the ether" that the Russians were working with WikiLeaks. BANNON was 100% convinced they would win the election. BANNON had no knowledge of MANAFORT providing advice to KUSHNER. KUSHNER was the one who fired MANAFORT. After MANAFORT was fired, BANNON was unaware of any meetings between KUSHNER and MANAFORT. The last BANNON had spoken with MANAFORT was around 8/14/2016 to 8/15/2016. MANAFORT sent BANNON an email around the debates, and a congratulatory email after the win. There was no other conversation surrounding this email. When BANNON came onto the Trump Campaign, they were in a "free fall" and were down 20 points. BANNON had gone up to visit MANAFORT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in Trump Tower. The New York Times story had come out that associated MANAFORT with Russia, since the story was about MANAFORT taking money from Ukraine/Russia and that MANAFORT was [REDACTED] BANNON thought MANAFORT was [REDACTED] and could see it in the operations. BANNON did not associate WikiLeaks with Russia but believed that it was a narrative that was derived from media stories. BANNON did not discuss the topics of this email with anyone else in the campaign, besides this email itself. There were no discussions on the Trump Campaign during this timeframe on whether WikiLeaks was working with the Russians. BANNON believed that this was "noise" and he was more worried about the fact that they were 6 to 7 points down. BANNON couldn't remember if there were any conversations from when he joined the Trump Campaign in August 2016 to Election Day on whether Russia and WikiLeaks were working together. BANNON couldn't remember, but he wouldn't be surprised if those conversations may have occurred. GIULIANI, FLYNN, or Chris CHRISTIE might have talked about it, and that it was in the "realm of possibility". BANNON had no recollection on preparing for answers to debate questions that the Russians had hacked a political opponent.

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BANNON didn't remember meeting with Erik PRINCE during early January 2017. BANNON did remember PRINCE coming in three to four times during the

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transition timeframe. BANNON has no memory of discussing George NADER with PRINCE. BANNON met NADER months later. BANNON didn't remember PRINCE telling him that he would be travelling to the Seychelles prior to his trip. PRINCE did not tell BANNON that he would be meeting with a Russian individual in the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't tell BANNON about Kirill DMITRIEV prior to PRINCE meeting DMITRIEV in the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't talk with BANNON about an individual associated with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) prior to PRINCE travelling to the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't tell BANNON about a Vladimir PUTIN associated individual that he would be meeting with prior to PRINCE's trip to the Seychelles. PRINCE didn't show the CV of a Russian individual to BANNON prior to his trip to the Seychelles. It is possible that BANNON talked with PRINCE about sanctions on Russia, but he wasn't sure about it. BANNON didn't remember any contact with PRINCE on 1/11/2017. PRINCE didn't tell BANNON that he was in the Seychelles and that he was meeting with a Russian individual. BANNON did not talk to PRINCE about the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov docking at a port in Libya while PRINCE was in the Seychelles. BANNON did talk with PRINCE about Libya. PRINCE had advocated for working with the "good guys" in Libya, in November/December 2016, after they won the election. PRINCE never talked about working with the Russians, just the UAE. BANNON didn't recall meeting with PRINCE on 1/16/2017. PRINCE never told BANNON he met with a Russian government official. PRINCE never told BANNON he met with an individual from the RDIF. PRINCE never told BANNON he met with a representative of PUTIN. PRINCE never gave a business card of an individual associated with Russia to BANNON. BANNON didn't say anything to PRINCE about following up with the Russians. BANNON didn't say anything to PRINCE about setting up another line of communication with Russia that he remembers.

BANNON was shown a text dated 9/8/2016, Bates stamped SB_00068078. This conversation with PRINCE was not regarding PUTIN. The text from PRINCE was in regards to debate prep. BANNON heard PRINCE say the phrase in this text a bunch of times. BANNON used the phrase as well. BANNON believed this was a concept on the campaign.

BANNON reiterated again that PRINCE never gave BANNON a business card from a Russian who wanted to meet with the President and he didn't remember that happening. BANNON again said PRINCE never told him he met with a Russian associated with the RDIF and didn't remember that happening. PRINCE did say he met with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (MBZ) of the UAE, but not in the Seychelles. PRINCE had said he met with MBZ to discuss PRINCE's Afghanistan concept, and talked with him about his ideas on the Arab League and Libya. PRINCE told BANNON he met with MBZ after the meeting happened, not before. BANNON passed these things onto FLYNN. PRINCE was a business guy and BANNON didn't know that PRINCE had a relationship with MBZ. BANNON met MBZ in December of 2016. PRINCE travelling to the Seychelles wouldn't have stood out to BANNON. If PRINCE had told BANNON he had a meeting with Russians and given BANNON a business card from the Russians, BANNON would have remembered it. PUTIN had called TRUMP the first morning after TRUMP took office and therefore you wouldn't

[REDACTED] SM-2284941

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need a back-channel or "other guys running around". In January 2017 there were stories in the press that Russia was trying to help TRUMP win. BANNON believed that TRUMP had to see the documents that OBAMA had seen which convinced him to throw the 29 Russian diplomats out of the country. On 1/4/2017 BANNON was consumed with the upcoming intelligence briefing they had on 1/6/2017. PRINCE meeting with Russians would have stood out to BANNON. Receiving a business card from a Russian, through PRINCE, would have stood out to BANNON. BANNON believed that guys shouldn't run around freelancing in a meeting such as that. PUTIN and TRUMP had called each other one to two times, so why would they need a back-channel. BANNON would have had an issue with PRINCE meeting with a Russian.

BANNON did read PRINCE's testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). BANNON discussed it with PRINCE because he thought it was wrong for PRINCE to not hire a lawyer or prepare for his testimony. PRINCE believed that it was a political witch hunt, he would tell them what happened, and he didn't need a lawyer. PRINCE considered his testimony before HPSCI a "chat". BANNON never asked PRINCE if his testimony was truthful.

BANNON is in touch with PRINCE frequently. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] BANNON and PRINCE never discussed the DMITRIEV meeting in the Seychelles.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

In regards to the texts with PRINCE on BANNON's blackberry, BANNON didn't know what was kept or not kept. In regards to archiving his messages, BANNON didn't do anything different in regards to his texts with PRINCE and just gave his phone to his secretary. BANNON did use his personal email for White House business. BANNON did not make any attempts to preserve the White House record information from his personal accounts.

BANNON met Bob FORESMAN through Mark BURNETT. BANNON thought FORESMAN might have been [REDACTED] BURNETT said he had a guy who was trying to save Christians in the Middle East and Russia. FORESMAN knew people in Russia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. BANNON rolled him over to FLYNN. There was zero talk about giving FORESMAN a position in the administration during the meeting with BANNON. To BANNON, FORESMAN didn't seem [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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BANNON's "phone guy" is located in Los Angeles. BANNON has known him for 15 years, but didn't remember his name. BANNON met him during his time in L.A. One of BANNON's secretaries is in L.A. BANNON's "phone guy" is the one who sets up his devices.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

When the Special Counsel was setup there was talk about conflicts of interest right away. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] BANNON thought all of the stated conflicts were ridiculous, [Redacted] TRUMP did not respond when BANNON pushed back on the stated conflicts of interest. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] the issue about [Redacted] having [Redacted] as an attorney was not a conflict in the legal community. [Redacted] they had invited MUELLER in to give TRUMP a perspective on what the FBI was and thought they might beseech him to take the job as FBI Director. MUELLER did not come in looking for the job as FBI Director. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The purpose of the meeting was to give TRUMP a perspective on the institution of the FBI [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] BANNON told TRUMP why he thought all these conflicts were ridiculous.

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] BANNON

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SM-2284941

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

explained it as it was not go get rid of MUELLER, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

BANNON told TRUMP he

didn't think that these were conflicts. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

BANNON told TRUMP that

that's ridiculous and petty. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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MCGAHN and PRIEBUS pushed back

on the conflicts of interest TRUMP raised. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED] SM-2284941

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 15 of 16

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

BANNON never talked to TRUMP or KUSHNER about injecting money into the campaign. Jeff DEWIT, PARSCALE, KUSHNER, and BANNON were going through the cash flow. They realized that they were going to need \$15 million dollars. They would need to generate more money or the candidate would have to write a check. KUSHNER said, as far as the candidate writing a check, that was not going to happen. KUSHNER said he was not a guy who while six to eight points down, was going to write \$25 million dollar checks. They were not even in the hunt. Coming out of the last debate, they were in fantasy land, they were so far behind. TRUMP is a probability guy, and if it's not a dead lock, don't expect \$25 million. Since KUSHNER said there was no way this was going to happen they worked to get it down to \$10 million. Steve MNUCHIN came up with a cash flow plan. MNUCHIN called it a cash advance. They had enough money coming from small donors that it would lag to it and this money would eventually come in. Just this last \$10 million was needed to come in to buy the television time. MNUCHIN would structure it like a loan and he had a term sheet, but it was like a cash advance. They had a five hour conversation with TRUMP. MNUCHIN, BANNON, KUSHNER, and TRUMP were present. MNUCHIN turned over the term sheet, which was structured as a loan, and he had the wire instruction documents for the \$10 million. TRUMP didn't know that MNUCHIN had the documents ready. It was ten days to two weeks ahead of Election Day and they couldn't do the final television spot without it. BANNON didn't think TRUMP even read the documents. TRUMP wasn't thrilled that MNUCHIN had the wire instructions ready. BANNON didn't think that TRUMP talked to [REDACTED], MCGAHN, or DEWIT from the Trump Organization. The conversation about the \$10 million with TRUMP started on the 26th floor of Trump Tower, with MNUCHIN, BANNON, KUSHNER and TRUMP. They were flying to a campaign stop so they continued the conversation on the plane. They kept working on TRUMP until he couldn't take it anymore, and then MNUCHIN pulled out the sheets with the wire instructions. TRUMP was convinced the cash would be there. TRUMP understood the logic of it.

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

As far as the messages on his phone being deleted prior to 2/23/2017, BANNON was told all of his stuff was deleted. BANNON never deleted the

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Stephen K. Bannon , On 10/26/2018 , Page 16 of 16

PRINCE messages himself. BANNON never discussed with anyone about deleting his messages with PRINCE. BANNON didn't know why they were deleted and didn't tell anyone else to delete the PRINCE messages. BANNON was told everything was deleted before a certain date. BANNON never deleted his messages with PRINCE or instructed, asked, or told anyone to delete his messages. BANNON never set up a function to not to retain his messages. BANNON didn't discuss with his tech guys on why these messages were missing. The only other person who had access to BANNON's Blackberry was [REDACTED] and that was only once or twice. BANNON had "no earthly idea" on why the messages were deleted.

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BANNON did not have a lot of contacts with [REDACTED] during the election. BANNON didn't remember what his interactions with [REDACTED] during the campaign consisted of. From approximately March to May of 2016 [REDACTED] had come up with a concept to show that [REDACTED] BANNON was just making sure that [REDACTED] didn't blow him up. BANNON thought that [REDACTED] was another guy who was better [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BANNON didn't remember what they were discussing. It wasn't a big enough deal for BANNON to remember, he got texts from a lot of people. BANNON thought [REDACTED] BANNON thought that if you don't keep guys like STONE [REDACTED] happy they eventually would settle scores in their books. When investigator detailed the amount of calls and messages BANNON had during the campaign, BANNON didn't know what the messages with [REDACTED] were about, but BANNON said they were likely talking about the election or ideas [REDACTED] had. BANNON didn't know anything about WeSearchr or anything about using crowd sourced funds for bounty information. BANNON didn't know anything about getting [REDACTED] getting hacked or leaked information. BANNON didn't remember anything about passing deep web or hacked information. BANNON didn't remember anything about [REDACTED] getting any information from WikiLeaks. [REDACTED] was always talking about his relationship with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] talked about the dark web/deep web, but BANNON didn't remember the specifics. BANNON was not interested in dark web information. [REDACTED] was telling BANNON about his theories about [REDACTED] or an idea of what district he should be in. [REDACTED] would say that he knows stuff from the dark web. [REDACTED] would come up with stuff like helping on social media and helping to find stuff on the dark web. [REDACTED] might have mentioned the 33,000 missing CLINTON emails while BANNON was looking for them. [REDACTED] might have talked to BANNON about his efforts to get in contact with WikiLeaks. BANNON didn't remember the information that [REDACTED] was trying to get from WikiLeaks or the access. The only time [REDACTED] spoke to BANNON about his meetings with WikiLeaks were the two emails. On the campaign, [REDACTED] might have mentioned the dark web. [REDACTED] would have outside the box ideas like getting the DNA for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would text with BANNON about these things. The dark web was always something [REDACTED] would talk about. It was likely [REDACTED] had told BANNON he had a contact with WikiLeaks in only these two emails. [REDACTED] possibly texted BANNON about WikiLeaks.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/01/2018

Erik Dean Prince, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Present representing Prince were [Redacted] and [Redacted]

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The interviewing team were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels Jeannie Rhee, Zainab Ahmad and Aaron Zelinsky.

Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which Prince made himself available for the interview (Document 1). Prince stated that he understood the terms of the letter agreement. Prince and [Redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, Prince provided the following information:

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Prince was not initially a Donald Trump supporter. As the campaign heated up, Prince found that he agreed with many of Trump's positions. Prince spoke with [Redacted] about holding a fundraiser for Trump. [Redacted] told Prince that the Campaign had rejected Prince's request to hold a fundraiser because Prince was too controversial. Prince did not speak with anyone else in the Campaign about the fundraiser.

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Prince contributed money directly to the Trump Campaign. Prince also donated at a Las Vegas event, to a Political Action Committee (PAC) run by the [Redacted] and to Roger Stone's ads and social media efforts regarding [Redacted]

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Prince met Steve Bannon in 2013 at an event held at Breitbart for Prince's book. Bannon and Prince hold similar beliefs on many issues. Bannon knew Prince's experience and respected Prince's knowledge of certain matters. Bannon had Prince as a regular call-in guest on Bannon's radio show. During the campaign, Prince sent Bannon mostly unsolicited policy papers.

Prince was introduced to Donald Trump, Jr. at Trump Tower. [Redacted] [Redacted] may have introduced Prince to Trump, Jr. The first meeting was brief, Prince expressed his support and encouragement

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Investigation on 04/04/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/05/2018
by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 2 of 12

for the Trump Campaign. Prince met Trump, Jr. approximately two more times at Trump Tower before the election. At one of the meetings, Trump, Jr. asked if Prince had met Trump. Prince said no. Trump, Jr. walked Prince into a room and introduced Prince to Trump. Trump and about ten other people were in the room and Mike Pence was on the telephone.

Prince organized a meeting between [REDACTED] and Trump, Jr. to discuss Iranian civil rights issues. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] introduced Prince to [REDACTED] Prince met [REDACTED] in the Brussels Airport a year or two before their meeting with Trump, Jr. At the airport, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Prince is not aware of any attempts by [REDACTED] to get money from foreign governments. [REDACTED]

During their airport meeting, [REDACTED] provided Prince with some documents pitching his project. Prince does not recall the details of [REDACTED] project. [REDACTED]

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Sometime before the election in 2016, [REDACTED] requested that Prince set up a meeting with a high level person connected to Trump. [REDACTED] did not request anyone in particular. Prince knew Trump, Jr. and Bannon. Prince knew Bannon better and Bannon was a policy guy. Prince does not recall why he arranged the meeting with Trump, Jr. instead of Bannon. Bannon may have been unavailable because, at this time, he was very busy and often traveling with Trump. [REDACTED] did not say that he wanted to pitch Trump, Jr. for money, only that [REDACTED] wanted to discuss Iranian issues, such as the Obama administration's nuclear deal with Iran and payment of cash to Iran.

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[REDACTED] arrived for the meeting with George Nader. Prince had not expected Nader to be with [REDACTED] Prince had worked with Nader in Iraq around 2006. In 2006, Nader was a courtesan for the Vice-President of

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 3 of 12

Iraq. Prince, [REDACTED] and Nader met with Trump, Jr. in Trump Jr.'s office. Prince introduced [REDACTED] to Trump, Jr. as an Iran policy person. Prince introduced Nader as a person with knowledge of the Middle East. Prince also told Trump, Jr. that Prince had known Nader in Iraq ten years earlier. [REDACTED] took the lead on explaining why the nuclear agreement with Iran was wrong. [REDACTED] gave a brief synopsis of his communications project but only as a way to bolster his position for a change in Iran policy. Trump, Jr. said that it was interesting information and that he would take it onboard. Trump, Jr. had no time or interest for a granular discussion. During the meeting, [REDACTED] never said anything about using his company to help the Trump Campaign. [REDACTED] did not discuss anything with Prince about the Trump Campaign's social media activities.

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Prince does not recall anyone else attending the meeting. Prince does not recall Stephen Miller attending the meeting. Prince believes that Nader was helping [REDACTED] meet potential investors. Prince does not recall Nader speaking at the meeting with Trump, Jr. Prince does not know if Nader had a separate agenda for attending the meeting. Prince does not recall whether he was with [REDACTED] and Nader throughout the entire time that they were upstairs at Trump Tower.

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Prince does not know [REDACTED] other business interests. Prince has heard of the PSY Group as an Israeli technology and communications company. [REDACTED] had mentioned the PSY Group to Prince, but Prince does not recall the context. Prince does not know if [REDACTED] was associated with the PSY Group.

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In July or August 2016, Prince had breakfast with Bannon. Bannon understood the union mentality of Trump's supporters. Bannon had been in contact with them through his radio show. Prince and Bannon discussed policy at the breakfast. Two days later, the Trump Campaign hired Bannon.

Prince sold Blackwater in 2010. Prince's main policy desire was to have a president that would be open to private contractors conducting stability operations. Prince helped the UAE successfully combat Somali pirates. Prince has focused on "peripheral" areas where the Department of Defense does not have a significant presence, such as Yemen, Somalia and Libya. Prince has also focused on Afghanistan. Prince sent Bannon a policy paper "Update on Problem Areas." Prince also sent Bannon his "Case for a Private Option." Prince got the impression that Bannon had more important policy matters on his plate.

Prince met Bannon a couple of times at Trump Tower before the election. Prince set up the meetings by texting Bannon or communicating with [REDACTED]. Prince and Bannon discussed foreign policy and

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 4 of 12

trade. Prince does not recall the subject of Russia coming up during any of their discussions.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] introduced Prince to Roger Stone. [REDACTED] told Prince that Stone was working on a 501(c)(4) Fund. [REDACTED] did not say that Bannon or the Campaign approved of Stone's fund. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Stone mentioned WikiLeaks a few times. Prince began one conversation by asking what Stone thought would be released next. Prince does not recall anything that Stone said about WikiLeaks. Stone did not give Prince any inside information on the WikiLeaks release of Democratic National Committee e-mails nor any information on Stone's contacts with Julian Assange. Prince was not aware of Stone's public statements about WikiLeaks or Stone's contacts with Assange.

Barbara Ledeen had a trove of e-mails from the dark web that were purportedly deleted e-mails from Hillary Clinton's server. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the e-mails. Prince provided funding so that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could hire a tech advisor to determine whether the e-mails were

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 5 of 12

real. [REDACTED] reported to Prince that the tech advisor had determined the e-mails were not authentic. [REDACTED] returned the unused portion of Prince's money. Prince does not believe that anyone from the Campaign knew of the effort.

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Prince spent election night at Trump Tower watching the voting returns. [REDACTED] cleared Prince into the event. When it appeared that Trump would win, Prince and other people walked over to the Hilton to hear Trump's speech.

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Prince met Bannon in Trump Tower a few days after the election. Prince advocated for people to fill key National Security positions. Prince wanted people that would support his private approach and support disentangling America from foreign conflicts. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Prince returned a few weeks later and met again with Bannon. Prince again discussed personnel decisions. Trump did not select any of the individuals that Prince recommended. Prince never sought a position for himself. On one occasion, Prince rode the train back from New York to Washington, D.C. with KellyAnne Conway. They did not have any substantive conversations during the train ride.

Prince met Flynn in June 2016, before the Republican convention, for breakfast in Alexandria. [REDACTED] introduced the two men. Prince and Flynn discussed foreign policy. Flynn had not yet become active in Trump's campaign. Prince does not recall any other substantive interactions with Flynn until after the election. Post-election, Flynn and Prince had a quick meeting at Trump Tower regarding which people should fill National Security positions. Another time, Prince and Flynn met at an Irish Pub and talked about how to put out fires in peripheral areas. Prince never talked about the role of Russia with Flynn.

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Prince met Trump three times. The first time was the introduction by Trump, Jr. in Trump Tower. The second time, Prince met Trump during a campaign event in Las Vegas before the last debate. The third time, Prince met Trump at a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Prince never spoke for more than a minute to Trump. The substance was always Prince expressing his support and encouragement.

Prince has Trump's phone numbers in his cell phone. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 6 of 12

[REDACTED] briefly introduced Prince to Jared Kushner while they were in Trump Tower. Prince and Kushner did not have any substantive conversations.

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Prince discussed National Security appointments with Dave Bossie. Prince and Bossie also discussed Robert Levinson, a former FBI Agent, that disappeared in Iran.

Prince briefly met K.T. McFarland. Prince said hello to McFarland while she was in an office talking with Judge Jeanine Pirro.

The earliest text messages in Prince's cell phone are from March 2017. Prince used his cell phone prior to March 2017. Prince does not know why the text messages do not go back farther than March 2017. Other than housekeeping, such as deleting spam messages, Prince has not deleted any text messages from his cell phone. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Prince did not know in advance about the December 15, 2016 meeting in New York between Trump representatives and UAE officials. During the meeting or shortly after it, Prince met Nader in the coffee shop of the Four Seasons Hotel where the meeting was taking place. Nader said that Kushner, Flynn and Bannon were at the meeting with Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ) and other UAE officials. Nader said that they discussed Middle East issues including Iran, Syria, Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorism generally. Prince does not know who set up the meeting.

Prince reviewed a series of text messages that he and Nader exchanged on December 15, 2016 (Document 2). In the first message, Nader asked Prince when they could meet at the Pierre Hotel where Nader was staying. Prince responded that he had been asked to come straight to Trump Tower upon arriving in New York. [REDACTED] had probably told Prince that Bannon had a window to see him. Prince ended up meeting Nader in the lobby of the Four Seasons Hotel. Prince agreed to give Nader a policy paper on the Muslim Brotherhood to pass on to MBZ. Prince probably went somewhere to print the paper, then returned and left it at the front desk for Nader. After their meeting in the lobby, Nader messaged Prince that Nader "told Steven that we just met and he was delighted." Nader always stated things in the superlative. Prince had told Nader that Prince had met with Bannon. In another message on December 15, Nader writes that he cannot wait to "[f]ollow upon our excited mission." Prince assumes that the mission is getting the UAE and Saudi Arabia (KSA) to financially support Prince's solution to end the fighting in Yemen. Prince's solution

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 7 of 12

involved a smaller, more-focused, and perhaps private, armed force. Prince was confident that the UAE or KSA would go forward with this solution if Prince could get permission from the U.S. Government. Prince met with Bannon on December 16, 2016. Bannon said that Prince was right about MBZ being a great guy. Prince had told Bannon about a 2010 conference on freedom and Islam that Prince hosted in the UAE and that MBZ had attended.

After Trump won the election, Nader wanted access to as many people as possible. One time, Nader and Prince were waiting outside of Bannon's office. Prince does not believe they came to Trump Tower together. Prince does not recall any meetings that he attended with both Bannon and Nader. Trump, Jr. walked by and Nader attempted to talk with him. Trump, Jr. told Nader not to contact him anymore because he no longer handled policy matters. Trump, Jr. separately told Prince that he wanted Nader to stop texting him all the time. Nader received inauguration tickets from somebody at the stratum of Kushner. After inauguration, in May or June 2017, Prince ran into Nader in the White House. Nader did not say who he was meeting in the White House.

Prince reviewed messages between himself and Nader (Document 3). On December 20, 2016, Nader messaged Prince about Nader visiting the "neighboring country." Prince interpreted the "neighboring country" as Saudi Arabia and that Nader would be meeting with Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Prince interpreted Nader's reference to going "big real hunting," as Prince's solution to end fighting in Yemen. Prince had discussed his ideas for ending fighting in Yemen with Nader but provided no detailed operations plan. Prince and Nader did not discuss the Trump administration and UAE working together. Prince does not know why Nader sent Prince an image of Nader and Putin together, other than the fact that Nader always likes to show off his connections.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior to this interview, Prince reviewed records showing that he travelled to New York on January 3, 2017. Prince does not recall the travel. The trip was probably to see Bannon. Prince does not recall checking whether Bannon or Trump, Jr. would be available before he travelled to New York. Prince reviewed messages exchanged between him and Nader from December 31, 2016 to January 4, 2017 (Document 4). Based on the messages, Prince believes that he planned to meet Nader in New York on January 3. Nader was pushing for a meeting with anyone from the Trump team. Prince does not know why Nader wanted to meet with someone from the Trump team. Prince does not recall setting up any meetings for Nader with the Trump team.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 8 of 12

Prince reviewed a message that he sent at approximately 1:36 p.m., on January 3, wherein he wrote that he would be at the Pierre Hotel restaurant in 10 minutes to meet Nader (Document 4). Prince does not recall meeting Nader. Prince and Nader probably planned to meet so that Nader could download the information from Nader's meetings with MBZ and MBS. Prince reviewed a set of messages arranging a later meeting at the Pierre Hotel restaurant, the messages ended with Prince writing "[a]m in the restaurant" at 7:32 p.m (Document 4). Prince does not recall the second meeting with Nader either. It was probably a continuation of the same issues as the first meeting.

Agents showed Prince images of the Pierre Hotel and its restaurant. After viewing the images, Prince recalled meeting Nader in the restaurant (Document 5). Prince does not recall what they discussed. They may have discussed Prince's upcoming meeting with MBZ. Prince does not recall them discussing Russia, Dmitriev or contacts with the Trump administration.

Prince does not recall going to Trump Tower on January 3. Prince may have been trying to meet Bannon. Prince had spoken with former U.S. intelligence people about his plan and may have wanted to update Bannon. Prince often sat in the Starbucks in the Trump Tower lobby hoping that Bannon would have an opening to see him.

Prince does not know why Nader sent Prince information on Kirill Dmitriev - a link to a Wikipedia page, "Quotes KD_DT.pdf," and "Kirill DMITRIEV.pdf" - on January 3 and January 4 (Document 4). Nader may have sent the information because it came up during their dinner. Prince would be surprised if Nader sent the information without any discussion. The first time that Prince heard of Dmitriev was at Prince's meeting with MBZ in the Seychelles. At the end of that meeting, MBZ or one of his brothers said that there was a Russian guy that the UAE had done business with and that Prince should meet him.

Prince does not recall opening the attachments sent by Nader on January 4, which contained the information on Dmitriev (Document 4). Prince does not recall calling [REDACTED] shortly after the attachments were opened. Prince would have called [REDACTED] to see if Bannon had time to meet with Prince. Prince probably did not meet Bannon on January 3 because Prince would not have come back on January 4 if he had met with Bannon the day before. There were other times when Prince went to Trump Tower trying to meet with Bannon and never got in to see him. Prince does not recall whether he met with Bannon on January 4. Prince does not recall telling Bannon or anyone else with the Trump Transition team about Dmitriev before the meeting in the Seychelles.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 9 of 12

Prince was like a kid at Christmas about his meeting with MBZ, he could only focus on the presents under the tree. Prince had previously conducted significant business with the UAE and he hoped to gain business for the future. Prince does not recall when he first learned that his meeting with MBZ would be in the Seychelles rather than the Middle East. Prince does not recall communicating to Bannon or anyone else that Prince would be meeting with MBZ. [REDACTED]

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When Prince landed in the Seychelles, one of MBZ's men walked Prince through customs and drove him to the Four Seasons Hotel. MBZ owns the resort so Prince did not have to pay for his room. Prince met separately with Nader before meeting with MBZ. Nader warned Prince about the atmospherics of MBZ's court and the rent-seeking behavior of its members. Prince and Nader took a golf cart to MBZ's villa. Prince talked with MBZ about problems in peripheral countries where the UAE had troops, like Somalia, Libya and Yemen. MBZ was exasperated by the Obama administration. In Prince's mind, Prince was not there on behalf of the upcoming Trump administration. Prince did not play up his relationship with Bannon or anyone else close to Trump. MBZ asked though whether Prince thought that the Trump administration would support the ideas that they were discussing. In response, Prince cited Trump's campaign promises and what Prince had heard from Trump's Strategic Policy Advisor, Bannon, on the issues. Prince spent about an hour and a half with MBZ. MBZ offered Prince a ride back to Abu Dhabi on MBZ's airplane. At the end of the meeting, one of MBZ's people said that there was a Russian guy at the resort, that the UAE had put money into his funds, and that he would be a useful guy for Prince to meet.

After the MBZ meeting, Prince went back to his room and napped. Prince then went to dinner, he believes Nader ate dinner with him. After dinner, Prince and Nader walked over to the bar and met Dmitriev. Dmitriev's wife was with him but soon walked away. Dmitriev spent the first six or seven minutes discussing his hope that their countries could work better together. Prince responded that if Roosevelt could work with Stalin to defeat the Nazis then Trump and Putin could work together to fight terrorism. Dmitriev also talked about the two countries resuming normal trade relations, but Prince does not recall Dmitriev specifically mentioning sanctions. Dmitriev knew Prince had been a loud advocate for Trump but Prince does not recall Dmitriev speaking as if Prince was a contact to the Trump people. Dmitriev did not say when he had been asked to meet with Prince or who asked him to meet with Prince. Prince understood that Dmitriev was in the Seychelles to meet MBZ. Prince and Dmitriev spent most of their time discussing oil prices. Prince owns a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 10 of 12

geoscience business that searches for oil. Prince explained to Dmitriev how the Saudis failed to put the U.S. fracking companies out of business by increasing production to keep prices low because the companies continued to operate under U.S. bankruptcy laws. Dmitriev insinuated to Prince that he wanted Prince to pass along the message of better relations to people in the U.S. Dmitriev emphasized wanting to get past the past. Prince does not recall any discussion of potential Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. Prince had a beer during their conversation.

Prince went back to his room after the meeting with Dmitriev. Prince got a message from a Libyan friend that the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov had been toured by Khalifa Haftar of Libya. Prince contacted Nader and asked to meet with Dmitriev again. Prince initially told investigators that the second meeting also occurred in the bar. After Agents showed Prince images of Villa [REDACTED] at the Four Seasons Seychelles (Document 6), Prince stated that his second meeting with Dmitriev was in Nader's villa. Prince pointed out to Dmitriev that Dmitriev had talked about wanting to work together but that Prince personally thought that the Kuznetsov incident would be offensive to the Trump administration. Dmitriev answered that he did not know about the incident and that the Russian armed forces sometimes got ahead of themselves.

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Prince told Nader that he would let Bannon know that Prince had talked with Dmitriev. Prince would pass along to Bannon that someone in the Russian power structure was interested in better relations.

Prior to meeting Dmitriev, Prince read Dmitriev's biography that Nader had previously sent him. Prince cannot recall how he knew to look in his cell phone for Dmitriev's information. Prince posits that Nader must have told him that Dmitriev is the person about which I previously sent you information. Even given the fact that Nader had sent the information earlier, Prince is not sure whether the meeting between him and Dmitriev was pre-arranged. Having read the biography and knowing that Dmitriev managed Russia's sovereign wealth fund, Prince knew before the meeting that Dmitriev had strong political connections in Russia.

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[REDACTED]

On the plane back to Abu Dhabi, Prince spoke alone with MBZ for about an hour. They mostly talked about planes and Prince's idea for using a modified crop duster as a counterinsurgency plane. MBZ is a

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 11 of 12

gearhead. Prince does not recall discussing Dmitriev with MBZ. Prince landed in Abu Dhabi and went to China the next day. Prince spent three or four days in China before flying back to the U.S. on January 15.

The next day, on January 16, Prince met with Bannon at the Breitbart house. [REDACTED] Prince also told Bannon about his meetings with MBZ and Dmitriev. Prince said that MBZ was interested in his solution to the fighting in Yemen and other areas. Prince described Dmitriev as a Western educated, sovereign wealth fund manager. Prince told Bannon that Dmitriev wanted an improved and more cooperative relationship with the U.S. On the morning of January 16, before visiting Bannon, Prince captured a screenshot of Dmitriev's Wikipedia page on his cell phone (Document 8). Prince believes that he captured the image so that he could remember Dmitriev's name when he met with Bannon. Prince cannot recall whether he showed Bannon the screenshot. Likewise, Prince cannot recall whether he told Bannon that the meeting was in the Seychelles.

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Prince reviewed a January 17, 2017, message from Nader asking if Prince had time to meet with [REDACTED] (Document 9) Prince replied yes. Prince does not know who [REDACTED] is. Nader then messaged "[w]hat about Kirill?" (Document 9) Prince does not think he responded to this message. Prince does not recall communicating with Nader about Dmitriev after they left the Seychelles. Prince does not recall sending a message to Nader stating Prince had been contacted by the Senate Intel Committee "all thanks to the Russian guy you wanted me to meet." Nader would not take any action unless it was approved by MBZ. Prince does not know why he would have wrote "you" wanted me to meet when it was one of MBZ's other people that suggested the meeting unless it was because Nader walked Prince into the meetings with MBZ and Dmitriev. Prior to the Washington Post article in April 2017, only Bannon, Nader, Dmitriev and the UAE officials knew that Prince had met with Dmitriev. Prince may have told Flynn but he does not believe that he told Flynn.

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On the day of his testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Prince believed that he was only going to speak with Devin Nunes about illegal unmasking of Americans and the wrongful use of SIGINT. Prince agreed to the release of his HPSCI testimony because, after speaking with [REDACTED] Prince did not believe that he had a choice.

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[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]


[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Erik Prince 04.04.2018 , On 04/04/2018 , Page 12 of 12

[Redacted]

MBZ would have arranged the meeting for strategic reasons such as chipping away at the relationship between Russia and Iran.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/04/2019

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Jerome Robert Corsi, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC in the presence of his attorney, [Redacted]. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [Redacted], FBI SA [Redacted], FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [Redacted], Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, SASC Andrew Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky. Prior to the interview, Corsi signed a proffer agreement, originally signed on September 21, 2018. Corsi was advised that intentional false statements during this interview would be a violation of federal law. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identities of the interviewing Agents, Corsi provided the following information:

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Corsi had remained silent on his media platforms, for approximately two months, and since he was first approached by representatives from the Special Counsel's Office. He will eventually return to those activities because he depends on them for income.

Corsi spent the evening prior to this interview trying to reconstruct events that were discussed in previous interviews. Corsi wanted to remember certain things but could not and he became frustrated as a result. Corsi had a hard time determining whether or not he was actually remembering things or if he was inventing them. Corsi forgot a lot of events given they happened over two years ago.

[Redacted]

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Investigation on 10/31/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/19/2018

by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 2 of 14

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Corsi said he would do his best in this interview and try to remember key events in this interview.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Corsi did not start watching Assange until after Assange created a search engine for his information and therefore, he did not believe Wikileaks was a large topic of discussion for him in February 2016.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When asked who else he may have told, Corsi said he may have also told [REDACTED] Corsi and [REDACTED] discussed the possibility of contacting Assange through their organization, WorldNetDaily (WND). If [REDACTED] would have sent Corsi to meet with Assange he would have gone. [REDACTED] did not do so. Corsi thought he might have audio recordings with [REDACTED] where they discussed the possibility of meeting with Assange.

When asked if he had reservations in making attempts to contact Assange, Corsi said he had two. First of all, Corsi did not believe he would be breaking the law if he contacted Assange but he did not want to surface on the radar of any intelligence agencies as a result of doing so. Secondly, even if Assange had wanted to meet with him, Corsi did not believe Assange would have shared information with Corsi about what would be coming in future releases of information.

On or about July 22, 2016, Wikileaks released a series of emails belonging to Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Corsi remembered the event and referred to it as "the Schultz drop." A day after the Schultz drop, Assange publicly stated he had more information to come and Corsi wanted to know what it was. Corsi began reviewing the information from the Schultz drop immediately, which was approximately 40,000 emails released over a two-day

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 3 of 14

period. Corsi examined the senders and recipients of each email. Corsi also compiled a list of the emails which he posted online. What jumped out to Corsi was that all of the emails pertained to operatives in the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Corsi looked for emails from John Podesta and did not find any. From that, Corsi deduced that Assange's next release of information would likely pertain to Podesta. [REDACTED]

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Corsi was asked if he also looked at what was released by DCLeaks and he confirmed that he had. Corsi downloaded the DCLeaks release and put them into a file. He remembered downloading a compressed [.zip] file and going through each file one by one. Corsi remembered seeing files with the initials NGP on them. Corsi knew those to be the initials of [REDACTED]

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Corsi said he believed there were two ways to hack a computer. First, having the username and password credentials for a legitimate user on a system. Second, having access to a server where the emails passed through. Corsi believed the information from the Schultz drop seemed they were obtained from a server where they had passed through. In addition to the lack of emails from Podesta, Corsi also noticed that the last email had been sent in late May 2016. Therefore, Corsi believed the emails were likely to have been stolen around that time.

Corsi advised that he knew Seth Rich had been killed at 4:30 AM on July 10, 2016. The circumstances surrounding Rich's death were suspicious to Corsi. Specifically, he wanted to know where Rich's laptop went. Corsi then explained there had been speculation as to whether or not Rich had actually stolen the emails from the DNC, rather than them having been hacked.

Corsi's source, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] told Corsi she is crazy, but Corsi continues to rely on her for information because her reporting is good. Corsi provided an example of how [REDACTED] had tracked down [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was involved in setting up a private server for Clinton.

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 4 of 14

Corsi knew [Redacted] to be obsessed with another individual, [Redacted] [Redacted] When Corsi relayed information from his sources he usually told people in a way that portrayed, "this is the way it is." Corsi does not usually cite his sources by name.

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[Redacted]

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Corsi and others were constantly talking about Assange after the Schultz drop. Corsi said it seemed as if the world had stopped after the Schultz drop and he did nothing but review the emails for several days to see what Assange had.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Corsi said he must have also had prior discussions with Malloch about Assange. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Corsi said it would have made sense if they discussed how they could reach Assange. Malloch was a professor at the University of Oxford and Corsi thought Malloch might be able to reach Assange, possibly through a direct message on Twitter. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

When asked whether he and Malloch ever discussed Nigel Farage, Corsi said they had [Redacted]

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Corsi rather remembered having discussions with Malloch about Brexit at the time and believed the discussions about [Redacted] occurred later in time. When asked if they ever discussed getting in touch with Assange through someone [Redacted], Corsi said it would have made sense if they had but he didn't remember doing so. Corsi then immediately said, "I'm sure I must have."

Later in the interview, Corsi said he did not remember having any discussions with Malloch about reaching Assange through Farage. Corsi explained that he viewed Malloch as [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 5 of 14

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[Redacted] Corsi first met Malloch through an introduction from [Redacted] over the telephone.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 6 of 14

[Redacted]

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additional instructions for Malloch. Corsi generally had much more detailed discussions with Malloch and provided two examples; when he tried to get Malloch a job on the Trump campaign and when he introduced Malloch to [Redacted] Corsi did not actually think [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Corsi said he only remembered having such a discussion with [Redacted] Corsi believed that discussion occurred sometime before he left for Italy, possibly on July 25, 2016. Corsi has known [Redacted] since approximately 2004. [Redacted]

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also thought Rich stole the emails from the DNC and believed the British and John Brennan were behind the Fusion GPS dossier. [Redacted] also believed the upcoming Wikileaks information would pertain to Podesta.

[Redacted] told Corsi he believed Assange was smart and strategic, and that if Assange didn't drop all of the emails at once then there would be a second drop sometime in October.

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 7 of 14

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 8 of 14

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Later in the interview, Corsi said he did not remember receiving any

[Redacted]

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08/10/2016 EMAIL TO [Redacted]

Corsi was shown an email he sent to [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

RETURN FROM ITALY 08/12/2016

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 9 of 14

Corsi [Redacted] returned from Italy on August 12, 2016. [Redacted]

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08/15/2016 EMAIL FROM CORSI

ASC Zelinsky read Corsi an email that Corsi sent to [Redacted] and [Redacted] [Redacted] on August 15, 2016. In the email Corsi said, "Despite MSM drumroll that HRC is already elected, it's not over yet. More to come than anyone realizes. Won't really get started until after Labor Day." When asked what he was referring to, Corsi said, "must have been Podesta emails."

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 10 of 14

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 11 of 14

Corsi recalled that on October 7, 2016, Access Hollywood released a recording of Trump having a conversation with Billy Bush during which Trump spoke about grabbing women by the genitals. On or about that same day, Wikileaks released the information about Podesta. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Corsi remembered sitting at his computer, looking for materials and seeing Podesta at the top of the document. The purpose of the article was to plant sources in the paragraphs of the article, which was 8 pages long, so

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 12 of 14

that they could be sourced as being derived from open source materials.

[Redacted]

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Corsi felt like he had solid research. Corsi then said he had no distinct memory of looking at public sources, doing any research at that time,

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Corsi recalled the articles related to Viktor Vekselberg as being difficult to read. Corsi could not recall where he was when he read those papers.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 13 of 14

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Corsi remembered when

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
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jerome Corsi (10/31/18) , On 10/31/2018 , Page 14 of 14

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/16/2018

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, Richard Gates was interviewed at the law offices of Sidelly Austin, 1501 K Street N.W., Washington, DC 2005. Gates was being interviewed pursuant to an ongoing cooperation agreement entered into with the Office of the Special Counsel. Present for the interview were DOJ Senior Financial Investigator [redacted] FBI Spec Agent [redacted] Assistant United States Attorneys [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] from the Southern District of New York; and Assistant United States Attorney [redacted] DOJ National Security Division. Also present was Gates' attorney, Thomas Green. After being advised the identity of the interviewing parties and the purpose of the interview, Gates furnished the following information:

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Note: Prior to the interview commencing, AUSA [redacted] reminded Gates that he had to be truthful with the interviewing parties and at anytime he wished to consult with his attorney (Thomas Green) he could do so. Gates verbally acknowledged that he understood.

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Skadden Report Background:

Gates' initial involvement with Skadden Arps and the subsequent Skadden Report was when Paul Manafort (Manafort) contacted Gates about using one of their (Davis Manafort Partners) Ukrainian funded bank accounts in Cyprus to pay for an independent review of the imprisonment of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. To the best of Gates' recollection, Manafort was put in contact with Greg Craig of Skadden Arps after speaking with [redacted] Gates was unsure why [redacted] referred Craig to Manafort.

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Skadden Report Media Strategy:

Gates recalled Craig initially agreed to be involved in the overall media strategy, but FTI Consultants was subsequently hired to handle it. FTI was referred to Manafort via Craig.

Craig went back and forth on his role with the overall media strategy, but eventually agreed to talk with [redacted] of the New York Times. It was

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Investigation on	09/11/2018	at	Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File #	[redacted]	Date drafted	09/17/2018
by	[redacted]		

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Gates' recollection that Craig mentioned having a good relationship with [redacted] while at a meeting in DC. Craig believed his relationship with [redacted] would give them a shot at a fair interview.

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When FTI ultimately drafted their initial media strategy/plan, it had Craig playing a more active role. Craig pushed back, but compromised to reach out to a few media and political contacts.

Gates recalled that a few United States Legislators were contacted prior to the release of the Skadden Report; however, he could not recall who they were. Initially Craig was willing and felt comfortable reaching out to these elected officials, but Gates was unsure if he ever ended up doing so. However, Gates said Manafort told him Craig contacted people identified on the list of contacts.

Alex Van Der Zwaan was a Skadden Associate based in London and was brought on board because Skadden needed a Russian speaker. Van Der Zwaan ultimately became Craig's right-hand man in Ukraine and reported directly to Craig.

Gates was unsure why Skadden didn't file under FARA, but recalled they hired FTI because Craig and Skadden didn't want to be involved in a full blown media strategy. Gates recalled Manafort telling him Skadden was going to look into whether they needed to file under FARA.

Gates recalled having approximately two one-on-one meetings with Craig. He also attended meetings with Craig, Manafort and others in NYC once or twice. Manafort had more direct/regular interaction with Craig; however, Gates would regularly receive downloads from Manafort.

Emails/Documents Shown to Gates:

Tab 11 - Gates was shown an email chain with Bates stamps SAU 020823 - 020825 which was a conversation between Gates and Van Der Zwaan on May 1, 2012 with the subject "Re: Call". Gates was unsure the origin of the PR information; however, he believed this was around the time FTI was hired.

Tab 21 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachments with Bates stamps SAU 021116 - 021130 which was a conversation between Gates and Van Der Zwaan on July 17, 2012 with the subject "Project Veritas - Communications Strategy". [redacted] was Gates' initial contact at FTI; however, he was replaced by Jonathan Hawker because he [redacted] was difficult to deal with.

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Gates was questioned about the Skadden Report Strategy Section starting on page 5 of the attachment. Although the Report was not yet finalized, Gates

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said Craig provided an outline of the project to Manafort. It was around this time Manafort was pressuring Hawker to finalize the Media Plan.

Gates said it was "aspirational" the Skadden Report would conclude the trial of Tymoshenko was valid. In fact, the Skadden Report did not conclude the trial was valid.

The journalists identified on pages 9-10 came from Hawker and FTI. It wasn't until later on that Craig advised he had a better contact at the NY Times [REDACTED]

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Tab 22 - Gates was shown an email chain with Bates stamps SAU 021132 - 021133 which was a conversation between Gates and Van Der Zwaan on July 18, 2012 with the subject "Project Veritas - Communications Strategy". Gates said the reference from Van Der Zwaan that Greg and [REDACTED] wanted him to speak with Gates urgently involved two separate conversations Van Der Zwaan had with each.

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As it related to his conversation with Craig, Van Der Zwaan told Gates that he sat down with Craig to discuss the plan and he (Craig) had concerns with the overall intensity of the plan.

As it related to his conversation with [REDACTED] Van Der Zwaan told Gates [REDACTED] wanted additional people added.

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Tab 24 - Gates was shown an email chain with Bates stamp SAU 030158 which was a conversation between Gates, [REDACTED] Hawker and Van Der Zwaan on July 29, 2012 with the subject "Re: Media Plan". Van Der Zwaan requested all discussions about the media plan be sent via private email. Van Der Zwaan indicated that after speaking with Craig about this arrangement he felt more comfortable with it.

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Gates was also shown an attachment to Tab 24, a Memorandum from [REDACTED] to PJM, dated July 27, 2012 with the subject "SA Report - Media Plan (Bates stamps SAU 030154 - 030157)". Item number 6 in the Report Release section referenced briefing a small number of international journalists in advance of the publication of the Skadden Report. Gates said at this stage they were still having discussions with Craig on what or what not he would be willing to do. Those discussions were primarily between Manafort and Craig and Gates would subsequently be briefed down by Manafort.

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As previously mentioned, on occasion Gates communicated with Van Der Zwaan and Hawker via private email. They also communicated via telephone and in-person. Gates said they would use private emails to send draft sections of the Skadden Report to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and to also highlight

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changes to the Media Plan and Report. It was Gates' understanding that Van Der Zwaan was sharing all changes and updates with Craig. The private emails were used more as an intermediary so the conversations weren't sent through a Skadden server. Skadden wanted to maintain the perception of independence.

Gates never had a conversation with Craig about the use of private emails.

Tab 25 - Gates was shown an email from Gates to Van Der Zwaan with Bates stamp SAU 021141 on July 30, 2012 with the subject "Call". Gates assumed this was in reference to the revised Media Plan. When asked if Craig would have approved Van Der Zwaan furnishing an advance/draft copy of the Skadden Report, Gates said absolutely.

Tab 34 - Gates was shown an email from Gates to Van Der Zwaan with an attachment with Bates stamps SAU 147989 - 147994 on September 19, 2012 with the subject "Here". Gates said the attachment was a memo written by Manafort for Craig following up on suggested changes to the Skadden Report.

Gates was questioned about the Harvard Club (NYC) meeting between Manafort, Gates, Hawker and Craig. It was his recollection the purpose of the meeting was to push for the finalization of the Report and to discuss what Craig would be willing to do as part of the GR (Government Relations) and PR (Public Relations) rollout. Prior to the meeting, Manafort and Craig met alone to discuss Craig's assistance in the rollout. Manafort told Gates and Hawker he would be able to get Craig to agree to do a few things.

The actual meeting at the Harvard Club lasted approximately two hours, of which 45 minutes was spent discussing the Media Plan. In the end, although they were unable to get as much assistance from Craig on the Media Plan rollout, Craig agreed to provide an advance copy of the report and brief it to [redacted] (NY Times). Gates said it was critical to have what was perceived to be a neutral article written by a prominent media outlet like the NY Times.

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[redacted] name came up during both at the pre-meeting and the actual meeting. Gates said the reason for [redacted] and the NY Times was for perception right out the box. Gates recalled Craig saying if he used [redacted] he could help guide the story and set the stage. While Craig never expected the article to be 100% positive, he wanted the Report to be taken seriously and to not be considered a whitewash.

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Tab 95 - Gates was shown an email and attachments which was a conversation between Hawker, Manafort, Gates, Konstantin Kilimnik, Craig and Van Der

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Zwaan with Bates stamps FTI 005805 - 005834 on September 23, 2012 with the subject "Documents". The documents referenced included an agenda for the Harvard Club meeting to discuss the proposed media plan. Gates confirmed a copy of the agenda was distributed to everyone in attendance at the meeting. Gates recalled they went through every item on the agenda to include the role of Craig. It was Gates' understanding Craig felt more comfortable talking with politicians (GR) on the background of the Skadden Report more than he did with the media (PR).

Action number 7 on the Master Control Grid called for the "Engagement with Bloomberg". Gates believed Craig volunteered to contact Bloomberg and it was on his list of items to do; however, he doesn't think he did.

Action Number 6 on the Master Control Grid called for Craig to meet with [redacted] and [redacted] Gates did not believe these meetings ever took place.

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The SA Report Media Plan Overview proposed leaking a copy of the Skadden Report to the Bloomberg Bureau in Washington, DC. As previously stated, Gates believed Craig volunteered to contact Bloomberg and while it was on his list of items to do, he doesn't think he did. That being said, Gates said if anyone would have leaked the Skadden Report to Bloomberg it would have been Craig.

Action Number 21 Master Control Grid called for Craig to brief the Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights. Gates did not recall Craig agreeing to do this.

Action Number 22 Master Control Grid called for Craig to Brief [redacted] and [redacted] Gates recalled Craig agreed to do this prior to the Harvard Club meeting. As previously stated, Gates did not believe these meetings took place.

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Action Number 24 Master Control Grid called for Craig to engage with US Media. Besides the NY Times [redacted] Gates did not recall any other US Media contacted by Craig.

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Action Numbers 25-30 Master Control Grid called for Craig travel to Brussels and Moscow for roundtable discussions. Gates believed Craig agreed to do this prior to the Harvard Club meeting; however, he said it never took place.

Action Number 21 Master Control Grid called for Craig to engage with US Political Stakeholders and the UK Ambassador to the US. Gates could not recall if Craig ever did this.

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One of the documents attached by Hawker was the Project Veritas - Master Questions and Answer Document. Gates said this document was prepared by Hawker for the MOJ and would have been discussed at the meeting. Gates could not recall if Craig raised any concerns it.

Tab 40 - Gates was shown an email which was a conversation between Hawker, Gates and Van Der Zwaan with Bates stamps SAU 026067 dated September 24, 2012 with the subject "Problem". Gates did not recall what the problem was.

Tab 41 - Gates was shown an email and attachments which was a conversation between Hawker, Craig, Manafort and Gates with Bates stamps SAU 026698 and SAU 026701 - 026710 dated September 24, 2012 with the subject "Draft Messaging". Gates said this email and documents were shared post (after) the Harvard Club meeting in an effort to shore up the Media Plan.

Gates was shown an email chain with Bates stamps FTI 004504 - 004505 dated September 24-25, 2012 which was a conversation between Hawker, Craig, Manafort and Gates with the subject "Draft Messaging". Gates believed Craig had a follow-up call with Hawker and he (Hawker) then sent out a revised Media Plan.

Tab 96 - Gates was shown an email chain with Bates stamp FTI 002246 dated September 25, 2012 which was a conversation between Gates and Hawker. Gates recalled one of the issues Hawker needed to discuss with Craig was the validity of the Tymoshenko Trial. The MOJ wanted the Skadden Report to say the trial was valid.

Tab 42 - Gates was shown an email chain with Bates stamp PDG 00045001 which was sent by Gates to Mercury and Podesta on September 26, 2012 with the subject "Meeting Agenda". The body of the email referenced a meeting agenda for the DC Consultants (Mercury and Podesta). Gates said Mercury and Podesta had better connections for outreach to US Politicians and that Mercury would provide their recommendations for media outreach.

Tab 98 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachments between Gates and Hawker with Bates stamps SAU FTI 001385 - 001395 dated September 24, 2012 with the subject "Document". The documents attached were the Project Veritas Media Plan as modified after review by Mercury and Podesta. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bloomberg, was identified as a US journalist to receive a background brief by FTI and Skadden. Gates believed [REDACTED] name was furnished by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] but that it might have also come from Craig. Gates said there was no reference to the NY Times because it was already in the works and they didn't want anyone to know about the NY Times, to include Mercury and Podesta. Gates recalled having discussions about this matter with Manafort and Hawker.

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Gates was questioned about the names of US contacts identified to be briefed (Bates stamp FTI 001392). Gates believed Harry Reid and Richard Durbin were included because Craig had a past relationship with them. Gates recalled Craig saying he would reach out to them. The other contacts came from Mercury and/or Podesta and Gates was unsure if they were ever briefed.

Tab 45 - Gates was shown an email and attachment which was a conversation between Hawker, Manafort, Gates and Kilimnik with Bates stamps FTI 003739 - 003743 dated October 2, 2012 with the subject "Master Grid". Gates stated the attachment was the European media rollout. According to Gates, the messaging would say the Skadden Report was independent and determined the Ukrainian Government did some things right and some things wrong. However, the Skadden Report would not state the Government was totally in the right.

The Domestic Strategy as referenced on Bates stamp 0037742 was a reference to the Ukrainian Domestic Strategy.

Tab 97 - Tab 45 - Gates was shown an email and attachment from Gates to Hawker with Bates stamps FTI 007384 dated October 2, 2012 with the subject "Matrix - Actions". Gates identified the attached document as the DC Consultant (Mercury and Podesta) Media Plan. Gates recalled at some point Mercury and/or Podesta expressed some hesitancy to use the NY Times because they did not think it would be a positive article.

Tab 48 - Gates was shown an email chain which was a conversation between Manafort, Gates, Hawker and Kilimnik with Bates stamp FTI 003135 dated October 5, 2012 with the subject "update". In the email Manafort requested a copy of the most recent Media Plan and referenced that GC (Craig) was coming back from the Middle East that day. Gates recalled Craig and [redacted] shared a client in the Middle East and were there together.

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When questioned about the delay in releasing the Skadden Report, Gates recalled Craig asked them to hold-off so he could attempt to interview Tymoshenko again. Gates also recalled the MOJ had some concerns with the Skadden Report and there was talk about them not releasing it. Podesta also had concerns with how the Skadden Report would be perceived in the US.

It was also around this time Mercury was looking into reaching out to the media, to include [redacted] speaking with [redacted]

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Tab 99 - Tab 42 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachments between Gates and Hawker with Bates stamps FTI 025794 - 025807 on November 26, 2012 with the subject "Report". The Master Control Grid had a noted task

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at 1700 for GC to provide background briefing at the request of the US Journalist on Tuesday at 1700. Gates said this was a reference to Craig reaching out to [REDACTED] (NY Times).

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The Master Control Grid also had a noted task at 2200 for Bloomberg to release story for print on Tuesday morning. To the best of his recollection this was going to be handled by [REDACTED] (Mercury).

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Gates said it was around this time, or maybe even in October, Manafort had him tell [REDACTED] about Craig and the NY Times. [REDACTED] pushed back and asked why not the Washington Post.

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Gates recalled the closer they got to the release of the Skadden Report it became clear Craig was going to be less involved in the overall Media Plan rollout.

Gates was unsure who put the reference to John Kerry on Bates stamp 025798 although they were aware Craig was close with him.

Gates could not identify anyone referenced from the USA Section (Bates stamps 025804 - 025807) that Craig agreed to reach out to.

Gates said it was Hawker's idea for a possible Vanity Fair article on Craig as referenced at 1900 on Bates stamp 025808. It was never pursued as far as Gates was aware.

Tab 100 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachment which was a conversation between Gates, Kilimnik, Manafort and Hawker with Bates stamps FTI 026136 on December 5, 2012 with the subject "Updated Docs". The attached Master Control Grid called for courtesy calls on December 12th. One of the individuals identified to call was Obama. Gates did not recall any discussions about reaching out to President Obama and opined it was most likely a reference to the Obama Administration.

Gates did not recall if Craig or anyone reached out to (Harry) Reid. It was also his understanding Mercury was going to reach out (John) Boehner.

The attached Master Control Grid called for the Report to be given to [REDACTED] of the NY Times who would then have an exclusive on the material for 24 hours. Gates recalled being aware of the date of this email that Craig had already reached out to [REDACTED]. A copy of this Master Control Grid would have been sent/shared with Craig, Gates, Manafort and Kilimnik. Kilimnik would have then had it translated to share with the Ukrainian Government.

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Gates opined that individuals might have been added to the distribution list to help bolster the Media Plan to the MOJ.

It was the idea that either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Craig would reach out to the key stakeholders. However, Gates was unaware if anyone was actually contacted.

[REDACTED] and an UNSUB were also hired by Manafort to conduct outreach during the rollout.

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TAB 101 - Gates was shown an email from Hawker to Gates with Bates stamps FTI 026230 December 6, 2012 with the subject "Docs". Hawker informed Gates everything has gone to Alex's (Van Der Zwaan) gmail, but that he can't get a hold of Greg (Craig). Gates was unsure why Hawker was unable to get a hold of Craig. Gates said he can't say for sure that Craig saw the attached Master Control Grid; however, he recalled being told by Van Der Zwaan around the time of this email that Craig received the assignments.

Gates never heard Craig didn't want to talk with the NY Times.

Tab 55 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachment which was a conversation between Gates, [REDACTED] Hawker, Kilimnik and Van Der Zwaan with Bates stamps SAU 030582 - 030592 on December 10, 2012 with the subject "Master Control Grid consult - SA Report.xlsx". Gates did not know if Craig saw the attached Master Control Grid, but said he sent it to Van Der Zwaan and opined he forwarded it to Craig.

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Hawker was tasked to organize Craig's schedule to start (implement) the Media Plan rollout.

Tab 56 - Gates was shown an email chain which was a conversation between Gates, [REDACTED] Van Der Zwaan and [REDACTED] with Bates stamps SAU 038013 on December 11, 2012 with the subject "Warsaw". It was Gates' understanding Craig was going to travel to Europe to brief a select group of European leaders, but had an issue with his flight. [REDACTED] wanted Van Der Zwaan to meet with members of the media, but Craig would not approve it. Gates said it was his speculation, and speculation only, Craig did not want anyone from Skadden besides himself doing any media outreach.

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Gates did not know what happened regarding the off the record briefing request by ANSA.

It was Gates' understanding that Craig took a middle of the road approach when speaking with the NY Times [REDACTED] Per a debrief by Manafort, he (Manafort) pushed Craig to be on record when speaking with the NY Times.

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Craig's willingness to engage the media showed a level of credibility for the Report and for the overall public perception of the findings. Manafort knew it was critical for Craig do it. Gates recalled there was a lot of give and take leading up to what Craig finally agreed to do. According to Gates, Craig was not only trying to please the client, but he also didn't want to damage his reputation.

Gates said Craig approached Manafort during the Summer (2012) to discuss additional work opportunities in the Ukraine. Those discussions continued into early 2013 and centered more on the business side and not GR. Van Der Zwaan was going to be Skadden's point person. Gates recalled Manafort telling him he helped arrange meetings between Craig and few Ukrainian Oligarchs.

Tab 102 - Gates was shown an email from Hawker to Gates with Bates stamp FTI 026366 on December 11, 2012 with the subject "In reception". Gates did not recall this email or what it was about.

Tab 103 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachment between Gates, Hawker and Van Der Zwaan with Bates stamps FTI 025218 - 025223 on December 11, 2012 with the subject "Contact List". To the best of his knowledge, no one from this list was contacted.

Tab 57 - Gates was shown an email from Gates to Van Der Zwaan with Bates stamps SAU 247167 on December 11, 2012 with the subject "Report". After reviewing this email and the last tab reviewed (Tab 103), Gates recalled instructing Van Der Zwaan to send a copy of the Skadden Report to those contacts identified. Gates opined that Mercury and Podesta would have done the advanced outreach.

Tab 58 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachment which was a conversation between Gates, Kilimnik, Van Der Zwaan, [redacted] and Hawker with Bates stamps SAU 007652 - 019858 on December 12, 2012 with the subject "Report - Information. Gates recalled being told by Van Der Zwaan that [redacted] didn't want Van Der Zwaan meeting with any reporters. Gates also recalled there was concern about Manafort's and MOJ's input to the Skadden Report.

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Tab 104 - Gates was shown an email chain and attachment which was a conversation between Gates, Kilimnik, Manafort, [redacted] and Hawker with Bates stamps FTI 027120 - 027124 on December 13, 2012 with the subject "Report Coverage". Gates recalled Manafort was a little upset with the NY Times article because it started off by saying Skadden concluded

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Tymoshenko's legal rights were violated and that she was wrongly imprisoned. The compromise was the article stated the prosecution wasn't politically motivated.

While Manafort wasn't happy with Craig's quote about leaving it to others the question whether the prosecution was politically motivated, the news article(s) would have been a lot worse if not for Craig speaking to [REDACTED] (NY Times). According to Gates, this was the strategy and it was worth the risk.

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Gates could not recall if Craig was upset about the article published in the Telegraph.

Gates was shown an email chain which was a conversation between Gates, Manafort and [REDACTED] with Bates stamps ES 00012 - 00015 on September 19, 2012 with the subject "an urgent request ON IT". Gates recalled this involved a pending US Senate Resolution re: Tymoshenko. Initially Gates could not recall having any discussions with Craig about reaching out to Durbin; however, it's possible during one of his one on one meetings with Craig he brought up the topic. Gates recalled Craig might have told him he would look into it and that he knew the people in the State Department. Although his take was Craig was reluctant to help at all, Gates still believed Craig was going to make the call.

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Tab 35 - Gates was shown an email chain between Gates and [REDACTED] with Bates stamp PDG 00045091 on December 19, 2012 with the subject "URGENT". Gates acknowledged reaching out to [REDACTED] and briefing him on the pending resolution and asking for his assistance. Gates recalled [REDACTED] expressed a willingness to assist, but was unsure if he contacted anyone. However, Gates believed [REDACTED] attempted to contact (John) Kerry.

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As previously stated, Gates recalled Skadden was looking into whether or not they needed to file under FARA and that they might have spoken with [REDACTED].

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(Note: It was agreed to meet with Gates at a later date to further discuss FARA.)

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As mentioned in previous interviews, Gates used several encrypted email applications to include Viber. Gates would often use Viber to talk with Van Der Zwaan. He never used Viber or any encrypted application to communicate with Craig.


Gates identified the following two telephone numbers he had saved in his cell phone for Craig : [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security number [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E. Street SW, Washington, D.C. 20546. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] was accompanied by his attorney, [Redacted] Esq. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Prior to the interview, ASC Zelinsky, [Redacted] executed a proffer agreement. A signed copy of the agreement will be maintained in a physical 1A.

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[Redacted] advised he attended [Redacted] [Redacted] for [Redacted] in 2014. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] described [Redacted] [Redacted]

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[Redacted] interacts with [Redacted] frequently via text message, and sees [Redacted] in person approximately once every two months.

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Investigation on 08/15/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/16/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Political Activity

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Prior to the 2016 Presidential election, [Redacted] was the chairman of the [Redacted] said [Redacted] has given money to the [Redacted] in the past. [Redacted] was often solicited for money and donations.

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In 2016, [Redacted] was introduced and began working with [Redacted] [Redacted] who are extremely well connected to the political elite. After being courted by [Redacted] [Redacted] wanted to start a [Redacted] and [Redacted] was intended to aggregate capital and support Republican causes. Though the [Redacted] initially supported a broad range of candidates, [Redacted] said the [Redacted] quickly turned to Donald Trump (Trump). [Redacted]

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In 2016, [Redacted]
[Agent Note: [Redacted]]
[Redacted] [Agent
Note: [Redacted]

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A text message in which [Redacted]

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b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/15/2018 , On 08/15/2018 , Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7A

[Redacted]


b6
b7C
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** Admin Note: Documents shown to [Redacted] during the interview are included in a physical 1A. **

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



b7A
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On August 1, 2017, [Redacted], social security number

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] home address [Redacted]

[Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted]

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 08/01/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/09/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/01/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]


b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/30/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted]
[Redacted] was interviewed at the law offices of [Redacted]
[Redacted] in the presence of his attorney, [Redacted].
Participating in the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted]
[Redacted] SA [Redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

Investigation on 10/09/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/10/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 2 of 11

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 3 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 4 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 5 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (10.09.2018), On 10/09/2018, Page 6 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 7 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of _____

, On

10/09/2018

, Page

8 of 11

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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b7A
b7C

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b7A
b7C

b6
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On

10/09/2018

, Page

9 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 10 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]


(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(10.09.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/09/2018, Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/13/2018

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

Background:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/06/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/06/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] August

Continuation of FD-302 of 3, 2018, On 08/06/2018, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] August

Continuation of FD-302 of 3, 2018, On 08/06/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Walid Phares trip to Egypt:

WALID PHARES was well known in Egypt from his many media appearances. In 2013, PHARES wrote articles against the Muslim Brotherhood. These articles made PHARES popular with the current government of Egypt.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] August

Continuation of FD-302 of 3, 2018, On 08/06/2018, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

[Redacted] PHARES also had a big title that made him look prominent in the campaign. [Redacted] had no information on other members of the TRUMP Campaign. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

El-Sisi and Trump meeting at UNGA:

[Redacted] is not aware of how the meeting between EL-SISI and TRUMP came together and was actually surprised that it happened. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

The tone in Egypt was divided in regards to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] The TRUMP campaign released a very positive statement about

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] August

Continuation of FD-302 of 3, 2018, On 08/06/2018, Page 5 of 5

the future of U.S./Egypt relations under a TRUMP presidency. The readout mentioned the strategic relationship and partnerships between the two countries.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Egypt's stance on U.S. elections:

Since the 1980 election, Egypt has been strictly neutral. Egyptian President ANWAR SADAT had been sure of the re-election of President JIMMY CARTER, even referring to him as "my friend CARTER." When President RONALD REAGAN was elected this stance harmed U.S./Egypt relations. SADAT was assassinated a short time later.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/13/2018

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FDIC

OIG Agent [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6 per FDIC/OIG
b7C per FDIC/OIG

b6
b7C

Paul Manafort

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/21/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person, Other (text message))

b6
b7C

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2017

b7E

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 11/21/2017, Page 2 of 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 11/21/2017, Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 11/21/2017, Page 4 of 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 11/21/2017, Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/21/2017 , Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] explained that after she heard Manafort and Gates were being investigated, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] took the interviewing agents to her desk area and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

The notes from conversations provided by [Redacted] included:

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

The emails provided by [Redacted] included:

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/21/2017 , Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Following this interview, [Redacted] sent a text message to SA [Redacted] which read as follows: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
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The documents shown to [Redacted] and provided by [Redacted] have been attached to this FD 302.

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[Redacted]


b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 11/21/2017, Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/06/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview was [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was provided with a Proffer Agreement and advised that the interview was voluntary. [Redacted] was also advised that if she chose to answer questions, she needed to be truthful in her answers.

Background

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/05/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/06/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer, On 12/05/2017, Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Paul Manafort

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer, On 12/05/2017, Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Google'd Manafort and learned he had worked for Reagan and Bush. [Redacted] thought Manafort was "a big deal".

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer _____, On 12/05/2017, Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer, On 12/05/2017, Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b3 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b3 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b3 per DOJ/OIP

Documents

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer, On 12/05/2017, Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer, On 12/05/2017, Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/22/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed via telephone. Present for the interview via telephone were [Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing personnel and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Large Redacted Area]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C
b7E

Investigation on 06/14/2018 at [Redacted] (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/15/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 06/14/2018, Page 2 of 3

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Large Redacted Area]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b3 Per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 06/14/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Large Redacted Area]

b3 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/02/2019

On 12/19/2018, [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] had a telephone call with Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the parties on the call, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Agent Note: [Redacted]]

[Redacted] and [Redacted] The individual has also been identified as [Redacted] by a restaurant manager in Boca Raton, FL. To date, the true identity of the unidentified male is unknown.]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was not expecting a call from Special Counsel's Office (SCO) investigators. [Redacted] said he thought [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] advised he had to tell [Redacted] that [Redacted] said he had no idea what [Redacted] and didn't know if he went by [Redacted]. [Redacted] added that [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

When asked if he lives with [Redacted] said he guessed [Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/19/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Phone Call with [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] 12/19/2018 , On 12/19/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] said he thought anything [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3 Per DOJ/OIP


b6
b7C

SA [Redacted] advised [Redacted] that it was a crime to lie to the FBI. [Redacted] said he was not lying and was "straight up" on what he had said on the call.

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

On 12/03/2018, [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] had a telephone call with Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the parties on the call, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

ASC Zelinsky advised [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] neither confirmed nor denied this information.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 12/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/14/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

On 12/04/2018, [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] had a telephone call with Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, ASC Andrew Goldstein, FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the parties on the call, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Agent Note: A follow-up phone call with [Redacted] was unsuccessful.]


b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/04/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/14/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

On 12/05/2018, [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] had a telephone call with Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the parties on the call, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

ASC Zelinsky advised [Redacted] that at the time of the captioned phone call, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] said [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] said the name [Redacted] did not want his [Redacted]

b3 Per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] called the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) later in the day regarding [Redacted]

b3 Per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] asked ASC Zelinsky to provide him with examples of case law addressing the issue of [Redacted]

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/05/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/17/2018

by [Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/08/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On Monday, July 31, 2017, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Senior Financial Investigator (SFI) [Redacted] [Redacted] Office of the Special Counsel, and Special Agent [Redacted] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - Office of the Inspector General. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing SFI and Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] furnished the following information:

b6 per FDIC/OIG
b7C per FDIC/OIG

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

It was explained to [Redacted] that the interviewing SFI and Agent had a Grand Jury Subpoena from the Office of the Special Counsel to serve to him for [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 07/31/2017 at [Redacted] New York, United States (Phone) [Redacted]
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/04/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~LES~~) [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] July 31 2017 , On 07/31/2017 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2018

Alexandria Sheriff's Captain [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] [Redacted] Present during a portion of this interview was Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Paul Manafort is an inmate at the Alexandria Sheriff's Jail.

Manafort's defense team requested they be able to provide a laptop for Manafort's use in the jail so Manafort could review discovery. Initially, they requested the laptop be used while Manafort was meeting with his attorneys. This request was denied, but the ability for Manafort to review discovery in the law library on his own was granted. The request came through the US Marshal's Service, [Redacted]

b6 per USMS
b7C per USMS
b7F per USMS

Through [Redacted] Manafort's defense team was told the laptop could be provided, but it would have to inspected to ensure it was not being used to communicate with anyone and could not connect to the internet. [Redacted] did not believe any explicit waiver of right to privacy in the laptop was signed, however it was made clear through [Redacted] to Manafort's legal team that the laptop would be inspected to ensure it complied with the above parameters.

b6 per USMS
b7C per USMS
b7F per USMS

b6
b7C

Manafort was only permitted to use the laptop at certain times and only in the jail's law library. When not being used for this purpose, the laptop was maintained in the Watch Commander's office.

When the laptop was originally provided to the jail, a flash drive was also provided which contained discovery. At some point during the week of August 13-17, 2018, Manafort's legal team said they were going to pick up the flash drive and return it the following week. However, when they came to pick up the flash drive, they picked up the laptop as well. [Redacted] did not know why the laptop was picked up at that time.

b6
b7C

Investigation on 08/21/2018 at Alexandria, Virginia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/10/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


(U) Alexandria Sheriff's Captain [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 08/21/2018, Page 2 of 2

On Tuesday August 21, 2018, Manafort's legal team returned the laptop with two flash drives. At that time, they said a password had been changed on the computer and they were unable to access a portion of it.

[Redacted] had his Information Technology Officer [Redacted] inspect the laptop when it was returned. [Redacted] confirmed a password had been changed and he could not access a portion of it. [Redacted]

[Redacted] did not have any further information on where the [Redacted]



b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

On 4/29/2018, SA [Redacted] SA [Redacted] and LA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] with a date of birth of [Redacted] a telephone number of [Redacted] and an email address of [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b6 Per CBP
b7C Per CBP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary. Furthermore, [Redacted] was advised that the interview [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7A
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/29/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/30/2018
by [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 04/29/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 04/29/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

Knowledge of

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subpoena Service


[Redacted]

was given a subpoena for testimony (attached here) at approximately 4:58 PM. Shortly thereafter, the interview concluded.

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -2

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
ON 06-02-2020

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/07/2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) JAMES BAKER, General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was interviewed at his office in FBI Headquarters by the writer and Special Agent [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents, and the nature of the interview, BAKER provided the following information:

b6 -1
b7C -1

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The interviewing agents advised BAKER that the purpose of the interview was to document his interactions with DAVID CORN, a journalist employed by the publication *Mother Jones*, in which CORN provided BAKER with documents from a former intelligence officer. This individual also was former FBI Confidential Human Source (CHS) codenamed [Redacted]. BAKER advised that he and CORN have been friends for years. On or about 11/6/2016 he spoke with CORN, and he (CORN) brought up to BAKER that a former intelligence official was passing information "around town" about Republican Presidential nominee DONALD TRUMP. He asked BAKER if the FBI wanted the information. BAKER advised him to send him the information so that he (BAKER) could pass it to the appropriate FBI personnel to evaluate. CORN then emailed BAKER the documents from the former intelligence official [Redacted]. After receiving the information BAKER forwarded the documents to WILLIAM PRIESTAP, the FBI's Assistant Director (AD) for Counterintelligence.

b7E -1

b7E -1

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Approximately two weeks after the Presidential election, CORN and BAKER spoke again about the matter, and CORN advised that some of the information provided by the former intelligence official [Redacted] was of such a salacious nature that CORN was afraid to publish it without corroborating it through a second source, or through citing the existence of an investigation by the U.S. government into the matter. BAKER advised that he did NOT/NOT discuss with CORN the existence of any FBI investigation into TRUMP or [Redacted] allegations.

b7E -1

b7E -1

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ During this conversation CORN also advised BAKER that [Redacted]

b7E -1

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/19/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b3 -1
b6 -1

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/22/2016

b7C -1
b7E -2

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of FBI General Counsel

Continuation of FD-302 of James Baker , On 12/19/2016 , Page 2 of 2

reports were also provided to Congressional Representative NANCY PELOSI and Representative ELIJAH CUMMINGS. CORN was aware that [Redacted] was surprised that his reporting did not get more attention in the media. BAKER and CORN have note had additional conversations on [Redacted] reports.

b7E -1


(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]

b3 -1
b6 -2
b7C -2
b7E -1

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ BAKER advised that he understood that [Redacted] reports were prepared for a Republican consultant who distributed them around Washington, D.C.

b7E -1

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed at his residence [Redacted] [Redacted] Special Agent [Redacted] was present and assisted with the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/04/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/09/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/04/2018, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

CORSI had a close relationship with Roger STONE (STONE). STONE gave CORSI access to TRUMP. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] had never met STONE.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was aware that STONE had a history with TRUMP, however TRUMP kept his distance from STONE.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/04/2018, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] recalled that it was the day when the Access Hollywood tape was made public and the PODESTA emails were released by WIKILEAKS. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(AGENT note: At approximately 11:00AM, [Redacted] requested some time to review [Redacted] to refresh his memory about his interactions with CORSI. Agents departed the residence until 12:30PM).

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/04/2018, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] STONE provided an inside connection for CORSI to TRUMP and CORSI relished that relationship.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

CORSI was supporting TRUMP from the beginning of TRUMP's candidacy for the position of President of the US.


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/31/2017

[Redacted] home address [Redacted]

[Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted]

[Redacted] was interviewed in his residence. Also present for a portion of the interview was [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

Investigation on 07/27/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/28/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/27/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP


b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/05/2018

[Redacted], date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres. Also present on the conference call was [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/24/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

(U) On 09/19/2018 Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] and [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at the [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] The interview was established by phone calls between [Redacted] and SA [Redacted] earlier on 09/19/2018 in which SA [Redacted] informed [Redacted] of the purpose of the interview. SA [Redacted] admonished [Redacted] that the interview was entirely voluntary and it could end at anytime. Additionally, SA [Redacted] requested [Redacted] answer all questions truthfully during the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing SAs, [Redacted] provided the following information:

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 09/19/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/19/2018, Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/19/2018, Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/19/2018, Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/19/2018, Page 5 of 7

(U) [Redacted]
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(U) [Redacted]
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/19/2018, Page 6 of 7

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/19/2018, Page 7 of 7

(U) [Redacted] provided his email address of [Redacted] for SA [Redacted] to contact.

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/10/2018

On 10/03/2018, [Redacted] white male, born [Redacted] [Redacted] Social Security Account Number [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of residence, [Redacted] Home Telephone [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] does not have a personal relationship with Jerome Corsi, nor is he in regular communication with Corsi. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] have never met Corsi in person, but spoke to him via telephone. [Redacted] when interacting with Corsi. They conversed with Corsi [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/03/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/04/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview - [Redacted], On 10/03/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/10/2018

On 10/03/2018, [Redacted] white female,
 born [Redacted] Social Security Account Number [Redacted] was
 interviewed at her place of residence, [Redacted]
 [Redacted] Home Telephone [Redacted] Cellular Telephone [Redacted]
 [Redacted] Email [Redacted] and [Redacted]
 After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the
 nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 10/03/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/04/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview - [Redacted], On 10/03/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
ON 09-09-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/04/2018

[Redacted] (Hereafter, [Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]
[Redacted] home address [Redacted]
[Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] social security
number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] was interviewed at
Starbucks, [Redacted]. After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the
nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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(Writers note: Prior to the start of the interview, [Redacted] was
advised the interview was voluntary, he could stop the interview at
any time or take a break. It was also explained that [Redacted]
veracity was paramount in the interview, [Redacted] stated he
understood and wanted to proceed with the interview).

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]
[Redacted] recognized
GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS (hereafter, PAPADOPOULOS). After confirming it
was PAPADOPOULOS [Redacted]

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[Redacted] h

[Redacted]

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~~Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated
20120629
Declassify On: 20421231~~

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Investigation on 04/03/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/04/2018

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by [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 04/03/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] At that point PAPADOPOULOS stated that [Redacted] knew of PAPADOPOULOS's contacts including JOSEPH MIFSUD (hereafter, MIFSUD) PAPADOPOULOS stated [Redacted] did not remember any other details regarding [Redacted]

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PAPADOPOULOS didn't bring up any other members of the TRUMP Campaign. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was a twitter follower of [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] could not remember anything else relevant about his conversation with PAPADOPOULOS nor did he have questions for the interviewing Agents.

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Writer informed [Redacted] that he has the right to discuss the topics covered in this interview, but writer asked [Redacted] to keep the interview confidential. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

A copy of the [Redacted] hand written notes, [Redacted] CpClear report, drivers license information and negative National Crime Information Center (NCIC) report are attached to this document and made part of the file.

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
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 04/03/2018, Page 3 of 3

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/11/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, was contacted by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 07/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone, Email)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/11/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] contact _____, On 07/10/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/30/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] address [Redacted] [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] [Redacted] was interviewed at her place of employment, [Redacted] in [Redacted] by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Agent [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Background

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] began working for Mercury Public Affairs (Mercury) in New York.

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Mercury

[Redacted] boss at Mercury was [Redacted] worked on

[Redacted]

Mercury had a government relations (GR) section prior to its acquisition of [Redacted] Clark & Weinstock; however, Mercury's GR section was not as robust [Redacted]. When Mercury acquired Clark & Weinstock it became Mercury/Clark & Weinstock (MCW). After this acquisition, [Redacted] role remained the same.

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ECFMU

Investigation on 09/26/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/29/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 2 of 9

[Redacted] recalled working on a client called the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU) sometime in 2012.

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[Redacted] first recollection of this client was when [Redacted] told her MCW had a new client [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The client was comprised of "rich people" who had a benefit in better Ukrainian-American relations. [Redacted] told [Redacted] Rick Gates was the point of contact. [Redacted] said Gates worked for Paul Manafort and was a "mover and shaker". [Redacted]

[Redacted] It was clear to [Redacted] that Gates was considered an important client.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] the ECFMU was described as an organization established by members of the Ukrainian ruling party, the Party of Regions (PoR) and funded by "oligarchs". The purpose of establishing the ECFMU was to create a favorable economic situation for the Ukrainian government which the oligarchs could use to enrich themselves and their businesses.

The fact that the ECFMU was a non-governmental organization (NGO) was not abnormal to [Redacted] explained that NGO's are established and used as vehicles by companies all of the time to relay a companies' message and add to the "echo chamber". [Redacted] gave an example of the "Real Cost Campaign". In this campaign, cement companies created a non-profit to promote the message that cement was better than asphalt. Although it was not abnormal for businesses to create and use an NGO to promote their message, [Redacted] thought it was abnormal for a sovereign government to do this.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 09/26/2017, Page 3 of 9

[redacted]
[redacted] Gates' agenda as it related to MCW to be centered around a few main issues. Namely, Ukraine's desire to become a member of NATO and the European Union, the fact that Yulia Tymoshenko deserved to be in jail, how Ukraine was working on economic and corruption reform, and that the upcoming elections needed to be seen as fair and free. [redacted]

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From the beginning of her work on this client, [redacted] understood that the ECFMU existed. [redacted] believed the ECFMU had a website already. [redacted] understanding was that the ECFMU was still in development stages and needed to be seen as a credible source in the US. [redacted]

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[redacted] was someone [redacted] could never get on the phone. [redacted] understood that [redacted]

At first, the ECFMU seemed legitimate to [redacted] and then things went "sideways". [redacted] gave a few examples of what she considered odd. MCW was being asked to obtain visas so Ukrainian government officials' wives could go shopping in Miami. MCW set up interviews with NPR and the Washington Post for visiting Ukrainian government officials only to have them cancel last minute. [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] was aware the ECFMU had public relations firms in Europe as well.

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FARA

The more MCW did for the ECFMU, the more [redacted] wondered how and why they did not register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). From early on in PDG's work for the ECFMU, reporters such as Rosie Gray from Buzzfeed and Eli Lake from the Daily Beast and Newsweek questioned why MCW was not registering under FARA for this work.

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[redacted] had never registered under FARA before and did not know what FARA was initially. Through conversations with [redacted] [redacted] and others at MCW, [redacted] realized MCW's work for the ECFMU required a FARA registration. Everyone [redacted] talked to about the topic was uncomfortable with the fact that

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 4 of 9

MCW had not registered under FARA. [Redacted] sense was the reason they did not register was because Gates did not want to. [Redacted] did not hear this from Gates directly, but that was her sense based upon conversations with others at MCW.

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[Redacted] understanding was that MCW needed to register under FARA if they were lobbying in the US for a foreign entity. [Redacted] knew MCW was setting up meetings for Ukrainian government officials with US government officials. [Redacted] said the work MCW did seemed more like "favors" for the Ukrainian government and work for the PoR. The ECFMU would just "get in the way".

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In conversations with [Redacted] believed [Redacted] wanted to register under FARA, but didn't because of Gates. [Redacted] [Redacted] was on calls with [Redacted] in which MCW employees complained that the work they were doing for Gates was work for the Ukrainian government and MCW needed to register under FARA. [Redacted] understood the issues people had and seemed like he was in agreement. [Redacted] wanted to do his best work for the client, but he was given strict orders from Gates not to register under FARA. [Redacted] would say, "technically" we work for an NGO.

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[Redacted] was present for some of the same discussions about why MCW didn't register under FARA. Similar to [Redacted] would say MCW worked for an NGO. [Redacted] It was obvious to [Redacted] that [Redacted] wanted to keep the ECFMU as a client because the retainer was high and [Redacted] considered Gates to be an influential person. Additionally, [Redacted] was trying to expand his international business. [Redacted] understood there was more money and more prestige in the international sector. Many foreign entities wanted to hire US firms because the US firms used more advanced digital tactics.

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[Redacted] spoke with [Redacted] about the FARA issue as well. [Redacted] seemed hesitant that MCW was not registered under FARA. [Redacted] was not involved in this client on a day to day basis. [Redacted] believed [Redacted] was brought in on certain aspects of the client for advice and as a sounding board.

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[Redacted] who worked on this client. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] had little communication with [Redacted]

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[Redacted] member of the Mercury team. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 5 of 9

[Redacted] talked about the FARA issue as well. [Redacted] just "did what he was told".

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] also talked with [Redacted] at Mercury [Redacted]
[Redacted] knew [Redacted] feelings about the ECFMU being controlled by the Ukrainian government.

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When [Redacted] began questioning MCW on the matter, it forced MCW to do research and try to answer a number of questions MCW had not been able to get the answers to earlier on. There were basic questions MCW could not answer about the ECFMU. [Redacted] tried to do research on the ECFMU, but it was difficult to learn much about them. Some of the basic, unanswered questions were: where was the money coming from, [Redacted] [Redacted] and what intellectual /education/research products did the NGO create and/or disseminate. When [Redacted] thought of think tanks, she thought of the Brookings Institute or the Heritage Foundation who had intellectual platforms, hosted round table discussions and were centers for influential ideas and thought. The ECFMU did not do this.

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No one [Redacted] spoke to understood exactly where the ECFMU's money came from. The only answer MCW got from Gates or [Redacted] was "rich people" in Russia or Ukraine. [Redacted] would say "rich people" who have a vested interest in closer relations between Ukraine and the European Union were funding the ECFMU. [Redacted] never got to the bottom of the issue and compared it to the rabbit hole in Alice in Wonderland.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview, On 09/26/2017, Page 6 of 9

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] only knew about the PoR. [REDACTED] understood the ECFMU was established by the Ukrainian government. [REDACTED] did not think the ECFMU was independent. In MCW's work for the ECFMU, everything done was political in nature. There were no cultural or educational events.

When [REDACTED] asked where Gates and [REDACTED] received their direction, they would say things like, "We'll get back to you." [REDACTED] felt Gates and [REDACTED] received direction from Yanukovych's office. Through [REDACTED] work for MCW, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed Yanukovych himself, or someone close to him was directing the ECFMU.

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[REDACTED]

was told [REDACTED] PoR members founded and funded the ECFMU. That coupled with the fact that everything MCW did for the ECFMU was really for PoR, namely, helping with gerrymandering, slandering Tymoshenko, and placing PoR-favorable op-eds, made it obvious to [REDACTED] that the PoR funded the ECFMU.

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[REDACTED] knew the ECFMU was "shady". [REDACTED] heard MCW was getting paid with checks which came from Cyprus. [REDACTED] knew Cyprus was a haven for Russian offshore money laundering. [REDACTED] could not recall exactly how she learned about the money coming from Cyprus. [REDACTED] may have seen some documentation of this, or may have been told this by someone else. [REDACTED] recalled her and her co-workers, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] about how the money was coming from Cyprus.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No one who worked on the ECFMU, including [REDACTED] believed the ECFMU was independent from the Ukrainian government. Neither [REDACTED] were in a position to argue with [REDACTED] about this topic.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 09/26/2017 , Page 7 of 9

[Redacted] did not see any correlation between the work MCW was doing for the ECFMU and the ECFMU's stated mission of fostering a closer EU-Ukraine relationship. Everything MCW did for the ECFMU was to give legitimacy to the Ukrainian government's message.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was told that budget was not an issue on this client. [Redacted] told [Redacted] there was no budget and to just ask for whatever she wanted and/or needed and they would make it happen.

[Redacted] believed the amount the ECFMU was paying Mercury was a high amount. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] never saw any proof that what [Redacted] and/or Gates said was true.

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Documents

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] knew from [Redacted] that Gates was Manafort's "number two". [Redacted] also knew Manafort was close to the President of Ukraine. [Redacted] it was clear that Manafort and Yanukovych were directing Gates and the ECFMU. [Redacted] knew Yanukovych was a "puppet" for Putin and [Redacted] heard Manafort had questionable dealings in Russia.

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 09/26/2017, Page 8 of 9

[Redacted]

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Other

[Redacted] never met Manafort. [Redacted] received her instructions from Gates. Gates approved strategy and content. [Redacted] had some input as well, but mainly [Redacted] did not know the hierarchy between [Redacted] and Gates. Both [Redacted] and Gates were on weekly calls. [Redacted] did not recall [Redacted] and Gates disagreeing about things.

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Much of the information [Redacted] found regarding the ECFMU and the Ukrainian government was written in Russian. [Redacted] found one media outlet in Ukraine which was in English. Most of what this news outlet wrote indicated the ECFMU was a front for PoR.

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At some point, Ukrainian President Yanukovich came to the US for a UN meeting. This occurred sometime in October 2012. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] recalled Yanukovich wanted to be interviewed at the same time President Obama was giving a speech. [Redacted] knew no notable reporter would miss Obama's speech to interview Yanukovich. [Redacted] [Redacted] the Wall Street Journal to do the interview. In the end, Yanukovich did not say anything newsworthy. Gates was angry because the article didn't end up on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. [Redacted]

The Skadden Report referred to a report the Ukrainian government paid a law firm to write. The report was supposed to review the Tymoshenko imprisonment and provide third party verification. [Redacted] wasn't sure who paid the law firm for the report. [Redacted] read and reviewed the report [Redacted]

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[Redacted] recalled the date of the report's release kept getting pushed back. [Redacted] saw a draft of the report [Redacted] [Redacted] but they were never approved. [Redacted] did not know why.

In 2016, [Redacted] told [Redacted] he was approached by Jeff Horowitz of the Associated Press. [Redacted] told [Redacted] he gave Horowitz her

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview, On 09/26/2017, Page 9 of 9

number as well. [REDACTED] was never contacted by Horowitz and never gave a statement to the press about this matter.

With regards to MCW's retention policy, [REDACTED] recalled it being quite relaxed. [REDACTED] believed there was a policy in place which indicated email had to be moved into folders or they would be deleted after a certain amount of time.

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
The documents shown to [REDACTED] were attached to this FD 302.

Follow-Up

Following this interview, [REDACTED] emailed SSA [REDACTED] some documents she found in her [REDACTED] email account. That email and attached documents have been attached to this FD 302.

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/05/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres. Also present on the conference call was [Redacted]

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[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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
Investigation on 05/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 05/24/2018

by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/16/2017

On August 14, 2017 at approximately 2:50 PM, Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted] attempted to locate and interview [Redacted] at his residence, located at [Redacted]

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Upon arrival at the residence, the Agents rang the doorbell and were met at the door by [Redacted]. The Agents identified themselves and requested a few minutes to speak with him. [Redacted] immediately declined the interview and inquired as to whether or not the Agents had a warrant. The Agents responded that they did not and again requested to speak with [Redacted] then relayed that it was not a good time for him to speak and requested that the Agents call him back at a later time. [Redacted] provided a phone number of [Redacted] where he could be reached.

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[Redacted] was provided with contact information for both SA [Redacted] and SA [Redacted]. Then interview was then discontinued.

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On May 15, 2017, at approximately 12:45 PM, SA [Redacted] attempted to reach [Redacted] at phone numbers [Redacted] and [Redacted]. Both attempts were met with no answer.


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Investigation on 08/14/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/15/2017
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2017

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On August 21, 2017, SSA [Redacted] received a telephone call from [Redacted] stated that he was not represented by attorney [Redacted] who he had spoken with but told [Redacted] that [Redacted] does not need representation for meeting with the FBI. [Redacted] explained that he wanted to cooperate and was willing to be interviewed without an attorney. [Redacted] explained he would check his schedule and email SSA [Redacted] to setup a time for the interview.

Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky also confirmed with [Redacted] that he no longer represented [Redacted]


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Investigation on 08/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/22/2017

by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/17/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]
[Redacted] social security account number (SSAN) [Redacted] was interviewed
[Redacted]
telephone number is [Redacted] and his email address is [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was advised that intentionally providing false statements to the interviewing Agents was a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] understood the nature of the interview to be a discussion about Russia and the 2016 campaign. [Redacted] stated his willingness to speak with the interviewing Agents about what he knew. [Redacted] was no longer represented by his attorney for this matter. [Redacted] relayed that in his opinion, this matter was a bunch of smoke and he hoped that the investigative findings would eventually be released so that those findings would be known to the public. [Redacted] inquired about the location of the interviewers current duty station and whether or not the Agents were detailed under the Special Counsel, ROBERT S. MUELLER III. The Agents confirmed that they were detailed to the Special Counsel Office in Washington, DC.

After the Agents attempted to interview [Redacted] on August 14, 2017, he prepared a document outlining his initial thoughts on the Special Counsel investigation. [Redacted] wanted to publish the article in the press, but ultimately chose not to do so. [Redacted] contemplated putting the names of the interviewing Agents in his article to the press. [Redacted] stated he had prepared the document in the interest of best serving the public.

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[Large Redacted Block]

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Investigation on 08/23/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/24/2017
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/23/2017, Page 2 of 8

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/23/2017, Page 3 of 8

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[Redacted] understood the FBI had attempted to interview [Redacted]. He had learned that information from speaking with [Redacted] also told [Redacted] about a recent news article related to this investigation, which was featured in the Washington Post. [Redacted] then inquired as to who else the interviewing Agents had spoken with, and who they had planned to interview in the future. [Redacted] relayed that he did not hold any employment in the administration, and that he considered himself to be neutral. [Redacted] then inquired as to whether or not the Agents had spoken with SAM CLOVIS (CLOVIS). [Redacted] described CLOVIS as having knowledge of the background of the foreign policy team; although CLOVIS was not very active after the team was stood up. CLOVIS was TRUMP's co-campaign chairman at the beginning of the campaign. Given that role, CLOVIS was active in formulating the blueprint of the foreign policy team.

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When asked if any campaign members brought up topics related to Russia, [Redacted] provided the names of PAPAPOULOS and CARTER PAGE (PAGE). Those two individuals were part of the foreign policy advisory team, but not part of the national security team. [Redacted] provided the names of [Redacted] individuals who were part of both teams; KEITH KELLOGG (KELLOGG), [Redacted] [Redacted] recalled [Redacted] was only present for one of the foreign policy meetings, which was held at the TRUMP TOWER in New York.

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[Redacted] viewed [Redacted] KELLOGG as being [Redacted]. [Redacted] did not see CLOVIS much, therefore [Redacted] could not speculate as to what CLOVIS' relationship was like with TRUMP. [Redacted] estimated he spoke with CLOVIS approximately [Redacted].

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] stated the remainder of the foreign policy advisers did not have anything to do with TRUMP. [Redacted] explained the foreign policy team would provide suggestions up to the national security team, but there was no evidence the information they pushed up the chain actually made its way to TRUMP. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2017, Page 4 of 8

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email communication referencing [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] JEFF SESSIONS (SESSIONS) took over as the nominal head of the group and J.D. GORDON (GORDON) inserted himself as the coordinator.

[REDACTED] was not sure how GORDON assumed that role but the others seemed to work their administrative issues through GORDON. [REDACTED] described SESSIONS as being too busy and high up for administrative tasks. [REDACTED] recalled there being a lot of jockeying for positions at the time of that meeting.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PAPADOPOULOS brought up a potential meeting with VLADIMIR PUTIN (PUTIN). When asked what the response was to that proposal, [REDACTED] recalled the more mature members thought it was a bad idea. When asked to provide further specifics about the context in which PAPADOPOULOS brought that topic up, [REDACTED] recalled PAPADOPOULOS relaying his thoughts on possibly setting up a meeting between PUTIN and the foreign policy team. [REDACTED] then relayed that some of the foreign policy guys were not politically savvy about stuff, and as a result, a lot of things were misconstrued by the media. [REDACTED] then explained that a lot of foreign governments wanted to meet with the TRUMP campaign team so it made sense to him.

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When asked what SESSIONS' response was to PAPADOPOULOS' proposal of the meeting with PUTIN, [REDACTED] could not recall exactly what SESSIONS had said, but surmised that SESSIONS would probably not have approved of such an idea. When asked if there were any other individuals who were interested in engaging with Russia, [REDACTED] stated he was only aware of instances related to PAPADOPOULOS and PAGE.

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[REDACTED] then explained that he generally advised against showing ones cards to the enemy, but sometimes it was good to keep your enemies close in certain situations. [REDACTED] described TRUMP as being a fresh, disruptive approach to many things. For that reason, [REDACTED] was brought in to help with the campaign; [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2017, Page 5 of 8

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[REDACTED]

In [REDACTED] mind, PAPADOPOULOS' statements were ultimately inconsequential after that meeting. [REDACTED] relayed that it was also the job of the foreign policy team to throw ideas out during the campaign, and that he believed there was nothing inappropriate about PAPADOPOULOS doing just that.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When asked if the subject of Ukraine surfaced [REDACTED] stated TRUMP did not see why the team should get involved in Ukraine, because it was not in their backyard. [REDACTED] then added that TRUMP held the same views about Germany and other countries.

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Later in the interview, [REDACTED] stated he could not remember if PAPADOPOULOS had actually brought up the idea of meeting with PUTIN; but if he did, then everyone would have remained silent about it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and could not recall whether TRUMP, or any of the other foreign policy team members, were encouraging or discouraging towards PAPADOPOULOS' idea.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of anything related to the alleged Russian hacking of computer servers at the DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE (DNC). [REDACTED] viewed the Special Counsel investigation as a spin-off from that alleged activity; of which he has seen no evidence to support the fact that the Russians were actually behind the hacking. [REDACTED] did not observe any activity in the TRUMP campaign which would support the idea of collusion with the Russian government. In his opinion, the TRUMP campaign was comprised of good guys. [REDACTED] relayed the campaign may have seen some sort of economic benefit with doing business with Russia in the future, but he could not think of anyone dumb enough to collude with Russia who would have the ability.

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[REDACTED] viewed the Russian collusion investigation and the hacking of the emails as being in two separate camps. [REDACTED] did not recall anyone in the campaign having substantive discussions about hacked emails, but recalled they had joked about how they would use such information against the other campaign. [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone in the TRUMP campaign who claimed the Russians had emails they wanted to disclose during the campaign.

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[REDACTED] remembered many articles in the media related to PAGE and his connections to Russia and relayed that PAGE had no campaign interactions with Russia. [REDACTED] opinion was the media had boosted the entire

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/23/2017, Page 6 of 8

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issue. In approximately [Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted] viewed PAGE as seemingly neutral but recalled that SESSIONS viewed him as shakey, and was supportive of the eventual sidelining of PAGE.

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PAGE was sidelined when STEVE BANNON (BANNON) and CONWAY were leading the campaign team. Prior to that, it was led by PAUL MANAFORT (MANAFORT) and COREY LEWANDOWSKI (LEWANDOWSKI). The foreign policy team in Washington DC dissolved after that incident and GORDON was considered Persona non-Grata (PNG) with the campaign. GORDON eventually left the campaign as a result of a fall out over not being paid by the campaign. [Redacted] recalled RICK DEARBORN (DEARBORN) and STEPHEN MILLER (MILLER) were also part of the campaign team after CLOVIS. SESSIONS was the first U.S. Senator to endorse TRUMP, and therefore he became the head of the campaign team in lieu of CLOVIS. SESSIONS brought both DEARBORN and MILLER to the campaign. WALID PHARES (PHARES) was part of the advisory team and was an expert in Middle Eastern matters. PHARES is a Lebanese Christian. JOHN MASHBURN (MASHBURN) worked for [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] had frequent contact with GORDON during the campaign, given that GORDON was a coordinator. [Redacted] was not sure if GORDON held that official title or if it merely stemmed from GORDON's prior relationship with SESSIONS. [Redacted]

[Redacted] KUBIC, [Redacted]

PAPADOPOULOS, and PAGE also attended the RNC. PAGE went on his own accord and PAPADOPOULOS may have met with a guy who gave a presentation on Israel. [Redacted] recalled it was allegedly at the RNC where SESSIONS met with the Russian Ambassador, though he had no direct information related to that event. [Redacted] recalled hearing about that meeting after it had happened, [Redacted]

[Redacted] was not aware of TRUMP having any impact on the GOP platform during the RNC.

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[Redacted]

The TRUMP campaign tried to appeal to moderates and elites and held weekly meetings or phone calls. On many occasions, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/23/2017, Page 7 of 8

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[Redacted] never viewed Russian hacking as being important, given the bigger issues that faced the world. [Redacted] had to explain the commitments and risks associated with each of those larger issues. [Redacted] then provided North Korea as being an example of a larger, emerging threat that they discussed.

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[Redacted] stated he was tired of the Cold War mentality because [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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When asked why PAPADOPOULOS left the campaign shortly after his interview with the INTERFAX news agency, [Redacted] stated [Redacted]
[Redacted]
PAPADOPOULOS and PAGE both had issues early in the campaign and they were the least qualified members of the team. [Redacted]
[Redacted] and it was determined that PAGE had to go because of all the negative publicity surrounding him in the media. The TRUMP campaign was behind in the poles at that time and they could not afford any negative publicity. PAGE was let go in August, after [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] In both cases, PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS were removed from the campaign team [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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Ultimately it was [Redacted] who decided to remove PAPADOPOULOS from the campaign as well. [Redacted] could not recall a specific incident resulting in PAPADOPOULOS' removal, but was aware of two articles that had been written about him in the media. One article was featured in the New York Times and the other was the Washington Post article that [Redacted] had told [Redacted] about.

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[Redacted] described the campaign as being loosely structured. The foreign policy advisory team, which both PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS were members of, was not actually part of the campaign team. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]
[Redacted] again relayed that a lot of foreign governments wanted to meet with the TRUMP team during that time period, [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/23/2017, Page 8 of 8

and recalled Europe was worried about TRUMP's views on NATO. When asked if he was close with REINCE PRIEBUS (PRIEBUS), [Redacted] stated he was not but he did have friends in the RNC.

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When asked who else the FBI should speak with about this matter,

[Redacted] recommended the Agents interview [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]. As of the date of this interview, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] advised the Agents that he was still subject to the non-disclosure agreement he had signed with the TRUMP organization [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] does not use the Skype application to make phone calls.


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The original documents provided by [Redacted] are being maintained for the file in a physical 1A envelope. Copies of those documents have been enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302.

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
ON 08-06-2020

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Date of entry 09/06/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

(U) On August 24, 2017, SSA [Redacted] contacted [Redacted] to see if he has any questions about [Redacted] the previous day. [Redacted] indicated that he [Redacted] SSA [Redacted] explained the FBI could assist with that if he wanted.

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI NSISC-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 08/24/2017 at [Redacted]
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/24/2017
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(U) Telephonic conversation with [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted]

, On 08/24/2017 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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
(U) [Redacted] indicated that he would still be available if the FBI has follow up questions for him. He will [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/12/2018

[Redacted] [PROTECT IDENTITY], date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] cell telephone [Redacted] home telephone [Redacted] home address [Redacted] was interviewed. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on January 22, 2018, [Redacted] provided his iPhone, model number [Redacted] serial number [Redacted] to the interviewing agents. [Redacted] signed an FD-941, Consent to Search Computer (s), providing his consent to search his iPhone [Redacted] [Redacted] was given an FD-597, Receipt for Property, for his iPhone. At approximately 10:15 p.m., Special Agent [Redacted] returned the iPhone to [Redacted] and [Redacted] signed another FD-597, Receipt for Property.

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Investigation on 01/22/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/22/2018
by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/29/2017

[Redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) was contacted on his mobile telephone, [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] and would re-contact the writer shortly.


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Investigation on 07/11/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/14/2017
by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/29/2017

[Redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) was contacted on his mobile telephone, [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] will be providing [Redacted] contact information to the writer.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 07/14/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/17/2017
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (PROTECT IDENTITY) _____, On 07/14/2017, Page 2 of 2


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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/12/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On April 18, 2017, [Redacted] work address [Redacted] [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of business, [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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
Investigation on 04/18/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/08/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/13/2018

On Monday, May 14, 2018, [Redacted]

[Redacted] appeared at the Office of the Special Counsel [Redacted]

[Redacted] Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann, Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and [Redacted] attorney, [Redacted] furnished the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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Investigation on 05/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/01/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted], On 05/14/2018, Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted], On 05/14/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2017

On August 2, 2017, Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] attempted an interview of Aaron Nevins, residence address [Redacted] [Redacted] Florida.

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At approximately 7:30 a.m., SA [Redacted] arrived at Nevins' residence. SA [Redacted] knocked and Nevins answered the door. After being advised of the identities of the agents and purpose of the visit, Nevins requested agents contact his attorney. Agents were previously unaware Nevins had legal counsel. Nevins went inside to obtain contact information for his counsel and shortly thereafter returned to the door and provided agents with counsel's contact information. Agents advised they would follow up with his counsel as requested.

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The provided counsel contact information was as follows:

[Redacted]

Email: [Redacted]


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Office: [Redacted]

Mobile: [Redacted]

Investigation on 08/02/2017 at [Redacted] Florida, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/14/2017
by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/05/2018

On October 16, 2018, FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] attempted to locate and interview [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] at his residence located at [Redacted]

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Agents arrived at [Redacted] at approximately 9:00 AM and [Redacted] Agents attempted to make contact with [Redacted] by ringing the doorbell for [Redacted] Those attempts were met with negative results.

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At approximately 10:00 AM, Agents began attempts to reach [Redacted] by calling him at telephone number [Redacted] After several unsuccessful attempts SA [Redacted] left a voicemail. SA [Redacted] identified himself and relayed the intent to speak with [Redacted] At around 1:30 PM, SA [Redacted] made a subsequent phone call to [Redacted] and was able to successfully make contact with him. During the call, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] immediately asked SA [Redacted] to spell his full name and SA [Redacted] did so. [Redacted] inquired as to the nature of the interview and SA [Redacted] informed that it pertained to [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] stated he would be willing to meet with the Agents and relayed that he [Redacted] SA [Redacted] told [Redacted] the interview would primarily focus on the details surrounding [Redacted] and that the Agents did not wish to speak with him about [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] agreed to meet with the Agents in [Redacted] on the following day. [Redacted] and he preferred to meet with the Agents somewhere near that location. SA [Redacted] confirmed the Agents would travel [Redacted] to meet with him and both parties agreed to a tentative time of 2:00 PM.

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b7C

Investigation on 10/26/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/05/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Attempt to locate and interview [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

, On

10/26/2018

, Page

2 of 2

[Redacted] was informed that SA [Redacted] would call him on the following day after a location for the interview was identified.

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b7C


Later that afternoon, [Redacted] sent SA [Redacted] two text messages confirming the interview location and time on the following day. A screen shot of the exchange is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SA [Redacted] took a photograph of [Redacted] which is also enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.

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b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/08/2018

On January 08, 2018 at approximately 3:30 PM, Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] telephoned [Redacted] and spoke with [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] [Redacted] resides at [Redacted] New York, New York 10028.

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SA [Redacted] identified himself as an FBI Agent currently assigned to the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, DC. SA [Redacted] requested an interview with [Redacted] who provided his availability for an interview on January 11, 2018, at 2:00 PM. [Redacted] requested the interview take place at [Redacted] in New York and SA [Redacted] confirmed the date, time, and location.

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b7C

[Redacted] stated he believed the Special Counsel's investigation was bullshit and that he was not aware of any evidence of collusion between the DONALD J. TRUMP campaign and the Russians. [Redacted] relayed he was only with the TRUMP campaign for a very short period of time and as such he had little information to provide to the FBI. [Redacted] then voiced his discontent for former FBI Director, JAMES B. COMEY.

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b7C

[Redacted] then stated he had the utmost respect for the FBI and that he wanted to fully cooperate with this investigation despite his general disagreement with it. He relayed that he believes in the FBI's overall mission to protect the people of the United States.

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SA [Redacted] confirmed the date and time of the interview in New York and the call was ended. Shortly thereafter, [Redacted] telephoned the Special Counsel's Office and spoke with SA [Redacted] requested contact information for SA [Redacted] and provided his email address of [Redacted] SA [Redacted] sent [Redacted] a follow-up email with contact information.


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Investigation on 01/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/08/2018

by [Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/10/2018

On January 9, 2018, Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] received a telephone call from attorney [Redacted] New York, New York 10279. [Redacted] cellular telephone number is [Redacted] and his office number is [Redacted] advised he was representing [Redacted] in regards to SA [Redacted] attempt to schedule an interview with [Redacted] on the day prior.

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[Redacted] inquired as to the nature of the Special Counsel's interest in [Redacted] SA [Redacted] relayed that [Redacted] was being viewed as a potential witness to the overall investigation and that the FBI wished to speak with him about his early interactions with the DONALD J. TRUMP campaign. [Redacted] provided that [Redacted]


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[Redacted] then agreed to making [Redacted] available for an interview on Thursday, January 11, 2018, at [Redacted] office. A tentative time was scheduled for that interview and the call was ended.

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Investigation on 01/09/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/09/2018
by [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/05/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E. Street SW, Washington, D.C. 20546. [Redacted] cell phone number [Redacted] and his email addresses are [Redacted] and [Redacted]. Present during the interview was [Redacted] attorney, [Redacted]. Present from the Special Counsel's Office was attorney, AARON ZELINSKY, FBI Special Agent, [Redacted] FBI Special Agent, [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst, [Redacted]. [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/05/2018
 by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 02

Continuation of FD-302 of /22/2018 , On 02/22/2018 , Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 02

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /22/2018 , On 02/22/2018 , Page 3 of 7

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 02

Continuation of FD-302 of /22/2018 , On 02/22/2018 , Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5482

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 02

Continuation of FD-302 of /22/2018 , On 02/22/2018 , Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 02

Continuation of FD-302 of /22/2018 , On 02/22/2018 , Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] said STONE was talking to MANAFORT very frequently during this period in time.

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ b6 P
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 02

Continuation of FD-302 of /22/2018 , On 02/22/2018 , Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/15/2019

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] made statements to SA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b3
b6
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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b6
b7C

[Redacted]


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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b6
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on	[Redacted]	at	[Redacted]	(In Person)	b3
File #	[Redacted]	Date drafted	01/15/2019		b6
by	[Redacted]				b7C
					b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/14/2017

[redacted] and [redacted] was interviewed telephonically with dial in number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Prosecutor Ryan K. Dickey and the nature of the interview, [redacted] and [redacted] provided the following information:

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[Large redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7A
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b7E

[Redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C
b7E

[Large redacted block]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 12/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

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File # [redacted] SM-2230634

Date drafted 12/14/2017

by [redacted]

[redacted] SM-2230634 [redacted]


b6
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[redacted] SM-2230634

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted], On 12/08/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 08-06-2020

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/04/2017

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

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(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ OHR stated he had recently been contacted by Christopher Steele on three separate occasions via WhatsApp or FaceTime. On 12 March 2017, Steele told OHR he was concerned about receiving a letter from Senator Grassley asking Steele to disclose additional details regarding the dossier Steele compiled on Donald J. Trump. Steele also expressed concern about [Redacted]

b6
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b7D

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ On 15 March 2017, Steele told OHR if asked, Steele would tell the investigating congressional committees what he could about the dossier, but Steele must protect the sources and methods used to collect the information.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ On 26 March 2017, Steele told OHR he expected a letter from the congressional committee investigation at any moment. Steele was aware that Glen Simpson has already revived such a letter. Steele further told OHR that [Redacted] an attorney representing [Redacted] [Redacted] was acting in an informal capacity with Senator Mark Warner's staff, and was in contact with Steele. Steele noted since he resided in

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI NSISC-
20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 03/27 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
72017
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/03/2017
by [Redacted]

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b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Interview of Bruce Ohr 27

03/27

/2017

Page 2 of 2

Continuation of FD-302 of March 2017
the United Kingdom

[Redacted]

"Steele would answer

b1
b3
b6
b7C

written questions from investigators


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/18/2018

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b7C

[Redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein at [Redacted] Washington, DC [Redacted] was accompanied by [Redacted] [Redacted] from [Redacted]

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/18/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/18/2017

by SA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/18/2017, Page 2 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/18/2017, Page 3 of 6

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/18/2017, Page 4 of 6

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/18/2017, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 12/18/2017, Page 6 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

On 07/10/2018, Henry Oknyansky, aka Henry Greenberg, date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] spoke with Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky and Special Agent [Redacted] [Redacted] via telephone multiple times over the course of the day. After being advised of the identities of the those on the phone call, Oknyansky provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

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
Investigation on 07/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

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b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/12/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]



b7A
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/19/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]
[Redacted] After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted]
[Redacted] and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following
information:

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[Redacted]

b7A
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
[Redacted]

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Investigation on 01/11/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/15/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



b7A
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/29/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]
[Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing Agent [Redacted] and the nature of the interview, [Redacted]
[Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C
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
[Redacted]

b7A
b7E

Investigation on 01/24/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/29/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/15/2019

On 12/11/2018, [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FBI Special Agent [Redacted] was advised the interview was entirely voluntary and that he could discontinue it at any time. During the interview, [Redacted] was further advised that intentionally providing false statements to FBI Agents was a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] was advised that [Redacted] SA [Redacted] provided a copy of [Redacted] to [Redacted] after [Redacted] said he was not aware of it.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/11/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/13/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 12/11/2018, Page 2 of 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

Roger Stone

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was shown a 7/25/2016 Sat 12:27 ET email which was about getting to the Ecuadorian Embassy. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 12/11/2018, Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Referring back to the Ecuador email, [Redacted] was not aware of any action Stone may have taken [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 12/11/2018, Page 4 of 8

Jerome Corsi

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 12/11/2018, Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 12/11/2018, Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/11/2018, Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Advanced Knowledge

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 12/11/2018 , Page 8 of 8


[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2017

On August 16, 2017, [Redacted] work address [Redacted] [Redacted] work telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of work, [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] but at the time of Paul Manafort's (Manafort) purchase [Redacted] [Redacted] looked through the purchasing documentation [Redacted] and could not recall anything about it.

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
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Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/22/2017

by [Redacted]

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b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/20/2017

(U) On 10/10/2017 at approximately 11:00am Special Agent [Redacted] and Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] [Redacted] New York. The interview was established through a voicemail left for [Redacted] and a subsequent phone call.

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) After having been advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and Employee, and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

(U) [Redacted] asked how the FBI came to learn [Redacted] [Redacted] SA [Redacted] stated that the FBI determined it through the course of their investigation. [Redacted] asked if it was [Redacted] SA [Redacted] insisted that the FBI learned of [Redacted] through the course of the investigation.

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b7C

(U) [Redacted]

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b7C

(U) [Redacted] met PAGE through [Redacted] whom [Redacted] has provided [Redacted] for many years. [Redacted] for [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted] has [Redacted] [Redacted] provided by [Redacted] who has since left [Redacted]

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Investigation on 10/10/2017 at [Redacted] New York, United States (In Person, Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/11/2017
by [Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) PAGE and [Redacted] only typically communicate [Redacted] is familiar with PAGE [Redacted]

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b7C

(U) [Redacted] could not recall [Redacted] further recalled that PAGE [Redacted]

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b7C

(U) According to the local paper and media accounts, PAGE had a small amount of foreign stock that PAGE sold. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/10/2017, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] says the company typically [Redacted]

[Redacted] Email communication is more varied; [Redacted]

[Redacted] Each communication is determined if it is pertinent at the time. [Redacted] states that he

[Redacted]

[Redacted] maintains [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) PAGE

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]


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(U) At the conclusion of the interview, [Redacted] stated [Redacted]

[Redacted] He further stated

that he questioned SA [Redacted]

[Redacted]



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/06/2018

[Redacted] was contacted at mobile telephone number [Redacted]. After being advised of the official identity of the investigating agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] presently runs [Redacted]. [Redacted] has come to know [Redacted]. [Redacted] A mutual friend of [Redacted] and [Redacted] first introduced them, and [Redacted] is scheduled to speak [Redacted].

[Redacted] had a telephone conversation with [Redacted] following the news of indictments of 13 Russians as part of a 'troll farm.' [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] reached out to [Redacted] again and insisted they speak via WhatsApp. In their subsequent conversation, [Redacted] stated that he wanted to speak to someone on the Special Counsel's team regarding information he had. According to [Redacted] he had 'direct information' that

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b7C

[Redacted]


[Redacted] wished to provide this to Special Counsel investigators face-to-face.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/21/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/06/2018
by [Redacted]

b3
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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/06/2018

[Redacted] was contacted at mobile telephone number [Redacted].
[Redacted] After being advised of the official identity of the investigating agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] is presently in [Redacted] had a follow-up WhatsApp conversation with [Redacted] in which he stated he wished to remain anonymous. [Redacted] described the present political scene as

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Rather, [Redacted] received this information [Redacted]

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted] stated that [Redacted]
[Redacted] Gyorgy Rtskheladze. Rtskheladze runs the business called Silk Road,
[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/22/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/06/2018
by [Redacted]

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b6
b7C
b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/21/2018

[Redacted] was contacted at mobile telephone number [Redacted]. After being advised of the official identity of the investigating agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] had texted the investigating agent earlier in the day to recount a text message she had just received from [Redacted]. [Redacted] read the text message to the investigating agent, which read as follows:

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{Start text:}

[Large redacted block]

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{End text:}

[Redacted] spoke on the telephone with [Redacted] after receiving the text message. [Redacted] as well as some sort of deal (reported in the New York Times [Redacted] stated) that a proposed missile sale to Ukraine from the U.S. hinged on halting cooperation with the Mueller investigation.

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[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/18/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/20/2018

by [Redacted]

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b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2018

[Redacted] was telephonically contacted at [Redacted] provided the following information to the writer:

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[Redacted] sent [Redacted] a text message over the past weekend. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] explained to [Redacted] that he wished to meet with the writer upon his return. [Redacted] stated that [Redacted] had provided a few items to her and would supplement with additional details upon his return:

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] remains in contact with former President Bill Clinton. [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/02/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/03/2018

by [Redacted]

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b7C
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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic Interview of [REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] on 7/2/2018, On 07/02/2018, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/24/2018

On 3/20/2018 at approximately 4:00 pm, SA [Redacted] and SSA [Redacted] attempted an interview of SAM PATTEN at his residence at [Redacted]

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After agents knocked, [Redacted] opened the door and informed agents that PATTEN was [Redacted] and would be home soon.


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Agents observed the home for approximately 2 hours and Patten was not seen.

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Investigation on 03/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/13/2018
by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/02/2018

On April 25, 2018, FBI Agents attempted to locate and interview [Redacted] [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] at the address of [Redacted] [Redacted]

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Upon arrival at the residence the Agents were met at the door by [Redacted] [Redacted]

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When asked whether or not [Redacted] had a telephone number for [Redacted] she invited the Agents into the home and called [Redacted] [Redacted] relayed the same information to the Agents about [Redacted] whereabouts. [Redacted] advised they did not believe [Redacted]

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[Redacted] when [Redacted] ted

[Redacted] provided a cell phone number of [Redacted] In the Agents presence [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] provided her telephone number as [Redacted]

Investigation on 04/25/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/30/2018
by [Redacted]

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(U) Attempt to locate and interview

Continuation of FD-302 of

. On 04/25/2018 , Page 2 of 2

The Agents returned to the residence to meet with [redacted]. SA [redacted] telephoned [redacted] and spoke with [redacted] inquired as to whether or not SA [redacted] had received a text message from him and SA [redacted] relayed it was not received. [redacted]

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SA [redacted] then inquired as to where [redacted] would be later that evening. [redacted]

The Agents then [redacted] on the [redacted] address and identified it [redacted] Multiple attempts to reach [redacted] via phone number [redacted] including calls, voicemails, and texts, were all met with negative results. All calls were immediately sent to voicemail.

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The Agents returned to the [redacted] address and again spoke with [redacted] Both relayed they had not seen [redacted] that evening and could not provide any further information about his whereabouts. [redacted] provided that [redacted]

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
[redacted] and relayed that [redacted] may have been interpreting the Agents [redacted] attempted to reach [redacted] via cell phone and advised that his phone had been turned off.

A subsequent telephone attempt was made on the morning of April 26, 2018. The call was immediately sent to his voicemail.

On April 30, 2018 at approximately 2:11 PM, SA [redacted] telephoned [redacted] and spoke with [redacted] advised that [redacted]

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SA [redacted] again relayed his intent to speak with [redacted] [redacted] agreed to relay that intent to [redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/20/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) on May 11, 2018 by Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky and FBI Special Agent [Redacted] resides at [Redacted] [Redacted] and his cellular telephone number is [Redacted] [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

STONE referred to DJT as "the big guy."

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] said [Redacted] [Redacted] was a familiar name but provided no further information. [Redacted] [Redacted] but provided no further information.


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Investigation on 05/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/15/2018

by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/01/2018

On May 7, 2018, FBI Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] located [Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number (SSAN) [Redacted] at the address of [Redacted] New York, New York 10029.

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Upon arrival at the residence the Agents were met at the door by [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account [Redacted] [Redacted] who also lives in the apartment. The Agents identified themselves and inquired as to whether or not [Redacted] was home. [Redacted] confirmed he was and invited the Agents into the apartment. [Redacted] SA [Redacted] identified himself to [Redacted] and requested to speak with him. [Redacted] agreed.

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SA [Redacted] reminded [Redacted] [Redacted] The concierge at the hotel told [Redacted] there was a problem with his reservation so he returned to New York. SA [Redacted] then relayed the FBI's continued interest in speaking with him about ROGER J. STONE and requested that [Redacted] accompany the Agents back to Washington D.C. for an interview with representatives of the Special Counsel's Office. [Redacted] stated, "OK, might as well" and was allowed to gather his personal belongings to travel to Washington, D.C. [Redacted] packed a bag and left the residence with the Agents.

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Prior to departing New York, [Redacted] [Redacted] was reminded that accompanying the Agents to Washington was completely voluntary on his part and that he was not required to do so. In response to that, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was transported in an FBI vehicle from his residence in New York City to the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, D.C. Transport of [Redacted] began at approximately 11:15 AM. Approximately one hour into the drive, [Redacted] [Redacted] agreed to continue to Washington without those items. The Agents assured [Redacted]

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Investigation on 05/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/11/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 2 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] At approximately 12:30 PM, the Agents stopped at a rest stop and [Redacted] was provided with lunch.

While at his home, and again during the transport to Washington, [Redacted] was reminded that the FBI's interest in speaking with him pertained to his interactions with ROGER J. STONE.

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STATEMENTS DURING TRANSPORT TO WASHINGTON

[Redacted] made several statements to the interviewing Agents during the transport. [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] currently has no relationship with Stone, and has not since

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 3 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 4 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The name Guccifer did not ring a bell with [Redacted]

[Redacted] did not know Jerome Corsi.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 5 of 14

[Redacted]

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INTERVIEW AT THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE

[Agent note: The interview continued at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SE, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted] SA [Redacted] [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee, FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [Redacted] and FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) [Redacted] was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged.]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 6 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 7 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 8 of 14

[Redacted]

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Early on, [Redacted] googled Stone and learned he was a campaign strategist.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] knew Stone was working on the Trump campaign early on. Stone was always on the phone with radio stations, talking about the campaign. [Redacted] could tell by the calls that Stone was pro-Republican and pro-Trump. Stone

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 9 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 10 of 14

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] thought he may have heard the name Jerome or Jerry Corsi, but he did not remember meeting him. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 11 of 14

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] was shown an email that dated [Redacted] from the email address [Redacted] to himself and the email address [Redacted] did not remember the email and thought the other person on the email may have been someone from [Redacted] [Redacted] did not know [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] reviewed an email dated [Redacted] with subject line [Redacted] [Redacted] did not know much about Podesta in general, but knew Stone was "raging on Twitter" about him. [Redacted] thought [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] reviewed an email dated [Redacted] with subject line [Redacted] which contained [Redacted] [Redacted] information for [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 12 of 14

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] reviewed an email dated [Redacted] from [Redacted] with subject line [Redacted] said it [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] had no indication anyone else was using his gmail account.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 13 of 14

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/07/2018, Page 14 of 14

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] did not recall ever calling Michael Cohen.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] but he offered to bring it to the investigators at a later date. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]


[Redacted] was shown a photo and did not recognize the individual in the photo. [Agent note: The individual depicted in the photo was denoted as [Redacted]']

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Administrative:

The interview notes and documents shown to [Redacted] will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/21/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office on May 8, 2018 by Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] resides at [Redacted] [Redacted] New York, New York 10029 and his cellular telephone number is [Redacted]

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[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[Redacted] and [Redacted] were aware of his meeting with the FBI and the Special Counsel's Office for this interview. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] was asked to think overnight and attempt to recall anything related to Michael Cohen (COHEN) calling his cell phone. [Redacted] advised he first learned about COHEN calling his phone when he was questioned by the Special Counsel's Office. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 05/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/24/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
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b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018. , On 05/08/2018 , Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] remembered hearing STONE discuss Wikileaks [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

STONE has a great relationship with Infowars and the host, Alex Jones (JONES). STONE did interviews with Infowars [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8 /2018.

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/08/2018, Page 3 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] did not think STONE really supported TRUMP until TRUMP became the Republican nominee. [Redacted] was surprised to learn STONE was part of the 2015 TRUMP Campaign for President. STONE spoke with TRUMP members of his campaign every day. STONE participated in daily conference calls with the campaign. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8 /2018.

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/08/2018, Page 4 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018. , On 05/08/2018 , Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] the news was reported about PODESTA's email having been hacked around October of 2016.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8
/2018.

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/08/2018, Page 6 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8 /2018.

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/08/2018, Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018. , On 05/08/2018 , Page 8 of 10

[Redacted]

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STONE was always very complimentary of Donald J. Trump Jr. (TRUMP JR) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

At approximately 12:41 PM, [Redacted] retrieved his phone and provided the following contact information from it:

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Roger Stone

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] believed [Redacted] would be able to provide further information to the interviewing Agents.]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8 /2018.

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/08/2018, Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] allowed the interviewers to view several messages and email communications on his phone. Those included communications with [Redacted] [Redacted]. SA [Redacted] took several photographs of the communications. Those photographs have been enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 5/8

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018. , On 05/08/2018 , Page 10 of 10

[Redacted] provided the following contact information for himself:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] had no memory of Steve Bannon, Paul Manafort, Eric Prince, or Rick Gates.

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[Redacted] executed a Consent to Search Computers Form [FD-941] granting the FBI permission to search his iPhone. Upon further reflection, [Redacted] was concerned about photographs of a personal nature on the phone. [Redacted] revoked his consent for a complete search of the phone and subsequently signed a Consent to Search Computers form [FD-941] granting the FBI permission to search the phone for everything with the exception of videos and photographs on the phone. [Redacted] provided the password for his phone as [Redacted] also executed a Consent to Search Computers form [FD-941] for search of his [Redacted] provided the password for his [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/07/2018

(U) On 10/24/2018 Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] and [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [Redacted] via telephone. Present with [Redacted] were his counsels, [Redacted] and [Redacted] ASC Zelinsky admonished [Redacted] that the same guidelines from his prior interviews were in effect: [Redacted] must tell the truth, he is not a target of the investigation, and the interview is voluntary. After having been advised of the identities of the interviewing SAs, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) [Redacted] CREDICO was the back-channel between ROGER STONE (STONE) and JULIAN ASSANGE (ASSANGE). [Redacted] the idea of a back-channel between STONE and ASSANGE surfaced. [Redacted] There was speculation that the back-channel may have been CREDICO, [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted] STONE went to testify in Congress and was later pressured to reveal who his back-channel was, [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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Investigation on 10/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/24/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Telephone Interview of [Redacted], On 10/24/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Telephone Interview of [Redacted], On 10/24/2018, Page 3 of 3

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] CREDICO was the "go between" STONE and ASSANGE.

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]


(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted] CREDICO the alleged back-channel to ASSANGE assisting in DONALD J. TRUMP's Presidential victory. [Redacted]

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/07/2018

(U) On 05/17/2018 Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [Redacted] [Redacted] 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY. Also present at the interview were [Redacted] legal counsel [Redacted] and [Redacted] ASC Zelinsky admonished [Redacted] that the interview was voluntary; it is a crime to lie to the FBI; and ASC Zelinsky requested discretion in not revealing the interview to the media. After having been advised the identity of the interviewing Special Agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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Investigation on 05/17/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/21/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/17/2018, Page 2 of 6

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) During TRUMP's candidacy, the relationship with STONE was volatile. STONE always talked about TRUMP and how STONE knew TRUMP would run and knew he would get elected.

(U) [Redacted] STONE was a close advisor at the beginning of the campaign. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] STONE had a close personal relationship with TRUMP. STONE said he had called TRUMP, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) After STONE left the campaign he continued informally in the same capacity. STONE would speak to TRUMP on the phone but [Redacted] held the opinion STONE was not particularly involved in the campaign.

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted] STONE was like TRUMP on his social media savvy. STONE knew how to direct broadcast information to circumvent the media and how to use it as a system to amplify a message. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 05/17/2018, Page 3 of 6

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/17/2018, Page 4 of 6

(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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b7C

(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted] assumed RANDY CREDICO was STONE's connection to WIKILEAKS.
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/17/2018, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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b7C

(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/17/2018, Page 6 of 6

(U) STONE never spoke in substance about CREDICO, but [Redacted] thought any communications with WIKILEAKS would have been through CREDICO. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted] has had no contact with STONE or his associates [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U)

[Redacted]


(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2018

(U) On 05/04/2018 Special Agent [Redacted] made telephonic contact with [Redacted] and requested a voluntary interview.

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(U) [Redacted] advised it would be beneficial to the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) to speak with [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 05/04/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/14/2018

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by [Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

On 4/9/2018, SA [Redacted] and DOJ Senior Financial Investigator [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at his home located at [Redacted] Washington, DC 20001. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers, and that lying to federal investigators was a criminal offense, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Prior to the interviewer's arrival, [Redacted] had googled SA [Redacted] name and observed information related to the Special Counsel Office's investigation. [Redacted] commented on SA [Redacted] minimal web presence.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Initially [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/09/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/09/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 04/09/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] had never heard of RICK GATES before GATES's name appeared in the news. [Redacted] had heard of PAUL MANAFORT and recalled that at one point in time, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 04/09/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/02/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] home address [Redacted] was interviewed on Tuesday, January 30, 2018, at the Special Counsel's Office (SCO). Present during the interview were [Redacted] Attorneys [Redacted] and [Redacted] FBI Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted] [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab AHMAD, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Brandon VAN GRACK.

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large redacted block]

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b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted block]

b3
b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large redacted block]

b3
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 01/30/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/01/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b3
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b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 2 of 8
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
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b7A
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 4 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 6 of 8

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 7 of 8

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Proffer #3 of [Redacted], On 01/30/2018, Page 8 of 8

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/21/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed on October 26, 2017. The interview was [Redacted] and documented in the referenced serials. Attached to this report are the notes and exhibits from the interview.

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
Investigation on 10/26/2017 at DC, Washington, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/06/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]



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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted]
ON 08-31-2020

Date of entry 02/21/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed on November 9, 2017. The interview was [Redacted] and documented in the referenced [Redacted] serials. Attached to this report are the notes and exhibits from the interview.

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [Redacted]


Investigation on 11/09/2017 at DC, Washington, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/06/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/11/2017

Richard Pinedo (AKA Ricky Pinedo), [Redacted] was interviewed via telephone [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent [Redacted] and Prosecutor Lawrence R. Atkinson and the nature of the interview, PINEDO provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 12/06/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/07/2017
by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

On Friday, May 4, 2018, [Redacted] interviewed at her place of employment, [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] stated the name Lucicle Consultants did not sound familiar.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] who referred to Paul as [Redacted] described [Redacted] as very good customers who were always nice to deal with.


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Investigation on 05/04/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/09/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/16/2017

On May 10, 2017, FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FBI Special Agent [Redacted] attempted to locate and interview [Redacted] [Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] at the address of [Redacted] [Redacted]. Upon arrival at the address, the Agents spoke with [Redacted] who is the current resident at that address. [Redacted] advised that [Redacted] formerly resided with her at that address, but that [Redacted] was now residing somewhere on [Redacted] then telephoned [Redacted] and allowed SA [Redacted] to speak directly with [Redacted].

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SA [Redacted] advised [Redacted] that the Agents wished to speak with her about an individual who she knew. [Redacted] agreed to meet with the Agents near the intersection of [Redacted] and [Redacted]. At [Redacted] request, SA [Redacted] sent her a text message in order to exchange contact information with her. During transit to the interview location, SA [Redacted] received a telephone call from [Redacted] [Redacted] identified herself and advised that another individual, [Redacted] was also present on the call. [Redacted] then introduced himself and stated that [Redacted] had contacted him to ensure her safety in meeting with the Agents. SA [Redacted] then relayed to [Redacted] that the Agents wished to speak [Redacted] about someone that she knew, and that she was not the subject of this interview. [Redacted] then stated that he understood, and relayed that he is currently employed at [Redacted].

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[Redacted] then agreed to meet with the Agents at a coffee shop located inside the [Redacted] near the intersection of [Redacted] and [Redacted] phone number is [Redacted].

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at the [Redacted] located at [Redacted]. [Redacted] was advised that this interview was entirely voluntary and that the nature of the interview was to discuss someone who she knew. [Redacted] was then shown a photograph of GEORGE

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Investigation on 05/10/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/13/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/10/2017, Page 2 of 4

PAPADOPOULOS, who she immediately recognized. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] described PAPADOPOULOS as a nice guy, and that she believed he had previously spent a lot of time in London. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] has known PAPADOPOULOS for approximately [Redacted] years. She initially met PAPADOPOULOS through [Redacted] named, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] has met with PAPADOPOULOS in person [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] has difficulty trusting people, as she has been the taken advantage of by many people [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/10/2017, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/10/2017, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/06/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney Andrew Weissmann. Also present were [Redacted] attorneys [Redacted] [Redacted] with the law firm [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 01/08/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/18/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 2 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 3 of 9

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 4 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 5 of 9

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 6 of 9

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 7 of 9

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 8 of 9

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/08/2018, Page 9 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/28/2019

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. [Redacted] was accompanied by her attorneys [Redacted] of [Redacted]. Present for the interview were Special Agent [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky.

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Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made herself available for the interview. [Redacted] stated that she understood the terms of the letter agreement. [Redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] was shown a document produced by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 11/15/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2018, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b3
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[Redacted]

b3
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[Redacted]

b3
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2018, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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In regards to the text [Redacted] Bates stamped

[Redacted]

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In regards to the text [Redacted] Bates stamped

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

In thinking about the 2 text messages, Bates stamped [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2018, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


[Redacted]

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Administrative:

The agent notes and documents shown to [Redacted] will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2018

[Redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY - hereinafter "SOURCE"), date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] currently residing at [Redacted] was interviewed at his residence. The SOURCE indicated [Redacted] [Redacted] Throughout the interview, the SOURCE [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, SOURCE provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7F

Investigation on 04/24/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/24/2018
 by SA [Redacted]

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b7C
b7D
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
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b7F

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] [Administrative Note: Several minutes into the interview, [Redacted] The interviewing Agents requested the interview with SOURCE remain private, and that [Redacted] not participate at that time. [Redacted] and SOURCE acknowledged they understood, and [Redacted] agreed not to participate or be present for the interview.] The SOURCE advised [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The SOURCE stated he has never broken a U.S. law, and he believes very strongly in ethics and values; which, he advised was the single reason he chose to speak with the FBI. He recently engaged in a conversation with [Redacted] who asked him whether he, "always did the right thing." The SOURCE internalized the question, and later decided he should provide information he possessed to the FBI, in the event it was relevant to an investigation.

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7F

[Redacted]

b6
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(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 3 of 10

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(U) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

(PROTECT IDENTITY)

, On

04/24/2018

, Page

4 of 10

[Redacted]

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(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 5 of 10

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(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 6 of 10

[Redacted]

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(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 7 of 10

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[Redacted]

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(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 8 of 10

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(U) Interview of [Redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/24/2018, Page 9 of 10

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[Administrative Note: At 6:06 PM on the date of the above documented interview, the SOURCE sent writer a text message [from cellular telephone number [Redacted] stating the following: [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (PROTECT IDENTITY) , On 04/24/2018 , Page 10 of 10

At 6:10 PM (same day) writer responded with the following: "Thank you and we really appreciate the time you took to speak with us today. Best to you as well."

No further contact has been made with the SOURCE.]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/20/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number (SSAN) [redacted] home address [redacted] [redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office located at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, D.C. The interviewing team consisted of FBI Special Agent [redacted] Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky.

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[Large redacted block]

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Investigation on 04/26/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]-SM-2284941 Date drafted 05/20/2018

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]-SM-2284941 [Redacted]

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[Redacted]-SM-2284941

(U) Interview of [Redacted] 04/26
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/26/2018, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted]-SM-2284941 [redacted]

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[redacted]-SM-2284941

(U) Interview of [redacted] 04/26
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/26/2018, Page 3 of 5

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[Redacted] SM-2284941 [Redacted]

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[Redacted] SM-2284941

(U) Interview of [Redacted] 04/26

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 04/26/2018 , Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[redacted]-SM-2284941 [redacted]

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[redacted]-SM-2284941

(U) Interview of [redacted] 04/26
/2018


Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/26/2018, Page 5 of 5

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/12/2018

On Tuesday, July 3, 2018, [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] [Redacted] was interview telephonically by Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres and Senior Financial Investigator [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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By way of background, [Redacted] works with political candidates to [Redacted]

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In or around [Redacted] started doing work for Paul Manafort and the [Redacted] in Ukraine. At the time, [Redacted] was working as [Redacted]

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[Redacted] described Manafort as a demanding yet brilliant campaign strategist; however, he was not a good guy or a fun guy to work for. [Redacted] said Manafort was a very smart political operative who was able to achieve what no Ukrainian could achieve. While Manafort brought discipline to the campaigns, none of the other people/companies doing work for Manafort knew what the others were doing.

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[Redacted] worked on [Redacted] He estimated he made [Redacted] trips to the Ukraine during this time period.

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[Redacted] while in Ukraine and worked directly with [Redacted] Manafort wanted [Redacted] in advance. On occasion, [Redacted] would meet Manafort [Redacted] to get Manafort's approval or more often disapproval.

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Investigation on 07/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/10/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - July 3, 2018 , On 07/03/2018 , Page 2 of 2

Manafort called everyone by their initials and everyone called Manafort PM and/or PJM. For example, Manafort would refer to President Viktor Yanukovich as "VY".

[Redacted] recalled meeting Yanukovich [Redacted] times during planned photo-shoots. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] is familiar with Rinat Akhmetov, aka "RA". During one of his trips to Ukraine, Manafort [Redacted] [Redacted] recalled waiting [Redacted] for hours and never meeting with Akhmetov.

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[Redacted] did not have much interaction with Konstantin Kilimnik, aka "KK". He recalled Kilimnik was always with Manafort and [Redacted] viewed him as Manafort's fixer.

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[Redacted] had more contact with Rick Gates, aka "RG", and described Gates as Manafort's quasi-campaign manager in Ukraine for the Party of Regions. Gates was also in charge of approving and arranging all flights to Ukraine. Gates wouldn't act independently of Manafort.

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[Redacted] recalled sending invoices to Gates and never getting paid on time. In fact, [Redacted] [Redacted] was unaware how Manafort was getting paid by the Ukrainians.

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Other individuals who did work for Manafort in Ukraine were [Redacted] [Redacted] and Tony Fabrizio and [Redacted] [Redacted] did not have much interaction with the [Redacted]


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[Redacted] agreed to copy from his laptop all documents relating to [Redacted] [Redacted] and furnish to the Office of the Special Counsel.

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/01/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann. Present during the interview were counsel for [Redacted]. [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] stated that PDG's ultimately client was the government of Ukraine. PDG's interaction with their client, the government of Ukraine, had been through Rick Gates [Redacted]. [Redacted] In many ways, Gates was PDG's client.

[Redacted] saw no indication that Gates was directed by the ECFMU. Gates was directed by Kiev. [Redacted] was not sure exactly who within the Ukrainian government directed Gates. Whatever the ECFMU was, it was "irrelevant" as Gates was the important figure for PDG and Gates was directed by Kiev. [Redacted] understood Gates to be a political consultant for PoR.

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The question of who controlled the ECFMU was "irrelevant". PDG's contract may have been technically with the ECFMU. [Redacted] was not sure, but assumed PDG received payment from the ECFMU. Other than those two functions, namely signing a contract and sending payment, the ECFMU did not have any other role that [Redacted] was aware of. Gates was the point of contact. Gates gave the instructions. [Redacted] had no indication that the ECFMU was the source of any instructions for PDG.

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[Redacted]

Investigation on 09/25/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/29/2017

by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] follow up interview , On 09/25/2017 , Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] recalled the early meeting with Gates in which Gates talked about creating the ECFMU. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] follow up interview , On 09/25/2017 , Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] One indication of whether the ECFMU was a front for the Ukrainian government would have been where the funding came from.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] also told [Redacted] if PDG was going to register under LDA using the ECFMU as the client, they needed to be confident that the ECFMU was an independent entity and not a front for the government of Ukraine.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was aware that an LDA filing needed to list any affiliated organizations. [Redacted] was not sure if funding information was needed for an LDA.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] heard "gossip" about a letter written by an attorney at Skadden, but he never saw the letter. [Redacted] also heard about an attestation letter written by the ECFMU, but he did not hear about this until much later when he read about it in the newspaper. [Redacted] had never seen the attestation letter.

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[Redacted] for this matter. At some point, Gates [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] follow up interview , On 09/25/2017 , Page 4 of 5

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

was asked how much time he recalled being spent on the topic of the ECFMU at the meeting. [REDACTED] recalled it was a minor point in the meeting and not an important issue. [REDACTED] recalled being surprised when Gates brought up the idea of an NGO and the concept of LDA.

[REDACTED] did not think [REDACTED] was in the meeting with Gates. [REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] asking questions during the meeting. [REDACTED]

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A major topic during the meeting was the jailing of Yulia Tymoshenko. This issue was specific to the Ukrainian government and was one of the reasons the Ukrainian government had credibility issues around the world. Gates wanted PDG to persuade US government officials that Tymoshenko deserved to be in prison.

Had the ECFMU truly been an independent NGO in favor of Ukraine's integration into the European Union, they would likely have pushed back against the Ukrainian government on the Tymoshenko issue. It is always awkward for PDG to try and give clients advice contrary to their agendas. In this particular case, the ECFMU was not independent and did not have the influence to persuade the Ukrainian government. If the ECFMU had been a stand-alone NGO, it would not be unreasonable to assume they would have pushed back against the Ukrainian government on the Tymoshenko issue. This topic never came up because the ECFMU was "irrelevant".

[REDACTED] never read the Skadden Report issued on the topic of the Tymoshenko imprisonment. [REDACTED] had heard of the report and believed Gates, or the Ukrainian government, or the ECFMU had hired Skadden to write a report justifying the matter. [REDACTED] heard Gates was dissatisfied with the report. [REDACTED] did not think the report was ever disseminated. [REDACTED] believed he heard about Gates' disappointment from [REDACTED]

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In general, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] follow up interview , On 09/25/2017 , Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

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In August 2016, there was negative press attention related to PDG, MCW, Gates, Manafort and the Ukrainian government. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Since that time, he had not spoken with anyone at PDG about this issue. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/03/2019

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed over the telephone at [Redacted] [Redacted] Present during the interview from the Special Counsel's Office were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] was advised the nature of the interview pertained to his interactions with Roger Stone in [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] recalled having [Redacted] phone conversations with Stone. He surmised they happened sometime back in [Redacted] had learned about [Redacted] [Redacted] contacted Stone to see if [Redacted] [Redacted] thought Stone was helping out with the campaign at the time and [Redacted] [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] remembered hearing Stone speak on a local radio station in [Redacted] but did not know if Stone was still doing those shows.

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Investigation on 12/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/02/2019

by [Redacted]

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(U) Interview of [Redacted] on 12/14

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018. , On 12/14/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted] never met Stone in person. [Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted] That was the last time

[Redacted] communicated with Stone.

[Redacted] viewed his interactions with Stone as being insignificant and therefore did not remember the details about much of what they had discussed.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres pursuant to a Proffer Agreement. Present during the interview was counsel for [Redacted]. [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 12/14/2017 at [Redacted] (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/18/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer 2, On 12/14/2017, Page 2 of 6

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Statement 1

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Statement 2

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Statement 3

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer 2, On 12/14/2017, Page 3 of 6

Statement 4

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Statement 5

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Statement 6

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer 2, On 12/14/2017, Page 4 of 6

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Statement 7

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Statement 8

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer 2, On 12/14/2017, Page 5 of 6

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Statement 9

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Other

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Proffer 2, On 12/14/2017, Page 6 of 6

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/11/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were counsel [Redacted]

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[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 07/11/2018 at [Redacted] (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/11/2018

by [Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up, On 07/11/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

On August 16, 2017, [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] did not recall any business dealings with Paul Manafort (Manafort), or the [Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 08/16/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/22/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/29/2018

(U) On 10/3/2018 Special Agents [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein interviewed MARGARET RATNER-KUNSTLER (KUNSTLER) at [Redacted] [Redacted] to the law offices and after being asked to leave [Redacted] interview room and after being advised of the identities of the interviewing Special Agents KUNSTLER provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] KUNSTLER did not pass that email to ASSANGE or WIKILEAKS, [Redacted]

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b7A
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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Investigation on 10/03/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/10/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Margaret Kunstler, On 10/03/2018, Page 2 of 2
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


b6
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/20/2018

(U) On 11/06/2018 Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein, and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky and L. Rush Atkinson interviewed MARGARET RATNER KUNSTLER via telephone. KUNSTLER's attorney, [Redacted] was present with KUNSTLER on the call. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing SAs and the nature of the interview, KUNSTLER provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 11/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/08/2018

b7E

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Telephone interview of Margaret

Continuation of FD-302 of

Ratner Kunstler

, On

11/06/2018

, Page

2 of 8

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7A
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Telephone interview of Margaret
Continuation of FD-302 of Ratner Kunstler, On 11/06/2018, Page 3 of 8

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Telephone interview of Margaret

Continuation of FD-302 of

Ratner Kunstler

, On

11/06/2018

, Page

4 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Telephone interview of Margaret
Continuation of FD-302 of Ratner Kunstler, On 11/06/2018, Page 5 of 8

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Telephone interview of Margaret
Continuation of FD-302 of Ratner Kunstler, On 11/06/2018, Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Telephone interview of Margaret
Continuation of FD-302 of Ratner Kunstler, On 11/06/2018, Page 7 of 8

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


(U) Telephone interview of Margaret
Continuation of FD-302 of Ratner Kunstler, On 11/06/2018, Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/01/2017

[Redacted] THE METROPOLITAN CLUB OF THE CITY OF WASHINGTON (METROPOLITAN CLUB), telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted] work address [Redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted] at his place of work. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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Members of the METROPOLITAN CLUB had reciprocity at the METROPOLITAN CLUB OF NEW YORK, and vice versa. Members were not considered members at the others club, but could use its facilities.

If someone was politically active, [Redacted] believed becoming a member of the METROPOLITAN CLUB was political suicide. Attaching oneself to the top one percent of the population was not beneficial to a political career. As such, the METROPOLITAN CLUB had very few members who were currently in politics, such as Senators or Congressmen. However, the METROPOLITAN CLUB had members who were former Senators or Congressmen since they were no longer politically active. The METROPOLITAN CLUB also had several Ambassadors that were members.

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The METROPOLITAN CLUB did not maintain guest records. METROPOLITAN CLUB members were free to bring whomever they wanted. The METROPOLITAN CLUB did not require members to provide guest names, even if guests were coming for a large party. The METROPOLITAN CLUB stressed privacy for its members, so it deliberately did not ask questions.

METROPOLITAN CLUB members billed everything to their account. The METROPOLITAN CLUB retained Point-of-Sale (POS) records, [Redacted] [Redacted] For example, if a member had dinner one

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Investigation on 11/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/28/2017
by SA [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 11/28/2017, Page 2 of 2

evening, their would be a POS record for the dinner associated with the member's account. If a member brought guests to the dinner, the METROPOLITAN CLUB did not have a record of who the guests were.

The following individuals were not members the METROPOLITAN CLUB: CHARLES "CHUCK" BOYD, JEFF SESSIONS, and SIMES (First name not provided).

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted] did not recall seeing SESSIONS at the METROPOLITAN CLUB. If SESSIONS visited the METROPOLITAN CLUB as a guest of a member prior to becoming the Attorney General, [Redacted] likely would not have noticed.

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[Redacted] saw REX TILLERSON at the METROPOLITAN CLUB a few times. [Redacted] saw IVANKA TRUMP one time. TILLERSON and/or TRUMP were not members. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2017

On Wednesday, October 25, 2017, [Redacted] was interviewed by Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew A. Weissmann, Assistant Special Counsel Brian M. Richardson and Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator [Redacted] Representing [Redacted] were [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] [Redacted]. After being advised the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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ASC Richardson explained to [Redacted] that the interview was voluntary and if at any time he wished to consult with his attorney's he could do so. [Redacted] was also reminded he needed to be honest in answering the questions and that making false statements could constitute a federal crime. [Redacted] acknowledged that he understood and the interview commenced.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 10/25/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/26/2017

b7E

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - October 25, 2017 , On 10/25/2017 , Page 2 of 7

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-5765

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - October 25, 2017 , On 10/25/2017 , Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - October 25, 2017 , On 10/25/2017 , Page 4 of 7

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5767

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] October 25, 2017 , On 10/25/2017 , Page 5 of 7

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - October 25, 2017 , On 10/25/2017 , Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - October 25, 2017 , On 10/25/2017 , Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/04/2018

On Friday, May 11, 2018, [Redacted] work address [Redacted]
 [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email address [Redacted]
 [Redacted] appeared at the Eastern District of New York Federal Courthouse in Central Islip, NY in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort (Manafort) in [Redacted] Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] furnished the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 05/11/2018 at Central Islip, New York, United States (In Person)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/22/2018
 by [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - May 11, 2018 , On 05/11/2018 , Page 2 of 2

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/12/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 3, 2017, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]

[Redacted] Also present during the interview was [Redacted]

Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview,

[Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/03/2017 at [Redacted]

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/31/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/03/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted] did not have any knowledge of Manafort's finances, nor did Manafort advise [Redacted] of his businesses.

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of entry 06/19/2017

(U) On or about 06/19/2017 SA [Redacted] called [Redacted] which is the number listed [Redacted] on the website for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), [Redacted]. SA [Redacted] reached [Redacted] [Redacted] asked if the call was related to a background check, SA [Redacted] advised that it was related to a different matter that he would prefer to discuss with [Redacted] in person. [Redacted] warned SA [Redacted] that [Redacted] would likely want [Redacted] to determine the purpose before agreeing to the interview. [Redacted] and would be available for an interview in early [Redacted] also stated that he will call SA [Redacted] back for more information once a date is established.

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Investigation on 06/19/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/19/2017
 by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/08/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the SAXBY'S coffee shop located at 1303 19th Street Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20036. [Redacted] email address is [Redacted] was advised the nature of the interview pertained to an individual he knew named, JOSEPH MIFSUD. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] confirmed he knew MIFSUD and stated he had surmised the interview likely pertained to him. [Redacted] stated his intent to provide the Agents with as much information as possible in order to best assist with the investigation. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] described MIFSUD as an academic who is affiliated with the LINK CAMPUS UNIVERSITY in Rome and the LONDON ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY in the United Kingdom.

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In either [Redacted] [Redacted] was then introduced to MIFSUD [Redacted] met with MIFSUD on an infrequent basis. [Redacted] estimated the two of them had approximately [Redacted] [Redacted] with one another

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
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Investigation on 11/16/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/28/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b3
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b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/16/2017, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] thought the conversation was odd but viewed it as just nonsense at the time. [Redacted] knew MIFSUD was linked to the labor party in Malta which he viewed as being an openly pro-Russian organization. [Redacted] also knew MIFSUD was pro-Russian in his own views and provided the Ukraine as good example of a topic which MIFSUD was pro-Russian about.

[Redacted] was not aware of the names GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS or [Redacted] [Redacted] did not recall having any discussions with MIFSUD about the Russians having "dirt" on HILLARY CLINTON. [Redacted] then relayed he viewed SCOTTI as being pro-CLINTON and if MIFSUD had known such information he may not have shared it with SCOTTI or [Redacted] MIFSUD was often reserved when speaking near [Redacted] and couched his answers when [Redacted] was around.

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[Redacted] believed MIFSUD had been running various academic institutions in Slovenia since 2012. [Redacted] viewed MIFSUD's subsequent arrival and establishment of an academic presence in London as being suspicious, as it came immediately following PUTIN's re-election in 2012.

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[Redacted] then voiced his concerns about [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] relayed that MIFSUD's LONDON ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY was generating an annual revenue of one million pounds per year. [Redacted] viewed the amount as being substantially too large for an organization of its size.

[Redacted] then provided the Agents with [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/16/2017, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

MIFSUD has extensive contacts in the Russian government. In October of 2017, MIFSUD traveled to Russia to arrange a summit between the Russian government and the King of Saudi Arabia. [Redacted] understood the purpose of the summit was to promote Russian and Saudi energy relations. [Redacted] understood the meeting received media coverage and was not a secret. [Redacted] understood MIFSUD to have conducted similar work in Dubai.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] agreed to conduct a search for any relevant emails or documents which could provide further information about MIFSUD. Subsequent to the interview, SA [Redacted] received several follow-up emails from [Redacted] Those communications are enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302.

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/20/2018

On May 11th 2018 12:00 PM, at [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted] was
 interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance
 were [redacted] Attorney [redacted] Attorney [redacted]
 [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [redacted]
 Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [redacted]
 [redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero. After being advised
 of the identity of the interview agents, and purpose of the interview,
 [redacted] stated the following:

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/11/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)
 File # [redacted]-SM-2589105 Date drafted 05/11/2018
 by [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted] -SM-2589105 [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] -SM-2589105

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/11/2018, Page 2 of 2
b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5785



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/13/2018

On 5/7/2018, SA [Redacted] SA [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann interviewed [Redacted] was represented by [Redacted] and [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Prior to the start of the interview, SCP Weissmann advised [Redacted] that the interview was voluntary. Additionally, [Redacted] was advised that lying to federal investigators was a criminal offense. After being advised of the above and the identities of the interviewing team, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/11/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/07/2018, Page 2 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5800

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/07/2018, Page 3 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/07/2018, Page 4 of 8

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b6 b5 per DOJ/OIP
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5802

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 05/07/2018 , Page 5 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/07/2018, Page 6 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5804

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/07/2018, Page 7 of 8

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5805

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 5/7

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 05/07/2018, Page 8 of 8

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP


b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

[Redacted]

NOVARTIS FINANCE CORPORATION (NOVARTIS FINANCE), was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. [Redacted] was accompanied by NOVARTIS CORPORATION (NOVARTIS) outside counsel [Redacted]. [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/09/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/21/2017

by SA [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/09/2017, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b7E



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/08/2017

[Redacted] was contacted at [Redacted] on 8/24/2017 by the undersigned. [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 08/24/2017 at [Redacted] (Phone)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/08/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/28/2017

[Redacted] provided the following information to the writer on 9/27/2017:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] provided a business card which read as follows [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/27/2017 at [Redacted] (Email)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/28/2017

by [Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/19/2018

[redacted]
[redacted] business telephone number [redacted] business cellular
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his business. After
being advised of identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] was unfamiliar with telephone number [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] has received several telemarketing calls on his business cellular
telephone where the caller had a foreign sounding accent. Once [redacted]
identifies a call as being a telemarketing call, or a possible scam, he
discontinues the call. [redacted] has received calls to his business cellular
telephone where the caller ID shows his own cellular telephone number as
the number calling into this phone.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 01/17/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]-SM-2230634 Date drafted 01/18/2018

by [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]-SM-2230634

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [redacted], On 01/17/2018, Page 2 of 2


[redacted]

b6
b7C

Administrative Note: Interviewing Agent called telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] from his Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued Samsung
cellular telephone and it was answered by the receptionist at [redacted]
[redacted] Interviewing Agent advised [redacted] of this occurrence.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



~~UNCLASSIFIED//LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/12/2017

~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

This information is the property of the FBI and may be distributed to state, tribal, or local government law enforcement officials with a need-to-know. Further distribution without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access.

[Redacted] were interviewed via telephone. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was recommended to PAUL MANAFORT (MANAFORT) by one of [Redacted] clients. [Redacted] does not recall who recommended his services to MANAFORT. MANAFORT was a strange guy who would regularly send texts complaining about [Redacted] work.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Most of the payments from MANAFORT came via wire transfers. The wires came in from different accounts. [Redacted] did not know anything about the accounts being used to pay [Redacted]. [Redacted] would email them to let them know when to expect a wire transfer to come in.

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED//LES~~

Investigation on 06/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/07/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]


(U) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] on June 7, 2017, On 06/07/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted] mobile phone number is [Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/31/2018

PATIENT MEDICAL INFORMATION

This document contains patient medical information protected under the Privacy Act or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Such information may be accessed and used only if necessary for the performance of one's official duties and only to persons with a need-to-know. This information must be safeguarded and protected from inadvertent disclosure.

On Friday, May 11, 2018, [Redacted] telephone number: [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present during the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann and FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C

Most of the payments received from Paul Manafort (Manafort) for [Redacted] [Redacted] were sent via a wire transfer. Invoices and billing would have been handled by his bookkeeper, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Of [Redacted] clients in [Redacted] he stated [Redacted] of them paid by wire transfer. [Redacted] recalled Manafort would let him know in advance when he was wiring money; however, Manafort never mentioned where the wires came from.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/22/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - May 11, 2018 , On 05/11/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

NOTE :

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(PATIENT MEDICAL

INFORMATION) .

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/11/2018

On Tuesday, April 24, 2018, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

cellular telephone number [Redacted] appeared at [Redacted]

[Redacted] in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Greg D. Andres and FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted]

[Redacted] furnished the following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 04/24/2018 at [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/24/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] April 24, 2018 , On 04/24/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP


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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeney. Present on the phone with [Redacted] were [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions, he needed to be honest as lying to an FBI agent could constitute a federal crime.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/02/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/06/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 10/02/2017 , Page 2 of 3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Interview

, On 10/02/2017

, Page 3 of 3

Continuation of FD-302 of (U)

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/27/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, DC. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutors (SCP) Andrew Weissmann and Jeannie Rhee. Present representing [Redacted] was [Redacted]. Prior to the start of the interview, SCP Weissmann reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made himself available for interview. [Redacted] had signed the agreement on 05/31/2018. SCP Weissmann, [Redacted] and [Redacted] initialed the agreement. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 08/23/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 8/20
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/20/2018, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 8/20

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 08/20/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6 per DOJ/OIP

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 8/20

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 08/20/2018, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 8/20

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 08/20/2018, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/17/2018

[Redacted] DOB: [Redacted] telephone numbers [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. Present for the telephonic interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and Special Agent [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/16/2018

by [Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/08/2018

(U) On 10/15/2018 Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at his office at [Redacted]. Also present in the office was [Redacted]. [Redacted] in response to a request from the FBI for [Redacted] [Redacted] was admonished that the interview was voluntary, and that information provided to the SAs must be truthful. After having been advised of the identity of the interviewing SAs, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted] did not expect for the FBI to call him [Redacted].

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 10/15/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/18/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/15/2018, Page 2 of 6

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/15/2018, Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/15/2018, Page 4 of 6

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted] told [Redacted] he was contacted to provide more information to the FBI. [Redacted]

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b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/15/2018, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 10/15/2018, Page 6 of 6

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


b6
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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/31/2018

On May 24, 2018, [Redacted] at First Nationwide Title, social security account number [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] business address 50 Charles Lindbergh Blvd., Uniondale, New York, cellular telephone number [Redacted] work telephone number [Redacted] was telephonically interviewed in preparation for possible testimony at the trial of Paul Manafort in July 2018. Also present were [Redacted] Corporate Counsel at AmTrust Financial Company (AmTrust), Assistant United States Attorney [Redacted] and FBI Forensic Accountant [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewers, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/24/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] Interview , On 05/24/2018 , Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/17/2018

[Redacted], telephone number, [Redacted] was telephonically interviewed about information he wanted to provide to the Special Counsel's Office. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Corey LEWANDOWSKI, former Campaign Manager to a US Presidential Campaign. [Redacted]

[Redacted] LEWANDOWSKI, [Redacted]

[Redacted] The reason [Redacted] wanted to contact the FBI was to

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 02/23/2018 at District of Columbia, Washington, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/14/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/09/2019

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20024. Accompanying [redacted] during this interview was her attorney, [redacted]. Present from the Special Counsel's Office were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel Lawrence Atkinson, FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [redacted] [redacted] and FBI Intelligence Analyst [redacted]. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the interviewers, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

Investigation on 01/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/08/2019
by [redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/23/2018, Page 2 of 5

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/23/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7A

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7A

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/23/2018, Page 4 of 5

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7A

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/23/2018, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7A

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/13/2018

On 11/1/2018, SA [Redacted] and [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] at his home at [Redacted]. Also present for the interview was [Redacted] cellphone number [Redacted]. [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] In or around February of 2017, [Redacted] mentioned to [Redacted] that he had contact with PAUL MANAFORT. [Redacted] was present for the conversation and told [Redacted] that he had an [Redacted] [Redacted] subsequently introduced [Redacted] to MANAFORT.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

The day started [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/01/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/06/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 11

Continuation of FD-302 of /1/2018, On 11/01/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 11

Continuation of FD-302 of /1/2018, On 11/01/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were [Redacted] and [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

Background

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Loan Process

At BOC, loans are initiated by Relationship Managers, who generally work on the retail side. Relationship Managers generate loan leads from their client base and at times, are referred loan leads from "Centers of Influence", which are like brokers.

The Relationship Manager sends [Redacted] a summary of the loan request and any preliminary documentation they may have received regarding the

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/07/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/11/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 12/07/2017, Page 2 of 9

borrower. If [redacted] determines the loan has potential, he assigns it to one of this Portfolio Managers and Credit Analysts (collectively, "the Underwriters"), who perform the underwriting of the loan.

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The Underwriters put together a "needs list" and provide it to the borrower via the Relationship Manager. When the Underwriters receive all of the documentation and information back from the borrower and have done their due diligence, the loan is "pre-screened" with [redacted] and [redacted]. If the loan exceeds \$5 million, it has to be reviewed by the Chief Credit Officer as well.

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[redacted] provides approval to move forward with the loan and provides any additional structures, terms, or requirements. Ultimately, when the loan is ready for approval, [redacted] and [redacted]

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[redacted] role in the process is to weed out loans that do not meet BOC's criteria, pre-screen loans with [redacted] and make recommendations to [redacted]. [redacted] can deny loans from moving forward, but he does not do so often. Typically, [redacted] tries to find a way to restructure loans so they fit BOCs criteria.

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BOC's underwriting guidelines are determined by a Risk Management Committee. Exceptions to guidelines are allowed with mitigating circumstances. Post funding, loans are reviewed by the Credit Review Team to make sure they were in line with the guidelines.

DTI and DSC

Debt-to-income (DTI), or Debt Service Coverage (DSC) is calculated by dividing the borrower's global income by their global debt obligations. BOC looks at a 5 year amortization of principal and interest when factoring new loan payments into the DTI/DSC, even if a loan is only a 1 year, interest only loan.

For self employed borrowers, BOC looks at tax returns, K1s from partnerships for which the borrower owns at least 20% and profit loss statements (P&Ls) to determine income. BOC also looks at the liquidity of businesses if the borrower's income is generated primarily by that business. However, the importance of this factor can be mitigated if the borrower has sufficient liquid assets.

BOC looks at the borrower's income and calculates DTI/DSC to determine if the borrower can repay the loan. Especially in the case of unsecured loans, BOC's primary source of repayment is the borrower's business. The secondary source of repayment is the borrower and/or guarantor's cash flow

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/07/2017 , Page 3 of 9

and liquid assets. BOC requires a liquidity ratio of at least 1X the loan amount for guarantors. In the case of the loan to Manafort, [REDACTED]

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Debt for the DTI/DSC ratio is determined by looking at the borrower's personal financial statement (PFS), credit report and business financial statements. The borrower is expected to disclose all debt obligations on their PFS. Borrower debt is relevant to BOC's underwriting decision because it factors into DTI/DSC.

Generally, [REDACTED] considers it a red flag if a borrower has other unsecured loans. [REDACTED] doesn't want the borrower to be a "slave to two masters", meaning if the borrower begins having financial problems, [REDACTED] doesn't want the borrower having to choose who they are going to repay. [REDACTED] does not necessarily consider it a red flag if non-borrower guarantors have other unsecured debt, however, it depends on the specific circumstances.

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PFS

[REDACTED] was shown Manafort's PFS which was submitted to BOC for an unsecured line of credit. [REDACTED] explained that the purpose of this form was to gather information about the borrower to satisfy the bank's Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements as well as gather information about the loan requested, the borrower's income, assets, liabilities, net worth and liquidity.

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The borrower for the Manafort loan was [REDACTED] and Manafort was [REDACTED] Manafort's DTI/DSC was important to [REDACTED] because it was a source of repayment on the loan. As such, Manafort's other debts such as, mortgages and other loans were relevant to BOC's underwriting decision.

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BOC required Manafort to submit a schedule of real estate (REO) to see what other assets Manafort had and what other liabilities Manafort was responsible for. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled running a property title search on one of the properties listed on Manafort's REO: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview _____, On 12/07/2017, Page 4 of 9

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Another section of the PFS required Manafort to list a "Schedule of Expenses" related to other properties he owned, such as HOA fees, property taxes, insurance premiums and the like. Manafort's non-disclosure of mortgage debt and other expenses associated with his properties was relevant to BOC because these amounts factor into Manafort's debt calculations and therefore affect DTI/DSC.

The section on the PFS for "Contingent Liabilities" was where Manafort was supposed to list any other loans for which he was a borrower or guarantor. Since the loan to Manafort was an [REDACTED]

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The section requesting information on other "Partnerships, LLCs and Businesses Owned" of which Manafort was at least a 20% owner was important to BOC's underwriting process because it related to the Manafort's cash flow and debt from any entities owned by Manafort.

The section for "Other Debts" was where Manafort was required to list any other debts, loans and/or liabilities not disclosed elsewhere on the PFS. [REDACTED] noted that this included margin lines of credit against brokerage accounts and other personal or unsecured loans would be included in this section.

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[REDACTED] reiterated that Manafort was expected to provide a global picture of his assets and liabilities in an accurate and complete way.

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[REDACTED] was aware that borrowers tend to embellish or minimize aspects of their financial situation, for example, by overvaluing property they own. [REDACTED] deemed this type of embellishment not that relevant as BOC does their own value calculations for properties. [REDACTED] stated the loan could be restructured or the asset disqualified if it wasn't worth what the borrower claimed. However, if [REDACTED] knew that a borrower was deliberately falsifying information about their assets and liabilities, it would be a "full stop" and [REDACTED] would not move the loan any further.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 12/07/2017 , Page 5 of 9

The borrower was required to sign the PFS to attest to the accuracy of the information provided therein.

2015 P&L

[Redacted] was shown the 2015 P&L for DMP provided in support of Manafort's loan with BOC. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

BOC looks for upward, or downward trends of income and at an average of income over the past 3 years. BOC also looks at a borrower's prospects to make income in the future.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Paul Manafort

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The in person meeting was to discuss the structure of the loan Manafort [Redacted] could not recall exactly when this meeting took place.

During the meeting, Manafort [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] stated that pre-construction costs were items like permits, plans, insurance and carrying costs on their purchase loans.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 12/07/2017 , Page 6 of 9

[Redacted] understood Manafort's role as the financial backer behind the real estate development business and not as a hands-on partner. It was represented to [Redacted] that Manafort had ownership in the properties being developed and that he [Redacted] to develop those properties.

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Manafort said little during the in person meeting and [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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[Redacted] recalled having a conference call with Manafort [Redacted] when the loan was coming due. The purpose of the call was to discuss how BOC was going to be repaid. [Redacted] recalled it was difficult to reach Manafort [Redacted] during this time and even more so after this time.

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[Redacted]

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During this conference call, a restructure and repayment was suggested. After the call, Manafort [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Other Loans

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 12/07/2017, Page 7 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 12/07/2017 , Page 8 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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CAM

[Redacted] was shown the Credit Approval Memorandum (CAM) for Manafort [Redacted] [Redacted] reviewed and signed this document which was prepared by Credit Anaylst [Redacted] [Redacted] had prepared the previous CAM for [Redacted] and Quick adjusted that CAM for [Redacted]

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The section of the CAM titled "Financial Covenants" refered to requirements for the borrower to maintain a certain amount of liquid funds and global DSC. The borrower was required to show quarterly that they had maintained their financial covenants. [Redacted] believed Manafort [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The financial covenants required a global DSC of 1.25 times the loan amount and liquidity of 1.5 times the loan amount.

If a borrower does not comply with the financial covenants, it is a technical default of the loan. That said, [Redacted] did not think BOC ever took collection action for this type of technical default. [Redacted] believed BOC would instead refer the loan to the Special Assets Group for resolution.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 12/07/2017 , Page 9 of 9

[Redacted] was asked about the section titled, "Guarantor Analysis" for Paul Manafort. [Redacted] stated that Manafort's analysis relied in part on his 2015 P&L as a verification of cash flow and income. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Business Loan Agreement

[Redacted] was shown Manafort's signed Business Loan Agreement. [Redacted] was directed to the portion regarding "Loan Proceeds" which read, "Use all Loan proceeds solely for Borrower's business operations, unless specifically consented to the contrary by Lender in writing."

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/07/2018

[Redacted] previously identified was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were counsel for [Redacted]

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[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 06/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/06/2018

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by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) _____, On 06/06/2018, Page 2 of 4

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 06/06/2018, Page 3 of 4

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 06/06/2018, Page 4 of 4

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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/06/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

On December 2, 2018 at approximately [Redacted] FBI Special Agents [Redacted] attempted to locate and interview [Redacted] at the address of [Redacted]

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Agents knocked on the door of the apartment and were met by an unknown male (UM). UM opened the door and [Redacted] was observed standing behind him inside the apartment. Agents requested to speak with [Redacted] and UM began speaking on his behalf. UM said [Redacted] was not willing to speak to the Agents without an attorney present. Agents asked UM to identify himself and he refused. UM stated he was [Redacted] and that he would not identify himself without an attorney present. Agents then confirmed with [Redacted] that he wanted to speak with an attorney prior to speaking with the Agents. Agents asked for the name of [Redacted] attorney and UM stated that they would not provide the name of the attorney without him or her being present.

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Agents then requested to speak with [Redacted] UM stated that [Redacted] did not live at the apartment. UM further relayed that [Redacted] was a resident of [Redacted] and that the Agents should look for him there. UM was then advised that intentional false statements to the Agents was a violation of federal law. UM then stated words to the effect of, "well, he's not here." Agents again asked UM if [Redacted] lived in the apartment and he refused to answer without an attorney. UM did not provide the name of his attorney.

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Investigation on 12/02/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2018
by [Redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted]
(U) Attempt to locate and interview

[redacted] on 12/02

Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted] /2018.

, On

12/02/2018

, Page

2 of 2

Agents departed the residence and returned a few minutes later. Agents gave UM and [redacted] a piece of paper containing contact information for both of the Agents and requested to be contacted after [redacted] had an opportunity to speak with his attorney. UM and [redacted] were advised that

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[redacted]
[redacted] UM and [redacted] were further advised that Agents wished to discuss topics related [redacted] In response, UM stated that they would attempt to contact an attorney and that they could possibly meet with the Agents later that evening, or perhaps the following morning. UM then that [redacted] was "the least complicit in all of this." Agents then departed the residence.

At approximately 3:45 PM, SA [redacted] telephoned [redacted] and spoke with [redacted] answered the phone and immediately stated that he could be reached through his attorney. SA [redacted] confirmed [redacted] identity and then relayed that the Agents had official documents for him. [redacted] stated that his attorney [redacted] would accept service of the documents on his behalf. SA [redacted] relayed that he was familiar with [redacted] and [redacted] responded by saying, "I'm sure you are."

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[Agent note: On December 3, 2018, [redacted] notified ASC Zelinsky that he did not represent [redacted] and would not accept [redacted]

Enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302 are electronic copies of [redacted] along with a copy of the email correspondence between ASC Zelinsky and [redacted]


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[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/10/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[Redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky at [Redacted] [Redacted] was accompanied by his attorney [Redacted] Prior to the interview,

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] was informed it was a violation of federal law to intentionally lie to federal investigators in the course of an investigation, and he acknowledged that he understood.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Investigation on 12/07/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/07/2018
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Receipt of Grand Jury production from

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 12/07/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Agent note: Prior to the interview, [Redacted] attorney advised that his client declined to provide information about the origin of the documents.

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
[Redacted] further advised he was not sure if his client [Redacted]

[Redacted] also stated his client [Redacted]

The original copies of the documents provided by [Redacted] are being maintained as a grand jury exhibit and a copy is being maintained in the 1A section of the case file. Agents photographed [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The photographs are enclosed in the 1A section of the case file.]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/09/2014

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]
[Redacted] was interviewed by telephone at [Redacted] After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of
the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/28/2014 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/02/2014
by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [Redacted], On 05/28/2014, Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of [Redacted], On 05/28/2014, Page 3 of 3

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted] promised to send the interviewing agent documents related to these subjects by e-mail. He indicated his willingness to be available for follow-up questions, once these documents had been reviewed and further investigation had been conducted.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/14/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]
[Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted]
[Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. [Redacted] phoned from the office
of [Redacted] who was also present during the call. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the
interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/13/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/12/2017, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

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
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[Redacted] she wished to provide FBI regarding [Redacted] advised he would collect items from [Redacted] and would scan and email them to SSA [Redacted] as he obtained them. (Attached as digital 1A.) [Redacted] is available for re-contact.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/11/2018

[Redacted] email address [Redacted] phone numbers [Redacted] was interviewed by phone. Present for the interview were Special Agent [Redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Weissmann, and Assistant Special Counsel Brian Richardson. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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
Investigation on 04/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/10/2018

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by [Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/04/2017

On September 25, 2017 at approximately 1:30 PM, FBI Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted] attempted to locate and interview [Redacted] at his place of employment,

[Redacted]

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The Agents were met at the front desk by [Redacted]

[Redacted] who advised [Redacted] [Redacted] The Agents provided [Redacted] with business cards and requested a return phone call from [Redacted]

Later that afternoon at approximately 4:00 PM, SA [Redacted] received a phone call from [Redacted] advised he was willing to speak with the Agents and relayed he believed the nature of the interview to be about an individual named, IVAN TIMOFEEV (TIMOFEEV), who was scheduled to speak at a conference on the following evening. SA [Redacted] confirmed that the nature of the Agents inquiry was regarding TIMOFEEV.

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
[Redacted] agreed to an interview with the Agents on the following morning, September 26, 2017, at 8:30 AM.

Investigation on 09/02/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/25/2017

by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/06/2017

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]
 social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted] His telephone number is [Redacted]
 [Redacted] and his email address is [Redacted] was advised
 the nature of the interview was to speak about an individual he [Redacted]
 [Redacted] IVAN TIMOFEEV (TIMOFEEV). After being advised of the
 identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview,
 [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] was aware of TIMOFEEV and identified him as the Director of
 Programs at a Russian think tank called, RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
 COUNCIL (RIAC). [Redacted] TIMOFEEV [Redacted]
 [Redacted] an FSVC event, being held on the same evening as this interview.
 The event was entitled "Financial Sanctions and "De-Risking": The Intended
 and Unintended Consequences of International Regulatory Actions." The
 event was being held at THE YALE CLUB, 50 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, New
 York.

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[Redacted] excused himself from the interview and when he returned,
 provided the Agents with both a pamphlet and a handout for the event being
 held later that evening. [Redacted] pointed out TIMOFEEV's name and
 biographical information depicted on the back page of the pamphlet.
 [Redacted] advised many other individuals were also speaking at the event,
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted] did not believe
 TIMOFEEV [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] described the FSVC as a non-profit organization which helps
 developing countries strengthen their financial sectors and financial
 institutions. [Redacted] provided Russia, China, and India as examples of
 developing counties that FSVC has performed such services in. FSVC is
 funded in part by the CARNEGIE CORPORATION in New York from which a large
 portion of the direction of their business is derived from. The FSVC is
 also funded in part by the US government. FSVC was founded in 1990 and has
 deployed approximately 9000 volunteers in over 60 countries. FSVC

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Investigation on 09/26/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/29/2017

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/26/2017, Page 2 of 4

coordinates their mission abroad with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Department of State (USDOS).

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Additionally, [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Once a strategy is identified in a developing country, the FSVC will attempt to identify specific experts with knowledge of that country's financial sector to assist with the modernization of and Westernization of their systems.

[Redacted] initially met TIMOFEEV approximately [Redacted] ago. He last saw TIMOFEEV in [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] thought TIMOFEEV was a nice guy and found him to be very articulate, professional, and thoughtful. [Redacted] viewed TIMOFEEV as having moderate, western-oriented views related to engagement and dialog between the United States and Russia. Therefore, [Redacted] TIMOFEEV to speak at the FSVC event on September 26, 2017.

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The CARNEGIE CORPORATION suggested the event on September 26, 2017, specifically for discussions about financial sectors and "de-risking."

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] approximately 200 participants at the event.

[Redacted] was aware of a Washington Post article published about TIMOFEEV, depicting his communication with a former foreign policy advisor for the DONALD J. TRUMP (TRUMP) campaign.

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/26/2017, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

The FSVC does not hold symposiums in Russia, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] approximately [Redacted] During that time, [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] a Russian named, ANDREY KAZLOV (KAZLOV), who was leading the banking reform in Russia and was assassinated in 2006. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

At this point in the interview, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/26/2017, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] believed KAZLOV had access to Russian intelligence. When asked to elaborate, [Redacted] KAZLOV in which [Redacted] the fact that he had access to information. [Redacted] KAZLOV he wanted to introduce him to someone, [Redacted] that KAZLOV could trust that individual. KAZLOV [Redacted] [Redacted]

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TIMOFEEV is aware that [Redacted]

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[Redacted] TIMOFEEV's organization, the RIAC, works directly with the Russian government so [Redacted]

However, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] TIMOFEEV approximately [Redacted]

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[Redacted] with TIMOFEEV

[Redacted]

[Redacted] further advised TIMOFEEV [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Copies of the pamphlet and the handout provided by [Redacted] are enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302. The original documents will be maintained in a physical 1A envelope.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/05/2017 b6 b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] New York, New York, was called at [Redacted] on 8/1/2017. [Redacted] had previously left a voicemail with the writer on 7/31/2017. [Redacted] provided the following:

[Redacted] stated that he had been called by [Redacted] last week as to her interview with the undersigned. [Redacted]

b6 b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] told the undersigned he was [Redacted]

The undersigned explained that he had asked [Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 08/01/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/01/2017

by [Redacted]

b6 b7C b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/09/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 2, 2017, [Redacted] work address [Redacted] [Redacted] desk phone number [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, [Redacted]. Also present during the interview was Financial Investigator [Redacted]. The writer made contact with [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C


At the conclusion of the interview, [Redacted] was [Redacted] [Redacted]. A copy of [Redacted] is included in this file as 1A evidence.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/02/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/31/2017
by [Redacted]

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b7C
b7E



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/17/2018

[Redacted] phone number [Redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [Redacted]. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and FBI Special Agent [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted] was shown a text message and said he had no idea what [Redacted] meant. The text message is enclosed and labeled 'Show Document #1'.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was asked what he meant in a message [Redacted]

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b7C

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Investigation on 12/11/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

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File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/12/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] 12/11

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 12/11/2018 , Page 2 of 2


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

The text message is enclosed and labeled

'Show Document #2'.



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2018

On 12/03/2018, [Redacted] white female, DOB [Redacted] was interviewed by telephone. Present on the call were Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Special Agent [Redacted] and he attorney [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

In or around October 2016, when WikiLeaks dumped the emails of John Podesta, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/03/2018

by [Redacted]

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b7C
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 12

Continuation of FD-302 of /03/2018, On 12/03/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was amenable to re-contact and was advised that any information she would like to provide the SCO in the future should be delivered via her attorney to ASC Zelinsky.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at his residence, [Redacted] cell phone number is [Redacted] was advised the nature of the interview pertained to a [Redacted] ROGER J. STONE. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 05/18/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/21/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

During the 2016 Presidential campaign, STONE [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/18/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] When asked about Wikileaks, [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] recounted another instance where [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was contacted by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted] was not aware of STONE utilizing any encrypted applications to communicate with his associates.

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/15/2018

(U) On 05/09/2018 Special Agent [Redacted] contacted [Redacted] at [Redacted] On 05/10/2018 [Redacted] responded. The contact with [Redacted] is attached as a 1A.

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(U) On 05/10/2018 [Redacted] called SA [Redacted] utilizing telephone number [Redacted] in response to SA [Redacted] sent on 05/09/2018. After confirming that the [Redacted] was [Redacted] SA [Redacted] confirmed that he was attempting to contact [Redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) [Redacted] heard from [Redacted] that the FBI came to her home and asked for [Redacted] This alarmed [Redacted] [Redacted] asked what the contact was about and asked if SA [Redacted] ROGER STONE, but was not sure why the FBI would be interested in that. [Redacted] stated he wanted to help and was willing to meet with the FBI. [Redacted] [Redacted] has a DC area code phone number for his work with politicians.

b6
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(U) In a later phone conversation on 05/10/2018, [Redacted] stated he would be available at 2pm on Friday 05/11/2018 in [Redacted] for an interview and he would send the details of location via email to SA [Redacted]

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
(U) [Redacted] provided a location for the meeting via email. A few hours later, [Redacted] stated via email he wanted to contact an attorney and asked to postpone the interview. Later, [Redacted] sent his attorney's contact information to SA [Redacted] The email communication with [Redacted] is attached as a 1A.

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Investigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/14/2018
by [Redacted]

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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/18/2018

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[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, DC. The interview team were FBI Special Agent [Redacted] FBI Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky. Present representing [Redacted] was [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] e-mail [Redacted]

Prior to the start of the interview, ASC Zelinsky verbally reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [Redacted] made himself available for the interview. [Redacted] stated that he understood the terms of the letter agreement. [Redacted] signed the letter. After being advised of the identities of the interview team and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] wanted to work for the Trump Campaign [Redacted] [Redacted] sent letters and e-mails to individuals that appeared to work closely with the Campaign, including Roger Stone. [Redacted] responded to [Redacted] e-mail to Stone. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] and Stone. During the [Redacted]

[Redacted] did not know whether or not Stone was affiliated with the Campaign. Stone told [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] met with Stone, [Redacted] and one of Stone's attorneys at a [Redacted]

[Redacted] Stone did not indicate who would be the customer. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Stone's Political Action Committees (PAC) included the [Redacted]

b6
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Investigation on 05/31/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/31/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 05.31.2018, On 05/31/2018, Page 2 of 5

b7E

Committee to Restore America's Greatness, Clinton's War on Women and Stop the Steal. [Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] a meeting with Paul Manafort. [Redacted]

[Redacted] does not know whether PACs and Campaigns are permitted to work together. The meeting with Manafort never happened. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] main point of contact was [Redacted] Post-election [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] did not discuss these messages with Stone [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] does not recall any discussions with Stone about Hillary's deleted e-mails. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

In August 2016, Stone and [Redacted] does not know why Stone and [Redacted]

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[Redacted] time. Stone did not explain who he was talking to or what they were talking about. [Redacted] does not recall what he [Redacted] discussed

[Redacted]

[Redacted] at the Republican National Convention (RNC). [Redacted] the RNC where Stone spoke. [Redacted] also spoke. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Later, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

05.31.2018

, On

05/31/2018

, Page

3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

did not hear anything from Stone or [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Stone had a security detail with him during the RNC. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

communications. [Redacted] does not know why Stone wanted secured communications. [Redacted] does not believe that Stone ever ended up using them. [Redacted] never communicated with Stone using secure communications.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] communicated with [Redacted] does not know how or where [Redacted] got the information. In casual conversation, [Redacted] mentioned that it was easy. [Redacted] sent [Redacted] the information through ProtonMail. [Redacted] worked with [Redacted] in order to make himself useful and to try to impress Stone. [Redacted] was upset because [Redacted] owed [Redacted] money. [Redacted] eventually stopped responding to [Redacted]. After [Redacted] stopped working for Stone, [Redacted] did not have any need to contact [Redacted].

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[Redacted] wrote to Stone: [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted] did not have any reason to believe that Stone was working with Assange or trusted him. [Redacted] must have been passing along what [Redacted] said. [Redacted] believes that

(U) Interview of [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 05.31.2018, On 05/31/2018, Page 4 of 5

Stone told him [redacted] with Stone about WikiLeaks and Assange but nothing more than what was in the news.

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[redacted] primary e-mail account has been [redacted] For a short time, [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] met [redacted] at the RNC. [redacted]

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[redacted] told Eric Trump but [redacted] Sometime in the last few days, [redacted] communicated to [redacted] would be at the SCO today. [redacted] does not recall [redacted] reaction.

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b7C

[redacted] did not mean something specific when he wrote this message. [redacted] Stone that [redacted] lot with Sidney Blumenthal and [redacted] got this information from [redacted] does not know where [redacted] got the information. [redacted] thought [redacted]

[redacted] knew that the information was for Stone. [redacted] believes that Stone knew that [redacted]

Stone and [redacted] talked about WikiLeaks releasing different items. Stone had [redacted] [redacted] did not hear Stone or anyone else say that Stone had direct or indirect communications with Assange.

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Stone told [redacted] that Stone consulted with the candidate. Stone, however, could never produce the candidate or [redacted] to speak with them.

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[redacted] his time working on Campaign issues. [redacted] did not have an official end date. [redacted] cannot recall when he last spoke with Stone, it was a long

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

05.31.2018

, On

05/31/2018

, Page

5 of 5

time ago.


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/04/2018

[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email addresses [Redacted] and [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically after an in person interview earlier in the day. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Additionally, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] stated he would provide records documenting [Redacted] to SA [Redacted] by May 28, 2018. (Note: [Redacted] sent SA [Redacted] several emails after this phone call with additional records. These records are attached to this report).

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 05/25/2018 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/01/2018

by [Redacted]

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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/04/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] telephone number
[Redacted] email addresses [Redacted] and
[Redacted] was interviewed at the [Redacted]
[Redacted] After being advised of the identities
of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted]
provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Background on [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/25/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

b6
b7C

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/29/2018

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of May 25, 208, On 05/25/2018, Page 2 of 3

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] is not familiar with the name [Redacted] or the company Psy-Group.

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

(Note: at 9:06 AM, [Redacted])

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[Redacted]

While awaiting [Redacted] return phone call, [Redacted] had a recollection that he needed [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(Note: at 9:12 AM, [Redacted])

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] now recalled with certainty.

[Redacted] explained that [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

In the beginning of August 2016, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of May 25, 208, On 05/25/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Miscellaneous:

[Redacted] is not aware of any foreign contributions to the 2016 presidential campaigns. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/17/2018

[Redacted] telephone number
[Redacted] email addresses [Redacted] and
[Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the
interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/12/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/13/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/10/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically by Special Agent [Redacted] [Redacted] Also present were Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad and Forensic Accountant [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6

b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/13/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/24/2018

by [Redacted]

b6

b7C

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of July 13, 2018

On 07/13/2018 Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] email addresses [Redacted] and [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. Also present was Senior Assistant Special Counsel Zainab Ahmad. [Redacted] was asked questions about the attached email and images that [Redacted] sent to Special Agent [Redacted] on July 15, 2018. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/18/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/30/2018

On May 30th 2018 11:00 AM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Democratic National Committee, Date of Birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [Redacted] Perkins Coie Attorney [Redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [Redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Investigation Management and Program Analyst [Redacted] and Special Counsel Attorney [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and purpose of the interview, [Redacted] stated the following:

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 05/30/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/30/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/30/2018, Page 2 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/30/2018, Page 3 of 6

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/30/2018, Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-5981

[Redacted]

b6
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b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/30/2018, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/30/2018, Page 6 of 6

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On May 11, 2017, [Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] telephone number [Redacted]

Also present during the interview was [Redacted] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator (Contractor). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2017 at [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/15/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/11/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted] is maintained in this case file as 1A evidence.

b3
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b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/20/2018

(U) On 12/19/2018 Special Agent [Redacted] and Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted]

b6

b7C

[Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

(U) [Redacted] voluntarily provided [Redacted]

b6

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b7D

(U) [Redacted] stated [Redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

[Redacted] Fusion GPS, Glenn Simpson's firm, responsible for the Trump-Russia dossier.

(U) [Redacted] stated [Redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

(U) [Redacted] stated [Redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

[Redacted] was not interested in learning the details of the Special Counsel's investigation, [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted] said [Redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 12/19/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)


File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/19/2018

by [Redacted]

b6

b7C

b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/20/2018

[Redacted] for UBS Bank was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeny. Present during the interview were counsel for [Redacted], [Redacted] and [Redacted] of [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

Investigation on 01/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/01/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 01/11/2018, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 01/11/2018, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 01/11/2018 , Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/20/2018

[Redacted] also known as [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed at her residence, [Redacted] [Redacted] email address is [Redacted] and her telephone number is [Redacted]. Present during the interview was [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] and his telephone number is [Redacted]. Assisting with this interview was FBI Miami Task Force Officer (TFO) [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] and [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

MARCH FOR TRUMP EVENT - AUGUST 20, 2016

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 02/09/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/12/2018
 by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 02/09/2018, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 02/09/2018, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

MARCH FOR TRUMP EVENT - SEPTEMBER 11, 2016

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] and

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 02/09/2018, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

MARCH FOR TRUMP EVENT - JANUARY 2017

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of [Redacted] and

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 02/09/2018, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE

[Redacted] agreed to conduct a search for any documents which could provide further information about the organizers of the MARCH FOR TRUMP events. She recently attempted to view their web page but found the account had been taken offline. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] When asked whether or not they would have participated in this event had they known the organizers were located overseas, both [Redacted] stated they would not have.

[Redacted] inquired as to whether or not the FBI had identified the actors behind the MARCH FOR TRUMP account as being Russian. [Redacted] was advised the FBI was continuing to investigate this matter in attempt to fully identify the individuals behind the account.

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b7C

During the interview, [Redacted]

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted] will be maintained as evidence for this investigation.

After the interview, SA [Redacted] received two emails from [Redacted] provided photographs of the event on August 20, 2016 and contact information for other participants. Those emails and their attachments are enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/13/2019

On February 16, 2018, Special Agent [Redacted] telephoned and spoke with [Redacted] who had previously been interviewed in this investigation. SA [Redacted] notified [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] acknowledged and stated that she had attempted to look for additional paperwork associated with her interactions with such individuals and was unable to locate any.

On February 16, 2018, Special Agent [Redacted] telephoned and spoke with [Redacted] who had previously been interviewed in this investigation. SA [Redacted] notified [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] had forgotten that during his interview with SA [Redacted]


Investigation on 02/16/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 02/11/2019

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/03/2018

[Redacted]

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] Social Security Number [Redacted]
 [Redacted] phone number [Redacted] was interview at his home on September 29 2018. Also present at the interview were Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Agent [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Agent Note: at this time, agents stepped outside for a two minute break]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 09/29/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/30/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/29/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted] remembered little about the Access Hollywood tape and had no knowledge of [Redacted] recognized the name of Roger Stone, [Redacted] but [Redacted] did not recall right off hand.

b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/30/2017

[Redacted], date of birth [Redacted] home address [Redacted] mobile telephone number [Redacted] business phone [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted] was asked if he would be willing to meet with Agents to further comment on [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Large redacted block]

not recall any other details. [Redacted] knows it is a crime to lie to Federal Agents and he did not want to say anything out of context.

Nonetheless, [Redacted]

[Large redacted block]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] claimed he did not put two and two together until seeing on the news GATES and MANAFORT had been arrested. [Redacted] was not certain GATES was MANAFORT's guy until seeing the arrest in the news. After the arrest, [Redacted] went back through his records and claimed he did not

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/15/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 2 of 3

have anything relevant [Redacted]
there was no records [Redacted]

[Redacted] in his initial interview. [Redacted] did his own research and learned GATES and MANAFORT hired another public relations firm on March 15, 2012. He did not know at the time they hired the public relations firms MERCURY and the PODESTA GROUP until after the arrest. [Redacted] has heard of both public relations firms before but did not have an opinion of either.

b6
b7C

At some point, [Redacted] believed ROGER STONE (STONE) was possibly setting [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] stressed he did not do anything illegal. When [Redacted] was asked if he would be willing to sit down and meet with the Agents face-to-face, [Redacted] stated [Redacted]

[Redacted] Agents explained to [Redacted]

[Redacted] When asked about the [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] contended he has never met MANAFORT.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

seeking public relations assistance. [Redacted] stated he would be willing to meet with Agents as early as next week [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/15/2017, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

Agents asked [Redacted] if he would be willing to forward the two emails he exchanged with GATES [Redacted] which he agreed to do. Both [Redacted] b3 Per DOJ/OIP emails are attached hereto and included as 1As. [Redacted]

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/29/2017

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of residence, [Redacted] Washington, D.C. 20008.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] was advised the Agents were attempting to locate and speak with an individual [Redacted] After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the interviewing Agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] confirmed [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] recommended the Agents attempt to contact [Redacted] of Washington, D.C..

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] did not have a phone number for [Redacted] as [Redacted] provided an email address of [Redacted] as an alternative means to contact [Redacted]

b6
b7C


Investigation on 11/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 11/27/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/25/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

(U) On 06/13/2018 Special Agents (SA) [Redacted] and [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] at her residence at [Redacted]. Also present was [Redacted] who left after the first few minutes of the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing SAs and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 06/13/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/19/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/13/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [Redacted] never gave [Redacted] an indication he had any special insight into the TRUMP CAMPAIGN. [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted] gave no indication he had insight into the campaign. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted] said he has a place in [Redacted] claimed he

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted] is unaware of [Redacted] business, or where his money comes from, if there is any money. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C


(U) [Redacted] did not know any of [Redacted] close associates but thought

[Redacted]

(U) [Redacted] and [Redacted] would communicate via text message.

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/21/2018

b6
b7C

(U) On 07/02/2018 Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] SA [Redacted] [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky interviewed [Redacted] at the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, DC. [Redacted] counsel, [Redacted] [Redacted] was present. ASC Zelinsky admonished [Redacted] that lying to the FBI is a crime. After having been advised of the identity of the interviewing SAs and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 07/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

b6

File # [Redacted]

Date drafted 07/02/2018

b7C

b7E

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 2 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 3 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 07/02/2018, Page 4 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 5 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 6 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 7 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 8 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 9 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 07/02/2018, Page 10 of 11

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 07/02/2018, Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]


b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/26/2018

On December 5, 2017, SA [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted] outside of his home. SA [Redacted] returned evidence [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] by PAUL MANAFORT. Some time around the Thanksgiving holiday, MANAFORT had called [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Investigation on 12/04/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

b6
b7C
b7E

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2017

by [Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/06/2017

On May 26, 2017, [Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [Redacted]. Also present during the interview was [Redacted], Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator (Contractor). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] was [Redacted] Davis Manafort Partners (DMP), a business/political consulting firm. At the time, DMP's office was located at 211 N. Union Street, Suite 250, Alexandria, VA. [Redacted]

[Redacted] The DMP office at 211 N. Union subsequently closed in 2012. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/26/2017 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/04/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/26/2017, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Manafort consulted for the Party of Regions in Ukraine since approximately 2006 and from 2008-2010 traveled back and forth from there quite a bit.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/26/2017, Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

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b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/26/2017, Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

In a subsequent telephone call from the writer to [Redacted] provided the following further information:


b6
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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/07/2017

On May 27, 2017, [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. [Redacted] was already aware of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview from previous contact by the writer. [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Large Redacted Block]


b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/27/2017 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/07/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

On June 22, 2017, [Redacted] was interviewed at the office of the Special Council located at 601 D Street, NW, Washington DC. Also present during the interview was Special Prosecutor (SP) Andrew Weissmann, Senior Financial Analyst [Redacted] SA [Redacted] and [Redacted] attorney, [Redacted] was familiar with the identity of the interviewing agent, as well as the nature of the interview. [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

SP Weissmann advised [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] was further advised he was at the interview voluntarily, and could terminate it and leave at any time. [Redacted] could also confer with [Redacted] at any time, and that would not be held against him. [Redacted] was reminded to be truthful to the best of his recollection, and any false and/or intentional misleading statement would subject him to possible prosecution, as lying to an FBI agent is a federal violation. [Redacted] told SP Weissmann the writer had told him the same things during his initial interview conducted on May 26, 2017.

b6
b7C

On June 5, 2017, [Redacted] through his attorney, provided the writer with a

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

This FD-597 (Receipt for Property Received) is attached to this document as 1A evidence.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 06/22/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person) File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/24/2017 by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/22/2017, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/22/2017, Page 3 of 5

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/22/2017, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

As previously stated in his initial interview on May 26, 2017, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

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b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~


[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/22/2017, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted] will furnish through his attorney a copy [Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/24/2017

On 07/19/2017, [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. Also present during the interview was Special Counsel prosecutor Kyle Freeny and [Redacted] attorney. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

In approximately [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 07/19/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/20/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 07/19/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Manafort was not at the Davis Manafort office very often during this time period because he was in the Ukraine and as a result, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Rick Gates [Redacted] might have more information on this topic.

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C



b3
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/12/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

(U) On 02/27/2018 Special Agents [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted]

b3
b6
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b7E

[Redacted]

directed [Redacted] to the interview room where SA [Redacted] were waiting. SA [Redacted] advised [Redacted] that he was free to leave at anytime. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents, [Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 02/27/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/05/2018

by [Redacted] SA [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 02/27/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/27/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


b3
b6
b7C

(U) [AGENT COMMENT: At the conclusion of the interview, [Redacted] was served with a search and seizure warrant which is covered in a separate FD-302. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

b3 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]



b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at [Redacted] by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Background

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 05/16/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/18/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 05/16/2018, Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Paul Manafort

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 2A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 2B

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 2D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 05/16/2018 , Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 3A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 3B

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 4A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 4B

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 5A

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

DOC 5B

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 05/16/2018, Page 4 of 4

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

DOC 6A

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

DOC 6B

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

DOCS 7-24

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Agent [Redacted] Present during the interview was counsel for [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted] was advised that his interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions he needed to be honest in his responses as lying to an FBI agent could constitute a crime.

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Background

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] was hired by First Republic Bank (FRB) [Redacted]

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FRB

Investigation on 09/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/29/2017

by [Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 2 of 12

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[REDACTED]

FRB bankers received on-line training from an "off the shelf" product. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Most of this training related to prohibited account types, compliance with the customer ID and Know Your Client programs, and assessing customer risk ratings. The goal of banker training was to prepare the "front line" to notice anything suspicious.

The ad-hoc banker training was not provided on a regular basis. Usually, it would be given when a policy changed or a new regulation was issued. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In addition, bankers were required to complete the FDIC's core curriculum each year. The FDIC's curriculum consisted of suspicious activity reporting, economic sanctions information, currency transaction reporting, and customer risk rating assessments.

New employees were required to complete all BSA/AML training within their first 60-90 days of employment. Existing employees took refresher training courses each year.

The "front line" [REDACTED] referred to consisted of Preferred Bankers and Client Services teams. The Preferred Bankers interacted directly with the client while the Client Services teams usually operated from a call center. The Client Services teams were the go-between for Preferred Bankers and the BSA/AML teams.

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Preferred Bankers were protective of their clients and were responsible for opening accounts, communicating with clients, and handling transactions. Wires would be handled by the wire room, but otherwise, Preferred Bankers handled transactions for the client. If a Preferred Banker was not available, a client could go through the Client Services team to initiate transactions.

FRB had a "second line" of defense in Wire Screening rooms and Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) teams. Wire activity and ACH transactions were screened regularly by the BSA/AML teams. EDD teams evaluated all new clients for risk depending on industry, products and geography. In addition, EDD conducted negative news screening and Lexis Nexis World Check once per month.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview, On 09/28/2017, Page 3 of 12

The Suspicious Activity Monitoring Group monitored transactions for suspicious activity using a series of indicators such as deviation from previous behavior, structuring and other risk indicators.

Paul Manafort

Manafort was already a customer at FRB [REDACTED] believed Manafort began with FRB in 2005.

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Manafort was not on FRB's radar until [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Since FRB was a domestic bank with no international presence, it was considered a risk factor for a client to do significant international transacting with their FRB account. In addition, Manafort was identified as a Politically Exposed Person (PEP), which was also a risk factor for FRB.

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When Manafort got on FRB's radar, a significant amount of time was being spent monitoring Manafort's accounts for potentially suspicious behavior. At some point, the resources expended to monitor an account outweighed the revenue earned by maintaining the client's accounts.

Document 1

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated June 22, 2011 and further identified by FRBSPC-00051285 - FRBSPC-00051287. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] reached out to [REDACTED] because Manafort's name came up during a Lexis Nexis World Check screening. The concern was Manafort was a PEP. As a result of this information, [REDACTED] likely initiated an investigation into Manafort's accounts for the prior 1-2 years, or possibly back to inception. The purpose of the investigation was to look for any risk factors and understand the client's transaction history.

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The EDD team looked into Manafort's business, DMP Inc. [REDACTED] did not recall the result of the EDD team's investigation. [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview, On 09/28/2017, Page 4 of 12

[redacted] reached out to [redacted] with the information on Manafort. [redacted]

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[redacted] hoped [redacted] could provide information on Manafort that would assist the investigative team in understanding the full picture of Manafort's accounts. [redacted] offered to speak with Manafort.

[redacted] did not believe he reached out to [redacted] directly at this time. [redacted] did not reach out to Manafort directly until much later.

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Beyond Manafort being a PEP, the main issue for [redacted] was the frequency of foreign wire activity to and from questionable countries such as, Russia, Ukraine and Cyprus. Cyprus was known to be a tax haven for Russia. [redacted] wanted an explanation from Manafort about why he was receiving money from these countries. In addition, [redacted] wanted to understand more about the entities in Cyprus which were sending Manafort money: why they were set up in Cyprus, what they did, and if they were legitimate businesses. The purpose of asking these questions was for FRB to accurately assess the risk associated with Manafort's accounts.

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FRB did not have many PEP clients and in general, FRB's clients did not conduct many international transactions. Since FRB did not have an international presence, they were not a logical banking institution for clients who conducted frequent international transactions. International transactions did not necessarily mean illegal activity; however, it did require significant monitoring by FRB for suspicious activity. [redacted]

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The investigation into Manafort's historical activity revealed other accounts with foreign transactions and other foreign entities to and from which Manafort wired funds. [redacted] was surprised Manafort's accounts weren't on FRB's radar earlier. [redacted] explained that in 2011, account screening was focused on OFAC and the non-cooperating country list. [redacted] thought in 2011, Cyprus and Ukraine were not as high on the suspicious country list as the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Panama were.

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[redacted] explained that BSA/AML investigations had the following tools at their disposal: open source documents, Preferred Bankers knowledge of the client, account opening documents, PACER litigation searches, and 314 (b) information sharing requests to other financial

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 5 of 12

institutions. Investigation records would be maintained by FRB for a period of 5 years, but in practice, FRB often maintained records beyond the official retention policy period.

Document 2

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated July 13, 2011 and further identified by FRBSPC-00044006. [REDACTED] identified three Cypriot entities from which Manafort received funds and about which FRB wanted more information. Specifically, [REDACTED] wanted to know what the entities were, who the beneficial owners were and why they were sending Manafort money. These were "typical risk questions".

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[REDACTED] explained that the account names: Leviathan Advisors Ltd., Global Highway Ltd. and Yiakora Ventures Ltd. sounded like investment accounts or private equity funds. It didn't make sense to [REDACTED] why these Cypriot investment funds would be sending money to Manafort, a US lobbyist. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not notify anyone outside FRB about his suspicions. [REDACTED] was prohibited from divulging this information outside the bank.

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Document 3

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated January 24, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00049835-FRBSPC-00049836. The investigation into Manafort was ongoing during this time and FRB was trying to decide what to do with Manafort's accounts.

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[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that Manafort was very difficult to reach as he traveled frequently. [REDACTED] speculated that was the reason [REDACTED] sent Manafort this email in January 2012 when [REDACTED] initial request for information was in July 2011. [REDACTED] spoke with [REDACTED] as well. [REDACTED] seemed to know Manafort well. [REDACTED] knew Manafort was a lobbyist and she was aware of his foreign wire activity. [REDACTED] did not believe he gleaned any information about Manafort from [REDACTED] that he did not already know.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 6 of 12

[REDACTED] was asked if he would have expected [REDACTED] to have alerted the bank to Manafort's accounts earlier. [REDACTED] stated "yes and no". [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] may not have brought it to the BSA/AML team's attention because Ukraine and Russia were not as suspicious in 2011 as they are today. However, as to the fact that Manafort was a PEP, [REDACTED] should have notified the bank.

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[REDACTED] speculated that Manafort's accounts were not as suspicious to her as they would have been now. Additionally, Manafort's balances were not that high and his account was not that large of an account for [REDACTED]. That said, the volume of foreign transactions in Manafort's accounts should have been alerting to [REDACTED]. Had Manafort been an investment advisor, this may not have been suspicious activity. However, Manafort was a PEP.

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[REDACTED] explained that FRB Preferred Bankers are typically closer to their clients than bankers at other financial institutions would be. This is for tactical reasons. The better the Preferred Banker knows their client, the better they can service them and offer them other products. Preferred Bankers receive compensation based upon their clients' total relationship with the bank, including when they refer clients for additional products.

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Document 4

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated January 24, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00051253 - FRBSPC-00051254. [REDACTED] was asked why he wrote, "It has been confirmed that the funds coming from Cyprus entities are being originated by Russian PEPs." [REDACTED] stated he probably should have written Ukrainian, not Russian. [REDACTED] was connecting Ukraine and Russia and Cyprus. [REDACTED] also recalled mention of Russians in the negative news stories. [REDACTED] did not have any other information that led him to write "Russian PEPs".

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Document 5

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated February 8, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00051259. [REDACTED] stated the investigation into Manafort's account had escalated and he was summarizing the matter for the AML Oversight Committee. [REDACTED] was recommending closure of Manafort's accounts.

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The reference to [REDACTED] in the email meant [REDACTED] and would

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 7 of 12

likely have been kept apprised of the Manafort investigation. [REDACTED] believed the reference to [REDACTED] in this email related to a different account which was under investigation and not to Manafort's accounts.

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Document 6

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated March 7, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00049862. [REDACTED] was directed to [REDACTED] email which read, "He (*Manafort*) has no problem opening a Chase account for the business to handle all transactions in/out internationally. Just to confirm, we are okay to accept funds from the soon to be established Chase accounts as the onus is on them to perform due diligence for any of those transactions, correct?"

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[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was asking if every bank needed to do due diligence. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] every bank had to do due diligence on foreign wires. [REDACTED] said even if Manafort opened accounts at Chase and accepted the foreign wires into the Chase accounts before moving the funds to FRB, that would not eliminate FRB's risk. This would only limit the amount of resources and time spent on reviewing Manafort's accounts and would not change anything with regard to the risk. Manafort's funds, even if passing through Chase, were still suspicious as he was a PEP and the funds were originating from Cyprus. FRB would still have to monitor Manafort's accounts for placement, layering and integration to ensure money laundering was not occurring.

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[REDACTED] explained layering as money coming into Chase as a pass through before being moved to another account.

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[REDACTED] was asked what the difference was between his explanation of layering and what [REDACTED] was suggesting in her email. [REDACTED] stated

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[REDACTED] was only asking if the Chase account was a solution which would allow Manafort's accounts to remain open. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] it was not a solution. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] idea was to create a "buffer for risk", which [REDACTED] explained could not be done.

[REDACTED] differentiated Manafort's business accounts from his personal ones. [REDACTED] would expect personal accounts to have various living and household expenses, not large international wires. FRB intended to [REDACTED] but close his business accounts. FRB had to continue monitoring Manafort's personal accounts to look for any international wires, or pass through funds from Chase. However, it was easier to detect suspicious activity in personal accounts and therefore required less resources.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 8 of 12

[REDACTED] was looking for a work around that would allow her to keep her relationship with Manafort. However, [REDACTED] suggestion to open accounts at Chase as a pass through was only accelerating FRB's risk and requiring them to monitor his personal accounts going forward.

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Document 7

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated March 7, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00049868 - FRBSPC-00051239. [REDACTED] identified an additional account held by Manafort about which [REDACTED] did not previously know, DMP International LLC. [REDACTED] did not know why he did not know about this account before. [REDACTED] speculated it was because the systems used by the BSA/AML team linked accounts by various identifiers and sometimes accounts were overlooked. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know why [REDACTED] didn't bring up this account before.

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[REDACTED] was directed to a portion of [REDACTED] email which read, "You and [REDACTED] said if funds came into Chase perse and then was transferred to FRB, it was fine because the onus is on Chase to complete the due diligence on those funds." [REDACTED] stated he never said that and he did not know why [REDACTED] attributed those statements to him. [REDACTED] recalled being "angry" when he read this email.

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[REDACTED] thought maybe [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] the Chase account was okay as it was Chase's risk.

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[REDACTED] recalled speaking with [REDACTED] about this matter and telling her that all of Manafort's business accounts must be closed to eliminate any risk of foreign wires coming into a PEP account. [REDACTED] never suggested a pass through account at Chase, or anywhere else. [REDACTED] was clear that a pass through account did not eliminate risk. [REDACTED] was confident he never suggested or agreed to a pass through account as it "goes against everything AML is about".

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[REDACTED] stated the AML sub-committee determined Manafort's business accounts needed to be closed. [REDACTED] did not know why they did not chose to close all of Manafort's accounts.

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[REDACTED] did not notify Chase or anyone outside the bank about Manafort. It would not be normal for [REDACTED] to contact Chase about this. FRB did not normally share information with other banks without an information sharing request. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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Document 8

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 9 of 12

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated March 8, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00051218 - FRBSPC-00051222. [REDACTED] was directed to a portion of Manafort's email which read,

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"From what you have indicated to me, I believe that DMP is the company of concern to FRB. Based on our conversation, I would like to do the following:

1. DMP (Davis Manafort Partners), the S Corp, will be closed as soon as the 2011 tax return is filed. In the meantime, I will cease using it for any further purposes.
2. We will open a non-FRB account to handle any international transactions.
3. We will keep DMP International, LLC open as this entity has our healthcare and other items registered to it. Moving forward we will only fund this account domestically."

[REDACTED] stated that Manafort explanation made sense to him as a way to limit risk. FRB would look into the DMP International LLC account for any suspicious activity.

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[REDACTED] had no indication that Manafort was changing jobs or changing the source of his income. [REDACTED] had no indication that Manafort would no longer be receiving funds from international sources. [REDACTED] understood that these international wires would be deposited into Manafort's business accounts at another financial institution.

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[REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] relayed this information to the AML sub-committee. If [REDACTED] was not in the meeting, [REDACTED] may have been the person to relay the information.

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When FRB began looking at the DMP International LLC account, they saw the same suspicious activity they had seen in the DMP account. [REDACTED] agreed that this did not line up with what Manafort said the account was used for.

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Document 9

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated March 9, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00051242 - FRBSPC-00051244. [REDACTED] stated he relayed to [REDACTED] the AML/BSA team's finding after reviewing the DMP International LLC account and told her that account needed to be closed as well.

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[REDACTED] did not recall meeting with [REDACTED] in New York as mentioned in the email. If this meeting did occur, [REDACTED] did not recall

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 09/28/2017 , Page 10 of 12

the substance of the meeting. [REDACTED] did not see a reason to meet with [REDACTED] in person about this matter.

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[REDACTED]

Document 10

[REDACTED] was shown two emails dated March 9, 2012 and April 3, 2012 and further identified by FRBSPC-00051247 - FRBSPC-00051249 and FRBSPC-00053521 - FRBSPC-00053523 respectively. [REDACTED] stated he notified [REDACTED] to close Manafort's accounts. Manafort was given 60 days to transition his business accounts.

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[REDACTED] was directed to his email dated March 9, 2012 which read, "... the client's intention is not an adequate control and we would still need to monitor the account." [REDACTED] was telling [REDACTED] that FRB could not keep DMP International LLC account open even though Manafort's intention was to only use the fund domestically.

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[REDACTED] was then directed to the emails on April 3, 2012 which indicated the DMP International LLC account could remain open. [REDACTED] stated the AML sub-committee decided to allow Manafort to keep his DMP International LLC account open only for domestic transactions. [REDACTED] could not recall who lobbied the committee to allow Manafort's account to stay open. [REDACTED] could not recall if any additional, mitigating circumstances were presented to the committee to influence their decision. [REDACTED] considered this solution a compromise.

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Document 11

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated March 27, 2013 and further identified by FRBSPC-00053585. [REDACTED] believed Manafort's accounts were being looked at for the purpose of FRB's annual risk assessment.

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Document 12

[REDACTED] was shown an email dated June 17, 2014 and further identified by FRBSPC-00044025 - FRBSPC-00044027. [REDACTED] recalled Manafort's accounts came under scrutiny again in 2014 due to sectoral sanctions and negative news about Ukraine, Russia and the Crimea. Manafort's name came up in the negative news stories.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview, On 09/28/2017, Page 11 of 12

[Redacted] called this "the last straw". The risk with Manafort's accounts was too high, even if the transactions in and out of FRB's accounts were only domestic. FRB did not want to leave the door open for any additional risk.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] noted the email referenced information sharing requests with other banks, but he did not recall this. [Redacted] was in a new position by this time and was not involved in this matter. The information in this email came from the Operations team and was being compiled for an AML sub-committee meeting.

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[Redacted] did not recall speaking to [Redacted] about this matter, other than this email.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] stated [Redacted] was advocating for Manafort's accounts to remain open [Redacted]

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[Redacted] had a conversation about this, but it was non-negotiable at this point. FRB had compromised on Manafort's accounts before, partially because [Redacted] had lobbied for that compromise. FRB was not willing to compromise a second time.

FRB chose to exit [Redacted]
[Redacted] FRB had "left the door open" before and it was too risky to leave it open again.

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[Redacted] notified Manafort of the account closures. [Redacted] recalled Manafort giving a "monologue" on what his business model was and what he did. Manafort said he was a lobbyist and he was paid for political work. [Redacted] did not recall any specifics about who Manafort worked for or where Manafort worked.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview _____, On 09/28/2017, Page 12 of 12

[REDACTED] could not recall any information Manafort provided about the nature or ownership of the foreign accounts. Manafort did not say why the money was coming from Cyprus.

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Manafort seemed to understand why his accounts were being closed, but he did not understand why [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Manafort wanted [REDACTED] to provide information to the AML sub-committee on his behalf so [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall if he did so, but he likely told his boss, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] likely took notes during that call, but he would have shredded them when he left FRB.


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After the call with Manafort, [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone contacting FRB on Manafort's behalf.

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[REDACTED] did not believe there was any special treatment with regards to the Manafort accounts. [REDACTED] did not feel any more or less pressure on Manafort's accounts than on any others with similar circumstances. Manafort's accounts did not receive any more or less oversight than any other accounts under similar circumstances. Manafort was not treated any better or worse than any other client in similar circumstances.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/23/2018

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] [Redacted] Intelligence Analyst [Redacted] Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. Accompanying [Redacted] were her attorneys [Redacted] from [Redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 01/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/11/2018

by SA [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/11/2018, Page 2 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/11/2018, Page 3 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/11/2018, Page 4 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/11/2018, Page 5 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/11/2018, Page 6 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 01/11/2018, Page 7 of 7

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[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/21/2017

[Redacted] born [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed at the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Washington, D.C. Also present during the interview were attorneys L. Rush Atkinson and Jeannie Rhee from the Office of the Special Counsel, as well as attorneys [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] representing [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and attorneys, as well as the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/11/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/15/2017
 by [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] 302, On 08/11/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/06/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed at the FBI Long Beach Resident Agency by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview were Forensic Accountant [Redacted] Special Agent [Redacted] Special Agent [Redacted] and attorney for [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Document 1

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 12/20/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person, Other (Lync video call))

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 12/21/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up _____, On 12/20/2017, Page 2 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 3

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up, On 12/20/2017, Page 3 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up, On 12/20/2017, Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 6

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Follow Up _____, On 12/20/2017, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Document 8

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

On May 11, 2017, [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically. Also present during the interview was [Redacted] Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator (Contractor). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] has worked for [Redacted] she worked in the [Redacted] at First Republic Bank (FRB). [Redacted] started working for [Redacted] when FRB [Redacted]

b6
b7C

While at FRB, Paul Manafort was referred to [Redacted] and subsequently became a client. Manafort maintained several accounts with FRB in addition to accounts with UBS and Morgan Stanley. [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Manafort's expenses included scheduled ones and those directed by Manafort to pay.

When questioned if [Redacted] accounts Manafort maintained with HSBC, [Redacted] said she had no knowledge of accounts with HSBC. It was then explained to [Redacted] there was a document [Redacted] for an HSBC account. [Redacted] several accounts associated with Manafort, but could not recall HSBC specifically.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] had no knowledge of any foreign bank accounts associated with Manafort and could not recall having any conversations with Manafort about foreign bank accounts.

b6
b7C

[Redacted] would speak with Manafort [Redacted] to discuss [Redacted] as well as other personal accounting matters.

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 05/11/2017 at Los Angeles, California, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/15/2017
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E


[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 05/11/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted] never received any type of financial bonus from Manafort for her assistance.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

[Redacted] previously identified was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres at [Redacted] Present during the interview were counsel for [Redacted] [Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted] was told that trial for Paul Manafort was scheduled to begin on July 10, 2018 in Alexandria, Virginia.

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted] indicated she had read portions of the original indictment charging Manafort, but had no read any subsequent indictments.

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 05/15/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/18/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 05/15/2018, Page 2 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 05/15/2018, Page 3 of 7

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 05/15/2018, Page 4 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview _____, On 05/15/2018, Page 5 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 05/15/2018 , Page 6 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 05/15/2018 , Page 7 of 7

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Other

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]


b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2018

[Redacted] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres via video conference. Present during the interview were FBI Forensic Accountants [Redacted] and [Redacted] (via video conference) and Special Agent [Redacted] (in person). Also present was counsel for [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] met Paul Manafort [Redacted] [Redacted] would recognize Manafort if she were to see him again.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] met Rick Gates [Redacted] when Manafort [Redacted]. This was when [Redacted] Gates came to meet with [Redacted] Manafort.

b6
b7C


Investigation on 07/09/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person, Other (video conference))

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 07/09/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

On September 21, 2017, [Redacted] cellular telephone number [Redacted] was interviewed by SA [Redacted] telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Large Redacted Area]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~


Investigation on 09/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 09/21/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/20/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) On the morning of Thursday, April 19, 2018, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky received a text message from phone number [Redacted] [Redacted]. The sender of the message identified as [Redacted] and wanted to set up a phone call.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 11:15 AM EST, Thursday, April 19, 2018, ASC Zelinsky called the aforementioned number to make contact with [Redacted]. Present for the phone call were SSA [Redacted] SIA [Redacted] ASC Zelinsky, and the writer.

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) The recipient of the call identified as [Redacted] of [Redacted]. After being advised of those present on the phone call and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted] b6
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted] b6
[Redacted] b7C

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP
[Redacted] b6
[Redacted] b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/20/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] #1, On 04/19/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2018

On May 10th 2018 10:00 AM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] Date of Birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [Redacted] Perkins Coie Attorney [Redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [Redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [Redacted] Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero, Special Counsel Attorney Lawrence Rush Atkinson V, and Special Counsel Attorney Heather Alpino. After being advised of the identity of the interview agents, and purpose of the interview, [Redacted] stated the following:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

Investigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted]-SM-2589105

Date drafted 05/10/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 05/10/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

SM-2589105

b7E
b6
b7C

SM-2589105

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 05/10/2018, Page 3 of 3

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP


b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/26/2018

[Redacted] previously identified was contacted by FBI Special Agent [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

The below is an interview summary. It is not intended to be a verbatim account and does not memorialize all statements made during the interview. Communications by the parties in the interview were electronically recorded. The recording captures the actual words spoken.

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 01/15/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person, Other (text))
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/25/2018
by [Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Contact with [Redacted], On 01/15/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C


[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]



b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/03/2018

On January 17 and January 18, 2018, Special Agent [Redacted] and Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] interviewed [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted] The conversations were in relation to information [Redacted] voluntarily provided previously [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was also interviewed on January 19, 2018. This interview [Redacted] and

therefore a separate 302 was produced documenting the details of this interaction.

[Redacted]

b7E


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 01/17/2018 at [Redacted] (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/02/2018

by [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E



b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/02/2018

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] previously interviewed, was interviewed at the [Redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) NOTE: SA [Redacted] showed [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] spoke freely with the Agents on the two previous days and opined he jumped around with topics. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 01/19/2018 at [Redacted] (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 01/23/2018
by [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 1/19/2018 , On 01/19/2018 , Page 2 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 1/19/2018 , On 01/19/2018 , Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]


UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview 1/19/2018 , On 01/19/2018 , Page 4 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]



b3
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/19/2018

On Tuesday, March 20, 2018, [Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted]
 [Redacted] was interviewed via telephone conference. Present during the
 interview were [Redacted]
 [Redacted] Special Agent (SA) [Redacted]
 [Redacted] SA [Redacted] Forensic Accountant [Redacted]
 [Redacted] Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Senior Assistant Special
 Counsel (SASC) [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
 interviewing personnel and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the
 following information:

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Investigation on 03/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)
 File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/20/2018
 by [Redacted]

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March 20,

Continuation of FD-302 of 2018

On 03/20/2018

Page 2 of 6

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Continuation of FD-302 of 2018

, On 03/20/2018 , Page 3 of 6

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March 20,

Continuation of FD-302 of 2018, On 03/20/2018, Page 4 of 6

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March 20,

Continuation of FD-302 of 2018

, On 03/20/2018 , Page 5 of 6

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- March 20,

Continuation of FD-302 of 2018

, On 03/20/2018 , Page 6 of 6

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/06/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Present for the interview were his counsel, [redacted] and [redacted]. Also present in the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel ZAINAB AHMAD, Senior Assistant Special Counsel BRANDON VAN GRACK, Forensic Accountant [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted].

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Agent note: [redacted] was given approximately 30 minutes to review [redacted].

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Agent note: [redacted] mentioned that [redacted] were very sensitive and it would be appreciated if it they were not explicitly mentioned. ZHMAD explained that the Special Counsel's Office was looking at specific topics and could likely accommodate this.

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Agent note: AHMAD explained the proffer letter to [redacted] and emphasized the importance of truthfulness. AHMAD told [redacted] that false statements to FBI agents would be violations of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1001.

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After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 02/08/2018 at DC, Washington, United States (In Person)

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File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/12/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 2 of 19

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018 , On 02/08/2018 , Page 3 of 19

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 4 of 19

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 5 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 6 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018

, On 02/08/2018 , Page 7 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 8 of 19

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February 8, 2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/08/2018, Page 9 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 10 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018 , On 02/08/2018 , Page 11 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018 , On 02/08/2018 , Page 12 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018 , On 02/08/2018 , Page 13 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 14 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 15 of 19

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Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018

, On 02/08/2018 , Page 16 of 19

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 17 of 19

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 18 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of February 8, 2018, On 02/08/2018, Page 19 of 19

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/07/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington DC. Present for the interview were his counsel, [Redacted] [Redacted] Also present in the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) ZAINAB AHMAD, SASC BRANDON VAN GRACK, Forensic Accountant [Redacted] Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] and SA [Redacted]

b6
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(Agent note: AHMAD explained the proffer letter to [Redacted] and emphasized the importance of truthfulness. AHMAD told [Redacted] that false statements to FBI agents would be violations of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1001. AHMAD told [Redacted] that investigators had reason to believe that [Redacted]

b6
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After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 03/15/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 04/05/2018

by [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/15/2018, Page 2 of 9

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 03/15/2018, Page 3 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/15/2018, Page 4 of 9

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15

Continuation of FD-302 of /2018

, On 03/15/2018 , Page 5 of 9

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-6155

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 03/15/2018, Page 6 of 9

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 03/15/2018, Page 7 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018 , On 03/15/2018 , Page 8 of 9

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 3/15

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] /2018, On 03/15/2018, Page 9 of 9

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP


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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/03/2018

[Redacted] date of birth [Redacted] was interviewed at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. Present for the interview were his counsel, [Redacted] [Redacted] Also present in the interview were Special Counsel Office (SCO), Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) ZAINAB AHMAD, SASC BRANDON VAN GRACK, and Special Agent [Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Large Redacted Block]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted Block]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 03/16/2018 at [Redacted] United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 03/19/2018
by [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [Redacted]
Friday, March 16, 2018

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/16/2018, Page 2 of 3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with [Redacted]
Friday, March 16, 2018

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 03/16/2018, Page 3 of 3

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP


[Redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/18/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] telephone number [Redacted]
[Redacted] was interviewed at his place of residence [Redacted]
[Redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] called and spoke with Stone. They agreed to meet next time Stone [Redacted] About a month later, Stone called and they met at [Redacted] They discussed their support for Trump. Stone said that he regularly consulted with candidate Trump.

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b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
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Investigation on 06/12/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/13/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

06.12.2018

, On

06/12/2018

, Page

2 of 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

Stone always talked about his connections to Trump. Stone did not ask

[Redacted]


b6
b7C

[Redacted] has not talked with anyone related to the Special Counsel's investigation. [Redacted] has not communicated with Stone in a year or more. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] has not communicated with Corsi since [Redacted]

[Redacted]



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/02/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington D.C. by Special Agent [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b6
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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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Investigation on	[Redacted]	at	[Redacted]	United States (In Person)
File #	[Redacted]	Date drafted	06/15/2018	
by	[Redacted]			

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted] on [Redacted], On 06/15/2018, Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7A
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[Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
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[Redacted]

b3
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[Redacted]

b3
b6
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FBI(19cv1278)-6166

[Redacted]

b3
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 06/15/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b3
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
[Redacted]

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b7C

[Redacted]

b3
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b7C

[Redacted]



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/06/2017

FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, the Engineering Research Facility of the FBI, [Redacted] Quantico, Virginia, telephone [Redacted] mobile [Redacted]. Having provided him the identities of the interviewing agents and the reason for the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted] was out of town on the week of January 6, 2017, and was not directly involved in any preparations related to this equipment. However, he was aware that several days prior to January 6, a request came in from either SSA [Redacted] of the Director's Protective Detail (DPD) or the Director's Chief of Staff James Rybicki, either by e-mail or phone call.

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This request may originally have been to have access to a [Redacted] laptop to be available for former FBI Director James Comey to use during a scheduled trip to New York to meet with then President Elect Donald J. Trump. [Redacted] Comey wanted access to a laptop during his trip to New York in order to take notes immediately following his personal meeting with Trump. [Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

[Redacted] On the January 6, 2017, flight, [Redacted] was on board with Comey. They used the [Redacted] and upon landing in New York [Redacted] retrieved the "red laptop" [Redacted] (the red laptop is capable of accessing the FBI's Secret network) and provided it to Comey for use in his vehicle. [Redacted] did not accompany Comey when he departed the aircraft.

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Later that day, Comey returned the laptop to [Redacted] who transferred Comey's notes onto his own computer, then "e-mailed it out." [Redacted] then deleted

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 06/29/2017 at Quantico, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 06/29/2017

by [Redacted]

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(U) Interview of FBI Supervisory Special

Continuation of FD-302 of Agent (SSA) [REDACTED], On 06/29/2017, Page 2 of 2

his sent item from his e-mail system. [REDACTED] may also have deleted the document itself from the hard drive. [REDACTED] does not know why it was handled this way and believed it may have been requested by Comey.

b6
b7C

On the night Comey was fired, [REDACTED] telephoned [REDACTED] to discuss the firing. [REDACTED] then called the DPD's new Unit Chief [REDACTED] to ask what they needed to do. The next day, [REDACTED] shut off Comey's access to the [REDACTED] and his access to all three FBI enclaves within the SCIF at Comey's residence.

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On May 12, 2017, the Friday following Comey's termination, [REDACTED] went to Comey's residence. Present at the residence was Assistant Director Richard Haley's [REDACTED] Associate Deputy Director David Bowdich, [REDACTED] and Chief of Staff to the Director James Rybicki. While [REDACTED] removed all FBI equipment from Comey's SCIF, Bowdich spoke with Comey.

b6
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The laptop Comey used to take notes remained [REDACTED] [REDACTED] does not know whether the laptop had been used since the time Comey used it to take notes following his meeting with Trump.

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Either the day before or day of Comey's testimony to Congress on June 8, 2017, [REDACTED] who was on official travel to New York, contacted [REDACTED] to share his realization that [REDACTED] was used by Comey during the January 6 visit to New York. Recognizing its importance, they decided to remove the laptop from service. [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] who in turn advised [REDACTED] to inform DAD Peter Strzok about the existence of the laptop. Strzok and [REDACTED] "went back and forth," after which Strzok instructed him someone would be in touch with him to pick up the laptop.

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
On June 12, [REDACTED] returned from his New York trip and on or around that day, the laptop's hard drive was removed and placed in a safe within [REDACTED] unit. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] can be reached at desk [REDACTED] and mobile [REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-6169



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/01/2018

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] social security account number [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically at phone number [Redacted] contact information was provided to the Special Counsel's Office via an e-mail from an individual named, [Redacted] [Redacted] using e-mail address [Redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted] requested

Investigation on 05/14/2018 at [Redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/29/2018

by [Redacted]

b6
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b7D
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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b7E

[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview with [Redacted], On 05/14/2018, Page 2 of 2

confidentiality from the Special Counsel's Office [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

A copy of the original e-mail referral from [Redacted] is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/21/2017

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of Special Counsel by Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissman. [Redacted] attorneys [Redacted]

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[Redacted] represented [Redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if at any time she wanted to consult with her counsel she could do so. [Redacted] was advised that he needed to be truthful in answering the questions and that making false statements could constitute a federal crime. [Redacted] acknowledged that she understood and then provided the following information:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b3
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b7C

Investigation on 10/26/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 10/31/2017

by [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 2 of 10

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 3 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 4 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 5 of 10

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 6 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 7 of 10

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 8 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 9 of 10

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 10/26/2017, Page 10 of 10

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
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/13/2018

[Redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [Redacted] and [Redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee and Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [Redacted] were [Redacted]. After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 08/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 08/03/2018

by [Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.02.2018, On 08/02/2018, Page 2 of 4

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FBI(19cv1278)-6183

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.02.2018

, On 08/02/2018 , Page 3 of 4

[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.02.2018

, On 08/02/2018 , Page 4 of 4

[Redacted]

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